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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 E U Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as w ell as t hematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
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1. Nature and Purpose of the Project 
The Know-Reset project has been carried out by the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), which conducts 
advanced research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at the European level, 
from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on 
economy and society more generally. The Know Reset project is part, too, of the advocacy policy of 
the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and its member agencies. These monitor and 
denounce human rights violations while proposing and promoting fair, effective and durable solutions, 
such as refugee resettlement. 
The Project was co-funded by the European Union DG Home Affairs in the framework of the 
European Refugee Fund Community Actions 2010. It was carried out by the EUI (European 
University Institute), in partnership with ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Brussels), 
from September 2011 to July 2013. 
The general objective of the project was to construct the knowledge-basis for better policy-making 
in the domain of resettlement, both at EU level and in the 27 Member States. Know Reset aimed at 
conducting a systematic inventory of resettlement frameworks and practices in the EU, providing a 
comparative analysis and assessment of resettlement in the Member States, evaluating their 
resettlement capacity while addressing policy recommendations to the EU and its Member States in 
order to enhance cooperation and improve resettlement activities. To better understand Member 
States’decision-making and better explore the potential for developing resettlement capacity in the 
EU, the Project has covered the 27 EU Member States whatever the nature and degree of their 
involvement in refugee resettlement (programme-based, ad hoc, ETC1, none). Its target audiences 
were policy-makers, institutions and non-governmental stakeholders as well as the public and the 
media who can all benefit from its main outputs: An online database and a dedicated website 
(http://www.know-reset.eu/). 
The partnership between the EUI and ECRE has enabled to confront and combine two different and 
complementary project approaches and has enriched the analysis of refugee resettlement in the EU and 
its Member States. This partnership has also brought two European-wide networks together, providing 
an exhaustive and various set of data and analytical tools.The two partners rely on large networks of 
academic and civil-society expertise. For this particular project, 16 NGOs from the ECRE alliance and 
20 researchers from the EUI have collected resettlement-related data directly from the national 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the 27 Member States. Besides, 132 various 
stakeholders have been interviewed all over the EU. The project team has proceeded to a systematic 
and comparative inventory of legal and policy frameworks and actual practices related to resettlement 
in the EU and its Member States providing an updated set of information, mapping and comparing 
those frameworks and practices. 
Know Reset is the first project focussing on the EU and its 27 EU Member States, in order to better 
compare the various approaches, assess the resettlement capacity potential in the EU and the impact of 
the Joint EU Resettlement Programme (JEURP) on Member States’ commitment in resettlement. 
Analysing all EU-27 States is a key contribution to the understanding of resettlement: such a 
comprehensive country analysis had never been accomplished before.Mapping resettlement 
frameworks and practices indeed implied covering all states that are involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. Some EU Member States do not have resettlement 
programmes, but have resettled on an ad hoc basis, in response to a specific refugee crisis and/or to 
UNHCR's calls. Besides, some EU Member States do not currently resettle, but have taken (legal, 
                                                     
1 Emergency Transit Facilities. 
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political and practical) steps to do so in the future. There is a great diversity in terms of commitment 
towards resettlement in the EU and a series of recent evolutions. This is a snapshot of the situation: 
 The majority of EU Member States have been involved in resettlement to one extent or 
another, 
 Very few of them have a long tradition of resettlement, 
 Some countries that seemed tied to an ad hoc approach have recently opted for a programme, 
 Other countries, which had pledged to resettle, could not meet their commitment, 
 Most of the 'new' Eastern Member States have decided to participate in resettlement. Some 
of them have actually implemented it, 
 Only six Member States have had no involvement in resettlement. 
Evaluating the potential to develop and improve refugee resettlement in the EU implies addressing 
the whole range of national attitudes towards resettlement, as well as their variations in time and in 
space. It relies on a broad understanding of resettlement capacity, which is based on financial and 
material means, but which is also matter of political will, legal framework, social context, civil 
society, and a series of country-specific determinants, that have been examined by Know Reset. 
Besides, unique field research has been conducted in three major countries of first asylum (Kenya, 
Pakistan, Tunisia) by external experts hired for the Project, who dedicated their observation and 
analysis on EU Member States resettlement practices in the pre-departure phase. 
The Project has produced a website (http://www.know-reset.eu/) only and fully dedicated to 
resettlement in the EU. It is the first website mapping EU’s involvement in refugee resettlement, and 
comprising the 27 EU Member States. Conceived to be as user-friendly as possible, the Know Reset 
website is a useful instrument which enables to learn about and to compare the diverse frameworks, 
policies and practices within the EU, to evaluate the resettlement capacity in the EU, to follow the 
evolution of Member States’ commitment in resettlement and to assess the impact of the JEURP. The 
Project has also developed a unique database comprising a systematic and comparative compilation of 
administrative and legal frameworks, statistics and policy documents for each of the Member States 
and for the EU as a whole. The Project has provided an edition of 27 country profiles dedicated to 
refugee resettlement and its comparison in the EU. Besides, it has produced first-hand graphs and 
tables for quantitative and qualitative country comparison within the EU, which have been developed 
on the basis of the data collected by the research team. 
2. Outputs and Findings 
The Project has been implemented at a crucial moment, when the JEURP was being adopted at the EU 
level and the project’s various deliverables have been able to measure the impact of the EU’s 
initiatives on the development of Member States’ commitments toward resettlement. During the 
implementation of the Project, from September 2011 to July 2013, four Member states became 
“resettlement countries”.  
The Development of Resettlement-Related Frameworks and Policies in the EU and its Member 
States 
While only one new resettlement country emerged in the EU during the 1990s (Ireland), nine were 
created during the 2000s: seven alone between 2008 and 2013. The number of ‘resettlement countries’ 
in the EU is now fourteen: in addition to the four “traditional resettlement countries” (namely Sweden, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland) and Ireland,the United Kingdom launched a programme in 2004, 
Portugalin 2007, the Czech Republic, Romania and France in 2008,and Hungary, Belgium, Germany 
and Spain in 2012/2013. Bulgaria is, meanwhile, to start a programme in 2014. Two additional 
2 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 
 
???? ? ? 
Member States refer to resettlement in law (Poland and Slovenia), even though they have not resettled 
yet, and two other Member States have already joined resettlement operations on an ad hoc basis (Italy 
and Luxembourg). Slovakia hosts an Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) for the humanitarian transfer of 
refugees before their resettlement to EU Member States or third countries, as does Romania. Among 
the six EU Member States which have not taken any steps toward getting involved in resettlement, 
Lithuania began discussions in February 2012 on resettlement participation. 
As elaborated in the EU Comparative Reports produced for Know Reset, the development of 
resettlement-related frameworks and policies in the EU and its Member States is undeniable and has 
accelerated over the past five years. This is mainly due to the combined effect of joint operations to 
respond to major refugee crises and to the EU’s increased support of UNHCR efforts to encourage States 
to resettle refugees. EU led initiatives for multilateral operations have been the main incentive for 
Member States in getting involved in refugee resettlement when said states have no resettlement history.  
A small majority of Member States are now resettlement countries, insofar as they have committed 
to resettling refugees on a programme basis. Moreover, while refugee resettlement depends on 
voluntary governmental decisions, exclusive from any legal duty, it is no longer exclusively based on 
an administrative framework. Refugee resettlement is increasingly based on asylum and refugee law. 
Thirteen Member States have included a reference to refugee resettlement in their asylum legislation; 
eleven of them did so during the past decade. This does not make resettlement a legal duty for those 
States, nor, indeed, is it a right for refugees. Yet, the adaptation of legal frameworks may facilitate 
refugee resettlement. This might allow the granting of refugee status outside the territory for instance, 
or determining the procedure and competent institutions.  
The absence of legal reference to refugee resettlement has not impeded certain Member States from 
resettling in a sustainable and regular manner in the past (in Scandinavia) and even today (the 
Netherlands). Equally, the existence of a legal reference to refugee resettlement is not a guarantee that 
the State does or will resettle. It does not constitute evidence of resettlement: but it can help and 
support sustainable commitment.  
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme adopted in March 2012 has been a great support in the 
development of commitments in resettlement and plays an important role in the search for a concerted 
approach to resettlement. Nevertheless, its impact has been limited. It is based on on a financial 
incentive, which does not convince all Member States, and on the positive impact of joint initiatives.  
Diversity in the Content of Resettlement Frameworks and Practices 
The selection process is extremely diverseamong Member States. Criteria and procedures vary across 
countries. They may also varyfrom one year/period to another. The quality of refugee resettlement relies, 
amongst other things, on the capacity of Member States to address the needs and concerns of the various 
stakeholders involved in the process: UNHCR, IOM, NGOs, local authorities, government ministries, 
and, finally, refugees themselves. Collaboration between stakeholders at the different stages (pre-arrival 
and post arrival) of the resettlement process differs greatly from country to country as well. 
In the last decade, most of the resettlement operations carried out in EU Member States have relied 
on UNHCR pre-selection. When referring some cases to resettlement states, UNHCR takes into 
account the preferences and criteria previously discussed with and indicated by Member States. Then, 
resettlement States generally add their own selection process, either on a dossier-basis or through 
selection missions, and may demand certain criteria which the refugees must satisfy.  
UNHCR has developed standards to identify and select those refugees who are most in need of 
protection. EU funding instruments have partly supported those standards. The transfer of refugees 
from a third country to an EU country would not be considered resettlement and would not be funded 
as such, if carried out independently of UNHCR. The EU also supports the resettlement of specific 
categories of vulnerable persons on the basis of UNHCR’s selection criteria and prioritizes the 
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resettlement of some refugee groups identified by UNHCR as being in urgent need of group 
resettlement.  
Most Member States incorporate UNHCR resettlement criteria and case submission as the basis of 
the selection process. However, some governments shy away from receiving refugees that they think 
might have less integration potential or that may require more financial and public services support. 
Selection criteria also include country specific asylum policy and foreign policy, the capacity of 
reception and integration services.  
While ‘being part of the club’ is a key motivation for Member States getting engaged in 
refugeeresettlement, Member States are extremely unreceptive to any proposal to harmonise the 
selection of refugees to be resettled. The ERF is one way in which the selection of refugees may be 
influenced. Indeed, through its funding conditions, the ERF influences the selection targets of Member 
States, as well as the procedure and ther ights granted. Nevertheless, the EU is unlikely to develop a 
common selection procedure.Nor is it likely to reach an agreement as to how to divide the refugees to-
be-resettled amongst Member States.  
Even more problematic is the diversity in the status and rights granted to resettled persons and the 
integration capacity of Member States. A growing problem concerns the possible development of 
lower reception quality in some countries, as a result of a greater number of places being available for 
resettlement. 
More Resettlement Countries, More Places? 
The JEURP was a positive step towards increasing the number of resettlement places made available 
by EU Member States. However, EU resettlement capacity has not significantly increased in parallel 
with the expansion in number of EU resettlement countries.  
The EU’s overall contribution to global resettlement has remained approximately the same: 7.9 % 
of the total number of refugees resettled in 2007 and 8.3 % in 2012. The traditional resettlement 
Member States still have the greatest impact on EU’s contribution to resettlement. In most EU 
resettlement countries, resettlement quotas are not reached,which can be attributed to a number of 
factors such as reception capacities, the socio-economic context and financial means. Failure to reach 
resettlement quotas can also be linked to selection methods and process. Some resettlement countries 
are able to offer only a very limited number of places, especially the new resettlement countries, as 
they require time and resources to build their capacity to develop and implement their resettlement 
programmes. The way the number of resettled refugees is calculated is also crucial: this affects what 
we know concerning the total number of refugees resettled. 
Resettlement efforts by EU member states are still limited particularly compared to the global 
resettlement needs, as well as in terms of potential capacity. For resettlement to fulfil its function as a 
meaningful demonstration of solidarity with countries of first asylum and as a useful component of a 
comprehensive durable solutions strategy, resettlement numbers need to be more significant in 
comparison with the number of refugees waiting for resettlement in countries of first asylum. 
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Background information: Resettlement and the Joint EU Resettlement Programme 
Refugee Resettlement 
Resettlement is a durable solution that may be offered to refugees who have sought protection in a 
country where local integration is not an option, and who cannot return to their home country. 
Unlike asylum, resettlement is not a right: States offer resettlement on a voluntary basis. In 
practical terms, refugees with specific needs are selected by UNHCR or the resettlement country. They 
are then transferred from their current country of asylum to the country that has accepted to receive 
them. These refugees should be granted a residence status. 
Why resettling? 
Resettlement is a way to alleviate countries of first asylum of the burden of refugees who can neither 
return nor be locally integrated. It is an essential tool in sharing responsibility for refugee protection with 
those developing countries that receive the largest number of refugees, such as Pakistan and Kenya. 
How many people are resettled? 
Only a small minority of refugees worldwide are resettled. Out of all refugees, only 1 per cent is 
considered by UNHCR as needing resettlement. Ultimately, about 10 per cent of these are actually 
resettled each year.  
Compared with protection needs and involvement in resettlement of countries like the US and 
Canada, the contribution of EU Member States is modest. Moreover, it varies from year to year and 
from place to place. Over the last years, the European Commission has tried to foster cooperation in 
the field of resettlement. A Joint EU-resettlement programme was finally adopted by the European 
Parliament on 29 March 2012. It introduces some important incentives to persuade Member States to 
start resettlement programmes or to increase the number of resettlement places. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 5
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The Joint EU Resettlement Programme (Jeurp) 
Historical background  
Already in 2000, the European Commission suggested that ‘Processing the request for protection in 
the region of origin and facilitating the arrival of refugees on the territory of the Member States by a 
resettlement scheme are ways of offering rapid access to protection’ (COM/2000/0755 final). The 
Commission believed that only a joint EU approach could create necessary political and operational 
terms for accessing European territory and for allowing resettlement to be used for strategic purposes - 
both to assist the EU Member States and attain the objectives of UNCHR’s Agenda for Protection. 
In the course of the years, resettlement was recognised as the key tool for offering a durable solution. 
However, only limited progress was made to implement it. 
During these years, the Commission argued that the coordination of resettlement activities between 
individual Member States was inadequate. Moreover, the European Refugees Fund (ERF) – which co-
finances resettlement in the Member States - was too rigid to respond to changing needs, particularly 
with respect to geographical priorities. The ERF used to fund only resettlement of refugees from 
outside the EU to Member States, and not the relocation between Member States. 
Finally, a full-fledged proposal to establish a Joint EU resettlement Programme was tabled in 
September 2009. The aim was to: 
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 increase EU’s humanitarian impact 
 to integrate resettlement into external relations policy, 
 to streamline actions of Member States to make them more cost effective. 
The proposal remained stuck between institutions mainly because of the annual priority setting and 
because of an argument about which decision procedure to use in connection to the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
Today we have a Joint EU resettlement programme 
On 29 March 2012, the European Parliament voted on the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme, already approved by the Council (6444/12). This vote paves the way for a 'Joint 
EU Resettlement Programme' presented by the European Commission back in 2009. This 
decision determines common EU resettlement priorities for 2013 and announces an increase 
of the compensation that Member States receive from the European Refugee Fund for 
resettlement of refugees. The EU Commissioner Malmström welcomed the decision, stating 
that it is a much-needed measure that will improve cooperation and allow the EU to pool 
resources for resettlement. 
Priority groups 
The decision targets the following priorities for resettlement: 
 Persons from a country or a region designated for the implementation of Regional Protection 
Programmes (COM(2005) 388 final): -Newly Independent States (NIS): Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus, 
 Great Lakes Region: Tanzania, 
 Horn of Africa: Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen, 
 North Africa: Egypt, Tunisia and Libya;  
 Persons from one or more of the following vulnerable group categories: -women and 
children at risk, -unaccompanied minors, -survivors of violence and torture, -persons having 
serious medical needs, -persons in need of emergency or urgent resettlement for legal and/or 
physical protection needs;  
 Persons from a geographical location on the list of common EU priorities for 2013: -
Congolese refugees in the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia); -Iraqi 
refugees in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan; -Afghan refugees in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran; -
Somali refugees in Ethiopia; -Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand; -
Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. 
More EU funding 
There will be a clear increase of funding for resettled refugees. Member States will receive a 
compensation for each resettled refugee falling into one or more categories mentioned above: 
 First time applicants will receive EUR 6,000 for the first year, and EUR 5,000 for the second 
year, 
 For the rest the compensation will remain at EUR 4,000.  
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Pilot scheme in 2013  
Member States were asked to provide the Commission by 1 May 2012 with an estimate of the number 
of persons per category that they plan to resettle in 2013 (European Parliament News, 29 March 
2012). The May deadline and the joint resettlement priorities are a novelty proposed by the European 
Commission; the aim is to make them a regular feature of policy-making on asylum. The scheme will 
be applied as a trial this year, which means that the Member States' estimates of the number of persons 
they plan to resettle are not binding (European Voice, 1 March 2012). 
For background information on the long legislative process of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme and ERF funding: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2009/0127%28C
OD%29&l=en 
Proposed Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) 2014- 2020 
While the amendment to the ERF only covers funding in 2013, it paves the way for new rules 
concerning the financial support that EU Member States may receive for the resettlement of refugees 
from third countries through future funding during the period 2014-2020. 
The Commission has proposed the Regulation establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) 
at the end of 2011: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/751.pdf 
The proposed funding should allow for more strategic use of resettlement during the 2014-2020 
funding period, with a more focused approach to resettlement priorities that are to be set bi-annually. The 
AMF will support the establishment of a Union Resettlement Programme for which an amount of €560 
million has been earmarked, five times the amount previously set aside for resettlement under the ERF. 
The aim of the proposed funding is twofold: 
 to provide durable solutions to an increased number of refugees by supporting their transfer 
from outside EU territory and their establishment in an EU Member State; and 
 to maximise the strategic impact of resettlement through a better targeting of those persons 
who are in greatest need of resettlement on the basis of common EU resettlement priorities. 
These priorities will be established for two year periods with the involvement of the 
European Parliament and the Council and in cooperation with UNHCR and the European 
Asylum Support Office. 
If adopted in the presently-proposed form, the AMF will support the resettlement of every refugee 
supported with 6,000 EUR per person, while the EU would fund 10,000 EUR for refugees that are 
covered by priority categories as stipulated in the AMF. The additional funding would relate to 
resettlement of refugees that are regarded as particularly vulnerable as well as refugees from certain 
regional priorities. The vulnerable groups would remain unchanged during the AMF period, while the 
regional priorities would be set on a bi-annual basis. 
The proposed vulnerable refugee groups are: 
 women and children at risk, 
 unaccompanied minors, 
 persons having medical needs that can be addressed only through resettlement, 
 persons in need of emergency resettlement or urgent resettlement for legal orphysical 
protection needs. 
8 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
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??? ? 
In Annex III to the proposed AMF Regulation, the following common Union priorities for the 
first two years 2014-2015 are listed as: 
1. Regional Protection Programme in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) 
2. Regional Protection Programme in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya) 
3. Regional Protection Programme in North Africa (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt) 
4. Refugees in the region of Eastern Africa/ Great Lakes 
5. Iraqi refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 
6. Iraqi refugees in Turkey. 





RESETTLEMENT IN THE EU  












Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 11
  
Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States
12 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS





Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 







Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States






Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 









Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States





Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 





Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States






Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 







Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States






Refugee Resettlement in the EU - 2011-2013 Report 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 21




Formal	  Basis	  for	  Resettlement	   Date	  of	  resettlement	  




Austria	   None	   None	   2011 None	  
Belgium	   None	  
	  
*Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  on	  a	  specific	  
resettlement	  –	  Iraqi	  and	  Palestinians	  from	  refugee	  
camps	  in	  Syria	  and	  Jordan	  (2009)	  
*Decision	   of	   the	   Cabinet	   on	   a	   specific	  












Bulgaria	   None	   *Council	  of	  Ministers	  draft	  decision	  (2012)	  -­‐	  Pilot	  
programme	  	  
None	   	  
Planned for 2014 
Cyprus	   None	  	   None	   None	   None	  
Czech	  
Republic	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  *Government	  Resolution	  on	  a	  specific	  
resettlement	  –	  Burmese	  (2008)	  
*Government	  Resolution	  on	  a	  specific	  
resettlement	  –	  Burmese	  (2009)	  
*Government	  Resolution	  on	  a	  specific	  









Denmark	   	  
Aliens	  Act	  (2011),	  as	  
amended	  in	  2005,	  
Section	  8	  
None	   None	   Since 1978 
Estonia	   None	   None	   None	   None	  
Finland	   	  
Aliens	  Act	  (2004),	  Section	  
90,	  91,	  92.	  
	  
	  
*Decision	  on	  the	  geographical	  allocation	  of	  the	  
refugee	  quota,	  17	  February	  2012	  
None	   Since 1985 
France	   None	   	  
	  
Since 1948 
Other relevant dates: 
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Germany	   Residence	  Act	  (2004),	  
Section	  22.	  
	  
*Ruling	  of	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  
about	  Iraqi	  refugees	  (2008)	  
*Decision	  on	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  permanent	  
resettlement	  programme	  and	  on	  admission	  of	  











Greece	   None	   None	   None	   None	  
Hungary	   Asylum	  Act	  (2007),	  
Section	  7	  
	  
*Governmental	  Decree	  (2011)	  Refugee	  Solidarity	  
Programme	  related	  to	  the	  North-­‐African	  crisis	  
None	   	  
	  
2012 
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2010	  
Latvia	   None	   None	   None	   None	  
Lithuania	   None	   None	   None	   None	  
Luxembourg	   None	   None	   2009 None	  
Malta	   None	   None	   None	   None	  
Netherlands	   None	   	  
*Decree	  (2000)	  transfers	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
quota	  policy	  for	  resettled	  refugees	  to	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Justice	  
*Decree	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  (2010)	  outlines	  
Dutch	  resettlement	  policy	  
*Government	  Decision	  (2012)	  Policy	  Framework	  
for	  Resettlement	  (2012-­‐2015)	  
None	   Since 1984 
	  
Poland	   Act	  on	  granting	  
protection	  to	  foreigners	  
(2003),	  as	  amended	  in	  
2011	  
None	    
2011 
None	  
Portugal	   	   	   2006  	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  Asylum	  Law	  (2008),	  
Chapter	  III	  Section	  V	  	  
*Resolution	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  (2007)	  	   Since 2007 
Republic	  of	  
Ireland	  
Refugee	  Act	  (1996),	  
Section	  24.	  
	  
*Cabinet	  Decision	  (1998)	  –	  Quota	  decision	  
*Cabinet	  Decision	  (2005)	  –	  Quota	  decision	  
None	    
Since 1998 
Romania	   Law	  on	  Asylum	  (2006),	  
Article	  3(5)	  
	  
Agreement	  with	  UNHCR	  and	  IOM	  (2008):	  
Emergency	  Transit	  Centre	  in	  Timisoara	  
Decision	  on	  the	  Resettlement	  of	  Refugees	  (2008)	  
–	  Sets	  out	  regulation	  of	  resettlement	  and	  states	  
how	  many	  refugees	  will	  be	  resettled	  during	  the	  
period	  2008-­‐2010	  	  
2012	  Decision	  to	  amend	  the	  2008	  Decision	  on	  the	  
Resettlement	  of	  Refugees	  in	  Romania	  






Planned for 2012-2013 
Slovakia	  
	  
None	   *Agreement	  with	  UNHCR	  and	  IOM	  (2009):	  
Emergency	  Transit	  Centre	  in	  Humenné	  
*Agreement	  with	  UNHCR	  and	  IOM	  (2010):	  
Emergency	  Transit	  Centre	  in	  Humenné	  
None	   None	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Slovenia	   International	  Protection	  
Act	  (2007),	  Chapter	  VIII	  
Section	  70	  
	  
*Government	  Decree	  on	  implementation	  of	  
resettlement	  based	  on	  yearly	  quota	  (2011)	  
None	   None	  
Spain	   	  
	  
Law	  regulating	  the	  right	  
to	  asylum	  and	  subsidiary	  
protection	  (2009)	  
	  
*Royal	  Decree	  (1995)	  –	  makes	  reference	  to	  
UNHCR	  requests	  to	  resettle	  
*Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  (2010)	  –	  
Approves	  the	  2010	  programme:	  75	  refugees	  
*Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  (2011)	  –	  
Approves	  the	  2011	  programme:	  100	  refugees	  
*Communication	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministries	  



















Planned for 2013-2014 
Sweden	   	  
Aliens	  Act	  (2005),	  
Chapter	  5	  Section	  2	  
	  
	  
*Spending	  authorization	  for	  the	  Migration	  Board	  
(2011)	  –by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  defines	  the	  
None	   Since 1950 
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resettlement	  quota	  for	  2012	  
*Migration	  Board	  Decision	  on	  Resettlement	  





and	  Asylum	  Act	  (2002),	  
Section	  59	  
None	   None	   	  
Since 2004 
	   13	  EU	  countries	  refer	  to	  
resettlement	  in	  Law.	  
15	  EU	  countries	  have	  adopted	  government	  acts	  
related	  to	  resettlement.	  
10	  EU	  countries	  have	  
resettled	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  
basis.	  
14	  EU	  countries	  have	  
resettled	  on	  a	  
programme	  basis.	  
	   18	  EU	  countries	  have	  had	  a	  formal	  basis	  for	  resettlement.	   16	  EU	  countries	  have	  already	  resettled.	  
Country Comparison Resettlement In The Eu And Its Member States
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I.	  PRE-­‐	  ARRIVAL	  PHASE	  	  






EU	  countries	  	  
Selection	  criteria	  
	  
Selection	  process	   Application	  Process	   Pre-­‐departure	  activities	  	  UNHCR	  criteria*	  
	  
National	  Target	  Preferences	  	  	  	   Dossiers	  	   Missions	   Actors	  involved	   Before	  arrival	   Upon	  arrival	  	   Cultural	  orientation	  	  
1	   Austria	   No	   2011:	  Christian	  Iraqis	   	   Selected	  by	  representatives	  in	  Iraq	  of	  the	  archdiocese	  in	  Vienna	  
-­‐The	  Church	  -­‐IOM	  -­‐Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  
Yes	   	   n/a	  
2	   Belgium	  	   No	  	  (2009,	  2011)	   2011:	  Family	  with	  children	  and	  single	  women.	  	  	  	  2009:	  women	  –at	  –risk	  and	  Palestinians	  	  
Yes	  (2011)	  	   Yes	  	  (2009)	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐CGRA	  	  -­‐State	  Secretary	  for	  Asylum	  and	  Migration	  -­‐FEDASIL	  	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	  (simplified	  procedure)	   2011:	  CO	  not	  provided.	  Information	  pamphlets	  covering	  information	  about	  Belgium	  were	  printed	  but	  not	  given	  to	  refugees.	  	  3	   Bulgaria	  	   Yes	  (possible)	   Bulgaria	  is	  interested	  in	  resettling	  Afghani	  and	  Iraqi	  refugees	  from	  Turkey.	  	  	  
/	  	   /	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐State	  Agency	  for	  Refugees	   /	  	   /	  	   /	  	  
4	   Cyprus	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  5	   Czech	  Republic	   No	  	   Possibly	  vulnerable	  persons:	  seriously	  ill	   Possible	   Yes	   -­‐	  UNHCR	  -­‐The	   Pre-­‐Selection	  	   Yes	  (simplified	   Done	  by	  the	  Resettlement	  Group	   when	   interviewing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Yes: The State accepts obligations towards refugees recognised by UNHCR according to a broader definition – Mandate Refugee Status – No: Geneva Convention criteria and generally Subsidiary Protection criteria.  
PRE-­‐ARRIVAL	  AND	  POST-­‐ARRIVAL	  PHASES	  OF	  REFUGEE	  RESETTLEMENT	  IN	  THE	  EU	  MEMBER	  STATES	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persons,	  children,	  women	  at	  risk	  and	  other	  cases,	  based	  on	  specific	  humanitarian	  factors.	  	  Some	  integration	  aspects	  are	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  	  	  
Resettlement	  Group	  -­‐Minister	  of	  Interior	  	  	  	  
procedure	  if	  previous	  UNHCR	  refugee	  status)	  
the	   people	   in	   need	   of	  resettlement	   in	   the	  country	   of	   first	   asylum	   –initial	   information	   about	  what	   they	   can	   expect	  from	   resettlement	   in	   the	  Czech	   Republic	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   they	   will	  receive	   assistance	   on	  arrival.	  6	   Denmark	  	   No	  	   Sub-­‐quotas:	  75	  urgent	  cases;	  “Twenty-­‐Or-­‐More”	  for	  specially	  sick	  or	  handicapped	  refugees.	  	  	  Integration	  criteria	  included	  in	  2005.	  	  Supplementary	  criteria	  of	  influence:	  language	  qualifications,	  education	  and	  work	  experience,	  social	  network,	  age,	  motivation.	  	  
Yes	  	  (Urgent	  cases)	   Yes	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  	  -­‐Danish	  Immigration	  Service	  (DIS)	  	  -­‐Danish	  Refugee	  Council	  (DRC)	  -­‐Municipalities	  	  
Yes	   	   Yes	  done	  by	  DIS	  and	  Danish	  language	  teachers.	  Offered	  to	  all	  	  refugees	  accepted	  on	  selection	  missions	  but	  not	  to	  refugees	  on	  dossier	  	  basis.	  Over	  one	  week.	  	  	  
7	   Estonia	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  8	   Finland	  	   Yes	  	  (possible)	  	  	  
Annual	  geographical	  allocation	  of	  the	  quota,	  based	  on	  the	  need	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  chosen	  	  refugee	  groups.	  	  	  Capacity	  to	  integrate	  is	  a	  factor.	  
Emergency	  and	  Urgent	  cases	  	  
Yes	  	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Finnish	  Immigration	  Services	  (MIGRI)	  
Yes	   	   Cultural	  orientation	  is	  the	  remit	  of	  IOM.	  The	  arrangement	  	  was	  established	  in	  2001	  and	  ran	  until	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  contract	  in	  2010.	  	  The	  co	  was	  not	  arranged	  in	  2011	  and	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  10%	  of	  the	  quota	  are	  reserved	  	  for	  emergency	  cases	  and	  urgent	  cases.	  	  	  
the	  contract	  is	  currently	  being	  negotiated.	  Currently	  no	  cultural	  orientation	  is	  organized.	  	  9	   France	   Yes	  	  	   2008	  (Iraq	  500):	  	  Belonging	  to	  a	  religious	  minority	  (especially	  Christian)	  and	  link	  with	  France	  (either	  through	  family	  ties	  or	  knowledge	  of	  French	  by	  at	  least	  one	  family	  member).	  Residence	  either	  in	  Iraq	  or	  in	  a	  neighbouring	  country:	  Jordan,	  Syria,	  Lebanon	  or	  Turkey.	  	  Programme-­‐Based:	  Integration	  potential	  together	  with	  protection	  need;	  consideration	  of	  the	  reception	  and	  housing	  capacity	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
Yes	   No	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  -­‐OFPRA	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	   Sessions	  of	  cultural	  introduction	  can	  be	  organised	  by	  IOM.	  This	  has	  been	  done	  only	  for	  Iraqis	  and	  EU	  relocation.	  	  When	  such	  activities	  cannot	  be	  organised,	  the	  IOM	  may	  distribute	  an	  information	  package,	  of	  which	  the	  Information	  Leaflet	  for	  People	  Resettled	  in	  France.	  	  
10	   Germany	   Yes	  	   2008:	  Focus	  on	  members	  of	  persecuted	  (religious)	  minorities,	  victims	  of	  violence	  and	  with	  special	  medical	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  	  -­‐BAMF	   	   Yes	   No	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needs,	  single	  women	  with	  children.	  	  Other	  criteria	  such	  as	  capacity	  of	  integration,	  ties	  with	  Germany	  and	  family	  unity.	  	  	  2011:	  Priority	  to	  refugees	  with	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  origin	  who	  fled	  from	  Libya.	  	  11	   Greece	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  12	   Hungary	   No	   No	  specific	  admissibility	  criteria.	  A	  family	  (5-­‐8	  persons)	  from	  the	  North-­‐African	  region.	  Aspects	  to	  consider	  when	  doing	  resettlement:	  need	  for	  international	  protection,	  security	  reasons,	  integration	  possibilities.	  	  
/	   Yes	   -­‐UNHCR	  	  -­‐OIN	  	   	   Yes	   No	  	  
13	   Ireland	   Yes	   Preference	  -­‐Group	  resettlement	  -­‐“balanced”	  caseload	  (mix	  of	  women	  at	  risk,	  disable	  persons,	  etc)	  -­‐community	  or	  spiritual	  leaders	  
Yes	   Between	  2005	  and	  2008	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Minister	  for	  Justice	  and	  Equality	  	  -­‐Minister	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  -­‐	  Office	  for	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Migrant	  Integration	  (OPMI)	  
Yes	   	   Yes	  Through	  the	  Irish	  authorities	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14	   Italy	   Yes	   No	  additional	  criteria.	  Possibly	  national	  security	  considerations.	  
Yes	   No,	  except	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2009	  to	  assess	  the	  local	  situation.	  
-­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  -­‐Territorial	  Commissions	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	  (Simplified	  Procedure)	   No	  
15	   Latvia	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  16	   Lithuania	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  17	   Luxembourg	   No	   2009:	  Families	  with	  children	  (young	  if	  possible),	  including	  single-­‐parent	  families.	  	  
Yes	   	   -­‐UNHCR	  	  -­‐Ministry	  in	  charge	  of	  immigration	  -­‐OLAI	  -­‐CARITAS	  
Yes	   	   OLAI	  did	  prepare	  some	  leaflets	  concerning	  rights	  upon	  arrival,	  including	  healthcare	  and	  education	  
18	   Malta	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  19	   Netherlands	   No	   Subquota:	  30	  Medical	  cases.	  Refugees	  with	  medical	  needs	  and	  women	  at	  risk	  are	  resettled	  through	  the	  ‘Twenty-­‐Or-­‐More’	  programme.	  	  More	  emphasis	  will	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  Integration	  potential	  which	  has	  been	  applied	  since	  2005.	  	  Dutch	  Minister	  for	  Immigration	  and	  Asylum	  recently	  proposed	  resettlement	  be	  used	  as	  strategically	  as	  possible	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  other	  purposes	  of	  the	  country’s	  
Yes:	  100	  refugees/year	   Suspended	  from	  1999	  to	  2005.	  Yes:	  400	  refugees/year	  
-­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Minister	  for	  Immigration,	  Integration	  and	  Asylum	  (quota	  definition)	  -­‐Ministry	  of	  Justice	  -­‐Municipalities	  -­‐Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  and	  Kingdom	  Relations,	  -­‐Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  -­‐Resettlement	  Unit	  of	  the	  Immigration	  and	  Naturalisation	  Service	  (IND)	  -­‐	  Central	  Agency	  for	  the	  
Yes	   No	   Organised	  by	  COA,	  consisting	  of	  three	  trainings.	  Content:	  elementary	  Dutch	  language	  skill;	  Information	  about	  the	  Dutch	  society;	  Information	  about	  the	  receiving	  municipality;	  and	  the	  future	  accommodation.	  For	  dossier-­‐based	  refugees,	  CO	  trainings	  are	  developed	  and	  offered	  by	  IOM	  in	  cooperation	  with	  COA.	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migration	  policy	  and	  UNHCR	  to	  select	  more	  higher	  profile	  refugees	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  activists	  and	  academics.	  	  
Reception	  of	  Asylum	  Seekers	  (COA)	  	  
20	   Poland	   n/a	   Humanitarian	  aspects,	  necessity	  to	  satisfy	  the	  essential	  needs	  of	  resettled	  refugees,	  actual	  costs	  of	  individual	  programmes	  of	  integration.	  	  
n/a	   In	  the	  future:	  Interview	  by	  the	  Officer	  of	  the	  Border	  Guard	  delegated	  to	  the	  selection	  task.	  	  
-­‐Council	  of	  Ministers	  -­‐Head	  of	  the	  Office	  for	  Foreigners	  via	  the	  officer	  of	  the	  Border	  Guard	  outside	  Poland	  
Yes	   Yes	   n/a	  
21	   Portugal	   Yes	   Programme:	  Continuity	  in	  resettlement;	  	  Privilege	  to	  citizens	  coming	  from	  the	  African	  continent	  and	  from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  but	  not	  excluding	  other	  situations	  of	  citizens	  coming	  	  from	  other	  places,	  if	  	  these	  justify	  their	  priority	  selection,	  mainly	  for	  	  serious	  humanitarian	  reasons.	  	  	  2011:	  People	  from	  countries	  covered	  by	  
Yes	   None	  so	  far	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐	  Immigration	  Service	  /	  Refugee	  and	  Asylum	  Cabinet	  	  -­‐	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	  Affairs,	  	  -­‐Portuguese	  Aliens	  and	  Borders	  Service	  	  -­‐Portuguese	  Refugee	  Council.	  
Yes	   	   Non	  systematic	  distribution	  of	  a	  “Cultural	  Orientation	  Leaflet	  for	  Resettled	  Refugees	  in	  Portugal”.	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a	  Regional	  Protection	  Programme,	  unaccompanied	  minors,	  children	  and	  women	  at	  risk.	  	  	  	  22	   Romania	   No	  	   Potential	  for	  integration	  applied	  in	  2008,	  dropped	  in	  2012.	  	  2012	  Criteria:	  Express	  consent	  of	  the	  refugee	  to	  be	  resettled	  in	  Romania;	  Romania’s	  foreign	  policy;	  Relocation	  requirements	  at	  EU	  level.	  Minimum	  medical	  requirements	  to	  be	  defined.	  	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Minister	  of	  Administration	  and	  Interior	  –Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  	  -­‐Romanian	  Office	  for	  Immigration	  (ROI)	  	  
Pre-­‐Selection	   Yes	   Yes	  Romanian	  NGOs	  involved	  in	  integration	  programmes	  will	  participate	  to	  the	  selection	  missions	  to	  	  inform	  refugees	  on	  integration	  activities	  in	  Romania	  and	  prepare	  integration	  programmes.	  	  In	  addition,	  possible	  cultural	  orientation	  and	  counselling	  services	  provided	  by	  ROI.	  	  23	   Slovakia	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  24	   Slovenia	   n/a	   Global	  migration	  trends,	  crisis	  areas	  around	  the	  world,	  integration	  capacities.	  
Yes	   Possibly	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Ministry	  in	  charge	  on	  internal	  affairs	  
Yes	   	   Yes	  Informative	  lecture	  	  -­‐	  	  general	  information	  on	  Slovenia,	  cultural	  characteristics	  and	  habits,	  on	  the	  prohibition	  of	  polygamy	  and	  gender	  equality,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  persons	  enjoying	  international	  protection	  in	  Slovenia.	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25	   Spain	   Yes	  (possible)	   The	  criteria	  will	  be	  defined	  on	  yearly	  basis.	  	  Will	  follow	  EU	  policies.	  	  	  	  
Yes	  	  (in	  the	  future)	   2011	  (Syria)	  2012	  (Tunisia)	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  	  -­‐OAR	  (Office	  of	  Asylum	  and	  Refugees)	  
Yes	   	   Yes	  (2011)	  By	  IOM	  –	  Information	  sessions	  about	  Spain	  	  
26	   Sweden	   Yes	   No	  additional	  criteria.	  Number	  of	  places	  by	  country	  of	  first	  asylum	  decided	  annually.	  	  350	  places	  for	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  cases.	  
Yes,	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  quota.	  
Yes,	  for	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  quota.	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐Migration	  Board	   Yes	   Possible	   Yes	  (Migration	  Board	  Officers)	  For	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  refugees	  selected	  for	  resettlement,	  mainly	  those	  selected	  via	  in	  country	  selection	  missions.	  Generally,	  cultural	  orientation	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  7-­‐10	  days.	  27	   United	  Kingdom	   Yes	   Regional	  allocation	  targets,	  including	  RPP.	  Small	  percentage	  for	  medical	  cases	  and	  a	  higher	  percentage	  for	  women-­‐at-­‐risk.	  For	  Mandate	  refugees:	  integration	  potential	  and	  links	  with	  the	  UK.	  
Possible	   Yes	  	   -­‐UNHCR	  -­‐UK	  Border	  Agency	  (UKBA)	  -­‐	  Refugee	  Team	  in	  the	  Asylum	  Casework	  Directorate	  	  	  
Yes	   No	   By	  UK	  mission	  staff	  to	  refugees	  explaining	  the	  travel,	  reception	  and	  initial	  integration	  arrangements.	  Previously	  by	  IOM.	  	  Since	  2011,	  a	  1	  day	  programme	  has	  been	  delivered	  by	  staff	  from	  the	  Refugee	  Resettlement	  Unit	  at	  the	  UKBA.	  It	  includes	  video	  interviews	  with	  refugees	  previously	  resettled	  through	  the	  programme	  in	  which	  they	  talk	  about	  their	  experiences	  of	  resettling	  and	  advice	  for	  new	  arrivals.	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II-­‐POST-­‐	  ARRIVAL	  PHASE	  
Post	  –arrival	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
phase	  	  
	  
EU	  countries	  	  
Status	  granted	   Rights	  granted	  Refugee	  	   	  Subsidiary	  protection	  	   Programme	  refugee	  status	  or	  other	  Specific	  status	   The	  same	  as	  national	  citizens	  	   The	  same	  as	  refugees	   The	  same	  as	  persons	  under	  the	  subsidiary	  protection	  status	  	   Other	  specific	  rights	  under	  national	  law	  1	   Austria	   X	   	   	   	   X	   	   	  2	   Belgium	  	   X	   	   	   	  X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  







	  	   Right	  of	  permanent	  
residence.	  
3	   Bulgaria	  	   X	   	   	   Potential	  to	  become	  
naturalized	  at	  a	  later	  phase	  
X	  	   	   	  




	   	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	   access	   to	  
education	   and	  
employment.	  
Citizenship	  may	  be	  granted	  
on	  request	  after	  5	  years	  of	  





	   	  
6	   Denmark	  	   X	   X	  	   	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  






after	  7	  years)	  
	  
X	  	   4	  year-­‐	  residence	  permit	  	  
7	   Estonia	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  8	   Finland	  	   	   	   X	  (Quota	  Refugees)	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment,	  after	  the	  
‘integration	  period’.	  




	   4	  year-­‐residence	  permit	  
Direct	  access	  to	  
immigrants’	  benefits	  
upon	  arrival	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9	   France	   X	  
	  
X	   	   X	  for	  health	  care,	  social	  
welfare	  and	  housing,	  






(1	  year-­‐stay	  permit)	  
	  
10	   Germany	   	   	   X	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  
	   	   3	  year-­‐stay	  permit.	  
After	  7	  years	  a	  
settlement	  permit	  can	  
be	  granted.	  
Strict	  conditions	  for	  
family	  reunification.	  	  
	  11	   Greece	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  12	   Hungary	   X	   /	   /	   /	   X	   /	   /	  13	   Ireland	   	  	   	   X	  (Programme	  
Refugees)	  
X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  
Access	  to	  citizenship	  after	  3	  
years	  –	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  5	  
years	  by	  future	  reform.	  
X	  
	  
	   Facilities	  for	  family	  
reunification	  




	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  







(3-­‐year	  stay	  permit)	  
	  




	   	  
18	   Malta	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  19	   Netherlands	  	   	  
	  
	   X	  (Invited	  Refugees)	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  
Access	  to	  citizenship	  after	  5	  






after	  5	  years)	  
	  
	   5	  year	  residence	  permit.	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20	   Poland	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   	  21	   Portugal	   X	   X	   	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  






(2	  year-­‐stay	  permit)	  
	  
22	   Romania	   X	   	   	   X	  for	  health	  care,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  
X	   	   	  
23	   Slovakia	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	   /	  24	   Slovenia	   X	   	   	   X	  for	  health	  and	  social	  
care,	  access	  to	  education	  
and	  employment.	  
X	   	   Right	   to	   permanent	  
residence	  




	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  







(1	  year-­‐stay	  permit)	  
	  
26	   Sweden	   X	   X	   	   X	  for	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  
Access	  to	  citizenship	  after	  4	  
years	  for	  refugees,	  after	  5	  








27	   United	  
Kingdom	  
x	   	   	   X	  for	  medical	  care	  and	  
social	  welfare,	  access	  to	  
education	  and	  
employment.	  




	   Indefinite	  Leave	  to	  Remain	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Country Profile: AUSTRIA 
In the period after the Second World War Austrian migration and refugee policy was strongly influenced by 
the political events in the neighbouring countries to the east. Between the years 1945 and 1950 it hosted 
more than one million displaced persons from Germany and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Some of these people were then resettled to third countries to alleviate Austria’s burden1
In this context it is also important to mention that in the 1970s Austria resettled nationals from Uganda, 
Chile, Indochina and Iraq. These activities took place in cooperation with international organisations such as 
UNHCR or the International Rescue Committee. Furthermore, between 1968 and 1986 Austria hosted around 
300,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, who then emigrated to Israel and the USA. 
. Due to its 
geographical position as a neighbouring country to communist states, Austria became an important 
destination for political refugees from its eastern neighbours. In the wake of the Hungarian Revolution in 
1956, approximately 180,000 Hungarians arrived in Austria, a major part of which considered it as a transit 
country and only 20,000 of them settled down permanently in Austria. Also, the violent suppression of the 
Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia led 162,000 Czechs and Slovaks to leave their country. An estimated 
12,000 of them remained in Austria, while others either returned to Czechoslovakia or emigrated to other 
states. Moreover, Austria served as a transit country in 1981 and 1982 for members of the Solidarność 
movement fleeing from Poland.  
At the end of the 1980s, Austria was no longer a country of transit but a host country. As was the case in 
Germany, Austria also hired a workforce in the post war period from southern and eastern European 
countries, the so called Gastarbeiter, who were supposed to cover the need for workforce and to return to 
their countries when no longer needed. But many of these mostly male Gastarbeiter settled down and 
brought their families to Austria. In the period between 1961 and 1974 approximately 265,000 people had 
immigrated to Austria in the framework of this policy. 
The oil crisis in the 1970s and the economic recession led to a stronger competition on the Austrian labour 
market, especially because many Austrians who had worked abroad returned to Austria in search of work. As 
a result of language and integration problems, foreign nationals were disadvantaged and faced higher 
unemployment rates. In addition to that the continuing flow of refugees from the former communist states 
created social tensions and caused political debates about a more restrictive immigration and asylum policy. 
Since 1990 the laws on immigration and asylum have become more and more restrictive. A quota on the 
foreign work force in the Austrian labour market was introduced and measures for faster deportation were 
adopted. The introduction of the clause of the safe third countries in the new law on asylum in 1991 restricted 
the possibilities to file an asylum application. Asylum claims from foreign nationals who have travelled to 
Austria through a so called “safe third country” are considered as unfounded and will be rejected. 
Public opinion with regard to refugees and immigrants in Austria has progressively become more 
negative over the past 20 years. The topic of resettlement is not of an important political concern. According 
to surveys, more than half of the Austrian population consider the integration of foreign nationals as rather 
bad and favour stronger integration measures. 
                                                            
1 UNHCR representative in Austria, Christoph Pinter. 
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Asylum Profile 

















I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Federal Act Concerning the 








Federal Act concerning 
Settlement and Residence 
in Austria, 2005 
 
No specific provision relating to resettlement. 
Defines the asylum status and subsidiary protection status of 
foreigners and the general procedures for the granting of them. It 
contains provisions on its preconditions and on the granting ex officio 
from which follows the recognition of the refugee status: 
§ 3. (4) An alien shall be granted asylum status ex officio without any 
further procedure if the Republic of Austria has undertaken to do so 
under international law. 
(5) The ruling whereby an alien is granted asylum status ex officio or 
on the basis of an application for international protection shall be issued 
in conjunction with a declaration that refugee status is accordingly 
conferred upon the alien by operation of the act. 
Contains the preconditions for the issuance of residence and settlement 
permits, including for humanitarian reasons and the right of residence 
for displaced persons. It also provides rules on the integration course 
offer for persons entitled to settle. 
Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
Austria is not interested in becoming a resettlement country. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  









101 Indian and Pakistani refugees from Uganda. They had been brought 
to Africa by the British colonial rulers as cheap workforce around the turn 
of the century and were expelled by Uganda’s president Idi Amin. 
This act was supposed to underline Austria’s humanitarian attitude, 
but the Ministry of the Economy and the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber committed strongly in the resettlement of highly qualified 
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• 1974  
 
 









refugees. Between 1972 and 1974 approx. 1,500 refugees were 
accommodated in Austria. However 1,400 of them left Austria again and 
were resettled to the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Great Britain. 
After the Coup d'état in Chile the Austrian Government decided to 
accept UNHCR’s request to host between 200 and 250 refugees from 
Chile and Argentina. The refugees from Argentina arrived only in 
1976/77 in Austria. Between November 1973 and July 1974 only 160 
refugees from Chile arrived in Austria, but many Chileans came on their 
own account, because no visa was needed for entering Austria. An 
estimated 1000 Chileans were resettled to Austria and many of those 
who had come from Argentina were already in possession of a 
convention passport. However, this passport caused problems with the 
work permit because the Austrian employment centre only accepted the 
Austrian convention passport. Against reimbursement the UN refugee 
funds from Vienna financed and first organised private accommodation, 
then housing granted by the Ministry of the Interior. 
In 1974 Austria granted asylum to 100 Iraqi Kurds who had fled to 
Iran. They had to register for the resettlement in the Iranian refugees 
camps. Among the refugees were university graduates with their 
families and students. 
On request of UNHCR the Austrian Minister of the Interior decided in 
1979 to resettle 196 refugees from Vietnam. After the UN conference in 
1979 another quota of 100 and shortly after that a further quota of 500 
persons was granted. By 1983, approximately 2,000 refugees from 
Vietnam were hosted in Austria. NGOs played an important role: 
Caritas Oberösterreich sponsored the resettlement of 700 Vietnamese 
refugees, parishes offered housing and work for 500 refugees. 
In the wake of the First Gulf War Austria resettled 201 Iraqi Kurds from 
Turkey in 1991 and 100 Iraqi refugees from Iran. Criteria for the selection 
were the intensity of the persecution in Iraq, relations to Austria (e.g. 
relatives living in Austria) as well as the need for protection.  
31 Iraqi Christians were accommodated in Austria following the 
initiative of the Cardinal Christoph Schönborn. 




The Austrian authorities emphasize that the resettlement activities of the 
31 Christians from Iraq in 2011 were a humanitarian evacuation and no 
resettlement. Austria defines resettlement as being limited to those 
evacuations where refugees are evacuated from a third country and not 
from their country of origin.
 
6
d) Through other Projects 
 The activities that have been carried out by 





















6 Interview with the Ministry of the Interior, 6 February 2012. 
7 http://www.news.at/articles/0911/15/236347/guantanamo-haeftlinge-eu-auskuenfte (February 2012). 
8 Interview with Anni Knapp from the NGO Asylkoordination Österreich, 8 February 2012. 
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31 Iraqi Christians (from Bagdad, Mosul, Kirkuk und Ninive), mostly family 
unions and some single persons, were accommodated in Austria. They 
were directly evacuated from Iraq and arrived in Austria on 17 February 
2011. They were supposed to spend their first months in the House of 
Education and Professional Integration (Haus der Bildung und beruflichen 
Integration) of the Austrian Integration Funds.9
They were entitled to asylum and following on from that they were 
granted refugee status.
 The Ministry of the Interior 
organised intensive preparation measures before their entry to Austria. 
Among these were the implementation of the necessary security checks, 
the organisation of the entry formalities, the creation of a detailed 
integration concept as well as permanent contacts with the IOM and the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign and International Affairs.  
10
a) Selection Criteria and 




Selection criteria  
 
• UNHCR Criteria 
• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
The selection was mainly the competence of the Church. Through 
representatives in Iraq, the archdiocese of Vienna suggested 31 
persons from Bagdad, Mosul, Kirkuk und Ninive who had all been 
afflicted by violent acts from Islamic extremists and who were nearly all 










• Cultural orientation (CO) 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 
 
• Medical screening 
 
2011 Operation:  
/ 
The organisation and the implementation of the transfer of these 31 
persons to Austria were carried out by the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM). 
Among their tasks were medical check-ups, the granting of visas 
through the Austrian Embassy in Amman and the providing of an exit 
permission from Iraqi authorities. 
Procedure Timing n/a 
Comments  The initiative to resettle Christians from Iraq is taken mostly following 
the commitment of the Catholic Church. The Church was also strongly 
involved in the implementation of this resettlement action. 
                                                            
9 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium/pressenews/presseaussendungen/2011/ankunft-von-30-irakischen-christen-
in-oesterreich.html (February 2012). 
10 Interview with the Ministry of the Interior. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Interview with Anni Knapp from the NGO Asylkoordination Österreich. 
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b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 Status granted  
§ 2 (4) of the Federal Act 
Concerning the Granting of 
Asylum 
 
“The selected persons were granted ex officio the status of a person 
entitled to asylum. For that a declaration of formal obligation was 
elaborated (with the IOM), in order to grant quickly and without too 
many administrative formalities the protection status which is connected 
with the refugee qualification.”13
Rights granted  
 The status of a person entitled to 
asylum grants them contemporaneously also the refugee status. 
Agreement between the 
Federal State and the Länder 
according to Art. 15a B-VGon 
the Common Measures for the 
Temporary Basic Care for 
Aliens in Need of Protection 
(Asylum applicants, persons 
entitled to asylum, displaced 
persons and other people who 
cannot be deported for legal 




The Grundversorgungsvereinbarung defines the responsibilities 
between the Federal State and the Länder concerning the Costs for the 
basic care for aliens in need of protection, to which also the resettled 
Christians from Iraq belong. It lists the basic needs that will be covered 
in Art. 6. Among these are:  
Accommodation in an adequate housing, adequate subsistence; the 
granting of a monthly pocket money for those living in organized 
accommodations; the payment of the medical insurance; necessary 
measures for persons in need of special protection; information and 
social support through adequate staff and if necessary interpreters; the 
payment of transport costs in the case of citation to court or to an 
authority; the payment of the transport costs, the satchel and the 
stationery for pupils; measures for the structuring of the daily life if 
needed; payment of funerals and transfer to the home country in the 
case of decease; support and information for those willing to return to 
their home countries and a one-time payment for the return.15
Comments 
 
Even though Austrian authorities do not consider resettlement as an 
important measure in the framework of its migration policy, there are 
still some activities e.g. the resettlement of Iraqi Christians. However, 
this topic is not of public interest and not much can be found out about it 
in the media. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 
− National Level 
− ERF 
 
In 2008 and 2009, 53 asylum projects were co-financed by the ERF 







Austria shows no interest in becoming a resettlement country. As the 
numbers of asylum applications have again risen there is no 
foreseeable possibility of participating in resettlement in the future. 
Authorities argue that there is a huge workload of pending asylum 
applications that have to be resolved before any further commitment in 
resettlement is possible. 
 
                                                            
13 Interview with the Ministry of the Interior. 
14 German version: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20003460 
(February 2012). 
15 See also: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI/aus_dem_inneren/files/Fremdenwesen.pdf (February 2012). 
16 http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI/aus_dem_inneren/files/Fremdenwesen.pdf (February 2012). 
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Country Profile: Belgium 
The beginning of 1990’s saw a large increase of asylum claims, which led to enactment of a stricter and 
faster asylum procedure that envisaged the importance of the eligibility procedure increase.  
During the following years, immediately after the implementation of this stricter asylum regime, the 
numbers of asylum applications predictably decreased until it increased again till 2000.  
After that, immigration in Belgium had seen a steady increase since 2000, including a rise in intra EU 
migration1. Figures show that in 2010 the immigration population constituted approximately 1/10th of the 
total population2. While asylum applications saw a sharp decrease from 2000 onwards, the number of 
asylum applications subsequently picked up and has seen a steady increase since 2007, rising from 11,115 
in that year to 25,479. An increase of 27.77% could be observed in 2011 in comparison to 20103
On several occasions, Belgium has been criticised and pen alized by the European Court of Human 
Rights for its implementation of immigration and asylum policy and v iolations of refugee rights. The 
revolutionary ruling by the European Court of Human Rights recent judgment 
.  
M.S.S. vs Belgium and 
Greece4
Moreover, Belgian immigration policies have been m arked by a heav y emphasis on s ecurity, and its 
detention practices have been the subject of much debate at both the national and i nternational levels. 
Bolstered by recent rulings issued by the European Court of Human Rights on Belgian detention practices, 
civil society groups and international bodies have criticized the country for a number of controversial practices.  
 had an impact on EU Asylum Law, in particular on the application of the Dublin II Regulation and 
on the Reception Conditions Directive. 
In view of the above facts, the Belgium Government, in its 2011 Governmental Agreement5, stated that 
immigration should be framed better and in accordance with international obligations. Among others the 
Governmental Agreement also sets out the responsibility for Belgium to offer asylum to those who have fled 
persecution but simultaneously points out the need for strict measures to limit the pressures for the 
reception of asylum seekers. Whereas the government mandate is to offer asylum it is also to organize 
together with countries of origin, discouragement campaigns in order to avoid the arrival of asylum seekers 
who have no chance to be of fered any protection or to be r ecognised as refugees. Other legislative 
measures and, somehow more severe for some of them, were foreseen in this agreement with regard to 
family reunification6
As mention above, in recent years Belgium has faced a crisis in reception of asylum-seekers
, detention of irregular migrants with minors children, access to the labour market for 
workers from Bulgaria and Romania etc.  
7
                                                            
1 Algemene Directie Werkgelegenheid en Arbeidsmarkt, De Immigratie in België: Aantallen, Stromen en Arbeidsmarkt, 
Rapport 2009 
. This 
crisis was moreover exacerbated during the political crisis which was only recently resolved. Asylum 
applications rose and Commissioner General for refugees and Stateless Persons (here hereafter referred 
to as CGRS) accumulated a l arge backlog in dealing with these applications. As the reception capacity 
crisis is still ongoing, the current Secretary of State for Migration, Asylum and Social Integration, Maggie De 
Block has been asked to propose solutions through a policy action plan.  
http://www.belgium.be/nl/publicaties/publ_rapport_2009_immigratie.jsp  
2 FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, Bevolking per nationaliteit en geslacht; oppervlakte en bevolking op 
1.1.2010, 
http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/modules/publications/statistiques/bevolking/Bevolking_nat_geslacht_opp_bevolkingsdichtheid.jsp  
3 Numbers refer to number of files. http://www.cgra.be/en/binaries/AsylumStatDecember_tcm266-159820.pdf: 
CGRA/CGVS Asylum Statistics, Overview 2011. 
4 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22880339%22]} 
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Since the Second World War Belgium has carried out several ad hoc resettlement schemes, however no 
official resettlement has taken place since 1999.8
The first ad–hoc scheme was undertaken in 2009. Belgium agreed to resettle 50 refugees (of Iraqi and 
Palestinian origin) in response to the European Council Conclusions in 2008 that encouraged EU Member 
States to resettle 10 000 refugees from Iraq
 The first steps towards renewed efforts began in 2007 
and 2008 when representatives from Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (CGRA) and the 
Agence fédérale pour l’accueil de d emandeurs d’asile (Fedasil- Federal Agency for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers) participated as observers on selection missions organised by British and Dutch 
resettlement programmes to Thailand and Tanzania.  
9
During the second ad-hoc scheme in 2011, 25 refugees were accepted for resettlement in response to 
the UNHCR’s and the EU’s initiative calling EU Member States to resettle refugees of Sub-Saharan origin 
(mainly Somalis, Eritreans, Soudanese and Ethiopians) -identified as particularly vulnerable by both the 
UNHCR and the EU- who had fled from Libya to the Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia which could only 
offer temporary protection
. A Geneva Convention criterion with a focus on vulnerable 
groups (women-at-risk and Palestinians) was applied by the CGRA to refugees referred by the UNHCR for 
resettlement in 2009.  
10
The two ad-hoc programmes carried out in Belgium in 2009 and 2011 were largely seen as successful 
endeavours. Improvements were observed in the latter programme as the trail was cleared by partners 
active in 2009. Coordination between actors is well established, especially considering the urgent nature of 
the resettlement programmes in 2009 and 2011. Nevertheless several practical issues highlighted below 
need to be addressed to improve resettlement experience for refugees and NGOs. 
. The security and c onditions within the camp were insufficient and refugees 
needed an immediate protection solution. 
Though Belgium has potential for creating an annual resettlement programme, there are factors, which 
make the launching of such a programme difficult at this time. The factors mentioned by actors interviewed 
were the relatively high numbers of asylum seekers, the reception crisis, political instability and bud get 
problems. Among these factors, the asylum situation in Belgium has the two-fold problem that not only 
encompasses capacity but also public opinion. At present, public opinion is that Belgium is too generous in 
granting asylum and therefore not able to accept more refugees through resettlement.  
In addition, the general public has little or no knowledge about resettlement. Short press releases were 
printed when refugees arrived in Belgium but no awareness-raising campaigns were carried out. The fear 
was expressed however, that while clarifying the difference between refugees who come to Belgium as 
asylum seekers and those who come through resettlement is important, it could lead to a preference for 
resettlement.  
Before an annual programme could be implemented, Belgium will have to address its asylum situation, 
work on public opinion and clarify budget issues. 
                                                            
8 Available in French only: http://www.reinstallation.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR00Historique.html 
9 Available in French only: http://resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/FR3.0Wie.htm 
10 Available in French only: http://resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR3.0qui.htm 
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• 2,857 Refugee Status Granted 
  
• 711 Other Protection 
 
     3,201 (2010)12
• 2,107 Refugee Status Granted 
 








Ad -hoc scheme  
A programme for 100 refugees to be resettled in 2013. 
 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Aliens Act: Act of 15 
December 1980 concerning 
the entry, stay, settlement and 
removal of foreign nationals, 
amended by law of 15 July 
2006.15 Implemented by Royal 
Decree of 8 O ctober 1981, as 








No provision for resettlement is provided in the 1980 Aliens Act. 
 
Covers entry, stay, settlement and removal, asylum procedure and 
competencies of asylum authorities. 
 
                                                            
11. Numbers refer to number of files. http://www.cgra.be/en/binaries/AsylumStatDecember_tcm266-159820.pdf: 
CGRA/CGVS Asylum Statistics, Overview 2011  
12. Numbers refer to number of files. http://www.cgra.be/en/binaries/ASYLUMSTATdecember10_tcm266-114515.pdf: 
CGRA/CGVS Asylum Statistics, Overview 2010 
13. Numbers refer to number of files. http://www.cgra.be/en/binaries/AsylumStatDecember_tcm266-159820.pdf: 
CGRA/CGVS Asylum Statistics, Overview 2011  
14. Numbers refer to number of files. http://www.cgra.be/en/binaries/ASYLUMSTATdecember10_tcm266-114515.pdf: 
CGRA/CGVS Asylum Statistics, Overview 2010 
15 Original title: Loi sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'établissement et l'éloignement des étrangers. 
16 http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1980121530&table_name=loi,  
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Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Decision of 24 March 
201117
 
, part of UNHCR Global 
Resettlement Initiative. 
Decision of the Council of 
Ministers, 13 February 2009 18




Circular of 19 A pril 1999 
concerning the special status 
of temporary protection and 






Decision to resettle 25 refugees from Libya. 
 
 
Decision to resettle 50 refugees from Jordan and Syria.  
 
Temporary protection granted to a group of ex-prisoners transferred from 
the former Yugoslav Republic20
 
Temporary protection granted to certain categories of Kosovar refugees. 
to Belgium by UNHCR/Red Cross. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
 
Belgium signed up to the Joint EU Resettlement Programme and has 
pledged to resettle 100 refugees in 2013. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  








    2011 
 
6,000 Hungarians who have fled after the Revolution are resettled in 
Belgium.  
400 Indo-Pakistani refugees who have fled from Idi Amin’s Uganda are 
resettled. 
1,100 Chileans fleeing from Pinochet regime are resettled. 
2,500 boat refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia  
47 refugees of Palestinian and Iraqi origin  
2522
 
 refugees of Sub-Saharan origin  
                                                            
17 http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.be/bestanden/parlement/11.05.03,-Kamer,-ComBZ,-Bull212,-De-opvang-van-25-
Eritreers.pdf  
18 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/52/ic464.pdf  
19 http://www.etaamb.be/nl/document-van-19-april-1999_n1999000319.html  
20 Source: EMN Report, Maes, Foblets and Van Heule, EU and Non-EU Harmonised Protection Statuses in Belgium, 
December 2009. (Unable to find primary source.) 
21 Available in French only: http://www.reinstallation.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR00Historique.html 
22 Available in French only: http://resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR3.0qui.htm. 
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Temporary protection granted to a group of ex-prisoners of Bosnian origin 
transferred to Belgium by UNHCR/Red Cross. The resettled refugee group 
was 200 families who were later followed by their children, wounded 
persons and family members. 
 
1.220 Kosovars selected by UNHCR for evacuation are transferred to 




d) Through other Projects 
Governmental Level 
1. 2008: “Durable Solutions 
in Practice”, with the 
Netherlands (together with 
the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Romania) 






Representatives from the Centraal Orgaan Asielzoekers (Central Body for 
Asylum Seekers –CGRS) and Fedasil joined the Dutch Minister for 
Integration during a resettlement mission to Thailand in 2008.  
 
Transnational programme concerning reception and resettlement. UK and 
Ireland carried out a j oint selection mission to Tanzania to select DRC 






 From Guantanamo  






Al Yanko, a Syrian who was detained in Guantamo for seven years was 
resettled to Belgium at the request of the United States. He received a new 
visa and residence permit. 
 
n/a  
Comments While no resettlement had taken place between 1999 and 2009, Belgium 
responded twice to international Calls for resettlement in the last two years. 
It has announced the beginning of a stuctural engagement. 
                                                            
23 http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d5f7.pdf  
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III. Resettlement Implementation 
 
Refugees resettled24





Ad –hoc programme in 
response to the UNHCR’s25
 
 
and the EU initiative calling EU 
member states to resettle 
refugees of Sub-Saharan 
origin who fled to the Coucha 
refugee camp.  
 
 
Ad hoc scheme 2009 in 
response to the European 
Council Conclusions in 2008 
that encouraged EU MS to 














 Country of Origin: Eritrea and DR of Congo. 
 
Country of First Asylum: Tunisia27
 
Composition: 5 families and 2 single women from Eritrea, 1 family and 1 








 47  
  
Country of Origin: 36 Iraq, 11 Palestine. 
 
Country of First Asylum: 10 Jordan, 26 Syria, 11 Iraq-Syria border29
 
. 
Composition: 19 women, 17 children (Iraqi refugees), 2 couples, each with 








                                                            
24 http://www.resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR3.0qui.htm. 
25 http://www.resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/L00Voorgeschiedenis.html 
26 Available only in French: http://www.resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/FR3.0Wie.htm. 
27 All fled from Libya to the Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia, which could offer temporary protection only. The security 
and conditions within the camp were insufficient and refugees needed an immediate protection solution. 
http://www.resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR2.2selectionbelge.htm and 
http://www.resettlement.be/apps-local/resettlement.nsf/LFR3.0qui.htm 
28 Belgium specifically requested families with children and single women. 
29 The refugees are coming from Al-Tanf camp in Iraq-Syria border. 
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a) Selection Criteria and 

















Selection of refugees is made following the criteria of the Geneva 
convention.  
During the two ad-hoc schemes the Geneva Convention criteria were 
applied with a special focus on vulnerable groups (women-at-risk and 
Palestinians in 2009).  
 
Until now the number of selected refugees for resettlement was a political 
choice and was dependant on a number of factors, including reception 
conditions. The decisions regarding the target groups to be resettled were also 
based on Belgium Foreign Policy as well as to the availability of EU funds.  
Ad-hoc scheme 2011: The Geneva Convention criteria were again 
applied. A group of Sub-Sarahan refugees had been identified as 
particularly vulnerable by both the UNHCR and the EU. Belgian regional 
experts examined the refugees’ dossiers for credibility. State Secretary for 
Migration and Asylum Policy Melchior Wathelet and the Inner Cabinet’s 
Council of Ministers made the final decision (11 March 2011). Refugees 
arrived in Belgium in July 2011. 
Ad-hoc scheme 2009: Geneva Convention criteria with a focus on 
vulnerable groups (women-at-risk and Palestinians) was applied by the 
Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRA) to 
refugees referred by the UNHCR for resettlement in 2009. State Secretary 
for Asylum and Migration, Melchior Wathelet, made the final selection.  
Selection Process 








UNHCR initially followed by and CGRA verifications in resettlement 
decision-making process 
 
In 2011, UNHCR prepared refugees dossiers, which were sent to CGRA 
for examination and consideration.  
In 2009, selection missions to Syria and Jordan were conducted by CGRA 
and Fedasil to interview preselected refugees.  
Pre-Departure Activities 
 
Cultural orientation (CO) 
 





In 2011: CO was not provided. Information pamphlets covering 
important information about Belgium were printed but not given to 
refugees. 
IOM prepares refugees travel and i nsures that the Belgian embassy has 
provided necessary documentation, travel is planned and refugees are 
escorted by IOM. 
Carried out by IOM. 
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Procedure Timing 
2011 
− 24/03/2011: Decision to resettle 
− 17/05/2011: Received Resettlement Registration Forms 
− 26/05/2011: Request to cancel mission 
− 22/06/2011: Result of selection UNHCR 
− 18/07/2011: Arrival of refugees 
− 20/07/2011: Decision on status 




Dossiers would need to be shared in advance with NGOs in order to plan for 
specific needs. Municipalities and social welfare aid offices CPAS - Centre 
publique d’action social (social welfare agency) - should be informed of the 
arrival of refugees and the ad-hoc resettlement scheme. Raising awareness 
of resettlement among the general public would also be helpful.  
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
Status granted  
Refugee status in Belgium is 




48(3) of the  
 
There is no legal framework in Belgium for resettlement and therefore the 
decision to grant refugee status should be made only upon arrival in 
Belgium. It also implies that even though accepted for resettlement each 
refugee was required to go apply to Immigration Department (OE/DVZ)32
Rights granted  
 
for asylum upon arrival. After applying for asylum, refugee status has been 
granted to all within one month of application.  
Opvangwet van 12 Januari 




 Airport arrival 
 
 
 Info upon arrival 
 Preparing local community 
 
 
 Developing integration 






Right of permanent residence based on refugee status  
Govt entities: Fedasil and CGRA meet refugees at the airport. In 2011, NGOs 
were also present (Caritas and Convivial). They are then accompanied to the 
reception centres in Pondrôme (Wallonia) and in Sint Truiden (Flanders) for 
period of 3 weeks minimum depending on the situation. 
Information is given in reception centre 
No 
This seems to have been done bit by bit as the programmes are ad-hoc. 
However the NGOs involved are experienced in the field of integration.  
Housing is organized by partnering organizations (Caritas and Convivial for 
refugees resettled from Libya) and is overseen by Fedasil. Together they 
make arrangements with the local authorities, locate available and suitable 
                                                            
30 CGRS and Fedasil, Hervestiging van Vluchtelingen, Meeting van 6 Oktober 2011, Verslag (“Resettlement of Refugees, 
Meeting of 6 October 2011, Report) http://hervestiging.be/apps-
local/resettlement.nsf/teksten/attachments/rechterkolom%20L/Verslag_Stakeholders_meeting_okt2011.pdf, at page 3  
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 Language/skills training 
  
 Employment assistance 
  










 Training of local service 
providers 
housing, schooling and contacts with the CPAS, access to public 
assistance and health care, managing household budgets, etc. 
A social orientation class is offered in the reception centre. The contents 
include information on schooling, expenses, food, housing, transportation, 
environment, etc. Refugees already established in Belgium are invited for 
knowledge sharing, in addition to representatives from external 
organizations/institutions. Convivial also offers a cultural/civic course. 
Psychological counseling is also made available if needed. 
French or Dutch classes are offered upon arrival in the reception centre. 
Once refugees are in private housing, NGOs help locate language centres. 
NGOs assist refugees in finding employment, signing up at employment agency, 
reviewing qualifications or assisting with diploma equivalency requests 
In Belgium, people with a refugee protection status (for 5 years), can apply 
for family reunification, even when they still receive a social income from 
the Public Social Welfare Centre, so for the resettled refugees it is possible 
to apply for family reunion. This however is likely to take a considerable 
amount of time, so refugees should be advised of this. 
Given by reference counsellor in reception centre and then by NGO social 
workers. 
A social worker is assigned to each refugee in the reception centre, this 
person will assist with adaption and a dministrative processes throughout 
the refugee’s 3-week stay. Once the refugee is transferred to individual 
housing, a Fedasil social worker will follow-up on the refugee’s integration 
for a period of +/-18 months in collaboration with civil society organizations 
involved (2011orgs: Caritas and Convivial ).  
No formal or specific training for resettlement is offered 
Comments As a whole, it appears that the stakeholders in Belgium (with the exception 
of municipalities) work well together. It also seems that the conventions 
signed between CGRA, Fedasil and NGOs make roles clear as there were 
no ambiguities reported. Regular stakeholder meetings are held roughly 3 
times a year where government and civil society come together to discuss, 
evaluate and plan for resettlement. During an ad -hoc programme Fedasil 
and NGOs meet once a month to evaluate and discuss practical field issues.  
Nevertheless several practical issues need to be addressed to improve the 
resettlement experience in Belgium. It is also needed to ensure linking pre-
departure and integration phases. 
Recommendations: 
It is suggested that the CGRA, Fedasil and NGOs must work together to 
manage expectations for the newly resettled refugees. In terms of family 
reunification especially, refugees’ expectations will be managed by keeping 
them fully informed of how the system works and any delay is explained 
fully to them. Resettled refugees must be informed of all procedures at as 
early a stage as possible. Beyond procedural expectations, living 
standards and lifestyle expectations in general must be managed. 
While the cooperation between CGRA, Fedasil and NGOs must be 
applauded and encouraged, all parties must strive to keep improving how 
they work together. An example is the time spent in reception centres by 
resettled refugees. If dossiers are sent in a t imely manner, pre-arrival 
then housing post arrival can be more organised. The same could be said 
of the organisation of paperwork that is needed in order to access social 
welfare and other vital services. 
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b) Costs and Funding  
Funding 
− National Level  
 











 Funding for refugees in general comes from the Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) 
 The ad-hoc decisions to resettle in both 2009 and 2011 were 
conditional upon securing European funding. The administrations twice 
managed to secure this funding, not through the classic pledging 
provided through the ERF, but through the so-called “Community 
Actions” of the Refugee Fund.  
 Resettlement of refugees from Libya in 2011 (nearly 90% of costs 
covered by Europe). The decision to carry out the resettlement initiative 
was linked to securing European funding for “urgent resettlement”.34 
The decision of the inner cabinet was again conditional upon securing 
European funding. The European Commission has included “urgent 
resettlement” in its annual priorities for the ERF programme community 
actions for 2011, through which up to 90% of the operation could once 
again be financed by Europe.35
 2009: selection mission and journey integrally funded by Temporary 
Desk on Iraq. Concretely, the selection mission and the transfer of the 
resettled refugees took place within the framework of the ERF 
community actions project “Temporary Desk on Iraq”, which meant that 
up to 90% of the costs of the selection and transfer of refugees could 
be recuperated through the European Commission. Furthermore, 50% 
of the reception and i ntegration of the resettled refugees was co-
financed by the national section of the ERF.  
  
Costs 
2009: Total costs for project support and reception of resettled refugees 





Belgium has the political will to enhance its resettlement capacity and 
Belgian NGOs and governmental actors are all eager to continue 
resettlement activities. The recent Belgium’s decision to resettle a hundred 
refugees in 2013 is hopefully the beginning of a structural engagement of 
Belgium towards resettlement. 
Nevertheless an annual programme might not be still feasible until Belgium 
finds solutions to the asylum situation and e specially in regards to 
reception centre capacity. Furthermore, no national budget is foreseen for 
resettlement, which means that Belgium will rely completely on what is 
available on EU funds. In addition to that, there is always the political 
element playing a key role in this regard. As there will be election in 2014 it 
is quite sensitive for the current government to engage the next 
government in a structural resettlement plan.  
So a s pecial attention should be gi ven to media by some intense media 
campaigns accompanied also by awareness- raising campaigns in order to 
change the general public opinion. Public opinion needs to be a focal point in 
preparing an annual programme. However it needs to be c larified to them 
that the programmes are different in terms of funding in order to do not  
replace Belgium’s responsibility towards other refugee’s protection needs.  
 
                                                            
34 http://www.dekamer.be/doc/flwb/pdf/53/1944/53k1944020.pdf#search="hervestiging" 
35 Information provided by CGRS and FEDASIL in interview obtained on 04-05-2012 
36 Fedasil, Jaarverslag 2009 (Annual Report 2009), http://www.fedasil.be/home/attachment/i/19890, at pg.29  
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Country Profile: Bulgaria 
Strategically situated in the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria shares an important 240-kilometre border with 
Turkey, and controls key land routes connecting Europe with Asia and the Middle East. While traditionally 
considered a refugee transit country by migrants on the route to Western Europe1, Bulgaria’s initiatives in 
the area of refugee reception and integration, have shown that Bulgaria is increasingly becoming a 
destination for refugees. Bulgaria is signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees since 1993. The national law governing refugees and 
asylum seekers in Bulgaria is the Law on A sylum and Refugees2, whose purpose is to harmonize the 
Bulgarian asylum legislation with international and European instruments, standards and practices.3
Governed by the centre-right political party Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria, Bulgaria 
has been historically considered a racially tolerant society. The worsening economic situation across 
Central and Eastern Europe has affected Bulgaria and t he country’s recent initiatives in the area of 
resettlement. In addition, Bulgaria’s ambitions to join the Schengen zone have translated in the growing 
militarization of Bulgaria’s border with Turkey, and on-going efforts aimed at reducing irregular 
migration.The prioritization of mounting political and economic issues have come at the expense of 
pressing asylum and refugee questions, such as this of resettlement. In addition, the strict border control of 
the external EU border has resulted in the marginalization of asylum seekers and refugees, increasingly 
seen as a threat to Bulgaria’s Schengen bid.  
 With 
the creation of the Law on Asylum and Refugees in 2002, the State Agency for Refugees with the Council 
of Ministers became UNHCR’s main government counterpart in Bulgaria, and is the single refugee authority 
responsible for examining applications for asylum made on the territory of Bulgaria.  
The number of refugees and asylum seekers in Bulgaria significantly increased following the wars in 
Former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq (1999 – 2004), and Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union 
in 2007 has been marked by a slight yet steady increase of applications. The country has never been faced 
with mass influx of refugees and t herefore temporary protection has never been granted. After an 
amendment in the national asylum law, the individuals who were granted protection acquired the right to 
family reunification as the recognized refugees, which was not accessible to them prior this amendment.  
By joining the EU, Bulgaria began to consider resettlement opportunities as a part of the harmonization 
processes. First official step in this respect was the establishment of an Intergovernmental Task Force on 
resettlement with an Order № P-57/03.03.2010, under the leadership of the State Agency for Refugees with 
the Council of Ministers. Finally, the resettlement was included in the Objectives of the national asylum 
administration4
Several consultations and colloquia were held since then, however until recently nothing was furthered 
on, either in legislation, or in policy or practice except a pr eliminary assessment report on resettlement 
prepared by the interagency working group at the end of the year 2010.  
 (2011), featuring as a plan the adoption of a s trategy and pol icy on resettlement until the 
end of the year. Also, the recent National Strategy on M igration, Asylum and Integration (2011 - 2020) 
merely stated that a nat ional resettlement strategy must be developed over the next few years within the 
UNHCR resettlement programme and in adherence to international resettlement standards.  
During the course of the year 2012, Bulgaria is doing everything possible to enhance its efforts in the 
area of asylum including resettlement. Considered as a big step in the field of international protections and 
national security, Bulgaria opened recently the first Transit Centre for Refugees in the village of Pastrogor, 
Svillengrad Municipality.  
 
                                                            
1 State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, Multi-Annual Programme. European Refugee Fund 
Department 2008. http://www.aref.government.bg/ebf/?cat=49 [accessed 16 November 2011], p. 6. 
2 Law on Asylum and Refugees Prom. State Gazette No. 54/31 May 2002, amend. State Gazette No. 39/20 May 2011.  
3 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR's Comments on the 2002 Law on Asylum and Refugees of Bulgaria, 19 
November 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f8fee4c4.html[accessed 4 November 2011].  
4 For more information: http://www.aref.government.bg/docs/celi_dab_2011.doc 
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On 13 June 2012 the government voted a formal decision to adopt and implement a Pilot Resettlement 
Program for refugees who were recognised by UNHCR in third countries. The responsible institution is the 
State Agency for Refugees. According to the Law on Asylum and Refugees the UNHCR mandate status 
holders automatically shall receive recognition in Bulgaria as well as a r efugee status. In addition, the 
Working Group (WG) on Resettlement is convoked on 18 October 2012 to work out a final Pilot Project on 
Resettlement where the exact parameters of the process and the profile of refugees to be resettled will be 
specified. The final draft Pilot project should be ready by the end of October 2012. 
Furthermore, the first resettlement activities will begin in 2013 and will include the development of the 
administrative capacity. They will be fully funded by the annual program 2012 of the ERF. Finally the 
Bulgarian government announced in June 2012 that it will resettle a g roup of 20 refugees in 2014. 
Nevertheless, it fears that public opinion will be negative about resettlement and i ntegration given the 
current financial crisis. According to all interviewed actors promotion of resettlement and practice should be 
done - in due course - within the society in order to receive as strong as possible support from the 
Bulgarian society.  
 
Asylum Profile 













192 (2011)  
• 182 Humanitarian Protection  
• 10 Refugee Status Granted 
 
138 (2010)  
• 118 Humanitarian Protection 
• 20 Refugee Status Granted 
 
890 (2011)  
 
1,025 (2010)  
Bulgaria is a non-resettlement country but it will participate in the joint 
EU Resettlement Programme by developing and implementing a small-
scale (20 refugees) pilot resettlement programme in 2014.7
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law on Asylum and Refugees, 
2002 last amended in 2011. 
Law for the Foreigners in the 
Republic of Bulgaria, 1998 last 
amended in 2011. 
No specific provision on resettlement in the national law and no such 
provision is envisaged until the assessment of the Pilot Resettlement 
programme in 2014. 
- guides all procedures and mechanisms for granting asylum, refugee 
and humanitarian status. Article 10 
- It also stipulates UNHCR’s role in monitoring the application of the 
Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol in Bulgaria. 
Article 53 (8) 
- regulates the entry, stay and exit of foreigners in Bulgaria. 
                                                            
5 Source: State Agency for Refugees. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Declaration of the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, 24 March 2011.” Bulgaria – equal partner in 
the building of the Common European Programme on Resettlement of Refugees, confirmed the 23 and 24 March, 
2011 in Sofia.” http://www.aref.government.bg/?cat=13&newsid=399 [accessed 14 November 2011]. Available only in 
Bulgarian.  
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Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Law on Bulgarian Citizenship; 
Law on P rotection against 
Discrimination; Health 
Insurance Act; Employment 
Promotion Act; Family 
Benefits for Children Act; and 
Law on Social Assistance Act. 
 
Agreement between the 
United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
and the Government of the 
Republic of Bulgaria, 1993 
 
Order N° P-57/03.03.2010 of 
the Prime Minister.  
 
Council of Minister Protocol 
No. 18340/13.06.2012 
regarding draft decision on the 
adoption of the report of the 
intergovernmental working 
group appointed by the above 
order, regarding the position 





These national laws contain provisions regarding the rights of refugees 





Covers mainly the co-operation between the Government and UNHCR 
in the field of international protection of and humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR. Article 2(1) 1 
The Agreement does not contain any reference to resettlement. 
 
Establishment of an Intergovernmental Task Force on R esettlement 
(RWG) with the objective to create a d raft pilot resettlement 
programme.  
A formal decision to adopt and implement a Pilot Resettlement 
Program for refugees who were recognised under the UNHCR 
mandate in third countries. The responsible institution is the State 
Agency for Refugees. According to the Law on Asylum and Refugees 
the UNHCR mandate status holders automatically shall receive 
recognition in Bulgaria as well as a refugee status. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
First resettlement activities will begin in 2013 and will include the 
development of the administrative capacity. The pilot Resettlement 
Programme will be implemented in 2014 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis 
End of 1950s and 1960s 
 
 
Refugees from Greece during the military regime8
b) On a programme basis 
. 
From 2014 
Pilot Resettlement Programme of 2014 foresees small-scale 
resettlement of 20 refugees. 
c) “Temporary 
Resettlement”: 
Humanitarian Evacuation n/a 
                                                            
8 Interview with Mrs. Anna Andreeva, State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, January 2012.  
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In 2010, the Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov confirmed that Bulgaria 
would receive one Guantanamo inmate under the Joint Statement of 
the European Union and its Member States and t he United States of 
America on the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and 
Future Counterterrorism Cooperation.9
In May 2011, the Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov announced the 
preparedness of Bulgaria to accept 2-4 North African refugees from 
Italy, as a sign of solidarity with Italy, which was experiencing an influx 
of illegal migrants, following uprisings in the Arab world.
 The inmate was a Syrian 
national and it was confirmed that he would be granted refugee status.  
10
III. Resettlement Implementation 
 There are no 
confirmed reports whether any North African refugees from Italy were 
resettled in Bulgaria. 
Refugees resettled n/a 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
• National Additional 
Criteria 
 
Bulgaria will comply with UNHCR criteria and recommendations for 
resettlement as well as Decision 573/2007/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007. 
Bulgaria is interested in resettling Afghani and Iraqi refugees from Turkey, 




Pre-Departure Activities n/a 
Procedure Timing n/a  
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 Status granted  
Article 10 of  Law on Asylum 
and Refugees. 12
The pilot resettlement programme foresees that the resettled refugee 
will be granted refugee status and will be entitled to and benefit from the 
rights and obligations outlined in the Law on Asylum and Refugees, and 
will have the potential to become naturalized citizen of Bulgaria.  
                                                            
9 Sofia News Agency, “Guantanamo Prisoner lands on Bulgarian Soil”, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=115919 [accessed February 27, 2012]. 
10 The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Iliana Savova, “Do We Have a Quota on Humaneness”, 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/publications/obektiv/iliana-savova/2011-08/do-we-have-quota-humaneness [accessed 
February 25, 2012]. 
11 Interview with Mrs. Anna Andreeva, op.cit.  
12 "Refugee status shall also be granted to any alien who is on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and has been 
recognised as a refugee under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees." 
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Rights and services granted 
 
Chapter II of the Law on 
Asylum and Refugees 





Rights granted for resettlement would be the same as outlined in the 
Law on Asylum and Refugees.  
Outlines the rights and obligations of foreigners seeking or having 
received protection in Bulgaria. 
Rights and Obligations of the foreigners having received protection 
would be equal to those of Bulgarian citizens with exceptions outlined in 
Article 32(1). 
Article 32 (2) stipulates the right to financial support for accommodation 
in a flat for a period of 6 months. 
 
Article 34 (1) right to family reunification. 
The State Agency for Refugees is the responsible institution for 
providing Bulgarian language courses, which however are not 
accessible to refugees arriving at different times of the regular school 
year. In addition, integration services such as language courses are 
only available in the capital Sofia, a s erious impediment to refugees 
wishing to live outside the capital.13
According to the preliminary report on resettlement the following 
services are foreseen to be pr ovided under priority 3 of  ERF -
“Resettlement for purposes of education and capacity building of the 
asylum national administration, local authorities and non-governmental 
organizations which would be leading with the resettled refugees”:-rent 
and utilities; language and professional education; scholarship (equal to 
minimum monthly salary); child’s tuition; initial accommodation 
assistance; health insurance; medical examination; transport; 
interpretation services; social assistance; adaptation course fees; 
seasonal clothing; etc.. 
 
The services provided will be al so in accordance with the National 
Program For Integration of Refugees14. Nevertheless, this programme 
does not quote any integration services for resettlement as such. It only 
states that for the period of 2011-2020 a National Resettlement 
Program for Refugees should be developed within UNHCR 




Before an annual programme could be implemented, Bulgaria needs to 
address its asylum situation. Improvements are needed in the area of 
refugee reception and integration. Bulgaria has been criticized for the 
lack of adequate reception and accommodation facilities. Both UNHCR 
and NGOs criticized receptions conditions which due to its practical 
arrangements excludes some of the most vulnerable categories such as 
extended families, single parents, elderly and disabled persons.  
The adoption of the National Programme for the Integration of Refugees 
already foresees improvements in these areas. Despite these 
improvements a better implementation of the programme should be 
pursued further. 
                                                            
13 United Nations High Commission for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Larry Bottinick and Areti 
Sianni, “No place to stay: A review of the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Bulgaria.” May 2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4dc3b9909.pdf [accessed 17 March 2012], p. 5. 
14 http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/EBCD864F-8E57-4ED9-9DE6-
B31A0F0CE692/0/NationalStrategyinthefieldofMigrationAsylumandIntgrationENG.pdf 
15 ibid. p.38 
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The State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers foresees 
the financing of resettlement initiatives by the European Refugee Fund 
under Decision 573/2007/EC. Starting from 2010 the budget for 
Resettlement capacity building and introducing the possibility of 
resettlement in Bulgaria is financed by both ERF and Bulgarian 
Government. 
25% of the financing for the establishment of administrative organs 
responsible for resettlement will be secured by the state budget. 
ERF contributes 75% of the financing for the establishment of 
administrative organs responsible for resettlement. 
Total: 27,628 € 
− 20,721 (EU contribution) 
− 6,907 (National Budget) 
Total: 24,000 € 
− 18,000 (EU contribution) 
− 6,000 (National Budget) 
Total: 24,060 € 
− 18,045 (EU contribution) 
− 6,015 (National Budget) 
Costs 
First resettlement activities will begin in 2013 an d will include the 
development of the administrative capacity. They will be fully funded by 
the annual programme 2012 of the ERF and by the state budget. No 
concrete figures are yet available for the funds that would be secured 
by the state budget.  
Comments  
 
Bulgaria has decided to take part in the EU resettlement programme 
with a pi lot quota of 20 refugees per calendar year, affirming with this 
the importance of establishing a mechanism for responsibility sharing 
with EU Member States and third countries unable to provide adequate 
protection for and integration of refugees. Thus there is a political will 
for resettlement behind this pledge.  
Bulgaria is interested in sharing expertise with first-time resettlement 
countries in Europe, an example of which is its decision to postpone the 
pilot resettlement programme given the unsuccessful resettlement of 
Bhutanese and Burmese refugees in first time resettlement countries in 
Central Europe. The failure to successfully resettle the refugees was 
arguably due to the culture and l anguage barriers, and i nability to 
effectively integrate the newly resettled refugees in these countries.18
                                                            
16 European Refugee Fund – Annual Programme 2011 Republic of Bulgaria, State Agency for Refugees with the Council 
of Ministers, 
 
Competent officials from the State Agency for Refugees with the Council 
of Ministers are seeking to accumulate knowledge and ac quire the 
necessary expertise for resettlement in the Bulgaria. Also, the financial 
stimulus provided by the European Refugee Fund by contributing 6000 
euro for every resettled refugee is considered an i mportant aspect of 
Bulgaria’s ambition for small-scale resettlement in 2014.  
http://www.aref.government.bg/ebf/index.php?cat=49 [accessed February 27, 2012]. 
17 European Refugee Fund – Annual Programme 2012, Annual Programme 2011, Annual Programme 2010. Republic of 
Bulgaria, State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, 
http://www.aref.government.bg/ebf/index.php?cat=49 [accessed February 27, 2012]. 
18 Interview with Mrs. Anna Andreeva, op.cit.  
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The established Iraqi, Afghani, Kurdish and Arab communities in 
Bulgaria make the country a favourable environment to resettle 
refugees coming from these ethnic groups.  
Overall, Bulgaria has demonstrated moderate political will to resettle, 
which has been impeded by the lack of financial resources to commit to 
this initiative, as well as the country’s fear of unpreparedness. In order 
to become a successful resettlement the Bulgarian Government should 
take into account the recommendations of different stakeholders- 
involved in this field- vis a vis the implementation of the resettlement 
programme itself. 
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Country Profile: CYPRUS 
Cyprus is located upon a strategic geopolitical point linking Europe with Turkey and the Middle East. The 
southern part of the island of Cyprus (or Greek-Cypriot part) has been a Member State of the EU since 
2004. Cyprus does not belong to the Schengen area, because of the territorial dispute with the northern 
(Turkish part) of the island. 
The Cypriot asylum system has only been established relatively recently. The Cypriot authorities have 
responsibility for handling asylum cases since January 1, 2002, when the Refugee Act (2000) replaced the 
UNHCR with the Cypriot Asylum Service for the processing of asylum applications.  
Since February 6th 2004, the responsibility for asylum was transferred to the newly founded Cypriot 
Asylum Service. The Asylum Service manages the European Refugee Fund which finances projects for the 
refugee integration and the improvement of their living conditions in Cyprus. A Dublin Regulation unit is 
included inside the structure of the Asylum Office, the main competence of which is to check whether an 
asylum application must be ex amined by Cyprus or another member-state. The Refugee Act of 2000 is 
completed by Regulations on asylum seekers introduced five years later (598/2005). 
The rate of foreigners in Cyprus is 127.3/1000, or 15.9% of the population (127,692 foreign nationals-EU 
citizens included), making Cyprus one of the EU countries with a very high rate of foreign nationals1
With regard to asylum applications, there has been a continuous decrease in the number of 
submissions: 3,922 in 2008; 3,199 in 2009; 2,882 in 2010; 1,766 in 2011
. EU 
citizens compose 10.4% of the population, while the amount of non-EU citizens is estimated at round 5.5%. 
Cyprus is one of the few EU member-states where there are more EU citizens residing than third nationals.  
2. Cyprus accepts ‘large flows of 
asylum seekers’ every year, due to its geographical location3
Cyprus is a country of first asylum for an increasing number of third nationals. Not only does Cyprus not 
have plans for resettlement but it also engages actively, with Malta, in negotiations with the EU with regard 
to relocation
. The authorities are trying to deal with the 
increasing amount of asylum applications. Besides that, the on-going financial crisis reduces the potential 




                                                            
1 6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad, EUROSTAT, 34/2011, p. 1 
2 Idem and Statistics of the Asylum service of Cyprus (2011) 
3 Interview with the Cypriot Asylum Authority, Natasa Andreou, for Head of the Asylum Service, Ministry of the Interior, 
January 2012. 
4 Idem. The legal provision can be found in the Article 20-K of the Law on Refugees, ‘Solidarity with other member 
states’. 
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Asylum Profile 














• 53 Refugee Status Granted 
• 15 Humanitarian Status 
• 1 Subsidiary Protection 
426 (2010) 
• 31 Refugee Status Granted 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law on Refugees, No 
6(1)/2000, 28 January 2000 
(With several modifications, 
last one in 2009) 
Regulations on the reception 
of Asylum seekers (No 
598/2005), 30 D ecember 
2005  
 
Law on aliens and 
immigration, 19 June 1952 
(with modifications, last 
amended in 2001) 
 
The Cypriot law does not explicitly make reference to ‘resettlement’ as 
such. Hence, we should look for legal dispositions open to interpretation 
for the possibility to resettle. Article 11 of the Law on Refugees (2000) 
states that ‘The application is submitted at all entry points of the 
Republic upon arrival of the applicant or within the Republic at any 
Police Station, and in case of the applicant’s detention or imprisonment, 
at the detention centers or the prisons where he is held7
However, Article 18(3) identifies the conditions of assessment of the 
refugee status by the administration. This assessment is being 
conducted on an individual basis and according to certain criteria. The 
presence of the applicant in the Cypriot territory is not considered as an 
indispensable condition of attribution of the refugee status.  
’. Therefore, the 
recognition of refugee status outside of the country’s territory does not 
seem to be possible.  
Finally, the interview with the Asylum service did not focus on the 
legislative obstacles when it comes to resettlement but rather on the 
political unwillingness to develop this practice. They do not exclude the 
possibility of future resettlement initiatives although at the moment this 
is unlikely8




                                                            
5 Statistics Service of the Republic of Cyprus (2011). 
6 Source: Asylum Service, Ministry of Interior. 
http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/asylum/Asylum.nsf/DMLstatistics_en/DMLstatistics_en?OpenDocument 
7 Source: Asylum Service, Ministry of Interior. 
http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/asylum/Asylum.nsf/DMLstatistics_en/DMLstatistics_en?OpenDocument 
8 Interview with the Cypriot Asylum Authority, Natasa Andreou, op.cit. 
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On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
None 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 










From Libya and Egypt: No data. The minister of foreign affairs declared 
in December 2011 that Cyprus reacted ‘effectively to the recent events 
in Libya and Egypt’.9
Lebanon: 
 
Cyprus became a de facto humanitarian evacuation station after the 
crisis in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, with the support of the EU10
40,000 evacuees were evacuated from Lebanon. Four days after the 
evacuation there were 5,197 EU citizens and 2,630 non-EU citizens in 
Cyprus. EU citizens were rapidly repatriated to their home countries. 
. 
In a Communication of the Ministry of Defense, it is reported that the 
Ministry and the General Staff of National Guard assisted and 
supported facility for military ships and aircraft involved in the 
evacuation of civilians from Lebanon to the Cypriot evacuation station11
The Minister of foreign affairs announced in December 2011:  
. 
[…]We must not ignore that in cases of instability plaguing North 
Africa and the Middle East, from the 1970's until today, Cyprus 
continues to be a humane shelter, tending a helping hand and 
cooperation, by addressing the immediate consequences of the crisis 
erupts or as a result of civil wars and military conflicts, or more recently 
the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. It is worth remembering the 
case where more than 60,000 Community and other foreign nationals 
were evacuated through Cyprus successfully, or found temporary 
asylum in our country, the events of 2006 and 2008 respectively took 
place in Lebanon, as we did also in the period 1975-1989, while also 
effectively responded to the most recent events in Egypt and Libya. 
Cyprus has established today that the mechanism can be managed 
successfully and efficiently as a result of such a nature panic 
evacuation, but also provides prospects for peaceful development with 




                                                            
9 Conference: ‘Cyprus between Europe and middle East’, University of Cyprus, Erato KOZAKOU-MARKOULI, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 16/12/2011, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/0/208BDAA7C48204D6C225796B002ED33E?OpenDocument&print 
10 European Union, Joint press release, 25 July 2006 
11 ‘The Defense Department supports the humanitarian evacuation of civilians from Lebanon’, Announcement of the 
Ministry of defense, 
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/All/F6115405EC2ED089C22571AF005A26B7?OpenDocument 
12 Conference: ‘Cyprus between Europe and middle East’, University of Cyprus, Erato KOZAKOU-MARKOULI, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, 16/12/2011, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/0/208BDAA7C48204D6C225796B002ED33E?OpenDocument&print 
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Cyprus is one of the EU Member States which views relocation as a 
solution to the challenges from massive immigration fluxes as well as a 




The Asylum Service of Cyprus declared: 
‘It is expected that in 2012, the Commission will propose a 
voluntary, permanent relocation scheme for beneficiaries of 
international protection. ‘Based on the experience from the two phases 
of the pilot project with Malta and taking into account EASO’s future 
engagement in relocation activities, the crucial questions could be 
whether the EU should develop a voluntary and permanent scheme for 
relocation of beneficiaries of international protection, following similar 
criteria and financial support as in the resettlement programmes. In 
particular, Member States could voluntary relocate in their territories 
beneficiaries of international protection from Member States which face 
particular pressures, based on s pecific indicators (e.g. population, 
surface, GDP)’14
III. Resettlement Implementation 
. 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
Cyprus is not viewing resettlement as an immediate option, especially 
because of the large amount of asylum applications it receives. As well 
as this, the current financial crisis that it is experiencing is a huge 
obstacle to any resettlement. However, a joint plan organized by the EU 
with financial support, may lead to further consideration of the possibility 
of resettlement. 
 
                                                            
13 Joint communiqué, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Italy, Spain, 19 April 2011, 
http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/press_releases/2011/04/DOI%20-%20pr0785A.asp 
14 Interview with the Asylum Service, op.cit.,  
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Country Profile: Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic has the specific status within the European Union of a s tate without external 
borders - with the exception of its international airports. Due to this characteristic, the country has a 
significant advantage compared to others lying on the EU’s external border as regards migration flows. In 
addition it has an advantage also with regards to the Dublin regulation. These factors contribute to the fact 
that the number of persons granted any form of international protection in the Czech Republic is very low.  
In terms of migration trends in the Czech Republic, asylum applications reached their peak in 2001 
when 18,094 persons applied for international protection. Since its accession to the European Union in 
2004, the country has experienced a decrease in the number of asylum applications and, as mentioned 
above, these remain very low in relative terms.  
Given the existing asylum infrastructure and available human and financial resources, there is potential 
for the Czech Republic to contribute further to the tackling of global refugee problems and to assisting 
refugees within the context of responsibility sharing initiatives alongside other developed countries. Since 
1999 the legislative framework on asylum has gone through different amendments and changes in order to 
comply with EU legislation on asylum and immigration. As a result of one of those amendments, the former 
two year mandatory period for re-submitting an application was no longer applicable due to the 
transposition of the Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status. This fact led to an even higher number of repeated applications - for example in 
2009- than in the previous year. 
In 2008 the Government of the Czech Republic adopted a resolution No. 745 which approved the official 
Concept of a National Resettlement Program. The Concept established the basis for the implementation of 
resettlement activities. It defined the resettlement procedures at all stages and stipulated the role of all 
stakeholders in the process.1
The adoption of the resettlement strategy was preceded by several humanitarian assistance 
programmes which were implemented by the Ministry of Interior. In 2005, the Czech Republic implemented 
-in close cooperation with UNHCR – a humanitarian operation by offering immediate protection to a group 
of Uzbek refugees who were forced to escape due to the forceful suppression of the social unrest in south–
eastern Uzbekistan.
 In addition, the legal framework for resettlement is based on the Geneva 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Asylum Act and Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals in the 
territory of the Czech Republic. 
2
Between the years 2008 – 2010, on the basis of the National Resettlement Strategy, 81 B urmese 
refugees from Malaysia and Thailand were resettled; in 2008 9 families and in 2010 8 families. The 
Burmese refugees were resettled due to their desperate situation in the countries of first asylum (Thailand 
and Malaysia), which are not signatories of the Geneva Convention. Therefore the chances of refugees to 
reach at least a basic level of protection are limited with no further chance to integrate into local societies 
due to their illegal status.  
. In 2007, another humanitarian operation was implemented in close collaboration with 
IOM and US administration and granted asylum to 3 Cuban families who were persecuted due t o their 
political convictions. In addition to that, in 2010 the Czech Republic granted asylum to a Cuban political 
prisoner and his family. The Czech Republic perceived the resettlement of Cuban refugees not only as aid 
specifically targeted at persons whose basic human and civil rights were severely violated, but also as an 
expression of solidarity with the citizens of a country with an authoritarian regime and a v ery low level of 
human rights. 
The resettlement quota is established each year according to the current situation. The number of 
refugees resettled each year counts in tens of persons - a requirement stipulated in The National 
Resettlement Strategy. The main organ to decide on the size of the future resettled group, the region of 
origin and an approximate timeframe for implementation is the Ministry of Interior.  
                                                            
1 http://www.mvcr.cz 
2 http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/asylum-migration-integration-asylum.aspx?q=Y2hudW09NQ%3D%3D 
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The system based on annual quotas was chosen due to its flexibility as it could be changed each year 
according to the current situation. And at the moment, there are no plans to change the current practice.3
Whereas in 2011 no resettlement activities were implemented, in the same year the Ministry of Interior 
committed to resettle- under Czech ERF annual programme 2012- 40 persons for 2012.  
  
In terms of the success of the past resettlement experiences, the opinions of the stakeholders 
interviewed differ. While some of them acknowledged the past resettlement experiences as a success, a 
number believed that the timing was too short between the two resettlement actions. It was felt that the first 
group was not fully integrated and after the second group arrived, little attention was given to the integration 
needs of the first group. 
Each resettlement activity is thoroughly evaluated in order to identify its positive as well as problematic 
aspects. Though the Czech Government is doing its best to tackle problems encountered during the 
resettlement activity, some problems - mainly during long term integration of resettled refugees -occur 
repeatedly. Those problems are often similar to those encountered by spontaneously arriving refugees. 
They are mainly rooted in exaggerated expectations and difficulties in adapting to a new environment.  
When it comes to the public opinion, it is necessary to separate the general one with the local one. The 
local community is open towards resettlement and resettled families. No xenophobic behaviour seems to be 
noticed, although there is a difference in reactions towards refugees from well-educated communities and 
less-educated ones. The less-educated communities seem to be m ore sceptical. Nevertheless, the 
relations seem to improve once the persons get to know each other. The regional media has been quite 
involved in promoting stories of the resettled families. Furthermore the cooperation with the regional and 
local media was considered as excellent.  
As opposed to the local community, the general public does not seem to know about the resettlement 
and is not even interested in it. The media marginalise the foreigners by picturing them negatively. Though 
the resettlement activities carried out in Czech Republic were mostly covered by the media; the government 
does not possess yet any detailed strategy how to use media in the resettlement process.  
The Czech Republic could resettle more but before doing so it would be necessary to increase the 
capacity to assist the resettled refugees during the integration process from a longer term perspective. In 
addition, the Czech Government should address many aspects of effective resettlement processes starting 
with a pr oper and s trategic planning of activities, deep c oordination of all stakeholders involved and a 
stronger involvement of NGOs, churches and local authorities. Moreover, the current development at the 
EU level offers some instruments including financial incentives which would help to use resettlement in a 
more strategic way.  
                                                            
3 Interview with Ms Kateřina Šimová from Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic conducted on 15 February 2012. 
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Asylum Profile 













• 108 Refugee Status Granted 
• 261 Subsidiary Protection 
229 (2010) 
• 125 Refugee Status Granted 
• 104 Subsidiary Protection 
756 (2011) 
833 (2010) 
Annual resettlement programme since 2008.  
 
2012: 40 refuges annually6





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act No. 325/1999 on Asylum 
and Amendments to Act No. 
283/1991 on the Police of the 
Czech Republic of 11 
November 1999, as amended 
(Asylum Act) – last 
amendment 375/2010 entered 







 on the 
Residence of Foreign Nationals 
in the Territory of the Czech 
Republic of 30 November 1999, 
as amended (Foreign National 
Residence Act) – last 
amendment 375/2010 entered 
into force 1.4.2012 
Specific provision on resettlement: Section 90. 
Regulates refugee’s status eligibility and status criteria-asylum seekers 
and resettled refugees: 
• Article 12 defines the criteria for granting refugee status.  
• An alien who applies for international protection will be gr anted 
asylum or subsidiary protection if s/he meets the criteria laid down 
in section 12, 13, 14, 14a or 14b.  
• Refugees accepted for resettlement following submission of 
UNHCR are all granted asylum under the criteria defined in the 
Section 12. 
• Section 90 facilitates the granting of asylum to foreign nationals 
without previous proceedings to an al ien recognized as a refugee 
the mandate of UNHCR.  
• In other cases resettled persons will be granted asylum under the 
same criteria as asylum seekers as defined in Section 12, 13 or 14.  
Establishes the conditions for entry of foreign nationals to and their 
departure from the Czech Republic, lays down conditions for the residence 
of foreign nationals in the Czech Republic and defines the scope of 
competences of the Police of the Czech Republic.  
 
                                                            
4 Ministry of the Interiror of the Czech Republic available at the website http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/statistical-
reports-on-international-protection-seekers-and-refugees-86918.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mw%3d%3d 
5 Ibid. 
6 Source: UNHCR 
7 Commission Communication to the EP and the Council on the establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme, 
COM(2009) 447 final available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0447:FIN:EN:PDF 
8 http://www.mvcr.cz/.../act-on-the-residence-of-foreign-nationals-pdf.aspx 
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Other basis of resettlement: 
Communication of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Czech 
Republic No. 20/2003 of 8 
February 2000 
Resolution N° 745 of 26 June 
2008  
Agreement between the 
Government of the Czech 
Republic and the UNHCR on 
the co-operation in the refugee 
resettlement – signed on 5 
March 2009 and entered into 
force on 10 April 2009  
Resolution N° 1147 of 7 
September 2009  
Resolution N° 213 of 15 
march 2010 
 
On the conclusion of an Agreement between the Government of the Czech 
Republic and the UNHCR on t he legal status of the UNHCR and i ts 
personnel in the Czech Republic. 
 
Accepts the Concept of National Resettlement Programme. 
 





Approves the continuation of the resettlement programme of the Burmese 
refugees from Malaysia under the above concept. 
Approves the implementation of the national resettlement programme of 
resettlement of the Burmese refugees from Malaysia and Thailand. 
 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
No on-going projects or reform are foreseen for the time being.  
 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  














The establishment of a resettlement strategy was preceded by 
humanitarian assistance programmes, which were implemented by the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic in 2005 and 2007 through the 
resettlement of Uzbek and Cuban refugee groups. 
15  
 
Country of Origin : 15 Uzbekistan 
Country of First Asylum : 15 Romania9








Country of Origin : 10 Cuba 
 
5 (A political prisoner with his family)12
 
 
Country of Origin : 5 Cuba 
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b) On a programme basis 
    2009 
 
2008 – 2010 - National 
resettlement programme 
(approved by Resolution N° 
745 of 26 June 2008)  
2008 – Pilot project on 
resettlement 
Annual quota is based on the current situation and on a needs analysis13
The main objective of the programme is the humanitarian consideration, 
efforts to provide assistance to needy and vulnerable groups of refugees 
who have no other prospects of refuge other than resettlement.  
. 
Each resettlement action, in the context of an annual plan, is implemented 
after the adoption of decision of the Minister of Interior (MoI).  
 
The objective is to resettle a gr oup of several families (20-30 people) of 





1993-2010 - Humanitarian 









126 patients from localities affected by war or natural disasters 
Country of origin:  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - predominately children 17; 
•  Kosovo-40 
• Chechnya – 1 
• Iraq –disabled refugees 42 
• Pakistan – 10 
• Afghanistan -14 
• Cambodia – 2 
d) Through other Projects 
Governmental Level 
- 2007 - ARGO twinning 
Project ‘Durable 
Solutions in Practice’- 
between the Czech 





ERF projects  
                  2011 
                       2010 
 
 
                       2009 
 
 





Aims to broaden cooperation related to the implementation of Community 
law and exchanges of experience with resettlement between partner 
organisations of MS. 
Aims to enable countries which do not have their own resettlement 
programmes to acquire sufficient theoretical and pr actical experience on 
the basis of which these countries will be able to reconsider their options in 
this area or to establish their own resettlement programmes. 
Organization for Aid to Refugees (OPU)– Beginning in a New Country.  
 
Association of Citizens Assisting Emigrants (SOZE) – Together in New Home  
 
OPU – New Beginning.  
Refugee facility administration (RAF) – Establishing and operating IAC for 
resettled persons and their following integration.  
SOZE– Resettlement – New Beginning I, II. (2009) 
RAF – Methodological and personal preparation for accepting resettled 
persons.  
ICMC -"European Resettlement Network for Practical Cooperation in 
Resettlement"16
                                                            
13 The UNHCR Resettlement Handbook – Country Chapter on the Czech Republic, July 2011 available at: 
 (implemented in close collaboration with UNHCR and 
ECRE) to foster practical cooperation in resettlement, and to promote the 
establishment of the new network, in partnership with seven European 
NGO's engaged in the resettlement and/ or integration of refugees. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,CZE,,4ecb9c0027,0.html 
14 2010 Status Report on Migration in the Czech Republic, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, 2011 
15 More details in 2007 Status Report on Migration in the Czech Republic, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, 
2008, p. 172-173 
16 More information available at: http://www.icmc.net/icmc-launches-new-network-support-refugee-resettlement-europe 
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The Czech Republic refused to accept detainees from Guantanamo Bay 
repeatedly in 2005 and 2009 as it was not equipped for that. 
 
The Czech Republic is not involved in any project of Intra EU relocation and 
does not consider participating in a future as it does not favour the idea of the 
distribution of migrants within the EU. It is of an opinion that the 
implementation of a pilot resettlement project concerning Malta brought a 
number of problematic aspects, such as high administrative and logistical 


























Country of Origin: 39 Burma 
Country of First Asylum: 16 Malaysia, 23 Thailand 





Country of Origin: 16 Burma 
Country of First Asylum: 16 Malaysia 
Religion: 16 Christian 
Ethnicity: 16 Chin 
 
23 
Country of Origin: 23 Burma 
Country of First Asylum: 23 Malaysia 
Religion: 23 Christian 
Ethnicity: 23 Chin 
 
                                                            
17 The Czech Republic´s position on migration prepared by working group for a Parliament, to be announced to the EU 
Institutions, 5. 6. 2011 (document available only in Czech). 
18 Source: Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. 
19 The Chin people are one of the large ethnic minority groups in Burma. 
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a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
 
• UNHCR Criteria 
1951 Geneva 
Convention and 1967 
Protocol 
 






Only persons complying with the criteria contained in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and 1967 Protocol and the criteria laid down in Czech law 
(especially the Asylum Act) will be considered for resettlement in the 
Czech Republic under the national resettlement programme. Eligibility 
criteria relate to persons with a well founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par ticular social 
group or political opinion. In case of a family (that is married couple with 
minors, in special cases also other family relative) it is enough if only one 
of the persons could comply with the above criteria.  
Eligibility criteria for resettlement of a particular person or family could also 
be based on other specific humanitarian factors according to the Czech 
Asylum Act, such as: seriously ill persons, children, women at risk and 
other cases, in which “humanitarian asylum status” is granted. 20
In addition to the above criteria, some integration aspects are also taken 
into consideration such as: the willingness of the refugee in question to be 
resettled to the Czech Republic and the willingness to integrate into the 
Czech Republic.  
 
Nevertheless exclusion factors are applied for persons subject to article 1F 
of the Geneva Refugee Convention and section 15 of the Asylum Act. 
Additionally, resettlement of an individual to the Czech Republic must not 
present a threat to public health or public order and must not harm the 
Czech Republic’s national and international interest.  
Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 













One or more members of the Resettlement group. 
 
The Resettlement Group interviews the people in need of resettlement in 
the country of first asylum and nominates them. Then, it is Minister of 
Interior who decides on the refugee status of the resettled persons.  
The selection of persons to be resettled is based on combined methods: 
facts known from the UNHCR Resettlement Registration Form and a 
private interview with each person. During the selection mission, the 
relevant asylum-related information referred to in the UNHCR file are being 
verified, supplemented and amplified. Found information are processed as 
a resettlement and integration folder, which offers crucial guidance in the 
selection process and becomes part of the ‘asylum file’ of each recognized 
refugee – resettled person. 
In the case of a dossier based decision, there are no possibilities to make 
an appeal or other recourse against the decision not to accept a refugee 
for resettlement into the Czech Republic.  
The above - mentioned “selection missions” (a trip of several days) are 
conducted by the Resettlement Group in the country where refugees are 
placed and mostly in the country of first asylum.  
In certain cases, resettlement may be organized in cooperation with another 
organization or another state or possibly without third-party participation, i.e. 
it may be ar ranged purely within the scope of Czech administration. The 
rules set for the resettlement process are then applied mutatis mutandis. 
 
 
                                                            
20 The UNHCR Resettlement Handbook – Country Chapter on the Czech Republic, July 2011. 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
 










• Medical screening 
 
This is done by the Resettlement Group when interviewing the people in 
need of resettlement in the country of first asylum – the personal contact is 
an opportunity to provide individuals with initial information about what they 
can expect from resettlement in the Czech Republic and t o what extent 
they will receive assistance on arrival. 
Persons who are to be resettled in the Czech Republic are issued with a 
90-day residence visa. This visa is issued in a t ravel document at the 
individual’s disposal, which is recognized by the Czech Republic, possibly 
using also the visa attachment form. If individuals do not hold a travel 
document from their country of origin, or if circumstances prevent them 
from using this document, then the admission related issues is solved in 
the cooperation between the Ministry of Interior, Directorate of the Aliens 
and Border Police Services and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The medical screening in the country of first asylum is done by UNHCR. 
There is another medical screening after arrival in the Czech Republic and 
transfer in the Integration Asylum Centre. 
Procedure Timing The required processing time from file reception to departure of refugees 
may vary from several weeks up to several months (emergency cases 
within few days).21
Comments  
. Transport from the current asylum country to the Czech 
Republic is organized usually within few weeks.  
According to the Resettlement Concept, the Resettlement Group (RG) 
plays a s ignificant role in pre-departure activities. However because this 
Committee is only composed of representatives from ministries and does 
not include other stakeholders who also have expertise in resettlement, the 
quality of the decision–making process could be impacted upon. Emphasis 
is given to the selection of the members of the RG as the first ones 
conducting interviews with the people in need of resettlement.  
There is room for improvement in the pre-departure activities as well in the 
country of first asylum, in particular the selection of people in need of 
resettlement and the quality of information for the host country provided to 
those people. Consequently, there is only a little knowledge about the pre-
departure activities among the stakeholders interviewed. Furthermore, 
“integration system tools” for vulnerable groups is missing.  
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
Status granted  
Legal source  
Asylum Act No. 325/1999 of 11 
November 1999 as amended 









Resettled refugees who were already granted refugee status by the 
UNHCR are provided with international protection in the form of asylum in 
accordance with the Section 12 an d Section 90 of the Asylum Act 
(facilitates the granting of asylum to foreign nationals without previous 
procedure if they have been granted refugee status by a decision of the 
UNHCR – asylum procedure in the Czech Republic only formality) 
In other cases (without the UNHCR refugee status), resettled persons will 
be granted international protection in the form of asylum in accordance 
with Section 12, Section 13 or Section 14 in keeping with the results of the 
asylum procedure they passed through on a rrival in the Czech Republic 
(undergoing the regular asylum procedure in the Czech Republic – 
decision on international protection taken by the Ministry of Interior) 
Until the asylum is granted they are legally considered as asylum seekers. 
 
                                                            
21 See details in the UNHCR Country Chapter on the Czech Republic. 
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Act No. 40/1993 on the 
Acquisition and Loss of 
Citizenship of the Czech 
Republic as amended by 
124/2008 (entered into force 
1.7.2008) 
Resettled persons who comply with the relevant provisions of this Act may 
be granted citizenship on request (5 years of permanent residence, certain 
level of Czech…), if citizenship is granted, their refugee status is 
automatically ceased. 
 
Rights granted  
Legal source: 
Asylum Act No. 325/1999 of 
11 November 1999 as 
amended by 375/2010 Coll.  














Info upon arrival/granting of 






Preparing Local community  
 
Developing integration  
programme (housing, 
employment assistance, 
education for children, 




They have the same rights and obl igations as citizens of the Czech 
Republic; except the right to vote, to serve in the Army of the Czech 
Republic and to hold some public offices.  
List of rights:  
Access to the fundamental human, civil, political, economic, social and 




The right to reside permanently in the Czech Republic (the validity period 
(10) years of the decision granting them international protection in the form 
of asylum), for this purpose they will be i ssued a r ecognized refugees 
Residence Permit (as identification). 
Once entering the Czech Republic the resettled refugees are assisted by 
the responsible staff to go t hrough customs and p assport control. Right 
after their arrival the resettled refugees are taken to one of the Integration 
Asylum Centres (IAC), where they will reside the following six months.  
The staffs in charge are from the IOM, the service responsible for 
coordinating resettlement OAMP23 and from RFA24
 
 responsible for 
integration.  
No later than two days after their arrival, all resettled refugees need to 
formally apply for international protection. Members of staff from the OAMP 
carry out the necessary formal procedures in order to be granted asylum 
status to the resettled persons. This procedure includes the registration of 
an application for international protection, prepared in advance by 
reference to observations made from the UNHCR file and supplementary 
interview, and its entry in the electronic registration system. The necessary 
procedures of the aliens policing service will also be arranged accordingly. 
Resettled persons will subsequently receive a decision granting them 
international protection in the form of asylum. 
Seminars for public organised by NGOs in years 2008 and 2009, funded 
from the European Refugee Fund (ERF). 
A six months multilateral assistance is provided in the Integration 
Asylum Centre (IAC) in order to enable the resettled refugees to adapt 
to their new setting.  
 
For the first six months the resettled persons are accommodated in IAC; 
the family ties of resettled persons and their nationality and r eligion is 
respected.  
 
                                                            
22 See http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/integration-of-recognized-refugees-913320.aspx 
23 Department of the Policy on Asylum and Migration (OAMP). 
24 Refugee Facility Administration (RFA). 
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Services 
 






Financial assistance  
 
 
Courses on integration and socio-cultural issues like for example: health 
care, education, finance, employment, cultural and social habits and so on, 
are organized in IAC by focusing on issues related to day to day life in the 
Czech Republic. During this period cooperation between the IAC and 
NGOs is set up to support the integration process of the resettled refugees.  
From the perspective of long-term successful integration, a major step is 
the provision of integration flats in the context of access to the labour 
market. Resettled refugees fall under the National State Integration 
Programme which has been developed to support the integration process 
for refugees.  
Municipalities, on v oluntary bases, offer rental contracts to refugees and 
are also eligible for donations from the Czech government for infrastructure 
development and financial support to furnish these apartments. Refugees 
sign standard municipal lease agreements, usually for one y ear with an 
automatic extension up to 5 years.  
It is possible to provide social, legal and psychological counselling in IAC, 
where necessary. A project with target group resettled people focusing on 
complex care, incl. social-legal counselling, was provided to the resettled 
people in 2010 and 2011 by NGOs.  
Refugees have mandatory health insurance similar in coverage and 
conditions as those provided to Czech citizens. 
During the staying period in IAC, resettled refugees attend intensive 
courses of Czech language (400hrs) and social cultural adaptation course.  
After moving in integration flats the Czech lessons are organised by NGOs, 
funded from ERF. 
Shortly after arrival in the Czech Republic all children (under 18) start 
attending primary or secondary schools. The integration of these children 
has so far proved to be very effective and efficient.  
Based on the National Resettlement Program Concept the resettled 
refugees are assisted to enter the labour market and the education system 
of the Czech Republic. They will also be provided with assistance to find 
employment and as well as employment–related training on the individuals 
needs and their capacity to speak the Czech language.  
In the year 2009, 3 children were resettled to be reunified with the 
Burmese resettled families.  
 
This is done according to the National Resettlement Programme in the IAC 
and within the ERF project from an NGO. 
 
No project is implemented by involving voluntary work of the other 
refugees’ communities in Czech Republic.  
 
As mentioned above the Government gives financial contribution to 
municipalities for the integration flats. This contribution must be used on 
development of infrastructure within the municipality only.  
 
Resettled refugees have the same rights and o bligations as citizens 
also when it comes to social welfare and financial assistance, including the 
case of unemployment. However in cooperation with municipalities, 
resettled refugees are eligible for special social assistance aiming to help 
better and faster integration on local level for a period of one year.  
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Comments The integration of the second resettled group of Burmese refugees has 
been considered a better experience than the first resettlement. This is 
largely due to a change of integration practice after moving the refugees 
into special integration accomodation.  
The role of the Resettlement Facility Administration has become 
somewhat unclear after the resettled persons leave the Integration 
Asylum Centre (IAC).  
In general the cooperation between municipalities and NGOs is 
viewed as being successful. It is suggested that training on c ultural 
background of the specific ethnic group resettled should be provided to 
officials and to actors involved in the resettlement.  
When it comes to the integration programme it is considered that there 
is a lack of capacity in time and lecturers for Czech lessons. Furthermore, 
the location of integration accommodation is viewed as an important 
factor which impacts upon the integration process of the refugees being 
resettled. They are usually located in small towns in which the job 
opportunities are very low.  
Most of municipalities managed to provide temporary jobs for at least 
one of the families. 
Some sustainable model of financing and ensuring essential services 
and support for the resettled group should be created. This model should 
ensure the resettled persons have access to supporting assistance, after 
moving into the integration accommodation, for a period longer than one 
year. The existing model, whereby the assistance is funded from the 
European Refugee Fund is viewed as being unsatisfactory and inflexible. 
A better cooperation should be amongst the central government, local 
authorities and NGOs involved in resettlement. 
 










-European Refugee Fund  
 
ERF 2008 
− EU contribution:  
− National budget:  
 
 
The cost of operating the Centre and other integration-related expenditure 
are covered after a negot iating/barging process with the service 
responsible for coordinating resettlement and with the organization 
managing the Centre.  
The Refugee Facility Administration (RFA) provides assistance out of his 
own resources or via non-governmental organizations for a m aximum 
period of one year after resettled persons leave the Centre. In cases 
meriting special consideration, this assistance may be pr ovided for a 
longer period.  
ERF III supports resettlement programmes and actions related to the 
integration of persons whose stay is of a lasting and stable nature.  
 
Total : 166, 666,66 € 
− 135,000€ 
− 45, 000 € 
                                                            
25 Source: Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. 
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ERF 2009 
− EU contribution:  
− National budget:  
− In addition:  
ERF 2010 
− EU contribution :  
− National budget :  
− In addition:  
ERF 2011 
− EU contribution :  
−  National budget :  
− In addition: 
Total : 166, 666,66 € 
− 125,000€ 
− 41, 666,66 € 
− 64, 000 € (EU contribution)26
Total : 132, 000 € 
 
− 99, 000 € 
− 33, 000€ 
− 88, 000 € (EU contribution)27
Total: 53, 333,33 € 
 
− 40, 000 € 
− 13, 333,33 € 






The Czech Republic has an existing and well developed asylum 
infrastructure. It has substantial experience with asylum seekers, refugees 
and is gaining experience in resettlement. The financial assistance given 
through the ERF has been extremely important. 
The main reasons that lead the Czech Republic to commit to resettlement 
were based on its previous long lasting resettlement experience (Czech 
compatriots from USSR or Kazakhstan) and on its well established 
infrastructure of refugee facilities (also number of NGOs providing refugees 
with broad assistance in integration process) and professional staff working 
with refugees. Moreover, due to a gradually declining number of asylum 
seekers, the Czech Republic was able to identify enough human and 
financial resources in its asylum infrastructure for further involvement in 
global refugee problems and burden sharing together with other EU 
countries. The resettlement activities are planned according to capacities 
in terms of both reception and integration.29
The main incentive as for today remains, still, the financial assistance 
provided by European funds which can be used to co-finance various 
activities related to resettlement and integration of resettled refugees. The 
approved joint EU resettlement program is an incentive to countries like 
the Czech Republic which are newly committed to resettlement. However, 
in the future the Czech Republic would also welcome organisational and 
logistical support, mainly with respect to selection and cultural-orientation 
missions (preferably through the EASO). The EU’s financial help is 
viewed as sufficient but the opinion is now commonly held that the EU 
should play a bigger role in countries of first asylum. 
 
 
                                                            
26 This amount relates to a fixed amount of € 4000 for resettled persons in accordance with Article 13 (3) of the Decision 
of the European Parliament and Council No. 573/2007/EC. The 2009 ERF annual programme foresaw resettlement 
of approximately 16 people (3 unaccompanied minors, 10 children and women at risk of psychological, physical or 
sexual violence or exploitation and 3 persons with serious medical condition. These persons are eligible for special 
financial assistance amounting to 4 000, - EUR (64 000). 
27 The 2010 ERF annual programme foresaw resettlement of approximately 22 persons who are entitled to 
special financial support amounting to 4 000, - EUR (88 000) in accordance with Article 13 (3) of the Decision 
573/2007/EC. 
28 The Czech Republic foresaw to resettle 11 pe ople (unaccompanied minors, children and women at risk of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence or exploitation) who are entitled to special financial assistance of a fixed 
amount of € 4000 for resettled person in accordance with Article 13 (3) of the Decision 573/2007/EC. 
29 Interview with Ms Kateřina Šimová from Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic conducted on 15 February 2012. 
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Country Profile: Denmark 
Denmark has had limited experience of immigration and so it remains one of the few countries in Western 
Europe with a relatively small migrant population.  
The 1980s was the first time that the Danish state experienced a r elatively large influx of migrants. 
Denmark had a booming economy at the time but its birth rate started to decline. As a result, immigrants 
have formed an increasing proportion of the Danish population. In 1980 immigrants constituted 1% of the 
total population. That figure has now increased to 6%. 
This growth has sparked a very polarized debate concerning migration issues and the effects that they 
have on a country that until quite recently remained homogenous and distinctly mono –cultural.  
Throughout the 1990s, Denmark was governed by the Social-Democrats, while the Conservatives ruled 
the country between 2001 and 2011, supported by the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) who have 
long advocated for tougher measures for migrants. The Danish People’s Party has contributed to keeping 
immigration on the political agenda since its foundation in 1995. Immigration has in fact become of 
widespread concern in Danish society. This political climate has lead to a series of laws which have 
impacted upon immigration control.  
Stricter rules are now implemented for Non-EU immigrants that access the country. They are required to 
learn Danish and become familiar with Denmark’s history and culture, while access to the social welfare 
system remains tightly controlled.  Denmark has also targeted people who intend on using marriage as a 
means of gaining access to Denmark.1
Over the past few years there has been a f all in numbers of asylum seekers. In 2011 about 3.800 
persons applied for asylum in Denmark. The Immigration Service ruled in 3.400 asylum applications cases 
in 2011, and approximately 33 % were granted asylum.
 
2
In the fall of 2011, the social democrats regained power, and the country is now run by a l eft-wing 
coalition. The current Government took the office with a 
 
pledge to ease up on the strict regulations. New 
immigration laws are already implemented for family reunification cases and for cases involving permanent 
residence. Furthermore, other significant changes in law are scheduled to come into effect.  
Immigration laws and the Danish state are moving toward a more liberal immigration regime but the 
Danish immigration policy will still be stringent. Even with the ratification of the new laws in 2011, Denmark 
will continue to have some of the most harsh immigration laws in Europe. 
Despite Denmark being reputed to be particularly strict as to its immigration law and policy, in terms of 
refugees, Denmark has for many years contributed to finding durable solutions through resettlement.  
Since 1979, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) in cooperation with UNHCR and the Danish Refugee 
Council (DRC) has implemented the resettlement programme. The involvement of the Danish Refugee 
Council is partly based on historic circumstances in Denmark and partly because of the close links between 
UNHCR and the DRC leading to the DRC being the implementing partner of UNHCR in Denmark. Until 
June 2005, the Danish Refugee Council was a m ember of the Resettlement Quota Committee, which 
decided on the overall distribution of the quota places. After a change of the law in 2005, the Committee 
was abolished and the responsibility for allocating the quota was made political and given to the Minister of 
Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (now the Minister of Justice) based on recommendations from 
the Danish Immigration Service (DIS). 
For many years the funding has covered an annual allocation of 500 resettlement places for refugees. 
As of July 2005, Denmark started operating a flexible quota programme lasting three years and consisting 
of 1500 places. The first three-year flexible quota period ended in December 2007 with only 17 unf illed 
quota places that were converted to funds managed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The present 
period started 1 January and will run until 31 December 2013.  
                                                            
1 The law now stipulates that for marriages involving a Dane and non –EU or non-Nordic citizen, both parties have to be 
aged over 24 and the Dane must be independent of government aid.  
2 Data from https://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/coming_to_dk/asylum/asylum.htm 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 85
 KNOW RESET Country Profile: Denmark 
The Danish People’s Party has had a n impact on resettlement. In 2005, that party introduced new 
integration criteria. In its efforts to loosen some of the stifling immigration laws the Government has 
announced that the integration criteria will soon be abolished. The stakeholders view this abolition as 
crucial and that this abolition should be implemented as soon as possible.  
Up until this point in time, the implementation of resettlement in Denmark has been considered as being 
successful through all phases. Danish stakeholders view it as a model from which other EU countries could 
benefit. In Denmark, existing refugee communities play an important role in resettlement by being involved 
in the resettlement programme. This participation is mainly in terms of the reception of the new comers. 
The Burmese are very good at creating their own associations and networks, as are the Bhutanese. The 
Congolese are not involved to the same extent.  
Although the public is generally not aware of the difference between resettled refugees and other 
refugees, this is not seen as a problem. When explained there is a generally a positive attitude, because it 
is easier to understand why refugees living in camps in some countries need to come to Denmark for better 
protection. The national media do n ot write very much about resettlement as such but sometimes local 
media may write about the activities of the local volunteer groups.  
Danish stakeholders generally agree that the EU should play a role in promoting resettlement in the 
member states. However, since the Danish programme has run independently for many years, the NGO’s 
do not focus on the EU but on national plans. 
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Asylum Profile 











2,250 (2011)  
 
2,124 (2010) 
797 (Refugee Status) 
1,327 (Other Protection i.e. Subsidiary protection,                                    
Humanitarian protection) 
3,811 (2011) 
5,115 (2010)  
Programme-Based (1978) 
1500 refugees/3 years6
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Udlændingeloven (Danish 
Aliens Act) (24/08/2011). 
 
 
Specific provision on Resettlement, as amended in 2005.  
Section 8 provides the legal basis for the Danish resettlement 
programme. It is a precondition that resettlement to Denmark takes place 
based on an arrangement with UNHCR or a similar international 
organisation. To qualify for resettlement to Denmark, the person must 
meet either the criteria of section 8 (1), (2) or (3). 
Other basis of 
resettlement: n/a 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The new government elected in 2011 is critical to the selection criteria 
and might remove them in favour of humanitarian criteria (see, the 
government’s statement of purpose in 20117
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
). Further, Enhedslisten 
(support party of the ruling coalition) is pushing to double the quota but 
whether this will happen remains unclear. 
a) On an ad hoc basis 
In the years prior to 1967 
In 1974, Denmark accepted 
refugees from the group of 
some 50 000 persons with 
Asian origin who were 




• 150 handicapped persons that had resided in UNHCR camps since 
World War 2. 
• 158 refugees from families with at least one handicapped member. 
Most of these moved on to English speaking countries shortly after. 
                                                            
3 Source: Danmarks Statistik. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Source: The Danish Immigration Service. 
6 Although the Danish quota is flexible in terms of numbers (1500 places over 3 years) the allocation process takes place 
every year starting with the presentation of the UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs report in July. 
7 http://um.dk/da/~/media/Tyrkiet/Documents/Regeringsgrundlaget2.ashx 
8 Ibid. p. 57 
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b) On a programme basis 
1976-19799
Udlændingeloven  




2005 and ongoing  
 
1976-1979-“Ten-Or-More” agreement with UNHCR in which Denmark 
accepted at least 10 handicapped refugees. This led to Denmark getting a 
reputation for being a resettlement country that accepted weak, 
handicapped, and elderly refugees – a tradition that ended in the 2000s. 
 
Quota of 500 refugees per year10
Quota of 1,500/3 years with a target of roughly 500/year
 
11
I. Sub-quota: circa 75 urgent cases 
 
II. Sub-quota: 20 or more for specially sick or handicapped (the 





































Country of Origin: 4 Bhutan, 140 Burma, 2 Burundi, 2 Colombia, 12 
Congo Brazzaville, 154 DR of Congo, 29 Eritrea, 7 Ethiopia,  1 Iran, 1 
Ivory Coast, 1 Jordan, 3 Stateless Palestine, 1 Rwanda, 11 Somalia, 
143 Stateless, 4 Sudan, 1 Uganda. 
Country of Asylum: 140 Malaysia (Burmese), 4 Nepal (Bhutanese),  154 
Zimbabwe (Congolese), 218 Other 
Status Granted: 382 Convention status, 98 Subsidiary protection, 31 
humanitarian residence, 5 Resettled as unaccompanied minors.  
494 
Country of Origin: 12 Afghanistan, 170 Bhutan, 160 Burma, 100 DR of 
Congo, 1 Eritrea, 7 Ethiopia,  6 Iraq, 2 Iran, 4 Russia (Chechenya), 5 
Rwanda, 7 Somalia, 20 Other. 
Country of Asylum: 132 Africa, 350 Asia, 4 Europe, 5 MENA. 
452 
Country of Origin: 21 Afghanistan, 157 Bhutan, 6 Burma, 23 Burundi, 145 
DR of Congo, 1 Eritrea,  17 Iraq, 17 Iran, 15 Liberia, 4 Russia (2 from 
Chechenya), 13 Somalia, 8 Stateless Palestinians, 8 Sudan, 19 Other. 
Country of Asylum: 215 Africa, 184 Asia, 4 Europe, 49 MENA. 
 




12 Danish Immigration Service. 
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2008 564  
Country of Origin: 18 Afghanistan, 157 Bhutan, 155 Burma, 122 DR of 
Congo, 41 Iraq, 9 Russia, 17 Rwanda, 1 Somalia, 1 Stateless, 8 
Stateless Palestinians, 12 Uzbekistan, 2 Other. 
Country of Asylum: 140 Africa, 341 Asia, 9 Europe, 72 MENA. 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
 
• Additional National 
Criteria 
The criteria were 
introduced on June 1, 
2005. 
Udlændingeloven 
(24/08/2011): §8 (3) 
 
 
The legal basis for recognition of refugees in Denmark accords with the 
1951 Convention of Refugees. Resettlement criteria consider the 
protection needs according to the UNHCR mandate first.  
Article 8(3) of the Danish Aliens Act, stipulates the eligibility criteria, for 
resettlement as follows: (1) be in humanitarian need in which case it is 
appropriate to grant a r esidence permit, (2) not to have been able to 
return to the home country for an ex tended period of time, (3) be an 
unaccompanied minor, (4) have the essential qualifications to be granted 
residence permit, (5) have family ties to Denmark, (6) other exceptional 
circumstances. This article has extended resettlement to cases based on 
humanitarian grounds. This means that refugees referred to Denmark by 
the UNHCR may be accepted if they could have obtained a residence 
permit in Denmark on other grounds had they entered the country as an 
asylum-seeker. Humanitarian grounds refers to medical cases and 
certain groups of women-at-risk, unaccompanied minors (who do not  
otherwise qualify for refugee status), persons who cannot for other 
reasons return to their home country and exceptionally, persons who 
qualify as professionals or specialists needed in Denmark. Another 
important change to the Act was the addition of integration potential 
[Section 8(4)], as the second criterion (after protection) for resettlement. 
The integration criterion (which takes into account educational and 
language background, family size, work experience and age) aims to 
measure the ability of a refugee to take advantage of the possibilities and 
opportunities available in Denmark. The integration criterion is not applied 
to emergency, urgent or Ten-Or-More cases. 
The Danish Government announced that the integration criteria stipulated 
in section 8 (4) will be removed but it has not yet been implemented in 
the law. 
When assessing submissions for resettlement, Denmark, focuses on the 
refugee’s prospects for settling and benefiting from living in Denmark, cf. 
section 8 (4) of the Danish Aliens Act. The following supplementary 
criteria are, therefore, of importance when considering a pe rson for 
resettlement: 
Language Qualifications; Education and Work Experience; Families with 
Children; Social Network outside the Family; Age; Motivation.13
Exclusion factors are also applied in the Danish resettlement system.  All 
refugees who are under consideration for resettlement in Denmark 
undergo a security investigation by the Danish Security Intelligence 
Service and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service.  
 
Pursuant to section 10 ( 1) (2) of the above act, an al ien cannot be 
granted a residence permit under section 8 based on t he conditions 
stipulated in this article.  
Furthermore, persons with mental illnesses will also not be accepted for 
resettlement in Denmark.  
                                                            
13 http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/node/1166 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff o UNHCR 


























Through JPO scheme 
Processing of resettlement cases shall be carried out by 
The Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and to a certain extent, the Danish 
Refugees Council (DRC) on selection missions. The DRC has been part 
of the refugee interviewing process since the start of the resettlement 
programme. Furthermore, the DIS invites municipalities to participate in 
the selection missions. They are also invited to indicate whether they 
would like to receive any of resettled refugees as part of their annual 
quota for settlement (including refugees arriving to Denmark as asylum 
seekers and granted asylum or humanitarian status). In recent years 
there has been an increased interest in the part played by municipalities 
in selection missions. 
Once the destination and dates have been decided upon, the UNHCR 
can start forwarding the dossiers by mail to the DIS. The dossiers should 
be sent as early as possible in order to screen the cases and to have 
them cleared by the security services (police) before the selection 
mission takes place. The DRC and participants from the municipalities do 
not normally receive the dossiers beforehand. 
During the selection mission, DIS and DRC conduct the interview jointly 
and the general cultural information, which is given to the refugees before 
the interview, is also presented jointly. The delegation normally agrees on 
the individual cases, but the final decision is made by DIS upon return to 
Denmark. At the end of the mission, the delegation gives general feed-
back to UNHCR regarding the presentation of the cases, the quality of 
the submissions and the practical arrangements surrounding the mission. 
In addition to the above dossiers, Denmark has 75 places for dossier 
submissions which can be either urgent or emergency priority cases. 
These cases are submitted by post from UNHCR and do n ot need t o 
belong to any specific region or nationality. The cases are examined by 
DIS; DRC has no involvement in this procedure since the changes in the 
law in 2005. The integration criteria do not apply to these cases but they 
have to fulfill the Danish criteria on refugee status, subsidiary protection 
or humanitarian status.  
Selection missions are carried out by the DIS and DRC. The delegations 
normally consist of two persons from DIS and two persons from DRC. 
The two persons from DRC will normally be one person with expertise in 
asylum law and one person with expertise in integration and reception of 
resettled refugees. 
For the last few years Denmark has conducted in-country selection 
missions to Malaysia (refugees from Burma), Nepal (refugees from 
Bhutan) and various African countries (refugees from DRC). In 2012 are 
(to be) conducted in-country selection missions to Malaysia, Nepal and 
Ecuador (refugees from Colombia). 
Pre-Departure Activities 
• Cultural Orientation (CO) 
 
 




Done by DIS and Danish language teachers. 20 lessons evenly divided 
between cultural orientation and language classes. Offered to all 
refugees accepted on selection missions but not to refugees on dossier 
basis. The CO takes place over one week and as soon as possible after 
the CO has finished the refugees can travel to Denmark.  
Travel and assistance with exit permits and travel documents are 
organized by IOM together with DIS and the nearest Danish Embassy 
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• Medical screening Based on the assessment of the delegation during the selection mission, 
the cases, which may qualify for resettlement to Denmark, are referred to 
IOM for health assessments. IOM has about one month to conduct the 
health assessments. Upon forwarding the files to DIS, that organisation 
makes the final decision. 
 Procedure Timing14 Normally, a decision will be made 3 months after the delegation has returned 
from the interview trip. It should be less for the emergency cases. 
 
Comments  Denmark has a well functioning and well-established resettlement 
programme both at the pre –departure and post- arrival phase. Civil 
society is involved in the implementation of the selection process to a 
certain extent (on selection missions but not on dossier cases, which 
form about 20 percent of all accepted cases). Furthermore, civil society 
has no influence on the selection of overall groups to be resettled in 
Denmark, which is decided politically by the responsible minister after 
consultations with the DIS. In this process the DIS consult –to a limited 
degree – the local authorities regarding the integration potential of 
previously resettled groups.  
It is recommended that NGOs and local authorities should be more 
involved on the selection process as they could bring their experience-
based expertise by better identifying the integration needs of the groups 
to be resettled in the post arrival phase. The selection interviews focus 
too much on the family composition and asylum motive and not enough 
on the psychological state of refugees, which could enable refugees to 
better prepare the integration programme.  
b) Status and Rights – Post-
Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
Legal source: Aliens Act 
(24/08/2011): 8 (1), (2) (3) 
 
Irrespective of which status the refugees are granted (convention, 
subsidiary, humanitarian), they receive- at arrival- a temporary residence 
permit valid for 4 years. The length of the temporary residence permit has 
changed many times over the years. The refugee can apply for a 
permanent residence permit after 4 years in Denmark, but the 
requirements are very high and in practice it would be very unusual for a 
refugee to obtain the permanent residence permit after 4 years.  
At the moment, the conditions for residence are being amended again.  





(20/08/2010): §24c, § 24a, §23 
Airport arrival 
 










DIS, receiving municipalities and sometimes local volunteers including 
previously resettled refugees 
Municipality is responsible for the reception of the refugees. DIS informs 




                                                            
14 Source: UNHCR Handbook on Resettlement: Denmark. 
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Developing integration 
program15
( housing, public 
assistance, legal issues, 
employment and education, 
child welfare, mental health  
and medical assistance, 
finance assistance and 
social integration)  
  
 
Preparing local community 
 















Advice on accessing 
services 
Mentoring 







Refugee contribution to 
integration 
 
Refugees accepted for resettlement are also granted the work permit. They 
have the right to take up employment in Denmark immediately upon their 
arrival in the country. The municipalities offer a 3-year mandatory 
integration programme on behal f of the government, financed by 
government funds. The integration programme consists of Danish 
language classes as well as lessons in Danish culture and hi story. The 
social workers from the municipality also provide assistance with housing 
as well as engaging in a d ialogue with the refugee to make an individual 
contract/plan of action to find employment in Denmark. The programme 
contains a m inimum of 30 hours of activities per week and i ncludes the 
abovementioned language and c ultural orientation. The programme may 
also contain vocational training.  
Municipalities responsible with assistance of volunteer groups. 
Danish cultural orientation courses as well as Danish language courses. The 
30 hours programme is run through language schools and civil society. 
 
Municipalities and civil society. 
Language schools run by municipalities or other contractors like the DRC. 
Free language training for the first three years. 
All persons registered as residing in Denmark have access to public 
health care. Once arrived, the resettled refugees receive a Health 
Insurance Card for their local municipality.  
All children residing in Denmark have access to the public school system 
that is free of charge.  
There are no restrictions on resettled refugees’ access to the Danish 
adult education system. In order to promote educational opportunities 
and job prospects, special courses may even be designed in order to 
meet their needs. 
Municipalities, and t o a l ess degree civil society, are responsible for 
education and employment assistance. 
Family reunification is outside the resettlement quota.16
Municipalities. 
 Applying for 
family reunification can be rather complicated and the refugees often 
need the assistance of legal aid clinics or the volunteer clinics of the DRC 
or others (municipalities/ volunteers) to help them apply.   
Done through civil society. 
Municipalities are responsible for the programme. 
Three major players, DRC, Danish Red Cross and KIT funded by the 
state or local budgets. 
Municipalities are responsible for finding appropriate housing for resettled 
refugees. Strong efforts are made to find permanent accommodation 
prior to their arrival or if this is not possible within the first 3 months of 
their arrival.  
Some of the refugee communities are involved in the reception of 
newcomers.  
 
                                                            
15 According to the Danish Integration Act: http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_998_399180562.pdf 
16 Rules on family reunification may change and therefore the official website must always be consulted: 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/ . 
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Integration programme for the first three years fully funded by the State. 
Comments The post arrival phase of resettlement is viewed as a well-established structure 
that in generally is functioning well. Nevertheless it could be improved in 
various ways in order to accommodate the needs of specific groups. 
In this view, the collaboration amongst the key players - NGOs and local 
authorities - was difficult at the very beginning and still varies from place 
to place. Most municipalities see a clear value in the volunteer work 
although there may be a tendency to include volunteers more and more 
due to cuts in public spending. This may not always be to the advantage 
of the refugees.  In those municipalities where the cooperation is good, 
there may be regular meetings between the volunteer group and the 
municipality to discuss the framework of cooperation. On the contrary, the 
collaboration amongst different NGOs is not viewed as being as good as 
it should be.  
With regard to placement in the municipalities, it seems to work relatively 
well but could be done better. The major problems relate to finding a 
proper house, which is affordable, and within reach of schools and jobs 
even with public transport.  
In terms of funding it can be a challenge for the NGOs to get proper 
funding for the activities as most funding comes from the state -so there 
are not enough funds for specific projects. Furthermore, because of the 
lack of financing opportunities under ERF, there are no twinning projects 
but there is a wish to learn from others.  
It is recommended:  
Multiyear planning (e.g. three years) is implemented in terms of numbers 
(flexible quota) and also in terms of priorities. This would give certainty to 
the UNHCR, local authorities and civil society to plan their integration 
efforts more effectively. If substantial changes take place in terms of the 
refugee groups most in need of resettlement, the plans could be altered 
during the period. This also includes a better allocation of funds for 
different projects run by NGOs. 
The Danish government should remove the integration potential criteria, 
as they have promised to, as soon as possible. 
When deciding the placement of the refugees to different municipalities, 
the Danish Immigration Service should have more regard to the 
capacities of each municipality to receive and integrate the refugees. The 
municipalities should also avoid placing the refugees in accommodation 
which is far from convenient public transport systems and i n any way 
distanced from jobs and educational opportunities. If the prices of 
housing are too high, there should be special economic support systems 
in place to compensate for that. 
With regard to a pos sible link between selection and integration, it is 
believed that is important to involve the volunteers as soon as possible 
post arrival.  
Although the cooperation between civil society and municipalities is very 
good in general, there are some areas of the country where the 
municipalities do not accept and do not see the advantages of the 
involvement of the local volunteer groups.  I n order to improve this 
cooperation, the various actors should be encouraged to meet more often 
and become familiar with each other. 
It is also emphasized that it is crucial that resettlement be granted to 
those refugees who have the highest requirements for protection. 
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In 2011 the Ministry of Integration was closed. The newly created 
Udlaeningsstyrelsen that took over the tasks related to refugee 
resettlement is a sub-division of the justice department.17 This 
department covers special expenditures related to the treatment of 
foreigners such as the costs for interpreters, asylum camp surveys, 
verifications, language tests, foreign legal aid, age verification and legal 
aid to foreign minors that seek asylum. Furthermore, expenditure related 
to the returning refugees who fail to reach certain criteria is also the 
responsibility of this new office. Finally, Udlaeningsstyrelsen covers 
integration costs for resettled refugees, interview trips for resettlement 
refugees, courses for these, and health examinations of these.18
Data: 
 
• For 2012: 17.2 million DKK (2009: 12.4; 2010: 18.4; 2011: 14.9 – 
projected for 2013-15: 17.2/year 




In Scandinavia, there is often a strong case to make comparisons 
between the countries. In Denmark’s case, this would mean an increase 
in the quotas, since Denmark accepts relatively fewer refugees than 
Sweden and Norway. This argument has also been raised in public 
debates on the topic, and indicates that Denmark may be capable of 
managing an increased capacity.19
Denmark has the capacity to resettle more refugees and increase the yearly 
resettlement quota to 1500 a year or 4500 over three years.  In order to do 
so, the funding could be allocated in a different way in order to create an 
incentive for the municipalities to do more for resettled refugees. 
 
 
                                                            
17 Source: Finansloven 2012: 11.51.01: 20: Særlige sagsomkostninger 
18 http://www.oes-cs.dk/bevillingslove/doctopic?book=BEVPUBL.FL12A&topic=11.51.01&searchtype=3 
19 e.g. http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2011/08/25/160402.htm?rss=true 
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Country Profile: ESTONIA 
Estonia has been a member of the EU since 2004. In 2007 it became part of the Schengen visa system. 
The first Refugee Act was introduced in 1997, in that same year Estonia became a signatory of the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention. Since 1997 Estonia has started to grant refugee status and after the transposition 
of the EU directives, it has also granted subsidiary and temporary protection. In 2006 an act entitled Act 
Granting International Protection for Aliens (Välismaalasele rahvusvahelise kaitse andmise seadus) was 
adopted which introduced the subsidiary and temporary protection possibilities.  
Estonian immigration policy is generally restrictive and is not very open to new waves of immigration. It 
is possible to apply for residence permit on the basis of family reunification, study, research, work, setting 
up a business, on the basis of legal income and in cases of substantial public interest.  
The Estonian migration and asylum policy report issued in March 2011 for the year 2010 states that the 
topic which was debated most was residence permit requirements for foreign labour. This issue concerned 
the opening up of the Estonian labour market for labour coming from third countries and to fix the salary 
requirements for labour coming from outside of the European Union.1
Estonia has also imposed immigration quotas, which are around 1,000 persons per year. The quota 
number is reviewed every year by the government. Estonia is considered more as a transit country and not 
as a settlement country. In 2010 there were 2,434 entry refusals at the border of Estonia
  
2
Public opinion towards immigration is mostly negative. Half of the responses to the public poll conducted 
in 2010 by Saar Poll OÜ indicated that immigration has negative impact on E stonia. The negative 
evaluation of immigration is supported by the opinion that immigration places a bu rden on t he social 
system, increases unemployment and situations of conflict. Estonia already has a very big proportion (30%) 
of the population which has an immigrant background and there are persistent integration problems.
.  
3
The number of asylum seekers coming to Estonia is increasing, but it has not been an important 
destination country for asylum seekers. While the number of persons applying for asylum was between 10-
20 persons per year before 2011, Estonia received 67 asylum seekers in 2011. The number of Dublin 
cases has risen (19 persons in 2010 were sent back to Estonia).  
  
Estonia is not a resettlement country and also does not see itself as a country where refugees should be 
resettled or relocated.4 Estonia has stated this opinion many times that it is not interested to participate in 
such projects related to immigrants. It is based on the difficulties related to the state budget and also a lack 
of reception capacity of refugees.5
 
 
                                                            
1 http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/ERV/2010_POLIITIKA_ARUANNE__ee_final.pdf, p 13 
2 http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/ERV/2010_POLIITIKA_ARUANNE__ee_final.pdf p 29 
3 http://www.siseministeerium.ee/public/EPF/Pagulasuuring_ARUANNE.pdf 
4 Interview with Pomerants, M, member of the Parliament, 27.01.2012. 
5 Komisjoni teatis nõukogule ja Euroopa Parlamendile Euroopa Liidu ühise ümberasustamisprogrammi loomise kohta, 
2.09.2009 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/et/09/st12/st12986.et09.pdf and Eesti põgenike ümberasustamise 
projektis ei osale, Eesti Päevaleht, 17.09.2009, http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/480500  
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Asylum Profile 













• 8 Refugee Status Granted 
• 3 Subsidiary Protection 
17 (2010) 
• 11 Refugee Status Granted 






I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act Granting International 
Protection for Aliens 
(Välismaalasele 
rahvusvahelise kaitse 
andmise seadus) Published in 




No provision relating to resettlement. 
Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
There is no reform or project going on. Resettlement is not on the 
political agenda. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 












                                                            
6 http://www.pagulasabi.ee/eesti.statistika/ 
7 available www.riigiteataja.ee 
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III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
There is no motivation to resettle refugees. The questionnaire filled by the 
parliament members, Ministry of Interior and NGOs do not give any 
promising possibilities to introduce resettlement in Estonia. Asylum 
seekers do not see Estonia as their destination country, in general 
practice, they tend to simply get stuck in Estonia or have been stopped in 
there on their way to Nordic countries. A number of the persons who 
were granted international protection, left soon after receiving the 
necessary personal and travel documents.  
Estonia does not have large diasporas of third country nationals from 
defined resettlement priority regions. There is a high probability that any 
resettlement to Estonia will not be successful and will result in secondary 
movements within EU. The NGOs dealing with asylum seekers and 
refugees (legal and social assistance in some cases) are dependent on 
the projects performed with the help of EU-funding. It seems that this 
system is not sustainable if the EU funding is cut.  
Very often the high number of foreigners settled in Estonia is taken as 
a basis for the arguments not to liberalize Estonian immigration policy; 
also the Estonian capacity to integrate newcomers is a w ell-known 
problem. The economic situation is the other main reason, as many 
residents live in extremely poor conditions or without jobs. 8
Estonian officials strongly believe that resettlement at the EU level 
should be a voluntary act and cannot be a state obligation. 
 
The Ministry of Interior, at interview, stated that asylum issues should 
remain up to the member states as it increases the financial and 
administrative burden of the states.9
 
 Estonian officials also do not have 
any experience or expertise in resettlement and therefore more training 
would be needed to manage any resettlement. There is also no political 
debate as to whether or not Estonia should resettle refugees. According 
to the opinion of the Ministry of Interior it would be an ex tremely 
unpopular decision to start to resettle refugees to Estonia. The public 
opinion poll ordered by the ministry and delivered in 2010 showed that 
Estonian population is not open to refugees. 
                                                            
8 Interview with Pakosta,L. member of the Estonian Parliament, 26.01.2012. 
9 Interview with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 14.02.2012.  
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Country Profile: Finland 
Being socially, culturally and politically homogenous, Finland has a relatively small number of immigrants. 
Notwithstanding the Finnish emigrants living in Sweden and the Finnish-speaking people living in 
neighboring areas of Russia, the Finnish language is not spoken widely anywhere outside of the country. 
The difficulty of the language, the remote location, the severe weather conditions and the small number of 
big cities are probably the most significant reasons for the low level of immigration into Finland. 
The number of foreign citizens in Finland reached 20.000 for the first time in the end of 1980s and has 
been growing since the beginning of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a peak in 
immigration in 1991-1993. A large number of immigrants are of Russian origin (many of them from pre-war 
Finnish territories) but also refugees are well represented (especially Somali and people from the former 
Yugoslavia). Since 1995, when Finland joined the EU, immigration has been growing steadily from an 
annual level of approximately 12.000 persons to closer to 30.000 immigrants in 2011.1
Finland aims at an active role in all types of international cooperation, especially in the framework of the 
United Nations. Another important framework for the country is the Nordic cooperation. The country’s well-
established refugee resettlement programme should be examined in this context. The beginning of refugee 
resettlement in Finland was greatly influenced by the other Nordic countries, especially Sweden. Finland's 
Scandinavian neighbours were receiving large numbers of refugees yet Finland had v ery few. Another 
motivation was that it was felt that cooperation with the UNHCR and the establishment of its own resettlement 
programme showed the country’s willingness to practice progressive international humanitarian policy. 
Furthermore, the opportunity to resettle refugees was seen as one of the ways in which Finland could further 
integrate with its European and Scandinavian partners and dissociate itself from its Russian neighbour. Today 
refugee resettlement is considered an i mportant form of Finland’s foreign policy. In addition, refugee 
resettlement is often seen as one of  the primary ways Finland participates in "burden-sharing" and gl obal 
distribution of social justice and peace and security. The resettlement programme is the most visible, and also 
generally accepted, form of the country’s humanitarian foreign policy. 
 
The first decision on admitting refugees collectively was taken by the Government on 24 October 1973 
concerning the reception of a hundred refugees from Chile. The actual beginning of refugee resettlement in 
Finland is usually placed in the year 1979 when Finland started to receive refugees at the request of the 
UNHCR. The first refugees were admitted on an ad hoc basis and they consisted of approximately 100 
Vietnamese refugees received from Malaysia. A resettlement programme has been in place since 1985. 
Legal provisions regarding resettlement were legislated for in 19912
Refugees who arrive under the resettlement quota (known as 'Quota refugees') have been the first 
refugees that arrived to Finland in large numbers. Since 2001, the annual number of quota refugees has 
been 750. The largest refugee groups admitted to Finland under the refugee quota since 2001 have been 
Iraqis, Afghans, Sudanese, Burmese and Iranians.  
.  
When the pre-quota Chilean refugees arrived in 1973, Finland was completely unprepared for the 
reception of large numbers of refugees. The first group of Vietnamese refugees in 1979 arrived to a similar 
situation. In the 1980s, Finland received about 1400 refugees, mostly Vietnamese. During this period, a 
large number of municipal decision-makers and officials were trained and became familiar with refugee 
resettlement. During the 1990s, Finland received a growing numbers of asylum seekers, thus the number of 
refugees living in the country went up. At the same time, Finland was suffering from a severe recession and 
unemployment. During this decade the legislation and practices concerning refugees’ reception, integration 
and prevention of social exclusion were created. In the beginning refugees were received in temporary 
reception centres. Since 1987, the reception was gradually shifted to municipalities.3
 
 
                                                            
1 Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/til/muutl/index_en.html). 
2 The Aliens Act of 1991 
3 Sirkku Päivärinne, Pakolaisten vastaanoton kolme vuosikymmentä, in Outi Lepola (ed.), Koto-maana Suomi, 
Kertomuksia maahanmuutosta 1999–2001, Työministeriö, Edita Helsinki, 2002, p. 25–34. 
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Public opinion is generally more welcoming toward quota refugees than other beneficiaries of 
international protection since it is widely considered that quota refugees come from serious conflict 
situations and have been individually chosen by Finland. A certain differentiation between quota refugees 
and other persons benefiting from international protection is also present in the legislation and practices of 
the Finnish authorities. This differentiation in the public opinion is, however, becoming maybe less evident 
because of the growing number of immigrants in municipalities across the country.  
There are also an increasing number of people who e are critical of Finland's immigration policy. This was 
demonstrated by the success of a nationalistic party, “True Finns”, in the parliamentary elections of 2011.  
In the current political climate of Finland, there does not seem to be the willingness, or financial capacity 
(especially in the municipalities), to increase the quota size. Additionally, the political reality in Finland is 
such that no political party would consider to proposing an increase in the resettlement quota. The role of 
media is crucial to influencing attitudes.  
Finland emphasises the need of strategic resettlement. It also stresses the need f or continuing the 
implementation of the Joint EU Resettlement Scheme including the need to get more EU states to 
participate in the global resettlement work in cooperation with UNHCR.4
 
 It is also felt that the EASO, by 
managing the EU resettlement scheme, has an important role in promoting, both by financial incentives and 
by sharing good practises, an overall increase of resettlement places in the EU.  
                                                            
4 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ecb9bfd1c.html 
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169 (Refugee status (Persons granted with asylum) 8
714 (Subsidiary protection)  
)  




181 (Persons granted with asylum)  
644 (Subsidiary protection) 
654 (Humanitarian protection)  





Programme-Based (since 1985)  
750/year (since 2001) 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 




Sections 90, 91 and 92 of Chapter 6 (International protection). 
The Finish Aliens Act lays down the definition of “refugee quota” 
and the requirements and procedures for admitting aliens to 
Finland under the refugee quotas.  
Other basis of resettlement: 
− Agreement with UNHCR 
1985 
− Decision SM/2011/2143 on 17 





Signed agreement to participate in the UNHCR resettlement 
Programme from beginning of 1985. 10
Adopted by the Finnish government on t he geographical 
allocation of the refugee quota based on a proposal prepared by 
the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy.  
 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The current Government continues the resettlement activity in 
accordance with the well-established practice.  
                                                            
5 Source: The Finnish Immigration Service. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 ‘Asylum’ refers to the residence permit issued to a r efugee under the asylum procedure. The asylum procedure is 
applied to asylum seekers that apply for international protection at the Finnish border or on Finnish territory. Quota 
refugees do not go through the asylum procedure. They are granted with a refugee status based on the assessment 
conducted by the UNHCR and the Finnish authorities during the selection trip.  
9 Includes persons admitted, for example, through family reunification and on individual human grounds. 
10 http://www.unhcr.org/3c5e57f07.pdf 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis 








Chile, 1973: The first reception of 100 refugees from Chile. 
In addition, Kirkon Ulkomaanapu (Finn Church Aid, an N GO) 
committed to the reception of 10 refugees. This resettlement of 
refugees to Finland was done on the refugees’ own application 
and in cooperation with the representative of the UNHCR based 
on instructions received from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.11
The first refugees were admitted on an ad hoc basis and they 
consisted of approximately 100 V ietnamese refugees received 
from Malaysia. Ad hoc resettlement was continued until a 
resettlement programme was put in place in 1985.  
 
 
b) On a programme basis 
Evolution of quotas between 

















2001-2012   
 
The annual quota for refugees is established in the annual State 
budget approved by the Parliament. Since 2001, the quota has 
been fixed at 750 persons a year. 10% of the quota is reserved 
for emergency cases and urgent cases. The reception of 
refugees at the request of the UNHCR is always implemented in 
the framework of the refugee quota. The same applies to the 
reception of persons appeared as witnesses at international 
criminal courts and considered to be in need of protection. 
Finland does not resettle outside the arrangements with the 





500 + 200 (An additional quota for ex-Yugoslavia) 
500  
















Two twinning arrangements in the form of the MORE and MOST 
projects. 
                                                            
11 Quick Holger: Chilen pakolaistoimikunta II:n raportti työvoimaministeriölle vv. 1973-1974 saapuneita Chilen pakolaisia 
ja heidän olojensa järjestämistä koskeneista toimenpiteistä. Helsinki: Työvoimaministeriö, 1975. 
12 The resettlement quota was never fulfilled but it varies from year to year 
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The MORE Project (Modelling of 
National Resettlement Process 
and Implementation of Emergency 
Measures) 
December 2003 - April 2005. 
 
The MOST Project (Modelling of 
Orientation, Services and Training 
related to the Resettlement and 





February 2010 and ongoing 
Non-Governmental Level 
An EU funded Project run mainly by the Finnish Ministry of 
Labour and the Reception and I ntegration Agency of Ireland in 
cooperation with the UNHCR, the IOM and the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).  
 
A transnational project funded by ERF. Led by the Finnish 
Ministry of Labour. Project partners: the Reception and 
Integration Agency of Ireland, the Spanish Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs and the Swedish Migration Board. Implemented in 
cooperation with UNHCR, IOM and ECRE. 
 
Informal cooperation with some other EU countries. Ireland, 
Romania, Poland and Hungary have participated to the Finnish 




ESF project: ‘EU-resettlement linked in’ an a wareness raising, 
fact finding, information exchanging, project. 
: to enhance the placement of highly 
vulnerable resettled refugees in local municipalities.  







Finland does not engage in any EU relocation activities.  
 
Finland has agreed, that if necessary, it will give protection to 
persons appearing as witnesses at international criminal courts 
(ICC, ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone). A small number 
of such persons have been admitted to Finland under the refugee 
quota. They were included in the emergency quota, that is 10 % of 
the overall refugee quota. 
Comments According to the current Government’s programme from June 
2011, the refugee quota policy will be continued at current level 
in cooperation with the UNHCR. The biggest challenge for 
effective resettlement is the small number of municipalities willing 
to receive quota refugees. The Government is thus aiming at an 
increase in the number of municipalities receiving quota 
refugees. A financial incentive in the form of the HAAPA project 
has been created for the promotion of resettlement of refugees in 
a vulnerable position. The Ministry of Employment and t he 
Economy is currently negotiating with the Association of Finnish 
Local and R egional Authorities on how to increase refugee 
placements in municipalities. The Government programme in this 
regard was set out in June 2011. In order to support the 
cooperation model between the state and municipalities, a plan 
will be prepared to gradually raise the level of compensation paid 
to municipalities. The level of compensation will then correspond 
with the actual development of costs. 
 
                                                            
13 Interview with Senior Inspector Monica Harju, the Finnish Immigration Service. 
14 http://www.resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/Creating%20Welcoming%20Communities_HAAPA%20Finland.pdf 
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Selection trip: Thailand 
Admitted refugees: 119 Burmese refugees, 50 so-called urban 
refugees of various nationalities 
Selection trip: Iran 
Admitted refugees: 265 Afghan refugees 
Selection trip: Rwanda 
Admitted refugees: 92 Congolese refugees 
In addition, 100 emergency cases of different nationalities 
(usually chosen based on e.g. health and security reasons) 
634 
Country of first asylum: Rwanda (126)  
Country of origin: DR of Congo (126) 
Country of first asylum: Iran (153)  
Country of origin: Afghanistan (153) 
Country of first asylum: Thailand (147)  
Country of origin: Burma (131) 
Sri Lanka (10) 
Pakistan (6)  
Country of first asylum: Syria (145) 
Country of origin: Iraq (144) 
Egypt (1)  
Emergency cases: 63 
727 
Country of first asylum: Rwanda (151)  
Country of origin: DR of Congo (151) 
Country of first asylum: Syria-Jordan (327) 
Country of origin: Iraq (301) 
 Stateless (26) 
Country of first asylum: Thailand (149)  
Country of origin: Burma (125) 
Sri Lanka (22) 
Iran (1) 
Somalia (1) 
Emergency cases: 100 
737 
Country of first asylum: Rwanda (156)  
Country of origin: DR of Congo (151) 
Burundi (5) 
Country of first asylum: Syria (282) 
Country of origin: Iraq (282)  
 
 
                                                            
15 Information received by email from Senior Officer Arja Rantonen-Lakkisto, the Finnish Immigration Service, on 23 April 
2012. Statistics for 2003-2010 are available on the website of the Finnish Immigration Service ( 
http://www.migri.fi/about_us/statistics/statistics_on_asylum_and_refugees/quota_refugees). 
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Country of first asylum: Thailand (200)  
Country of origin: Burma (150) 






Ivory Coast (2) 
DR of Congo (5) 
Stateless (3) 
Emergency cases: 99 
a) Selection Criteria and Process 
– Pre-Arrival Phase   












• Additional National Criteria 
Ulkomaalaislaki30.4.2004/301 
(Aliens Act) section 92 a nd 
section 36 
 
The requirements to apply for asylum are laid down in section 87 
of the Alien Act. The wording of this section is virtually identical 
to the definition in the 1951 Convention, omitting the territorial 
and temporal limitations.  
Refugee status is granted based on the assessment submitted by 
UNHCR. The UNHCR resettlement criteria is applied under 
section 92 (2). 
On an exceptional basis, persons other than those presented by 
the UNHCR may be granted a residence permit. This based on 
their need for protection, instead of being granted convention/ 
refugee status.16
The selection criteria for quota refugees are determined in 
Section 92 of the Aliens Act. Those in polygamous marriages are 
not accepted for resettlement in Finland.  
 
In addition to these selection criteria laid down in the Aliens Act 
and the annual decision taken on the geographical allocation of 
the refugee quota (based on the need of continuity in the chosen 
refugee groups), Finland has not determined any specific target 
groups. According to the Finnish authorities, the need for 
international protection is the primary and most important 
selection criterion. Finland also puts emphasis on the alien’s 
capacity to integrate into Finnish society. The refugee’s 
motivation to integrate is seen as an important factor. 
The general requirements for issuing residence permits apply 
also to quota refugees. It may be refused if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the alien intends to evade the provisions 
on entry into or residence in the country.17
 
 
                                                            
16 The Finnish Alien’s Act (301(/2001) , Section 90 
17 More detailed explanation of the selection criteria is included in the Government proposal for the Aliens Act of 2004. 
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• Deploying Staff 






The selection procedure is initiated by documents submitted by 
UNHCR. Based on these, the officials of the Immigration Service 
MIGRI and the security authorities make a pre-selection in 
Finland. All the relevant information concerning the refugee’s 
needs for resettlement, integration potential and possible family 
relations should be available at least a month prior to the actual 
selection mission.  
n/a 
 
The UNHCR and Finnish Immigration Services.  
 
As an ex ception to the normal procedure, in emergency and 
urgent cases, aliens are admitted to Finland without a pe rsonal 
interview on the basis of a written statement by the UNCHR. Very 
few cases are accepted through a dossier selection.  
These interviews are conducted by MIGRI officials, 
representatives of Employment and Economical Development 
Centres and, if necessary, security officials. In the recent years 
municipalities have also taken part in the missions. During the 
selection mission the delegation presents a briefing to provide the 
refugees with basic information on Finland.  
After the interviews the members of the delegation prepare a 
tentative list of those to be selected. At the end of the mission the 
list is given to the UNHCR’s field officer. The final decision will be 
made within two months. 
Pre-Departure Activities 




• Assistance with travel 
documents  
• Medical screening 
 
 
Cultural orientation is the remit of IOM. The course has been 
mandatory for everyone over 15 years of age. The arrangement 
was established in 2001 and ran until the termination of the 
contract in 2010. The orientation was not arranged in 2011 and 
the contract for 2012 is currently being negotiated. 
After a municipality has been located to accommodate the 
refugee(s), the travel arrangements can be made. These are 
handled by IOM and financed for by the Finnish government.  
Before departure, IOM conducts a f it-to-travel examination to 
ensure that there are no medical obstacles to the travel or that 
the passenger poses no risk of infection to the other passengers. 
 
 Procedure Timing   
January/February: Scheduling of selection trips with the UNHCR 
May: The UNCHR sends the refugees’ documents to the Finnish 
Immigration Service (“Migri”) 
June: First selection trip 
August: Migri’s decision, details of the chosen refugees are sent 
to the municipalities 
September/October: Information on municipal placement and 
accommodation to Migri, travel arrangements made (Migri/IOM), 
second selection trip.  
Decision is made in approximately two months. 
November/December: Arrival of the refugees, third selection trip.  
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Comments18 The annual refugee quota is never fully filled. According to the 
Finnish authorities, this is mainly due to the lack of suitable 
candidates proposed by the UNHCR and the lack of flexibility in 
changing the allocation decision to include candidates from other 
regions. Since the Finnish government policy regarding selection 
is explicitly based on humanitarian criteria and not on integration 
perspectives, it is unclear why the set quota cannot be 
materialized. 
  
The Finnish authorities prefer to receive refugees from the same 
regions and with similar backgrounds because it aims at 
coherence in the geographical and ethnic origin of the selected 
refugees. The Finnish authorities consider this a necessity since 
the organisation of municipal services for a l arge number of 
different cultural and language groups would be extremely 
challenging especially in smaller municipalities. Certain 
coherence in the composition of the refugee groups is considered 
to be also to the benefit of the refugees themselves. 
It may be also be linked to the reluctance of the municipalities 
to resettle refugees and t o the reason that they do not  get 
enough compensation from the state for the integration 
services they provide. The municipalities may also refuse to 
resettle refugees with special needs (medical or other) on the 
grounds that they are unable to provide for the adequate 
services due t o a l ack of resources. There have also been 
complaints from resettling municipalities that the information 
provided by UNHCR on s ubmitted cases with special needs 
has been insufficient and, at times, not updated. This can lead 
to the expectations of refugees and those of the receiving staff 
being very different. This in turn can negatively impact upon 
the integration process. Some municipalities may also feel 
uncomfortable in resettling refugees with a d ifferent skin color 
due to negative attitudes locally, both among the population 
and the policy makers. It is important to point out that the 
Finnish municipalities are extensively independent from the 
state and c annot be f orced to resettle against their will. The 
decision to resettle is taken through a pol itical process in the 
municipalities. Refugee issues tend therefore to be an ex tra 
sensitive topic ahead of municipal elections.  
Lengthy negotiations between government representatives and 
the municipalities are needed as a result of the municipalities' 
reluctance to contribute to resettlement. These negotiations take 
place before the needed resettlement places are allocated. When 
the bureaucratic process is prolonged, it results in unnecessary 
delays for the refugees’ departures after selection, in some cases 
putting their health and life at risk. In some cases refugees have 
died before being able to travel to Finland. Other circumstances 
which may contribute to prolonging the departure include a 
shortage of resources at Finnish Embassies which prevent the 
issuing of travel documents, a shortage of staff at the UNHCR 
regional office, logistical problems and bureaucratic exit 






                                                            
18 Data and information based on the qualitative and quantitative research done in the framework of this project 
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The government needs to secure the target (750 refugees) of the 
annual resettlement quota. It might be necessary to conduct an 
evaluation on the Finnish resettlement program and its different 
stages to find out the reasons for the backlog. Is it a l ack of 
resources? Should the cooperation and coordination between the 
different stakeholders, both national and i nternational, be 
improved? What other steps should be taken? While researching 
Finnish resettlement, positive reference was made time and time 
again to the Danish model for resettlement. Finland could learn 
much from this model. Denmark applies a three year quota. That 
would mean a quota of three years at 750 refugees per year 
(2250 persons) on the basis of the current Finnish quota. By 
introducing a three year quota, the yearly national and 
international bureaucratic decision making could be avoided and 
resources could thus be directed into planning, developing and 
implementing the scheme. The system would also save 
resources for planning and coordination for the UNHCR, as the 
organization would know the target allocations for Finland for the 
following three years. 
Another way to facilitate the selection process is to do m ore 
dossier based selection which is more cost effective and al so 
time saving. The challenge for dossier selection is that the 
information provided should be precise and up to date so that the 
municipality of resettlement is able to organize adequate 
reception arrangements. 
Currently no cultural orientation is organized for refugees 
admitted for resettlement to Finland. 
According to the principle of two-way integration, refugees and 
the receiving community should both be prepared prior to the 
refugees’ arrival. The cultural orientation should preferably be 
delivered in the refugees’ native language. Resettling municipality 
staff and NGOs should be involved in the planning and 
implementation. Refugee children should be pr ovided with their 
own cultural orientation. It is also important that the receiving 
municipality gets necessary and up dated information about the 
resettled refugees’ special needs in order to be well prepared for 
the reception. If accurate information is given to the refugees and 
to the municipality prior to arrival, this will reduce the gap i n 
expectations between both parties. 
Additionally, in order to become orientated with what awaits them, 
it is also important to inform the refugees about travel 
arrangements.  
Furthermore, online information should be available and secured 
with a password. The online site should be interactive. Through 
this website refugees waiting to be resettled can ask questions of 
already resettled refugees. Through the site relevant information 
may be s hared by refugees, NGO staff and v olunteers. This 
online service is especially relevant for dossier cases that may 








KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 109
KNOW RESET Country Profile: Finland 
b) Status and Rights – Post-
Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
Legal source  
Aliens Act, Chapter 6, Section 
106 
Refugee status is granted to persons who have been admitted to 
Finland under the refugee quota and have been issued with a 
residence permit on t he basis of their refugee status. Finland 
relies upon the UNHCR’s assessment of a person’s status as a 
refugee. The refugee criteria are observed during interviews on 
selection trips but such interviews do not correspond to the full-
length, first instance, asylum interviews conducted with asylum 
seekers in Finland.  
Refugee status is also granted to quota refugees’ family members 
if they have been recognized as being mandate refugees by the 
UNHCR. 
Family members admitted to Finland through family reunification 
are granted refugee status if they have been i ssued with a 
residence permit on the basis of family ties. 
Rights granted  
Legal source 
Lakikotoutumisenedistämisestä 
30.12.2010/1386 (Act on the 
Advancement of Integration) 


















Airport arrival  
 
 




The first Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of 
Asylum Seekers entered into force in 1999. The reform Act on 
Integration entered into force 1st September 2011. The new Act 
regulates issues concerning integration and reception. It also 
increases governmental compensation for municipalities which 
receive refugees.  
Like other immigrants (including other refugees and beneficiaries of 
international protection), quota refugees are eligible for the usual 
integration measures under the Act. Unlike other beneficiaries of 
international protection, quota refugees are, however, granted with 
a municipality of residence directly upon arrival to Finland. Quota 
refugees’ position is in this respect quite different than those 
refugees’ who have arrived in Finland as asylum seekers. Quota 
refugees have a direct access to immigrants’ benefits upon arrival 
to Finland, whereas other refugees and benef iciaries of 
international protection have in most cases stayed in temporary 
accommodation in reception centres while waiting for decision on 
their application. They have access to integration measures and 
benefits under this Act only after being issued with a r esidence 
permit and a municipality of residence.  
According to the Finnish Integration Act of 2011 all immigrants 
regardless of status are entitled to basic information about the 
Finnish society. Refugees and ot her immigrants once granted 
residence permit in Finland have the same social rights and 
duties as Finnish citizens. Normally the first residence permit is 
issued for one year but for resettled refugees the first residence 
permit is issued for a period for 4 years. After this initial four year 
period, permanent residence may be granted. Third country 
nationals have the right to vote in municipal elections if they have 
resided in Finland for 2 years.  
The refugees are received by the Red Cross upon arrival at 
Helsinki international airport. The reception is coordinated by Red 
Cross staff while mainly implemented by trained Red Cross 
volunteers. 
By municipal staff in the municipality of resettlement. 
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Preparing local community  
Developing integration program 
(housing, public assistance, legal 
issues, employment and 
education, child welfare, mental 
health and medical assistance, 






Cultural orientation  
Housing 





























Municipal staff and NGOs. The Finnish Red Cross has been very 
actively involved in advocacy both on national as local level. 
If it is deemed suitable, an individual integration plan is drawn up 
in cooperation with the municipality, the employment office and 
the immigrant. The integration period normally lasts 3 y ears, 
during which the participant is paid a so called integration 
allowance. After the integration period the refugees are entitled to 
the same benefits as Finnish citizens. The typical components of 
the integration plan are: language courses, employment policy 
actions, internships, training for working life, rehabilitation, 
vocational guidance and other similar/parallel activities. Parallel 
activities are organized by local and international NGOs, 
Community Based Refugee Organizations, language schools and 
associations etc. 
Cultural orientation forms part of the integration programme. 
Housing is provided by the municipalities that resettle refugees. 
Service provided by local employment office. 
Main component of the integration programme. Informal language 
training is also provided by the Finnish Red Cross e.g. in Finnish 
or Swedish language clubs organized by FRC volunteers. 
Provided by social/case workers in the municipality of 
resettlement and through health service providers. 
Family reunification is granted to Convention Refugees (resettled 
refugees have convention status in Finland) and people with 
subsidiary protection (including humanitarian protection). There 
are no maintenance requirements attached. 
Family reunion is granted with the following ‘core’ family 
members: 
• spouse/cohabitant/registered partner (including same sex) 
• unmarried minor children (aged under 18 years) 
• parents/guardians of an unaccompanied minor 
Other family members are eligible for reunification under certain 
conditions: 
• unmarried foster children are eligible for reunification IF 
there is evidence that the child’s parents or guardians 
are missing or deceased and the relationship was 
established before the sponsor arrived in Finland 
• minor siblings of unaccompanied minor IF they lived 
together in their country of origin and their parents are 
missing or deceased and it is in their best interest 
• Other family members IF refusing reunion would be 
unreasonable because the family member is fully 
dependent on the sponsor and they intend to continue their 
close family life in Finland. In such cases, dependency must 
be physical and emotional, as well as financial. 
The Finnish government pays the travel costs for the family 
members of resettled refugees. 
Training falls within the competence of the relevant ministries: 
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
and the Finnish Immigration Services in cooperation with the 
Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the 
Environment (The Centres for Economic Development, Transport 
and the Environment manage the regional implementation and 
development tasks of the state administration). Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health supervises the local governments’ promotion of 
the welfare of their inhabitants and s ustainable development. 
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Advice of Accessing Services 










Training is also organized by NGOs and associations such as: the 
Finnish Refugee Council, the Family Federation of Finland, the 
Finnish Red Cross, and the Finnish Association for Mental Health.  
The Family Federation of Finland WOMENTO-project started in 
January 2011 aims to advance the integration of educated 
immigrant women into Finnish society through a mentoring 
system. The main focus is in facilitating the entry of immigrant 
women into social networks and working life through personal 
mentoring by a Finnish volunteer woman. WOMENTO is built on 
the mentoring concept of the KVINFO organization in Denmark. 
WOMENTO encompasses 18 m entor-mentee couples in the 
beginning of 2012. Funding: SITRA and Finland´s Slot Machine 
Association RAY. 
Advice is provided by local authorities, on internet and by NGOs. 
Refugees’ CBOs need much reinforcement when providing 
integration support services. Refugees’ CBOs can be either paid 
service providers or act on a voluntary basis. There are several 
models for voluntary participation. Voluntary actions may also 
lead to job opportunities. Since many refugee communities have 
lived long enough in Finland, and i ntegrated well, it is a good 
moment to involve them in the reception and integration of 
newcomers. 
Volunteer support is provided by different NGOs and 
associations. An example is the Family Federation of Finland. 
That organisation has implemented a 3-year project called 
‘Vertaistukea Pakolaisille’ (Peer Support for Refugees) of which 
the objective was to promote integration both individual and 
family based for refugees and persons granted international 
protection. The project created a pe er support model for first 
phase reception which may be u sed as a component in the 
municipalities’ integration programme and also implemented in 
refugees’ CBOs. The objective of the ‘OVI-project’ (DOOR-
project) of the Finnish Association for Mental Health was to 
strengthen the operational qualifications of the participating 
refugees CBO project partners and their know-how of mental 
health issues.  
The Finnish Red Cross carried out a one-year (2011) pilot project 
called ‘Red Cross Volunteers Role in the Reception of Refugees 
for Resettlement’ in which the volunteers’ capacity to provide 
support on local level to newly arrived refugees was 
strengthened through intensified cooperation and s upport from 
the staff of the FRC HQ’s Refugee Team. 
Comments The framework for the Finnish Integration Act is based on t he 
idea that integration is a comprehensive, two-way process which 
involves learning and adaptability both on the part of the 
immigrants and also the local population. Finnish experts on 
integration have nevertheless expressed worries that the gap 
between objectives and implementation of the Act, adopted in 
2009, may widen due to the fact that it targets all immigrants. This 
includes those who arrived in Finland for work and through 
marriage if they are in need of integration support. The policy is 
comprehensive and stresses equality and thus all services should 
be equally accessible for all immigrants regardless of their status. 
However, the objectives may be di fficult to accomplish if, at the 
same time, the necessary financial resources are not allocated. 
This is especially true concerning language courses since 
language skills are crucial for successful integration. In particular, 
many small municipalities may have difficulties in implementing 
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the law due to insufficient financial resources. This fact will put 
immigrants in unequal positions since the availability of services 
may depend on where the person resides and who is the service 
provider. The service provider is selected through a t ender 
process. This may result in lost confidence towards the 
government’s integration policy both by immigrants themselves 
and the local population. There is a danger that policy might be 
blamed for failures which are down to deficient implementation.  
Training for public sector staff on the local level is needed 
especially when a m unicipality is starting resettlement. The 
local actors need ex tensive training to improve, adapt and 
increase structures that are necessary to meet the challenges 
of a multicultural society. It is important that service providers 
adapt their services and pr actices so that the services meet 
the needs of the refugees, and work well also for refugees and 
other migrants.  
It is also important to allocate resources for awareness raising 
and advocacy at a local level.  
Close cooperation on local level between authorities, NGOs and 
refugees CBOs will bring additional resources and be of benefit 
to all parties and the refugees. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 






















Most of the costs involved in resettlement are shouldered by the 
municipalities that receive the quota refugees. The state covers 
some of the expenses accruing to the municipalities. There is no 
separate monitoring of expenses relating to quota refugees only 
(they are grouped together with other expenses relating to 
beneficiaries of international protection). An estimated calculation 
is that for the annual refugee quota of 750 persons the 
compensation to the municipalities is approximately €2.4 million 
per year. The compensation for quota refugees is paid during the 
first four years. For other beneficiaries of international protection, 
the compensation period is three years. 
The state covers certain specific expenses relating to the 
integration of quota refugees (e.g. interpretation expenses, certain 
medical costs). A fixed sum of 700 euro/person is directed to the 
so-called ‘’initial mapping’ of the immigrant’s needs and skills. 
The contribution Finland currently receives from the European 
Refugee Fund is directed to the HAAPA project. The project 
grants a specific financial incentive to municipalities that receive 
emergency cases (approximately 100 persons in the annual 
refugee quota). The amount of the incentive is 50 % of the usual 
fixed compensation for refugees. The amount of this financial 
incentive paid to the municipalities in 2009-2011 was €76,596 .19
The compensation paid to the municipalities from the state 
budget is in the form of 1) fixed compensation and 2) 
compensation of specific expenses accrued. These forms of 
compensation are paid to the receiving municipalities for all types 
of beneficiaries of international protection. 
 
The computational annual contribution of the government to 
municipalities for resettlement is 2, 091€ for refugees over 7 
years, and 6, 845€ for children under 7 years. 
                                                            
19 Financial information obtained through email correspondence with Tiina Pesonen, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the 
Interior; Kari Kananen, Special Expert, Ministry of the Interior and Kristina Stenman, Immigration Director, Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. 
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− ERF For every quota refugee received, European Refugee Fund ERF 
pays Finland 4000 euros.  
Costs 
The travel expenses of the quota refugees to Finland are covered 
by a s pecific budget allocated to the Immigration Service. The 
estimated need is €915,000 per year. In 2011, the total sum came 
to €709,000. The expenses associated with these missions are 




Finland has a l ong-established and well-functioning tradition in 
the resettlement of refugees. Notwithstanding some recent 
changes in the political situation and a rise in xenophobia, there is 
a wide consensus on the continuation of refugee resettlement 
among all political groups. However, the capacity of the refugee 
quota is not likely to increase from the annual amount of 750 
persons in the near future. This is mainly because the capacity of 
municipalities to receive quota refugees is very limited. 
A constant challenge for Finland is in even reaching the annual 
quota which it has set for itself.  
Finland is currently trying to address the issues which have 
prevented it from filling its quota in the past by increasing 
flexibility in its own procedures and in its cooperation with the 
UNHCR. The Government is also trying to create more incentives 
for the municipalities to receive refugees. 
 
 
                                                            
20 Email correspondence with Kari Kananen, Special Expert, Ministry of the Interior. 
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Country Profile: FRANCE 
France is traditionally a country of immigration. After the Second World War, it received a great number of 
both foreign workers and refugees. 
The economic crisis of the early 1970’s resulted in increasingly restrictive immigration policies. There was 
an attempt to ‘stop’ economic immigration, while simultaneously integrating immigrants and their families who 
were already present on the French territory. This meant that the only immigration flows that were allowed 
was with regard family members of immigrants for settlement purposes and refugees. This indirectly led to a 
higher rate of irregular immigration. Immigration subsequently became a key issue of any political debate with 
two main topics particularly attracting public opinion’s attention: integration of immigrants and their offspring as 
well as irregular immigration. The rise of the right wing party Front National contributed to highlighting the 
most controversial aspects of the debate over immigration to France. 
In the mid-2000s, public discourse slowly changed. The issue of the integration of soothe -called ‘second 
generation’ immigrants becoming increasingly sensitive (the December 2005 riots being its climax), the 
doctrine of ‘chosen immigration’ vs ‘imposed immigration’ emerged1
The French immigration and asylum system is ruled by the Code on the Entry and Stay of Aliens and 
Asylum - Code d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA). Asylum is dealt with in 
Chapter VII of CESEDA (Livre VII) which was last modified by Law n°2011-672 of 16 J une 2011 on 
immigration, integration and nationality.
. According to this doctrine instilled by 
former President Sarkozy, the socio-economic integration of ‘second-generation’ immigrants arrived through 
family immigration had been a failure, while France was not attracting enough professional immigration, seen 
as desirable in the context of worldwide competition to attract ‘brains’. In other words, the intention to lower 
immigration flows on t he basis of family immigration, while promoting professional immigration. In such a 
background, “bogus” asylum seekers supposedly abusing the asylum system were also under focus. This led 
to the signature of several international agreements with main countries of origin of immigrants to France. 
Such agreements intended to exchange labour immigration as well as development aid for more cooperation 
of countries of origin to support France’s policy against irregular immigration. 
2
France has participated in major multilateral resettlement operations during the second half of the XXth 
century, such as the resettlement of Hungarians in 1956, of Southern Asian boat people in the late 1970s 
and Kosovars in 1999. 
 Refugee resettlement is not provided for by the CESEDA.  
France started a resettlement programme in February 2008 when the government adopted a framework 
agreement with the UNHCR. In June of the same year, France decided to engage in an ad hoc 
resettlement scheme for Iraqi refugees. While Irak 500 was not a resettlement programme as such since 
half of the Iraqis came directly from Iraq, it was dealt with by the same stakeholders and in the same 
circumstances as a resettlement programme. The Joint EU Call to resettle 10,000 refugees from Iraq, 
which was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 27-28 November 2008, came under the 
French Presidency of the Council. 
Nevertheless, the lack of interest of the French authorities for resettlement has been remarkable. French 
authorities are not actively participating in European and international meetings on resettlement, including 
ATCR (Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement) in Geneva and the IOM-UNHCR-ICMC project on 
the promotion of practical cooperation; France stopped relocating refugees from Malta in 2011, and refused 
to resettle refugees stuck in the Choucha camp in Tunisia. Although the resettlement quota remains the 
same3
                                                            
1 On the doctrine of ‘chosen immigration’, see Dominique Turpin, « La loi no. 2006-911 du 24 j uillet 2006 relative à 
l’immigration et à l’intégration: choisir pour ne plus subir? » Revue critique de droit international privé, 2007, p. 1-34.  
, the rejection rate is extremely high. Besides, the asylum service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did 
2 NOR: IOCK1003689L, Official Journal of the French Republic n. 0139 of 17 June 2011, p. 10290. 
3 According to the framework agreement between France and UNHCR, France committed to assess a hundred files per 
year, corresponding to about 300 persons. 
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not convene the working group on resettlement4
Refugee rights’ activists in France do not have a united position as to resettlement, which explains why 
only France Terre D’Asile (FTDA) and Forum Réfugiés are involved in the reception of resettled refugees. 
Several NGOs working for the promotion of immigrants’ rights do not participate in such operations on the 
grounds that they would degrade refugee law
 between May 2010 and February 2013, when the Ministry 
eventually brought its members together. A number of commitments were made on this occasion to 
improve the resettlement process and the reception of resettled persons. 
5 and might constitute a t ool for ‘externalising’ France’s 
immigration policy by creating a double process of refugee selection6
 
. 
                                                            
4 This working group used to meet every three months to discuss about the difficulties and to find solutions. UNHCR, 
IOM, the French Office of Immigration and Integration, OFPRA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France terre d’asile 
and Forum réfugiés were part of this group.  
5 See for instance, Gisti position on resettlement in a note published in November 2005 
(http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/nt_reinstallation-des-refugies_2005_en.pdf) further developed by Claire Rodier during a 
conference on resettlement organized by Forum réfugiés and CCME in December 2009. 
6 Interview of Matthieu Tardis with Claire Rodier. On the position of GISTI, see especially: La réinstallation des réfugiés, 
instrument européen de l’externalisation des procédures d’asile, Note de travail, November 2005, available at: 
http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/nt_reinstallation-des-refugies_2005.pdf  
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Asylum Profile 
Number of protection 
status granted7











Ad hoc and Programme-Based (since 2008) 
100 files/year  
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Code d’entrée et de séjour 
des étrangers et du droit 
d’asile (CESEDA) created by 
ordonnance n°2004-1248 of 
24 November 2004  
Last modified by: Law n° 
2011-672 of 16 June 2011 on 
immigration, integration and 
nationality 
 
Although there is no legal provision on resettlement, it is partially ruled 
by Livre VII on asylum, especially regarding reception, procedure and 
rights awarded after resettlement. 
OFPRA (Office for Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) is 
the only authority authorised to grant international protection and this 
can only be done in French territory. 
Other basis of resettlement: 
Framework
, signed in Paris 
on 4 February 2008 
 Agreement 
between the Government of 
the French Republic and 
the UNHCR
 
Article 5 – Refugee resettlement programme 
5.1 On the basis of the files presented by the UNHCR and transmitted 
to the French Representation to the United Nations in Geneva, the 
French Republic will examine the files of the refugees whose 
resettlement on the French territory is considered. 
5.2 The persons whose files will be presented to French authorities will 
have to fulfil eligibility criteria according to the strict mandate of the 
UNHCR and the French legislation relating to the determination of 
the refugee status. 
5.3 In the framework of strategic priorities of France, the UNHCR will 
present roughly one hundred files each year. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
No foreseeable project or reform. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis 





Agreement (concluded in June 1947 and supplemented by another 
agreement of 13 January 1948) between the French government and 
the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) – Essentially based on 
working capacity of post-war European displaced refugees. 
 
                                                            
7 These figures include: Asylum seekers in their first requests, Appeals upon first request and accompanying minors. 
Report 2010: http://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/documents/RA_2010_Ofpra.pdf - Relevant data: Annexes, from pp. 71-72. 
8 Ibid. 
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- From April to July 1999 
- Iraq 500: From 2008 
 
Two agreements of the 9th of August and the 16th of November 1948: 
About 1,000 Central European families resettled in French rural areas. 
Hungarian crisis – prima facie refugees: 12,690 Hungarian protesters 
against the Soviet invasion. 
Southern Asian ‘boat people’ were resettled in France on the basis of 
annual resettlement quotas. This led to the resettlement of 
approximately 107,500 Asian refugees in France 
About 8,000 Kosovar refugees. 
This operation was called Iraq 500, because it was originally conceived 
for the reception of about 500 Iraqi nationals. The refugees either directly 
came from Iraq or were Iraqi refugees from neighbouring countries (Syria 
and Jordan): 1,215 people were covered under this programme. 
Although it shares several characteristics with stricto sensu resettlement, 
Iraq 500 was not originally conceived to become a resettlement 
operation. Indeed, about half of the people selected came directly from 
Iraq and, consequently, were not already qualified for refugee status. 
b) On a programme basis 
Annual Programme 2008 
Annual Programme 2009 




About a 100 files to be submitted by UNHCR 
About a 100 files  
About a 100 files  










France did not participate in the activities of the UNHCR-IOM-ICMC 
project on practical cooperation although the asylum service signed a 








In 2009, two former prisoners from Guantanamo were authorised to 
come and live in France: Lakhdar Boumedienne and Saber Lahmer. A 
third one, Nabil Hadjarab was turned down10
France implemented the EU relocation programme in 2009 and 2010. 
190 beneficiaries of international protection arrived from Malta.  
. 
In 2009, 95 refugees were relocated to France (77 adults + 18 
children)11
The nationalities represented were
. 
12
Country of Origin: Somalia (57), Eritrea (18), Sudan (8), Iraq (4), 
Ethiopia (3), Sri Lanka (3), Ivory Coast (2) 
: 
                                                            
9 Ministry of Home Affairs, Interview of 3 April 2012 
10 http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2010/09/10/france-turns-down-guantanamo-prisoner-nabil-hadjarabs-appeal-for-asylum/ 
11 French Office for Immigration and Integration (‘OFII’) Activity Report, 2010, 8th Official Report, p. 122 
12 Rapport au Parlement, Les orientations de la Politique de l’immigration et de l’intégration, 6th Official Report drafted in 
accordance with Article L.111- 10 of CESEDA, December 2009, p. 144 
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In 2010, 95 refugees were relocated to France (73 adults + 22 
children) 13
The represented nationalities were
. 
14
Country of Origin: Somalia (66), Eritrea (13), Sudan (11), Iraq (3), 
Liberia (1), Morocco (1) 
: 
19,2% were women15
France stopped relocation in 2011. 
 





















The annual programmes are not achieved during the civil year. Early 2012, 
all refugees selected under the 2010 programme were still not in France. 
Annual Programme 2011  
333 persons submitted by UNHCR (100 dossiers). Dossiers were 
still under determination.  
Annual Programme 2010 
150 refugees17
Annual Programme 2009
 selected out of 253 refugees (100 files submitted by 
UNHCR). 
18
151 refugees selected out of 273 r efugees (100 files submitted by 
UNHCR): 52% of files accepted 
 
32 files from Near East countries (61,5% of accepted files): 
76 refugees (26 files): Palestinian refugees 
8 refugees (4 files): Iraqis 
3 refugees (2 files): Iranians from Turkey 
17 files from African countries (33% of accepted files) 
Ethiopia (7 files): 23 refugees 
Rwanda (2 files): 8 refugees 
Democratic Republic of Congo (6 files): 11 refugees 
Burundi (1 file): 4 refugees 
Ivory Coast (1 file): 4 refugees 
2 files from Asia: 
Afghan refugees living in Iran (1 file): 6 refugees 
Chinese women refugees in Kyrgyzstan (1 file): 2 refugees 
1 file from Europe: 
Chechens living in Azerbaijan (1 file): 5 refugees 
                                                            
13 OFII Activity Report, 2010, op.cit., p. 123 
14 Ibid, p. 123 
15 Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) Activity Report, 2010, p. 19 
16 Statistics published by the Ministry of Interior Affairs in December 2011, in Secrétariat général du c omité 
interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration, rapport au parlement, les orientations de la politique de l’immigration et 
de l’intégration, décembre 2011, pp. 120-124. See also France terre d’asile, le bilan contrasté du pr ogramme de 
réinstallation français, la lettre de l’observatoire de l’asile et de l’intégration, n° 48, octobre 2011. 
17 Figures provided during a seminar organised by France terre d’asile in June 2011 about resettlement. For more 
information, please read, France terre d’asile, le bilan contrasté du programme de réinstallation français, la lettre de 
l’observatoire de l’asile et de l’intégration, n° 48, octobre 2011. 
18 OFII Activity Report, 2010, op.cit., p. 121 
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239 refugees selected out of 347 refugees (99 files submitted by 
UNHCR): 64% of files accepted. 
 
On 20 November 2009, 211 people had reached France, the main 
nationalities represented being the following: Russia (83 people), 
Palestine (40 people), Iran (24 people), Afghanistan (14 people), 
Ethiopia (12 people) and Sri Lanka (10 people).20
Ad hoc resettlement – Iraq 500 – From 2008 
 
1,094 
Initially set for 500 I raqi refugees, the number of people supposed to 
benefit from resettlement to France has been set to 1,215 (in December 
2008 France agreed to take in 200 Christians from Mossoul).21
Out of these 1,215 people, 1,064 are Christians and 135 are Muslims. 
On December 2010, 1,002 refugees had arrived in France: 502 from 
Iraq, 150 from Jordan, 297 from Syria, 34 f rom Lebanon, 14 from 
Turkey and 5 from Tunisia. 
  
In addition, following the attack on October 31, 2010 at the Church 
of Our Lady of Hi-Baghdad, it was decided to host the national territory 
of persons whose situations are all related to the attack: the wounded 
and their carers as well as those selected on the basis of criteria for 
family reunification. To date, 92 people have already been received as 
part of this operation. 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
 




UNHCR criteria and French legislation relating to the determination 
of refugee status 
Ad Hoc Programme - Iraq 500 
The prerequisite to their selection is that they had to belong to a 
religious minority (especially Christian) and have a link with France 
(either through family ties or knowledge of French by at least one 
family member). At the time of their selection, they had to reside either 
in Iraq or in a neighbouring country: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon or Turkey. 
                                                            
19 Rapport au Parlement, Les orientations de la Politique de l’immigration et de l’intégration, 8th Official Report drafted in 
accordance with Article L.111- 10 of CESEDA, December 2011, p. 121  
20 La réinstallation des réfugiés, Etat des lieux 2009 (Forum réfugiés), pp. 106-108 
21 OFII Activity Report, 2010, op.cit., p. 122 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 

















The asylum service of the Ministry on Interior Affairs. The asylum 
service can ask for an opinion from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and/or OFPRA. The French Ministry now has a person in place 
dedicated to resettlement. 
Annual Programme 
According to the framework agreement, UNHCR and t he French 
authorities have a bi lateral meeting every year to discuss opinions on 
UNHCR and governmental activities. The asylum service of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs is taking the decision on t he cases. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and OFPRA are possibly consulted for advice by the 
asylum service. There is no collaboration with regional and local 
authorities when it comes to the decision. Every year, the asylum 
service is sending French priorities to the UNHCR. NGOs and other 
stakeholders are not officially informed of the priorities.  
The framework agreement signed in February 2008 set up the 
annual quota for France. According to Article 5, the UNHCR submits a 
hundred cases every year. The rate of rejected dossiers submitted by 
the UNHCR to France in the framework of the annual programme is 
very high. France refuses around one file out of two. Motives are 
unclear, security concerns have been evoked. 
Ad Hoc Programme - Iraq 500 
The terms of the arrival of Iraqis in France have been set out in a 
Convention between the French Office for Immigration and Integration 
(OFII) and the IOM signed on 4 June 2008.22 An administrative note 
(circulaire) was issued on 10 J une 200823
According to this note two hypotheses were considered:  
 on the reception of Iraqi 
refugees in France.  
− Resettlement could take place either upon the 
recommendation of the UNHCR, following a procedure 
much similar to the one provided for under the 2008 
Framework Agreement.  
− Resettlement could also take place following a special 
procedure according to which the Association d’Entraide aux 
Minorités d’Orient (created in January 2008) was in charge of 
recommending files to the French authority. This latter 
procedure specified that refugees whose files were accepted 
would be granted a short stay visa (Visa ‘C’) and would have 
the option to either apply for asylum at the OFPRA or to be 
delivered a one-year residence permit (‘vie privée et familiale’). 
− Finally, some files were spontaneously sent by some Iraqi 
family members already living in France.24
Following their submission, all resettlement files were sent to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, which carried out some safety checks on the 
persons whose files are under examination. If the files were selected, 
the asylum direction of the Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently gave 
its instruction to deliver visas to those whose files were chosen. 
  
25




24 Quel avenir pour les réfugiés irakiens en France ? – op.cit., p. 21 
25 Ibid, p. 21-22. 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
 




























Under OFII request, IOM can provide CO sessions for groups of 14 
people being resettled to France on t he topics listed here: the trip to 
France; administrative procedures upon arrival in France, reception 
condition (accommodation, rights, access to healthcare, education), 
integration in France (finding a job, learning French), life in France. This 
has never happened except for Iraqis and E U relocations. Since 
December 2008, half a day session of CO was organised before 
departure to prepare the beneficiaries for life in France. In April 2009, 
around ten such sessions were given in Damascus and Amman for a 
minimum of ten people. When such activities cannot be organised (for 
safety reasons like in Iraq), the IOM distributed an information package, 
of which the Information Leaflet for People Resettled in France.28
An information leaflet for persons being resettled to France has been 
conceived by Forum Réfugiés. Yet, it has not been s ystematically 
distributed to beneficiaries before departure. A new edition of the leaflet 
has been on the agenda of the Asylum Service for 2 y ears. It is 
currently preparing a leaflet presenting what refugees can expect when 
they arrive in France (accomodation, assistance, etc).  
 
Through its network of offices, IOM facilitate logistical arrangements 
(temporary accommodation, booking, ticketing, transportation to the 
airport, etc.) if so requested by OFII.  
In coordination with UNHCR and local partners, IOM collects from 
the competent authorities the required travel documents (exit permits, 
grants of asylum and/or the entry visas for France) and verifies the 
authenticity of the identity particulars of the persons concerned. To rule 
out any dishonesty, the travel documents are delivered to the interested 
parties at the time of departure – generally at the international airport – 
after a final identity check has been made. 
IOM staff assists the persons during immigration and c ustoms 
procedures and helps them with boarding. It can also provide special 
assistance (medical or non-medical assistance, help with clothing). 
At the request of OFII, IOM may furnish the following: 
− any relevant and useful information regarding the health 
situation in the area of departure, including recommendations 
as to any vaccinations that are needed before departure; 
− a health assessment of the persons concerned, including a 
medical history registration form and a physical examination, as 
well as clinical examinations (e.g. X-rays and blood tests); 
− pre-departure vaccination and/or treatment of the beneficiaries 
for infections such as malaria and intestinal parasites. 
OFII and IOM jointly assess the health of the persons to be resettled 
to France and any treatment that may be needed (including required 
vaccinations). The stipulated and accepted requirements as well as 
their cost will be set out in writing. 
 Procedure Timing n/a 
 
                                                            
26 Information provided by IOM. 
27 Ibid. 
28 http://www.iom.int/france/pdf/Livret%20reinstallation%20fr.pdf 
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Comments  Recommendations: 
- Refugees should be better informed of the reception conditions and 
life in France as to lower down unrealistic expectations. The 
information leaflet has to be improved, particularly on housing and 
employment issues. A video tool might be a  better tool for 
dissemination of information.  
Distributing a leaflet and a one-day CO have proven not to be 
enough. Refugees waiting for transfer to France could easily benefit 
the integration training system put in place for applicants for family 
reunification. France currently offers basic French classes and 
information about republican principles in more than 30 c ountries. 
This training usually takes place in the premises of the Alliance 
Française or by OFII representations abroad. They could easily be 
of benefit to resettled refugees without causing high costs.  
- The selection procedure is not appropriate for the following reasons: 
− The procedure is too lengthy. The asylum service is under 
resourced and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consultation 
delays the decision.  
− The rejection rate is too high. The number of selected 
refugees could be higher.  
− If the means are available and notwithstanding emergency 
cases, French authorities could conduct selection missions 
in the countries of first asylum. The selection missions 
should include a representative of OFPRA in order to fasten 
the administrative process in France and, eventually a 
representative of NGOs that will be in charge of reception 
and integration. If no selection mission is organised, OFPRA 
should be involved in the selection process in order to avoid 
conducting the asylum phase in France. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 Status granted  
Administrative instruction 
















- Iraq 500 
The procedure for the reception of Iraqis has been settled in an 
inter-ministerial meeting on the 23rd of November 2007. It has been 
decided that the selected Iraqis will not automatically be granted 
refugee status, but immigration status. However, this did not prevent 
them from requesting such status at their arrival in France under the 
common procedure. 
Initially, some selected Iraqis received a “visa D”, long-term visa 
granted in the case of protection transfers (when the UNHCR under a 
strict mandate recognises individually a refugee). Other received a “visa 
C” short term visa granted in the case of asylum seeking. Following the 
visit of an official from the French Ministry of Immigration (now the 
Ministry of Home Affairs) to the UNCHR offices in Jordan and Syria, it 
was found out that those Iraqis arriving with a “visa D” did not benefit 
from protection under the UNHCR’s strict mandate, but were granted 
such protection prima facie. Since, France does not recognise prima 
facie protection, it was decided that all Iraqis would first be granted a 
“visa C” and once they arrived they would lodge a r equest to be 
recognised as refugees by OFPRA. Those recognised as refugees 
would be given the ten-year residence permit, while others would be 
given subsidiary protection and accordingly, were delivered a one-year 
residences permit. As for those who were recognised as neither 
                                                            
29 NOR/IMI/A/08/00028/C 
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refugees nor beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, they would be given 
an ordinary one-year residence permit, for the reason of the obligations 
France holds towards them.30
- Annual Programme 
  
Refugees arriving under the procedure of the Annual Programme 
are bound to be granted refugee status. 
Before their arrival, they are granted a so-called ‘Visa D’ long-term visa. 
Upon their arrival, they are delivered a six month temporary leave to 
remain (récépissé), giving them right to work and other related social 
rights such as the Active Solidarity Income (RSA)31 (Article L262-4 2° a 
of Code de l’action sociale et des familles). Besides, they receive 
financial support while waiting for the OFPRA decision just as other 
asylum seekers32. Their being granted such benefits depends on their 
being hosted in specific housing facilities for asylum seekers (CADA)33. 
Moreover, they receive global medical coverage34
They have to file an application to be granted the refugee status with 
the OFPRA within 21 days after their arrival, just as other asylum 
seekers. 
. 
They are interviewed. 
Although they follow the same procedure, resettled refugees are 
automatically granted refugee status. The process to be granted asylum 
can last several months.35




















Resettled refugees are granted a permanent residence permit (ten year 
residence permit). 
The OIM meets the beneficiaries at the international area of the airport 
and accompanies them to the exit and/or to the TGV station if the final 
destination is not Paris. The OIM also organizes the local transport to 
the designed reception centre for groups of more than 10 persons. 
If resettled refugees arrive at an airport in Paris, they are received by 
FTDA staff that are responsible for transportation to the transit centre in 
Créteil, located in the Paris region, and managed by FTDA. Some of 
them might be redirected to the transit centre of Villeurbanne (Lyon 
region), managed by Forum Réfugiés. 
If resettled persons have to be t ransferred to the transit centre in 
Villeurbanne (Lyon region), refugees are escorted to “Gare de Lyon” 
train station in Paris and they are taken care of by the staff of Forum 
Réfugiés on their arrival at the station in Lyon.  
Nothing is foreseen in this respect. However, staff of the transit centre in 
Créteil informs refugees about the procedure and their rights and duties. 
                                                            
30 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, 2012. For full details, read Quel avenir pour les réfugiés irakiens en France ? – Une 
analyse des perspectives d’intégration des bénéficiaires de l’opération spéciale d’accueil, Une étude de 
l’Observatoire de l’intégration des réfugiés, France Terre d’Asile, February 2010, pp. 22-23. 
31 Revenu de solidarité active  
32 Allocation Temporaire d’Attente (see Article L5423-8 1° of Code du Travail) and Allocation mensuelle de subsistance 
(see Article R.348-4 II of Code de l’Action Sociale et des Familles) 
33 Centre d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile 
34 Couverture maladie universelle, article L 380-1, 3° of Code de la Sécurité Sociale 
35 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
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Preparing local community 
Developing Integration 






















Family Reunification  
 
Advice of Accessing Services  
 
Mentoring 






Resettled refugees are entitled to the same rights as nationals except 
electoral rights and access to employment in the civil service. More 
particularly, they are entitled to social rights such as a minimum 
subsistence income (RSA), free health care (CMU) and access to social 
housing. Moreover, like any other newcomers, resettled refugees have 
access to the reception and integration contract (CAI), managed by 
OFII, that offers civic training, assessment of the professional 
qualifications and l anguage classes. They are benefiting from social 
and legal assistance in the reception centres.  
Resettled refugees can benefit from integration projects run by 
NGOs and are assisted for about one year. Three specific projects are 
put in place for resettled refuges with the support of ERF.  
Resettled refugees have access to a civic training delivered in the 
framework of CAI. 
Counselling is generally provided by NGOs managing reception centres 
and integration projects. 
However, refugees have access to all social services in the same 
conditions as nationals. 
Resettled refugees have access to French classes (up to 400h) 
delivered in the framework of CAI. 
French classes are usually provided in reception centres on a 
voluntary basis. 
Resettled refugees have access to a skill assessment delivered in the 
framework of CAI. 
Reception centres, social workers and specific integration projects 
provide workshop and assistance on employment. 
Refugees have the right to family reunification in the same conditions as 
nationals provided the family links can be established. 
Resettled refugees have access to training on social services delivered 




Resettled refugees are first accommodated in the Créteil transit centre 
run by FTDA or in Villeurbanne transit centre run by Forum Réfugiés. 
Since September 2011, after a few days in transit centre, resettled 
refugees should benefit from direct placement in an apartment for a year.  
As a result of the lack of social housing available in France, FTDA, 
Forum Réfugiés and Adoma offer housing solutions for resettled refugees.  
For instance, FTDA’s network for the integration of resettled 
refugees can offer 80 places for a year in the Paris area and in Niort 
(Deux-Sèvres). Social workers offer individual administrative and social 
assistance, including workshops on housing and employment. The 
project is funded by the ERF and the Ministry of Interior Affairs.  
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NGOs are asked to send their foreseen housing availabilities to 
OFII who informs the asylum service who then asks the Foreign Affairs 
to deliver the visa to selected refugees in the country of first asylum. 
Comments Recommendations for a better resettlement programme are the 
following:  
− Transfer of information to organisations in charge of the reception 
of refugees: providing early information about the profiles of 
resettled refugees to the stakeholders involved in the reception 
and assistance is necessary to forestall needs, particularly medical 
needs and to offer better services. This would allow the process to 
begin for gaining access to social rights and to find a more 
permanent accommodation. 
− Specific reception conditions: accommodation in reception centres 
for asylum seekers and the successive housing solutions have 
proven not to be a relevant option for resettled refugees. Direct 
placement in housing that lasts longer such as the project run by 
the FTDA should be prioritised. 
− Social assistance tailored to the specific needs of resettled 
refugees: resettled refugees have specific needs related to their 
living conditions in the first country of asylum and they have to face 
a quick paced integration process in France. Social assistance 
should take these needs into consideration and seek for the 
empowerment of refugees. 
− Quick access to the reception and integration contract: access to 
the integration programme is postponed until formal recognition of 
the refugee status by OFPRA. It could be easily offered to sign this 
contract and the trainings as soon as the refugees arrive in France. 
This has already been done in the framework of the EU relocation 
scheme. 
− More involvement of local authorities can better foster integration in 
the local community.  
− Evaluation of the outcome of resettlement by a qualitative survey of 
the integration of refugees. 
− Strengthening the cooperation among national stakeholders: the 
working group meetings should convene regularly. 
− France should increase its participation in the European and 
international dialogue on resettlement. For instance, French 
authorities should be more active in practical cooperation in 
Europe.  
It is to be noted that French authorities made a number of 
commitments during the Working Group on Resettlement which was 
convened by in February 2013, such as the following: 
− Resettled refugees will be able to have access to the integration 
programme without having to wait for the refugee status. They will 
be able to sign the reception and integration contract upon arrival. 
− OFPRA will not systematically interview the refugees before 
granting refugee status. 
There are now other stakeholders, in addition to FTDA, Forum 
Réfugiés and Adoma, which provide places to resettled refugees (e.g. 
in Besançon and Pau). 
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c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 




France is already applying for the dedicated funds available under the 
ERF36
The authorities are co-financing with the ERF the reception and 
integration projects run by FTDA, Forum réfugiés and Adoma. 
. However, there is no information on ho w this money is used 
bearing in mind that vulnerable refugees do not benefit extra-services. 
The integration projects mentioned above could not exist without the 
financial support of the ERF (national actions). 
− Projected contribution 2009: 680, 000 euros 
(4,000 euros per person for 170 persons)37
− Projected contribution 2010: 272, 000 euros  
 






There does not seem to be any political willingness to further increase 
resettlement capacity in France for the time being. An important reason 
for this reluctance consists in the high number of asylum seekers and 
refugees in France. According to France’s official position, the Annual 
Programme was created to honour France’s tradition of receiving 
refugees. Although this creation substantially improved the previous 
situation making it more predictable, such a programme remains limited 
in its scope and still does not match current resettlement needs 
worldwide. 39
France’s involvement in resettlement remains quite low in 
comparison to other EU Member States. 
 
 
                                                            
36 Moreover, 90 % of the EU relocation programme was funded by ERF.  
37 ERF Annual Programme 2009 (France) pp. 11-14 
38 ERF Annual Programme 2010 (France) p. 17-19 
39 Ministry of Home Affairs, Interview of 3 April 2012.  
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Country Profile: GERMANY 
Following the Second World War, the right to asylum was established in the Constitution from 1949. The 
number of applicants was low until 1968. Most applicants were refugees from the Eastern Bloc and were 
granted refugee status.  
After deciding in 1973 t o end t he recruitment of foreign workers, Germany received 3 m illion new 
immigrants, most of them ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, Turkey and Italy. At that time German 
society considered its immigrants to be temporary by hoping that they would leave the country once their 
labour was no longer needed. Recruitment stopped in 1973, but immigration did not stop. However, the 
nature of the immigration did change1
A new period began in the late 1980s, when immigration again increased rapidly. Apart from on-going 
family reunifications, the number of ethnic Germans coming from Eastern Europe rose sharply after 1989 
as did the number of asylum seekers
. The foreign workers, mainly from Turkey and Italy, did not go back to 
their home countries, but brought their families to Germany with the intention of remaining in Germany. 
Integration problems arose and became clearer with economic recessions. The so called Gastarbeiter and 
their families had m ainly come from less educated and q ualified social backgrounds and had l imited 
German language skills. 
2. In spite of numerous legislative changes in asylum procedure during 
the previous ten years, all of which attempted to expedite asylum procedures in cases of manifestly 
unfounded or abusive asylum claims, the number of asylum seekers continued to climb and r eached 
440,000 in 1992. Moreover Germany received approximately 100,000 de facto refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia. Germany admitted almost 70 per cent of all asylum seekers registered in the European 
Community in 19923
So, as highlighted above, before 1993, the German Constitution guaranteed an absolute right to asylum. 
Faced with mounting immigration pressures, the major political parties of Germany reached a compromise 
in December 1992. The compromise set out that the Constitution would maintain the individual right to 
asylum but that an A mendment would restrict manifestly unfounded asylum applications and asylum 
seekers entering from safe third countries. The amendment of the German Constitution marked a change in 
German asylum policy. The change has been highly successful in stemming the burgeoning immigration 
into Germany. From 1993 onwards it was impossible for an immigrant to obtain asylum if he entered from a 
country of origin that was considered to be “safe”.  
.  
The large number of asylum seekers decreased rapidly after the constitutional and legal reforms of 
1993. Reform of the asylum regime was undertaken in an environment characterised by frustration about 
the economic burden of reunification and a very high level of unemployment.4
The new immigration law, focused on defining immigration, the integration of aliens in Germany and 
refugee protection. The new law potentially widens the scope of refugee protection by recognizing that 
victims of non-state and gender specific persecution fall within the protection scope of the Geneva 
Convention 1951. The latter and other important changes were considered as important developments
 Since then discussions about 
asylum have decreased in importance but at the same time a general debate on i mmigration started. 
Recognising the necessity of immigration for economic reasons due to changes in demography and after 
much wrangling with the opposition, the German government drew up a new immigration law. That law 
came into force on the 1st of January 2005. 
5
After a decline in the numbers of asylum seekers from 1995 until a resurgence in 2008, Germany has 
continually reduced the number of people granted entry into the country.  
.  
                                                            
1 Johannes von Stritzky, (2009), ‘Germany‘ s immigration policy: from Refusal to Reluctance’, ARI 93/2009, 3/06/2009.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Kay Hailbronner, (1994), ‘Asylum law reform in the German Constitution’, American University International Law 
Review 9, no. 4, pp.159-179. 
4 Johannes von Stritzky, (2009), op.cit. 
5 UNHCR (2004), New German Immigration law includes advances in refugee protection, 12 July 2004. 
http://www.unhcr.org/40f2bb884.html 
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In 2012, Germany saw a rapid increase in the number of asylum applications. The biggest number of 
those hoping to enter the country came from Serbia, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.  
After observing an ex treme rise in the number of the asylum seekers from Serbia and Macedonia in 
September 2012, Germany’s interior minister called for tighter rules for processing the applications.  
Despite this large increase, the 2012 numbers are still much lower than in 1990s, when Germany had 
more than 100,000 asylum seekers per year.  
The important ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in the case M.S.S. v Belgium & Greece 
also impacted upon German legislation on asylum seekers in Germany. Their situation is now examined in 
light of this ruling. On January 2011, the Federal Ministry of the Interior ordered that transfers of asylum 
seekers to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation be suspended for one year. In November, the suspension 
was prolonged until 12 January 2013. 
As far as resettlement is concerned, Germany has practiced ad hoc resettlement for many years without 
ever committing to an official annual quota for resettlement.  
In November 2008, the Ministers of the Interior (Ministers on the national and federal states level) 
decided to resettle 2,500 Iraqi refugees – 2,000 from Syria and 500 from Jordan. This came in anticipation 
to the European Council’s conclusions in 2008 t hat encouraged EU member states to resettle 10,000 
refugees from Iraq. In addition to UNHCR selection criteria, the admission order by the German Ministry of 
the Interior put a f ocus on persecuted minorities (Iraqi Christians) and introduced the following extra 
categories: ‘ability to integrate’ (indicators: level of education, professional experience, language skills), 
preserving the unity of the family, family or other ties to Germany that can facilitate integration, and the level 
of protection need. Germany also resettled 50 Iranians from Turkey in 2010. 
In December 2011 the Ministers of the Interior decided to adopt a permanent resettlement programme 
for the next three years, resettling 300 refugees per year starting in 2012. In response to the UNHCR’s and 
the EU’s initiative calling, priority was given to refugees of Sub-Saharan origin (mainly Somalis) who had 
fled from Libya to the Shousha refugee camp in Tunisia, and 100 refugees to be selected from Iraqis that 
fled to Turkey. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) ultimately accepted 200 
refugees for resettlement, out of 246 applications. In September 2012, 195 refugees were resettled in 
Germany after spending more than 18 months in the Shousha camp. In October 2012, 105 Iraqi refugees 
arrived in Hanover as part of the resettlement programme. They were resettled from Turkey. These 
represented a second group after September's arrivals and were part of the 900 vulnerable refugees that 
are to be resettled by 2014.  
The adoption of a permanent resettlement programme was an unexpected breakthrough after years of 
lobbying for a permanent resettlement programme by different stakeholders. The most important factors in 
leading the German government to rethink their position on a permanent resettlement programme were the 
mainly positive experiences of the ad hoc resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010 on the local level, and 
the developments on the European level with the campaign for resettlement to Europe. 
The capacities for increased resettlement numbers definitely exists in Germany. The extension of the 
resettlement programme solely depends upon the political will of the government. The general public has 
little or no knowledge about resettlement. However, public opinion concerning the admission of the Iraqi 
refugees was surprisingly positive even though general attitude towards refugees is not without its 
problems. NGOs and welfare associations stated that they could definitely support more refugees than the 
planned 300 per year. And on the local level, large numbers of volunteers – organised by the Save-Me 
campaign – offered their support for refugee resettlement. The media had also been reporting mainly in a 
positive way about the resettlement of Iraqis. All this would form a good basis for more resettlement in the 
future.  
Since there is only the experience of ad hoc  resettlement to refer to, and the future resettlement 
programme will draw on legislation and practices that were deployed for the ad ho c resettlement, this 
research focuses on the experience of resettling 2,500 Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010. 
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Asylum Profile 












9,675 (2011)  
 
• 6,446 Refugee Status Granted 
• 3,382 Other Protection  
10,395 (2010)  
• 7,061 Refugee Status Granted 
• 3,436 Other Protection  
43,362 (2011)  
48,187 (2010)  
Programme (Since 2012) 
300/year from 2012 to 2014 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Asylverfahrensgesetz, 
01/07/1992 (Asylum 
Procedure Act), last amended 
in November 2011. 
 
Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, 
die Erwerbstätigkeit und die 
Integration von Ausländern im 
Bundesgebiet 
(Aufenthaltsgesetz), 
01/05/2005 (Residence Act), 
last amended in December 
2011.  
 
Contains no specific provision on r esettlement, but rules about the 
procedure of granting of asylum and about the recognition of a refugee as 
well as the legal status of the persons entitled to asylum. 
 
 
Sections 22 and 23 (2), adopted in the first version of the Residence Act 
in 2005, contains the legal basis for resettlement.  
Section 22 contains provision for admission from abroad.  
A further legal basis for the issuing of a residence or settlement permit is 
section 23 (2). It was applied in the case of Iraqi refugees, following the 
ruling of the Federal Ministry of the Interior of 5 December 2008. 
Upon receiving a residence permit, Section 44 (1) entitles those 
foreigners who reside in Germany to attend an integration course.  
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Information on the procedure of 
the resettlement of Iraqi 
nationals from Syria and Jordan 





This UNHCR document contains information on the eligibility and the 
procedure of the resettlement of 2,500 Iraqis in Germany.  
 
 
                                                            
6 http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/statistik-anlage-teil-4-aktuelle-zahlen-zu-
asyl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (February 2012), p. 8 
7 http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/statistik-anlage-teil-4-aktuelle-zahlen-zu-
asyl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (February 2012), p. 8. 
8 Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
9 Informationen zum Ablauf des Aufnahmeverfahrens für irakische Staatsangehörige aus Syrien und Jordanien im ersten 
Halbjahr 2009, UNHCR Berlin, 
http://www.unhcr.at/fileadmin/rechtsinfos/fluechtlingsrecht/3_deutschland/3_2_unhcr_stellungnahmen/FR_GER-
HCR_rst_IRQ_012009.pdf (February 2012). 
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Ruling of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior 
pursuant to §23 (2) of the 
Residence Act, 5 December 
2008 
 
Decision on the launch of a 
permanent resettlement 
programme and on 
admission of refugees from 
North Africa, December 2011 
 
Decision on the reception of 2,500 Iraqi refugees from Syria and Jordan. 
In the ruling the Minister notes that the situation of the refugees in their 
countries of first asylum has worsened so that a common action at the 
international, European and national level is required. It defines the 
selection criteria and the distribution among the Länder according to the 
Königsteiner Key, a s ystem of burden sharing among the Länder in 
several political fields.  
Decision adopted at the 193th session of the Permanent Conference of 
the Ministers and Senators of the Interior of the Länder (8-9 December 
2011). It concerns the launch of a permanent resettlement programme 
and admission of 300 r efugees per year over the next three years 
(starting in 2012) from North Africa. 
As far as the resettlement of the Iranian refugees from Turkey is 
concerned, there was no specific ruling from the Federal Ministry as it 
was the case with the Iraqi refugees. The Iranians were resettled 
following individual decisions on the basis of the above mentioned 
Sections 22 and 23 (2) of the Residence Act. According to the BAMF, the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior has decided to resettle a f urther 25 
Iranians pursuant to § 22 (2) of the Residence Act.  
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The national legislation for the future resettlement programme will be the 
same as for the ad hoc  resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010, 
which does not provide a refugee protection status. This was criticized 
by all stakeholders interviewed for Know Reset, mainly because their 
legal status entails very strict conditions for family reunification. These 
factors would inhibit the integration of the refugees.  
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  






















Country of origin: Hungary 
Approx. 35,000 
Country of origin: Vietnam  
Approx. 3,000 
Country of origin: Albania 
Approx. 350,000 (acceptance and t emporary protection of just under 
350,000) 
Country of origin: Bosnia 
Approx. 15,000 
Country of origin: Kosovo 
14 
Country of origin: Uzbekistan 
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Country of origin: Iraq (2,501). 
Country of first asylum: Jordan (438), Syria (2,063). 
Gender: Male (1,117), Female (1,384). 
Age: 0-15 (879), 16-21 (339), 21-40 (608), Over 40 (675). 
Religion: Christian (1,207), Mandean (491), Muslim (798), Yezidi (5). 
50 
Country of origin: Iran (50) 
Country of first asylum: Turkey (50) 
b) On a programme basis 
2011 Decision of Ministers 
of Interior 
 
On the launch of a permanent resettlement programme for the next three 
years and on admission of refugees from North Africa. Based on this 




In March 2013, Germany has committed to receiving 5,000 Syrian 
refugees displaced by the violence in their country of origin. This goes in 
line with UNHCR plan for the humanitarian admission of 10,000 Syrian 
refugees while resettlement countries are also called to resettle 2,000 
vulnerable persons on a more permanent basis. 





“Share” project: focus on integration on the local level with UNHCR, IOM, 
NGOs, BAMF 
ERF project: “Linking-In EU-resettlement” an aw areness raising, fact-









In September 2010 t wo prisoners from Guantamo arrived in Germany. 
One came to Hamburg, the other one to Mainz.17
 
 
20 refugees from Malta in 200618
11 African refugees from Malta in 2009
 
19
102 African refugees from Malta, Project EUREMA 2010/2011
 
20
Country of origin: Eritrea (20), Ethiopia (2), Sierra Leone (3), Somalia 
(61), Sudan (16).  
 
Country of first asylum: Malta (102).  
153 African refugees from Malta in 2011/201221
Country of origin: Eritrea (71), Ethiopia (7), Somalia (72), Sudan (2), 
Unknown (1).  
 
Country of first asylum: Malta (153). 
Gender: Male (68), Female (83), Unknown (1).  
Age: 0-15 (43), 16-21 (7), 21-40 (100), over 40 (2). 
Religion: Christian (62), Mandean (86), Unknown (4). 
                                                            
16 Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
17 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/aufnahme-aus-humanitaeren-gruenden-guantanamo-haeftlinge-in-deutschland-
eingetroffen-11038373.html (February 2012). 
18 http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Aufgaben/HumanitaereAufnahme/humanitaereaufnahme.html 
19 See the interview with the German Ministry of the Interior, 13 February 2012. 
20 Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
21 ibid. 
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Comments 
 
In April 2013, Germany also announced that it would resettle 100 
refugees stranded in camp Hurriya near Baghdad in Iraq.  













Country of origin: Iraq 
Country of First Asylum: Turkey 
20023
Country of first asylum: Tunisia 
 
2,501  
Country of origin: Iraq (2,501). 
Country of first asylum: Jordan (438), Syria (2,063). 
Gender: Male (1,117), Female (1,384). 
Age: 0-15 (879), 16-21 (339), 21-40 (608), Over 40 (675). 
Religion: Christian (1,207), Mandean (491), Muslim (798), Yezidi (5). 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
 
• UNHCR Criteria 
 
 
• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
In addition to UNCHR selection criteria, the German Ministry of Interior 
put a f ocus on members of persecuted (religious) minorities, victims of 
violence, those with special medical needs and single women with 
children. 
Germany also applied other criteria such as capacity for integration.24
                                                            
22 Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
 
23 http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Aufgaben/HumanitaereAufnahme/humanitaereaufnahme.html 
24 UNHCR document: „Informationen zum Ablauf des Aufnahmeverfahrens für irakische Staatsangehörige aus Syrien 
und Jordanien im ersten Halbjahr 2009“,  
http://www.unhcr.at/fileadmin/rechtsinfos/fluechtlingsrecht/3_deutschland/3_2_unhcr_stellungnahmen/FR_GER-
HCR_rst_IRQ_012009.pdf (February 2012); See also BAMF document: Evaluierung zur humanitären Aufnahme 
irakischer Flüchtlinge aus Syrien und Jordanien 2009/2010. 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 












UNHCR identified refugees, also with the support of local NGOs in 
Amman and Damascus. 
UNHCR prepared refugee dossiers and submitted them to BAMF to 
make a pre-selection. 
 
After pre-selection in Germany on the basis of UNHCR dossiers, 
selection interviews were carried out by BAMF on a s election mission in 
Syria and Jordan. Refugees were accepted for resettlement during 
selection missions.  
As far as the Iranian refugees are concerned, the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior decided individually for each case.  
Pre-Departure Activities 
 
• Cultural orientation (CO) 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 




The German Foreign Office issued visas for the refugees. 
 
IOM 
Procedure Timing The resettlement took place in cooperation with the IOM. The time for the 
preparation of the resettlement was four weeks and the first refugees 
arrived in Germany in the middle of March 2009. They came by air to 




The German decision to give priority to members of the Christian minority 
for resettlement provoked discussion in the countries of first asylum as 
well as in Germany. Also, the ‘ability to integrate’ category for selection 
has been criticised by different stakeholders. As resettlement is intended 
for the most vulnerable refugees, the humanitarian purpose should 
therefore have absolute priority. 
Pre-departure: In individual cases, BAMF expected the refugees to 
return to Iraq to obtain their missing documents.  
Before embarking on the resettlement programme, hardly any information 
about Germany and what to expect was given to the refugees. 
Expectations among the Iraqis were often too high and unrealistic. 
Recommendations for pre-departure:  
• For the selection of refugees the category ‘ability to integrate’ or 
‘cultural proximity’ should be dropped.  
• Before refugees enter the resettlement programme, information 
service has to be i mproved and should provide a more realistic 
picture of Germany and what refugees can expect there (cultural 
orientation). 
                                                            
25 http://www.stadt-muenster.de/ratsinfo/00001/pdf/00280208.pdf (February 2012); see also: Nele Allenberg, Die 
Aufnahme irakischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland – ein erster Schritt hin zur Einrichtung eines 
Resettlementprogramms?, in: Asyl 4/09, p. 10. 
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b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
Status granted  
Residence Act, § 23 (2) 
Resettled refugees do not get a refugee protection status. 
The legal status of resettled refugees is a three –year, extendable 
residence permit pursuant to § 23 (2) of the Residence Act.  
The Federal Office for migration and refugees can revoke refugee status 
after three years if the requirements for recognition are not fulfilled 
anymore. After seven years refugees may apply for German citizenship 
upon passing a citizenship test and providing proof of employment26
Rights granted  
.  
Legal source 
Residence Act  
A residence title pursuant to § 
23 (2) (such as the one that 
the Iraqi refugees were 
granted) entitles the refugee 
to benefits from the Social 



























The temporary legal status of three years gives the refugee free access 
to an integration programme, social welfare assistance, education, 
employment and health care. If people are permanently unable to work 
they receive financial aid according to the Social Code XII. The amount 
corresponds to the Hartz IV amount but the funding is different. 
 
Iraqi and Iranian refugees were granted a residence permit for up to three 
years; it is possible to extend it for another three, then for another one year. 
After seven years a settlement permit can be granted.28
BAMF provided transport from the airport to the reception centre in 
Friedland. Medical cases that could not travel by bus were picked up by 
the German Red Cross and brought directly to hospital or to their final 
destination.  
 Different from the 
residence permit, the settlement permit is a permanent residence title. 
Section 9 of the Residence Act specifies the preconditions for the granting of 
the settlement permit, of which one important criterion is that the foreigner 
has been in possession of the residence permit for at least 5 years. 
In general, refugees stayed for a period of 2 weeks in Friedland, some 
stayed 3 months and attended language courses and gained further 
counselling before being distributed to the federal states (Länder). 
In Friedland, NGOs (German Red Cross, Diakonie and Caritas) held 
preliminary counselling and information sessions on integration into 
Germany, family reunification, status, distribution to the Länder and 
social welfare assistance. The German Red Cross offered a family 
tracing service. 
In some places there was a working group established especially for Iraqi 
refugees on the Länder and at a local level with all crucial stakeholders 
(local state authorities and NGOs) involved. Here, all relevant information 
was shared and it proved to be very efficient. However, this was more the 
exception than the rule. It also depended on the Länder and on how fast 
they would transfer information to the local level. Information on special 
needs, e.g. housing or medical needs, was not always communicated. 
Refugees were granted free access to integration programmes that 
include language and orientation courses and to integration services 
provided by welfare associations/NGOs for all migrants. In both, the 
following issue were addressed: housing, employment and education, 
child welfare, mental health and medical assistance, social integration. 
                                                            
26 ICMC (2009) 
27 Andrea Kothen (ProAsyl) 24/11/2009, document received by Sarah Hergenröther (Save-me-München). 
28 Nele Allenberg, Die Aufnahme irakischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland – ein erster Schritt hin zur Einrichtung eines 
Resettlementprogramms?, in: Asyl 4/09, pp. 10-11. 
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Refugee contribution to 
integration 
Orientation courses - as part of the integration programme - also offered 
cultural orientation. 
Preliminary counselling was held in Friedland, and after distribution to the 
Länder counselling was again offered by welfare associations and NGOs 
as part of the regular integration services offered for all migrants with 
residence permission. The following questions were addressed: status, 
social welfare assistance, health care service, family reunification, 
language acquisition, housing, employment. 
German lessons were offered in Friedland for those who stayed 3 
months. Once distributed to the Länder, they were entitled to attend 
integration programmes that included German lessons. Welfare 
associations and NGOs helped to locate integration programmes. 
Welfare organisations, NGOs and volunteers assisted refugees in finding 
employment, registering at employment agencies, and reviewing 
qualifications. Employment agencies assisted in trying to find 
employment. 
Resettled refugees do not get a refugee protection status. The conditions 
for family reunification are very strict: Livelihood has to be secured for the 
whole family without social welfare assistance, sufficient living space 
must be available, and the spouse has to have proven knowledge of the 
German language (§ 29 and § 5 (1) of the Residence Act). 
Given by welfare associations in Friedland and later on the local level by 
NGOs, volunteers (from the save-me network) and again welfare 
associations. 
In some places, save-me volunteers were assigned to individual refugees 
for mentoring. They assisted with adaption and administrative processes. 
Again, this was more the exception than the rule. 
No formal training 
Save-me is a network that tries to gain volunteer support on the local 
level for resettled refugees. The save-me groups are independent local 
groups that offer their help in finding housing, employment or childcare, 
etc. They are mainly in larger cities. 
The Länder and municipalities organized the first accommodations. Some 
municipalities offered for the beginning again reception centres others 
already provided private accommodations. In some cases, save-me 
volunteers also assisted in finding private accommodations. 
In Berlin, the Iraqi cultural association ‘El Rafedein’ was officially 
incorporated into the integration process. Some save-me members were 
also Iraqi (refugees). 
Comments In contrast to a refugee protection status, the status of resettled refugees 
includes strict conditions for family reunification, no UNHCR travelling 
pass, no permanent settlement permit and restricted permissible place of 
residence if the refugee is a r ecipient of social welfare assistance and 
long waiting periods until being given the opportunity to apply for a 
permanent residence status.  
Iraqi refugees were distributed to the Länder according to the 
‘Königssteiner Key’ and within the Länder according to determined quota. 
At the beginning, distribution was on the basis of personal requirements 
and family reunification. Later on, as quotas were filled, refugees were 
obliged to go to Länder where they were separated from family members 
or members of their religious community. The legal status of resettled 
refugees restricts their place of residence, a subsequent move to other 
Länder was rarely possible. Problems also resulted in their being 
distributed to rural areas without infrastructure for integration, meaning no 
counselling centres, no integration courses, no educational offers and no 
contact to other Arabic speaking people.  
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After leaving Friedland, some refugees were again accommodated in 
reception centres. This often caused disappointment. Interaction with 
other residents of the reception centre, especially with Iraqi asylum 
seekers with a di fferent legal status, resulted in tension, which was a 
situation of considerable emotional strain for some refugees. There are 
still some refugees - mainly larger families - living in reception centres.  
In the first months, the necessity of a t ranslator was inevitable. But 
authorities in general did not cover expenses for translation. Volunteers, 
especially native speakers, were overburdened by the great need of 
complex and time-consuming accompanying and counselling assistance.  
Problems occurred in cases when diseases or disabilities among the 
refugees were not known, or insufficiently known, prior to their arrival in 
the municipalities. In some cases, the reception facilities were therefore 
totally unprepared and h ad to undertake emergency care, which could 
have been avoided had there been enough information in advance.  
A special challenge was the reception of severely disabled persons. 
There were major difficulties in finding adequate accommodations. The 
language courses were also sometimes inaccessible for disabled 
persons. Social isolation was often a serious problem.  
The biggest obstacle for integration is the language barrier. Yet in 
some regions, refugees could not claim their right to language classes 
due to long distances to the course provider and inadequate public 
transport, and some language classes were cancelled due to insufficient 
enrolment. In some cases refugees had to wait months or even a year to 
get placed in a course. A need for special courses also appeared 
because often the Iraqi refugees were illiterate, unfamiliar with the Latin 
alphabet, and/or elderly. Those courses could not be pr ovided 
everywhere. 
Collaboration between state authorities and NGOs differed from place 
to place. In most cases collaboration was assessed as good. However, in 
some places the opportunity to make use of civil society (save-me 
volunteers) that offered their help for resettled refugees was simply 
ignored. Problems also occurred when staff members of the 
municipalities and/or immigration authorities were uninformed or 
insufficiently informed about the arrival of resettled persons and/or the 
legal status of the Iraqi refugees. Sometimes there was no clear division 
of tasks between involved services, authorities and institutions. 
Recommendations: 
 The legal status of resettled refugees should be changed into a 
refugee protection status according to the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and include a permanent residence permit from the 
beginning. This would require a change in the German Act. 
 Different stakeholders expressed the opinion that the stay in 
Friedland could be used and institutionalised in a better way by 
clarifying all administrative questions and gi ving all relevant 
information from the start. 
 Distribution of refugees within Germany has to consider refugee 
needs and the local infrastructure for integration. More flexibility 
in distribution is necessary. 
 After leaving Friedland, accommodation in reception centres 
should be avoided. 
 Translators should be planned for and funded by the state. 
 More information about the refugees’ health problems should be 
given in advance. 
 Access to language courses should be ensured and factored into 
the distribution process. 
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 Collaboration between state authorities and other stakeholders 
has to become regulated and i n some cases improved. All 
relevant stakeholders should be provided with necessary 
information about the refugees, and the responsibilities of 
different stakeholders should become regulated. 
 Conditions for family reunification have to be eased. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 


































The Federal State covers the costs for: 
• The standard financial aid according to the Social Code II: 
unemployment compensation, additional needs health insurance. 
Proportionately the Federal Government also covers heating and 
living costs (between 25.4 and 35.2%). The amount is paid 
together by the competent authorities. 
• Work finding aids according to the Social Code III 
• The costs for the selection and transport of the refugees from the 
countries of first asylum (e.g. the flight, possibly with the help of the 
army or the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, or also selection 
missions by the BAMF) as well as the integration course (through 
the BAMF). 
The costs covered by the Länder depend on: 
• The distribution procedure in the Länder, 
• The Länder themselves. It is regulated in each Land Reception Law 
or through Länder rulings. 
The municipalities cover the costs for: 
• Housing and heating for refugees receiving unemployment 
compensation II (Hartz IV), singular benefits in exceptional cases. 
• Social benefits, health treatment, housing and heating costs for 
elderly and permanently sick people pursuant to Social Code XII 
• The rent and operational costs of (temporary) accommodation 
which belongs to municipalities. In some cases the municipalities 
are reimbursed part of the costs by the Land or Federal State  
• In part the refugees themselves have to cover certain user fees. It 
is not possible to tell the general cost of rent and operation of 
these accommodations. This depends on t he Laws for 
Reimbursement in each Land, but also on the practice of each 
municipality in renting, renovation and allocation etc. Empty 
housing also incur costs for the municipalities so that, in some 
cases, there are more advantages to allocating them to refugees 
so that they can benefit from reimbursement by the State and 
cover the costs that otherwise they would have had t o bear 
themselves. 
• Voluntary benefits for the resettled refugees. Also here, the 
municipalities might use rules for reimbursement, depending on the 
laws in each Land. These rules are actually intended to grant help 
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− ERF The government received money from the European Refugee Fund. 
More than half of it was distributed to the Länder. 
• The Government can receive 4,000 € from the European Refugee 
Fund for each refugee. This money is usually used to cover the 
preparation and the transfer. Between 2008 and 2011 Germany 
has received € 8.6 million from the ERF.29
• For the resettlement of the 2,501 Iraqi refugees the Federal 
Republic had applied for an ERF Funding for 2,160 persons, but it 
was granted only for a part of them. Not all of these refugees 






The beginning and t he end of  resettlement is not legally defined and 
therefore is it impossible to give precise costs of resettlement activities or 
singular procedures of resettlement31
The asylum expenses amounted to €1,032 million in 2007, €842 




The ad hoc resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010 has been 
assessed as being positive and forms a good basis for future 
resettlement. It showed that Germany has the necessary capacities and 
resources and also convinced policy-makers to support further 
resettlement.  
However, programme problems that emerged need to be addressed 
in order to improve the resettlement experience for both refugees and 
NGOs into the future.  
On the basis of the quota that has been decided, the planning of the 
resources has become easier and more cost-effective for all participants. 
The necessary preparation for all of the respective groups of refugees 
can be made and the funding of the ERF can be better integrated in the 
financial planning. 
 
                                                            
29 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/085/1708562.pdf (April 2012) p. 1. 
30 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/085/1708562.pdf (April 2012), p. 4. 
31 Interview with the Ministry of the Interior, op.cit. 
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Country Profile: GREECE 
The population of Greece is 89.9% Greek. The remaining 10,1% are immigrants, the majority of whom are 
from Eastern Europe.1 Although, immigration had started in the early 1980s, Greece became a l argely 
immigrant-receiving country after the fall of communism, and thereby transforming the country’s status from 
a sending to a receiving country. Greece is bordered from west to east with Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey. The borderline with Turkey is one of the most frequented passages of immigration into Europe. 
According to the International Organisation of Migration, 85% of the illegal immigration to the EU passes 
through Greece and originates at its border with Turkey2 which places a ‘particular pressure’ on Greece.3
Greece’s legal framework for asylum and i mmigration is based upon two basic legal texts, one 
presidential decree (114/2010) and one law (3907/2011). In addition, there is an Action Plan which does not 
have a legal validity but serves as a guideline of the politics that should be adopted by the administration. 
The new law 3907/2011 of 21 January 2011, which has not yet been fully implemented, establishes the 
Central Asylum Authority and t he Regional Asylum Services, which will be attached to the Ministry of 
Interior, and will constitute an independent administrative authority composed of qualified and specialized 
civilian personnel who are responsible for the adjudication of asylum applications at first instance. This law 
is, according to the UNHCR, the basis for significant improvements and progress on asylum institution 
building, as well as for fair and efficient decision-making on individual claims’.
 
4
The assumption is that since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2009, the asylum system has been 
completely overloaded. Hence, the inability to register all the applications that were made explains why 
there has been a decrease in the number of asylum applications. Nonetheless, in the first half of 2009, 
Greece registered the 6th largest number of asylum applications in the EU.
 However, its implementation 
poses significant challenges due to the lack of financial means to set up, equip and operate the system. 
5
In general terms, the system of asylum provision is quite dysfunctional in Greece and less generous 
than in other EU countries. In fact, only 0.03 per cent of the applications of refugee attribution have been 
approved, while in countries such as France, the UK and Sweden, this percentage has reached almost 30 
per cent. For instance, in the first three quarters of 2010, Greece awarded refugee status to 8% of Afghan 
applicants, 0% of Somalis and 8% of Iraqis. The average protection rates for these same States in the five 
EU member states which have received the highest number of asylum claims in the same period of time, is: 
Somalis 70%, Afghans 45%, and Iraqis 51%.
  
6
In addition, it is admitted that the whole system of asylum processing is collapsing.
  
7 The conditions of 
detention of the asylum seekers in Greek detention centres constitutes a humanitarian crisis.8 On the 21st 
of January 2011, Greece was judged by the European Court of Human Rights to have violated the 
European Convention of Human Rights in how it applied EU law.9
                                                            
1 Data from the 
 In fact, Greece was condemned for the 
living and detention conditions of refugees and asylum seekers which is in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division's World Migrant Stock: 
The 2008 Revision 
2 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/greece 
3 See COM (2006) 401 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a 
mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism,  
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0401en01.pdf 
4 Asylum situation in Greece including for Dublin II transferees, UNHCR, 30 January 2011. 
5 See “Asylum Claims in Industrialised Countries, Monthly trends January – June 2009”, www.unhcr.org 
6 Asylum situation in Greece including for Dublin II transferees, UNHCR, 31 January 2011 
7 Interview with Iliana Raouzaiou, Caritas NGO, 16 March 2012 
8 ‘While Dublin II transferees are unlikely to end up in the Evros detention facilities upon their return to Greece from 
another Member State, the inability of the Greek authorities to provide for the basic standards required to ensure 
human dignity is of grave concern. There are no indications that Dublin II transferees are spared the hardships and 
treatment that – at present – are generally experienced by asylum seekers in Greece.’ Asylum situation in Greece 
including for Dublin II transferees, op.cit. 
9 ECHR, M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011 
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Finally, the financial crisis has paralysed the country for the past five years and ha s aggravated an 
already delicate situation and leaves no possibility for the introduction of resettlement in the political and 
therefore to the legal agenda.  
                                                            
10 Source: Ministry of Citizen Protection 
11 Ibid. 
12 Asylum situation in Greece including Dublin II transferees, op.cit.  
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• 95 Refugee Status 
• 35 Other Protection 
66 (2009) 
• 36 Refugee Status 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law 3907/2011, 26 January 
2011, Establishment of the 
Asylum Service and the 
Service of First Reception 




114/2010, 22 November 2010, 
‘Establishment of a uniformed 
procedure of identification of 
the status of refugee or of 
subsidiary protection for aliens 
and stateless in compliance 
with Directive 2005/85/EC ‘on 
minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States 




Article 5 of law 3907/2011 states that the Asylum Service is competent 
for ‘every process of granting the refugee status, its content, and the 
procedures of temporary protection attribution’. The basic innovation of 
law 3907 is the establishment of the Asylum Service, which, once it is set 
up, will have the competency of examining the asylum applications.  
The law is not used in reality. The reason is the delay in the 
establishment of the Asylum Service as it is proscribed in the law. 
The presidential decree 114/2010 assigns the responsibility for 
determining asylum applications at first instance to Police Directorates in 
fourteen locations (including two airports) and establishes independent 
appeals committees which are responsible, inter alia, for including for the 
applications backlog. The decree also establishes the Appeals 




Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
Although, the law 3907/2011 has been voted in order to replace the 
decree, the decree is still used as a result of the delay in the setting up 
the Asylum Service. 
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13 http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_02/03/2011_381072, 2 March 2011 
14 ‘Greece has agreed to offer hospitality to Chinese evacuees arriving from Libya, who will stay on Crete until 
arrangements are made for their return to China’, http://www.xpatathens.com/news/23422, 24 February 2011 
15 Idem 
16 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Updated UNHCR Guidelines for the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme of 
Kosovar Refugees in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 11 May 1999, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b31b7b.html [accessed 6 April 2012] 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 
















From Libya: During the protests against Gaddafi’s regime, there were a 
large number of foreign nationals who were evacuated from the country. 
Greece was one of the countries which participated in the evacuation 
plans, not only of Greek nationals, but also of Europeans and third 
country nationals. Firstly, Greece offered ports in Crete as points of 
arrival of six US war ships, which were transporting evacuees. Secondly, 
Greece sent two boats to Libya in order to evacuate foreign nationals, 
Europeans, Chinese, Filipinos, and Brazilians. Concerning the Filipinos 
transferred to Crete, Greek police guarded the hotel where they were 
staying because of fears that some of the Filipinos would stay illegally in 
the country. At the same time, there were agreements with Filipino 
diplomats to repatriate them back to the Philippines.13 It was also agreed 
that Chinese nationals would stay in Greece only temporarily and then 
they would be repatriated to China.14
2,146 Chinese and 665 Filipinos
 
15
During the war in Serbia in spring 1999, many Kosovars were forced to 
flee to Macedonia. The potential humanitarian crisis forced the United 
Nations, IOM and several states to participate in an evacuation plan in 
order to transfer refugees from Macedonia to other countries. Greece 
accepted to offer Thessaloniki airport for this purpose. The Government 
of Greece requested that flight plans be presented by IOM with four days 
notice being given for each flight by IOM and the concerned embassy in 
Athens. No other identity or travel documents were required.
 were transferred temporarily to 
Crete before being repatriated to their home countries. The same is true 
for an unknown number of Europeans and Americans. 
16
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17 European Voice, 26 January 2012, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ministers-to-discuss-asylum-
relocation-plan/73314.aspx 
18 Asylum in the EU27, EUROSTAT, 23 March 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/12/46&type=HTML 
19 Reference to the M.S.S v. Greece and Belgium decision of the European Court of Human Rights on 21 January 2011 
(see above). 
20 Reference to the asylum applications which were not treated in 2011 and therefore were transferred to 2012 
21 Asylum Seekers and refugees: Sharing responsibilities in Europe, Council of Europe, 6 June 2011, p. 11 
Intra-EU “Relocation” There is no relocation at this moment. There are, however, 
discussions, at the European level, to extend the relocation scheme 
existing in Malta to Greece.17
III. Resettlement Implementation 
 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
Greece is in the top ten countries of the EU in terms of the biggest 
number of asylum applications made.18
The Council of Europe in the report ‘Asylum system and refugees: 
sharing responsibilities in Europe’ of 6 June 2011, describes the Greek 
asylum processing system as ‘collapsing’. The reasons are described 
below: 
  
‘Indeed, many applicants refuse to provide any information 
whatsoever. This makes the asylum determination process much more 
complicated. Furthermore, Greece is in the middle of an economic crisis. 
[…] Greece, which is under particular pressure of arrivals of refugees and 
asylum seekers (but also of irregular migrants) due to its geographical 
position, is experiencing huge di fficulties in dealing with the asylum 
claims. In compliance with the Dublin Regulations, other EU member 
states send asylum seekers that first entered the European Union via 
Greece, back to Greece. Since the M.S.S. judgment19
Greece has still to deal with a backlog of over 50,000 asylum claims
, many EU 
countries have suspended returns of asylum seekers to Greece. This, 
however, has not been enough to solve the problems.  
20 
and urgently needs to reform its asylum procedure to ensure its fairness 
and effectiveness.’.21
Due to the severe financial crisis that the country is facing at this 
moment, the possibility of implementing any kind of resettlement are 
extremely limited. The Greek government are more likely to be willing to 
negotiate with regard to an expansion of the Maltese relocation 
programme rather than engaging in an inward resettlement programme. 
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Country Profile: HUNGARY 
Hungary is not a major destination for international migrants. Before the fall of the Communist regime in 
1989, Hungary was mainly a country characterised by emigration. After 1987, however, an increasing 
number of refugees started to arrive in the country, at first mainly ethnic Hungarians from Romania, forcing 
the political leadership to face a totally new situation. In addition to this, the Hungarian Government also 
provided support to people arriving from East Germany. In response, Hungary ratified the Refugee 
Convention in 1989 as well as the UN Protocol of 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees. Both documents 
constitute the legal basis that defines the concept of asylum procedure in Hungary.  
Regime changes occurred in surrounding States at the same time as these important changes to 
migration law in Hungary. These added to the strain on immigration services. At the beginning of 1990s, 
the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslavia led to a new wave of refugees. The government made a 
political decision to admit these refugees on humanitarian grounds and most of them were granted 
temporary protection. 
In the early 2000s, the number of legal migrants in Hungary increased, with the highest number arriving 
around the time of Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Long-term migration into Hungary 
has continued to decline in recent years. This trend reflected the economic crisis, which hit Hungary hard 
from 2009-10.1 As opposed to this, the number of asylum seekers saw an increase until 2009. In 2012, a 
total of 2,157 asylum-seekers were registered, representing half of the numbers of 2009. This was mainly 
due to a sharp decline in the number of asylum seekers from Serbia and Kosovo, a decline that might be 
related to the December 2009 implementation of the EU visa exemption agreement with Serbia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Fyrom) and Montenegro. According to government statistics, 25% of the 
applications were considered as subsequent applications (either in the context of Dublin II returns or 
otherwise), compared to 20% in 2010.2
Despite its geographic position, located at the crossroads of migratory movements in Central Europe 
and along the Eastern border of the European Union, Hungary has not yet developed an official migration 
policy. The Hungarian Government has considered asylum matters primarily in the context of the fight 
against “illegal” migration. In the amendments to legislation on asylum and foreigners, as well as in the 
respective implementing measures, the human rights and protection needs of asylum-seekers and refugees 
have been given lesser priority than security and law enforcement objectives. The detention regime and 
practice has become more extensive, while access to the asylum procedure is more restricted. 
 
Recently, in December 2012, the Hungarian Government announced the establishment of an annual 
resettlement programme thus becoming one of the newest States in Europe to resettle, together with Spain 
and Bulgaria.  
As this first resettlement programme is just a pilot project and given the recent economic situation as 
well as the limited capacities of Hungary, the Government pledged to resettle only one family in 2012-
2013.3
As Hungary’s resettlement programme has only one resettled refugee, it is not representative enough to 
draw general consequences on the outcome of the programme.
 With regards to further numbers, or provisions for the forthcoming years, there has been no decision 
made as of yet.  
4
Hungarian society does not know anything about refugees and even less about resettlement. Afghan 
border crossers are usually addressed by the media as criminals and not as potential asylum seekers. Yet, 
when it comes to public response regarding a case of resettlement, the Hungarian state could be seen by 
the public as having acted on a humanitarian basis, generously offering help and participating in global 
burden sharing.  
  
                                                            
1 http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/IMO%202012_Country%20Note%20Hungary.pdf 
2 Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality, http://www.bmbah.hu/index.html 
3 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, April 2012. 
4 Interview with Dr.Marta Pardavi, Hungnarian Helsinki Committee , April 2012. 
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The European Union’s agenda to strengthen its Member’s participation in refugee resettlement is seen 
as playing an important role in the political decision making on a national level as well. The role of the 
EASO is considered as facilitating and coordinating the exchange of knowledge. 
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• 87 Refugee Status 
• 375 Other protection 
188 (2011) 
• 52 Refugee Status 
• 136 Other Protection 
2,157 (2012) 
1,693 (2011) 
Pilot programme since December 2012 
Planned resettlement of 1 family (around 5-8 refugees) but only one 
was resettled on 29 November 2012 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum 
Section 7 § (5) 
 
 
The framework of the future Hungarian resettlement programme is 
delineated by Section 7(5). 
“The minister may grant refugee status to an alien who was granted 
recognition as a refugee by the competent authorities of another 
country or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and to whom the Geneva Convention applies as declared by 
the refugee authority.” 
Previously, the above cited clause had included: “The number of 
refugees recognised under the terms of the present subsection shall 
not exceed one hundred per year.”7






UNHCR Ministerial Meeting: 







Implementing Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum. 
“The refugee authority shall establish the applicability of the Geneva 
Convention based on a personal hearing of the foreigner or on the 
basis of the available documents.”  
The Hungarian Government announced its decision to become a 
resettlement country in October 2010 and confirmed its commitment 
through a pledge submitted to the Ministerial Conference organized by 
UNHCR in Geneva in December 2011. 
 
 
                                                            
5 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn003.html 
6 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn003.html 
7 Source: “UNHCR | Refworld | Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum”, n.d.  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,LEGAL,,LEGISLATION,HUN,4562d8b62,4979cc072,0.html. 
8 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d22fd496.html  
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Governmental Decree 
1139/2011 
The governmental decree is meant to guarantee the practical 
implementation of the Resettlement programme of 2012 (7/A 
paragraph of the 301/2007 decree). 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The Hungarian Government pledged to launch the first resettlement of 
one family (5-8 persons) in 2012-2013 from North-African.9
The first Hungarian national resettlement operation is considered as 
a pilot programme. 
  
The outcome will be assessed as well as the whole process (from 
the beginning until the end including the integration phase) in order to 
develop a good model programme tailor-made to the national needs on 
the basis of which Hungary will be able to extend its resettlement 
efforts in the future.10
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
  
a) On an ad hoc basis n/a  
b) On a programme basis In autumn 2010, a governmental decision was drafted on Hungary 
launching a national resettlement programme. In response to the “Arab 
spring” in 2011, a Governmental Decision (No. 1139/2011) was 
adopted. Within the framework of this programme Hungary showed its 




















Hungary has been participating in different initiatives related to 
knowledge sharing about resettlement for several years. The official 
twinning programme initiated by the Finnish government was 
highlighted in positive terms. It was also pointed out that the visit to 
Finland was followed by the authorities’ trip to Thailand, during which 
they had the possibility to assist a selection mission of the Finnish 
government within the framework of their resettlement programme.  
In addition to this, Hungary has been participating in the UNHCR 
initiated Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, convened for 
the first time in 1995, bringing together governments and NGOs. The 
Ministry of Interior has already represented Hungary as a possible 
resettling country in the ATC in 2010.  
Besides, together with 9 other EU Members States, Hungary took 
part in the 2010-2011 initiative of IOM, UNHCR and ICMC 
(International Catholic Migration Commission), called “Promotion of 
Resettlement in the European Union through Practical Cooperation by 
EU Member States and Other Stakeholders."11
                                                            
9 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
 This project was part of 
the initiatives aimed at encouraging the European Member States’ 
participation in the development of a larger scale, joint European 
resettlement program. Financed by the ERF, the project was officially 
launched in Timisoara in March 2010, and ended with a conference in 
Brussels in June 2011.  
10 Interview with the Hungarian Ministry of Interior , Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), March 2012. 
11 “A Joint IOM, UNHCR and ICMC Project: Promotion of Resettlement in the European Union Through “Practical 
Cooperation by EU Member States and Other Stakeholders.” International Catholic Migration Commission, July 2, 
2010. http://www.icmc.net/activities/ERF-project. 
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Non-Governmental Level Hungary was represented by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in the 
2008-2010 ASPIRE (Assessing and Strengthening Participation In 
Refugee resettlement to Europe) projects, which had as its main 
coordinator the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) 
and was financed by the ERF.12
The project focused on the expansion of a debate between 
governmental and non-governmental actors in Member States, which 
had started showing a recent interest in resettlement.  
 
According to the Helsinki Committee, the organization’s role within 
the project’s framework was to promote the implementation of the 
resettlement quota that was at that time part of the Hungarian Asylum 
Act, which recommended a limit of hundred persons per year.  
Besides the promotion of an actual resettlement programme, 
Helsinki had the possibility to promote the country’s involvement in the 
development of a common European framework for resettlement.13
During the project a number of different cooperative activities 
involving ten EU Member States, civil society organizations, UNHCR 
and IOM have been implemented. Amongst these, Hungary 
participated in a pilot programme on resettlement interviews via video 
link, which was carried out by the Dutch government at the Emergency 
Transit Centre in Timisoara, Romania, and was observed by Hungarian 
government officials. Moreover, Hungarian authorities and NGOs 
visited the UK and Sweden, to learn more about the two countries’ 
programmes for reception and integration of resettled refugees. Lastly, 
Hungary participated in the various multi-stakeholder-meetings and the 

















In October 2008, as a result of a bilateral agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Hungarian 
Government, 29 Cuban citizens arrived in Hungary, with the help of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). After that decision, which 
granted refugee status to all the newly arrived, an integration process 
started. As for the financial aspects of this programme, the resettlement, 
all the related procedures, as well as the integration initiatives were 
financed entirely by the US government. The majority of the refugees left 
Hungary a few months after arrival and have moved to Spain. 
It is not appropriate to consider that operation as an example of 
resettlement as the migrants who were beneficiaries of the programme 
were not refugees prior to their arrival to Hungary and as a 
consequence the programme does not match the criteria of 
resettlement. On the other hand, the case is still worth considering, as 
many of the experiences that it endowed the Hungarian authorities with 
could prove to be useful in any future resettlement programme. 
Although the 2007-2008 resettlement programme of Cuban 
migrants to Hungary does not match the criteria of resettlement 
entirely, it still holds many relevant conclusions worth considering. This 
case was a typical one as it showed how in some cases the 
government is ready to carry out this sort of programme, despite the 
fact that the legal and infrastructural frameworks had not been 
developed previously. 
                                                            
12 “Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe”, n.d. http://www.ccme.be/areas-of-work/refugeeprotection/aspire/. 
13 “ASPIRE: Assessing and Strengthening Participation In Refugee Resettlement to Europe (2008-2010).” Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, June 12, 2011. http://helsinki.hu/en/aspire-assessing-and-strengtheningparticipation-in-refugee-
resettlement-to-europe-2008-2010. 
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Hungary’s participation in the EUREMA (European Relocation 
Malta) project in 2010. The EUREMA project started in 2009 and was 
specifically designed to cater for the island’s needs by granting 
substantial financial assistance to Member States for every person who 
had been granted international protection and is resettled from Malta.14
The integration phase could not even start, as the couple left 
Hungary and returned to Malta three days after their arrival. The legal 
status of the couple started representing a problem only after their 
arrival, despite the fact that they were not even entitled to participate in 
the EUREMA, not being refugees. Namely, the man was a stateless 
person originating from Kazakhstan, while his partner, a woman, was a 
Russian citizen, and as such, was absolutely unwilling to give up her 
citizenship (a necessary consequence of the obtaining the refugee 
status, which was, parenthetically, offered to her). Also the couple in 
question had reached a relatively high level of integration in Malta.  
 
Hungary was amongst those Member States who agreed to relocate a 
small number of refugees from the island. In the framework of the 
project, a couple arrived in Hungary in August 2010. As was the case 
with the Cuban migrants some years earlier, that couple were first 
brought to the refugee camp of Bicske. 
To the questions of why Hungary insisted on persuading the couple 
to participate in the relocation programme if they were not necessarily 
in need of leaving Malta, most of stakeholders agree that there has 
been a serious communication issue in carrying out the selection 
phase. Additionally a more serious dilemma was raised related to the 
selection criteria used by the Hungarian authorities in the EUREMA 
project, probably because they were the only non-black couple family 
that could participate in the relocation.  
In spite of the negative outcome of Hungary’s participation in the 
first EUREMA, the country is planning to take part in the second phase, 
as the European Commission announced the extension of the 
project.15 Nevertheless, Hungary’s participation will be limited, together 
with other Member States to “token” pledges of five to ten refugees.16
Comments 
 
Notwithstanding the two precedents that have been elaborated above, 
Hungary has been formally a non-resettling country up to now. 
Nevertheless, in 2012, the country has announced the establishment of 
an annual resettlement programme. 
The possibility of resettlement is not envisaged in the Asylum Law 
but is referred to in a government decree, which only mentions 
resettlement in 2012. It seems that the possibility for resettlement in 
2013 will be created in a separate government decree. 17
The amendment to the Asylum Act with regard to the quota of one 
hundred was simply due to a political consideration. It was designed to 
tackle the government’s reluctance to pass the legislation in question 
without such a limitation included into it. Nevertheless, as will be shown 
later in the report, 100 resettled refugees annually is already an 




                                                            




15 Ibid.  
16 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
17 Interview with UNHCR office in Budapest, April 2012. 
18 Ibid.  
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While Hungarian legislation exempts third-country family members 
of a recognised refugee from general maintenance requirements for 
family reunification, the Act on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners was 
amended in 2010 to exclude family members of beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection from this exemption. 
III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled 
29 November 2012 
 
1 refugee resettled from Egypt  
The refugee is a Christian convert.  
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
 






• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
The resettlement programme is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Interior, however the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) will 
decide the applicability of the Geneva Convention under the 301/2007 
governmental decree, in the cases of foreigners involved in the 
selection procedures for resettlement. A decision as to the resettlement 
of the refugees chosen will take place after a personal hearing of the 
persons in question and in the presence of relevant documents 
(provided by the UNHCR).  
The Hungarian government has not announced any admissibility 
criteria; Neither has it expressed a preference for a particular 
nationality. Due to practical implications, Hungary is focusing on 
refugee groups meeting current criteria for ERF subsidies. Besides, the 
reason why the government decided to resettle a family might be that a 
family has better integration potential.  
Selection Process 
 
• Deploying Staff 




The pledge and the decree 1139/2011 do not include any resettlement 
specific procedural rules. 
n/a 
OIN and UNHCR  
 
No 
Selection mission was provided instead of dossier-based selection. 
National Security was not present in the mission.  
Pre-Departure Activities 
 
• Cultural orientation (CO) 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 
• Medical screening 
 
No cultural orientation was provided to the refugee neither by mission 
delegates neither by IOM.  
Though in principle assistance with travel documents was provided to 
the refugee, a lot of gaps were encountered during the process.  
n/a 
 Procedure Timing n/a 
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Comments  The debate focuses on the priorities of selection, and focuses on two 
main perspectives, namely the integration potential of refugees versus 
their protection needs. 
Even though Hungary resettled only one refugee, a few gaps are 
identified in implementing the pre–arrival phase. One of the gaps is the 
lack of Cultural Orientation. In addition, the travel arrangements 
emphasised a lack of planning, knowledge as well unclear division of 
roles and responsibilities.  
As for the pre-departure phase and the selection procedures, the 
OIN sees no possibility for NGO involvement and emphasizes the strict 
state priority when it comes to deciding on the target groups and 
people eligible for resettlement. Stakeholders interviewed 
acknowledged the decisive role of the state in this phase, but 
nevertheless the state should be ready to consider the involvement of 
NGOs in elaborating on the selection criteria. In this respect, it should 
be stressed that the knowledge of NGOs regarding Hungarian refugee 
communities, integration, as well as several other aspects that could be 
useful in complementing the state’s priorities and improving the 
implementation of the selection mission.  
It is recommended that a more precise development of the selection 
criteria to be used in resettlement would also facilitate a more 
conscious elaboration of an integration programme. There seems to be 
an agreement regarding the fact that Hungary should not embark on a 
resettlement programme for the most disadvantaged ones, as the 
country could not guarantee a positive outcome of their integration and 
their personal well-being. Stronger selection criteria should be 
developed with the involvement of civil society and international 
experts prior to starting the implementation of the resettlement 
programme itself. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum 
Section 7 § (5) 
 
The granting of refugee status in Hungary is a responsibility of the 
Minister of Interior.  
“The minister may grant refugee status to an alien who was granted 
recognition as a refugee by the competent authorities of another 
country or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and to whom the Geneva Convention applies as declared by 
the refugee authority.” 




Info upon arrival 






The resettled refugee is issued identity papers upon arrival and will 
need to wait for the issuance for up to 2 months. 
No 
No  
No inclusion and no information provided. Local community was not 
involved in the planning process and not informed about the arrival of 
the resettled refugee. This was also connected with the lack of 




                                                            
19 Ibid.  
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Developing Integration 












Family Reunification  
Advice of Accessing Services  
Mentoring 
Training of local service 
providers 
Volunteer support 
Only a short version of the integration plan was provided to the refugee 
after one month being over in Hungary. A few keys fact still remain 
unclear. The integration plan does not provide information on the 
educational and employment profile of the resettled refugee. 
Availability for two months.  
Access in the camp only in the Hungarian language, no English. 
Access not guaranteed for vocational training. 
Access to education only in Autumn 2013.  
Living in Biscke, the pre- integration centre. There are no plans for 
accommodation after one year.  
Availability of psycho-social counselling.  
No plans for the refugee’s employment. Limited access to specialized 






Comments Hungary considered the resettlement of only 5 persons in 2012 and 
integration capacity still remains a challenge. The integration plan is 
still unclear and still pending with OIN. 
As for reception conditions in general, refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection are accommodated in the open OIN integration 
facility in Bicske. As a consequence of changes in legislation, 
beneficiaries of international protection may generally stay only six 
months (instead of one year) in the camp which can be extended 
exceptionally by another six months. The present system has proven to 
be ineffective in equipping beneficiaries of international protection with 
the skills required for integration. Living in Bicske for up to one year 
keeps people isolated from the local community. Most of the residents 
do not have any contacts with Hungarian people except for the social 
workers. They often do not have any other ties to people living outside 
the camp who could ease their integration into the society. This also 
slows their process of learning the language and how different 
institutions and services operate. After having lived in Bicske for 6 
months, most of the refugees do not have a detailed knowledge on 
employment conditions, their own financial resources, proficiency in the 
Hungarian language etc. that are needed to find employment. After 
being released from Bicske, refugees do not have any realistic 
prospects on access to accommodation or employment. Access to 
language courses is also of great concern. As a result, some refugees 
opt to move to other EU Member States upon recognition of their 
refugee status. If returned to Hungary, they often become homeless. 
Homeless refugees reportedly face various violations of their physical 
integrity, with single women particularly at risk.20
Moving on to the post-arrival phase of resettlement, the possibilities 
of involvement open up. Since there seems to be a consensus that 
integration of resettled refugees should happen in a joint system with 
all other refugees, it is evident that the role of NGOs is expected to be 
similar to the one that they are currently playing in integration.  
 
                                                            
20 Interview with the UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
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Lastly, the involvement of the existing refugee communities and the 
possibility of them playing a supportive role if Hungary receives some 
resettled refugees should be addressed briefly. There is almost no 
example of an institutionalized refugee community which could be 
involved on a project basis or on a more systematic level in 
resettlement. Nevertheless, NGOs who have a deeper insight in the 
structure of the diaspora communities in Hungary see potential in some 
of the more settled and integrated refugee groups. 
The following is some recommendations: 
• A stronger cooperation between the governmental 
authorities and the NGOs is extremely important. The fact 
that NGOs lack basic information about the government’s and 
the Ministry’s decisions and activities regarding resettlement, 
while the availability and openness to sharing expertise and 
burdens seems to be present on the civil sector’s side, is 
certainly a serious problem. As it is evident from the analysis 
of the interviews, civil society in Hungary is capable of 
contributing to the implementation of the resettlement 
programme, with a vast amount of professional knowledge 
and enthusiasm. However, this potential is wasted by lack of 
communication between the government and NGOs. 
• The opening of a Resettlement Dialogue Panel would 
enable all parties to share views, expertise and ideas on 
resettlement in Hungary. Moreover, in connection to the 
previously highlighted need for a stronger cooperation 
between NGOs and authorities, the panel would also enable 
the governmental bodies to communicate their decisions to 
NGOs and other important stakeholders. 
• The Helsinki Committee’s representative argues that keeping 
the number of the resettled refugees to a minimum does not 
always make it easier to carry out successful resettlement and 
to set up a suitable plan for future resettlement activities. 
Quite the contrary, resettling more refugees may actually 
bring much more representative deductions and result in more 
usable know-hows that can “pay off” on the long run. 
• A greater determination and a sustained effort at 
improving the asylum system itself (with special emphasis 
on integration) is what, in the opinion of many commentators, 
the Hungarian authorities should offer. Namely, as NGOs and 
UNHCR articulate with regards to different topics, openness 
on the level of political declarations is not necessarily 
sufficient to bring about real improvements. Unless Hungary 
becomes aware of the crucial link between effective and just 
integration and the successful resettlement of refugees, an 
important decision to start a resettlement programme could 
fail to fulfil its principal goals. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 




OIN does not plan to complement the ERF support by matching funds 
additional to the basic support provided to all refugees in the country.  
Hungary pledged to resettle in the calendar year 2012 five 
persons belonging to the category of persons from a country or 
region designated for the implementation of Regional Protection 
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Programme in order to be eligible for additional resources from the 
ERF.21
Costs 
 It will thus receive 6,000 euros for each resettled refugee, as 
a first time applicant to the ERF’s contribution. 
It is recommended that a more detailed and more controlled budgeting 
of the funds allocated by the ERF for each resettled person could 
contribute to what many NGO representatives hope for, that is an 
improvement of the Hungarian reception and integration services and a 
better functioning of the system itself. This is especially true because of 
the fact that while ERF funding represents one of the biggest incentives 
to carry out resettlement, it is questionable whether the free handling of 
the sums in question is necessarily a positive detail. As the UNHCR 
warned, this can result in discrimination among the refugees. 
Comments  
 
With its resettlement programme Hungary committed to enhancing the 
delivery of comprehensive durable solutions, to promoting increased 
opportunities for refugee resettlement, the participation of new 
resettlement countries, improved integration outcomes for resettled 
refugees, and the strategic use of resettlement to unlock other durable 
solutions such as voluntary repatriation and local integration.22
The basis for the assessment of readiness for resettlement is the 
proven and credible integration of refugees. Ultimately, the delivery of 
Refugee Convention obligations on a domestic front remains a huge 
issue. Only once the country establishes a satisfactory and credible 
record in refugee integration will it be ready for receiving refugees 
through resettlement. Hungary currently has to recover from its own 




There is no sum allocated on a yearly basis to be spent on asylum 
seekers, neither on a system-level nor on a per capita basis. This 
makes the system more vulnerable to political decisions and, as the 
economic situation in the country has deteriorated in the past few 
years, financing of this area is becoming less and less of a priority. 
Thus EU fund are the biggest incentive.  
 
The kind of commitments and measures that Hungary has 
adopted in the past few months in order to participate in resettlement 
programmes are a promising start. Hungary now enters a critical few 
years to see how resettlement may evolve and how its programme 
may become more established. 
 
                                                            
21 Interview with the Hungarian Ministry of Interior, op.cit. 
22 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
23 Ibid.  
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Country Profile: Ireland 
Ireland has shared a common travel area with the United Kingdom, an Area which involves some co-
operation on matters relating to immigration issues. Ireland joined the European Union in 1973. It is not part 
of the Schengen area but participates in the Common European Asylum System. Inward immigration as a 
result of EU free movement went up massively during the last decade. Polish people have now overtaken 
UK nationals as the largest non-Irish community in Ireland.1 Lower figures but with a similar pattern are to 
be found with regard to Lithuania, Latvia and other eastern European States. Romanian and Indian are 
other nationals who have seen a large increase in inward migration to Ireland between 2005 and 2011. This 
free movement had slowed considerably by 2011. Non-EU national inward migration also increased over 
the past decade. The Minister for Justice, Alan Shatter, has recently announced visa waivers and other 
immigration incentives which the government has designed to stimulate the Irish economy.2
The late ’90’s and early ’00’s saw a huge increase in first instance asylum applications. It was indeed 
possible to gain Irish citizenship by virtue of being born on the territory of Ireland. In June 2004 the 27th 
amendment was made to Bunreacht na hÉireann – the Irish constitution.
 Ireland’s 
economic depression has not led to a substantial tightening in immigration control. 
3 Consequently, asylum application 
numbers have been falling since 2005.4
The reform of the legislation providing for international protection of refugees has been mooted for 




Ireland has a long history of resettlement. The website of the Office for the Promotion of Migration 
Integration, which is the office responsible for resettlement in Ireland, lists the resettlement of Hungarian 
refugees in Ireland in 1956 as its first resettlement.
  
6 Chilean refugees were resettled in 1973, Iranians in the 
mid-eighties and refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the early nineties. Ireland now admits “people for 
resettlement whether or not they satisfy the 1951 Geneva Convention conditions. Therefore the programme 
is seen as a humanitarian response.”7
It was not until 1998 that a government decision led to an actual resettlement programme being 
founded.
 
8 In 2005, the initial programme (for ten ‘applicants’ plus their immediate families) was expanded to 
two-hundred persons in total.9
                                                            
1http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/census/documents/census2011pdr/Pdf%203%20Commentary.pdf 
 This quota was filled until the economic crisis began. Thereafter the 
continuing uncertain economic conditions have hampered the filling of Ireland’s resettlement quota.  
2 http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/PR12000003 
3 That amendment changed the way in which Irish citizenship would be granted to children born on the island of Ireland. 
From then on, “…a person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at 
the time of the birth of that person, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not 
entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless provided for by law.” 
4http://www.orac.ie/pdf/PDFStats/Monthly%20Statistics/2012/2012%2001%20January%20ORAC%20monthly%20report.pdf 
5 This legislation has been disrupted by general elections in 2007 and 2011. The Minister for Justice was recently 
questioned in the Dáil on the status of this reform, he stated: "the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010, 
which I restored to the Dáil order paper, comprehensively reforms and simplifies the current refugee status 
determination process. The Bill provides for the introduction of a single application procedure for the investigation of 
all grounds for protection and any other grounds presented by applicants seeking to remain in the State. This change 
of the processing framework will remove the current multi-layered and sequential processes associated with the 
existing system." http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2012/02/21/00338.asp 
6 Available at:  
http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-overviewofrecentresettlementprogrammes-en 
7 Interview for Know Reset with Martina Glennon (Assistant Principal Officer) and Elaine Houlihan (Executive Officer), 
Resettlement Unit, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration , conducted on the 5th of January 2012.  
8 Irish Government Decisions are the decisions taken by Cabinet when it meets. The cabinet is made up of the 
Taoiseach (Primeminister); T ánaiste (Deputy Primeminister); and the Ministers in government. The Attorney General 
of Ireland also attends Cabinet. 
9 Available at: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-intro-en 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 159
 KNOW RESET Country Profile:Ireland 
The number of applications for international protection to the Office of Refugee Applications 
Commissioner has fallen year after year since 2005. The peak for that office came in 2003 with almost 
seven and a half thousand applications. That figure dropped to a nine year low of almost 1,300 applicants 
in 2011. This continuing lowering, along with Ireland’s low refugee recognition rate at first instance 
application has not influenced Ireland to increase resettlement beyond the 2005 decision to expand and 
certainly not since the financial crisis began. The 2005 decision to expand resettlement might be in direct 
response to the drop in numbers of applications at first instance. It seems that economic stability and 
continued low application rates would see Ireland’s quota for resettling refugees increase but only after 
substantial economic recovery. 
While Ireland has a resettlement programme and does not conduct ad-hoc resettlement, this does not 
mean that Ireland does not respond to “emergency requests” from the UNHCR and the EU. Responses to 
emergency requests are within the standing quota referred to above.10 The latest example of such requests 
came through Ireland accepting “requests from the UNHCR to accept refugees (ex-Libya) from Tunisia and 
to a call from the EU to accept refugees also ex-Libya, from Malta.”11 In recent years, Ireland has resettled 
refugees from Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) areas identified by the EU.12
 
 It is noteworthy that the 
relocation of refugees from Malta to Ireland has been realised within Irish annual resettlement quota. 
                                                            
10 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit.  
11 Ibid. 
12 ibid. 
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Asylum Profile 















Programme-Based (since 1998) 
200/year (since 2005) 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Refugee Act 1996, Number 
17 of 1996. 
 
Specific provisions on resettlement: “Programme Refugees” Section 24 











Marked the start of Ireland’s resettlement programme.18
 
 
Allowed for the expansion of the resettlement programme from ten persons 
plus family members to 200 persons. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
Reform of resettlement is unlikely. For the foreseeable future, all major 
policy decisions will be dictated by Ireland’s economic performance. This 
is also true of immigration and asylum. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  









530 refugees from Hungary  
120 refugees from Chile 
21220
26 refugees from Iran  
 refugees from Vietnam 
45521
1032
 refugees from the Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) 
22
                                                            
13 Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner. 
 refugees from Kosovo  
14 ibid. 
15 Source: Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. 
16 See: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-intro-en 
17 See: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-intro-en 
18 For the announcement of this in the Dáil, see: http://historical-
debates.oireachtas.ie/S/0157/S.0157.199812010007.html 
19 Numbers refer to initial intakes only. See: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-
overviewofrecentresettlementprogrammes 
20 591 persons admitted under Family Reunification process during the time period. 
21 886 persons admitted under Family Reunification process during the time period. 
22 31 persons admitted under Family Reunification process during the time period. 
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The original programme was set up to resettle ten people plus their family 
members which usually worked out as between thirty and sixty people. 
200 persons  
While the refugee resettlement programme is characterised as being the 
only resettlement which now occurs in Ireland, this programme can react 
to a given humanitarian situation which arises. Taking refugees in 
response to a humanitarian situation which arises is still done but it 












The MORE Project (Modelling 
of National Resettlement 
Process and Implementation of 







In resettling Burmese Rohingya in 2009, the Irish authorities were in touch 
with Canada and the UK who had already resettled Rohingya. The 
resettled communities were also put in touch with each other. In 2009, 
Ireland also took some refugees in cooperation with the UK. This was a 
Transnational EU funded project. Bulgaria and Belgium also participated in 
that initiative as they were considering participating in the resettlement 
programme.24
EU funded Project. The Project partners: Irish Ministry of Labour, Finland 
and the Reception and Integration Agency, Ireland in cooperation with the 
UNHCR, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). 
  
Aim: to develop comprehensive models for the resettlement process which 
can be utilised by other EU Member States and other countries. The main 











 Intra-EU “Relocation” 
 
 
In July 2009 it was widely reported in the press that Ireland would be 
resettling two prisoners from Guantanamo bay. The two identified were 
Uzbek nationals in origin.26 Press reports in September of that year confirm 
this resettlement and state that the men had arrived on Irish territory. It is 
further stated that “A team from the Department of Justice is assisting them 
in a resettlement programme.”27 No Uzbek resettlement is listed on the 
Department’s official statistics.28




                                                            
23 Source: Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. 
 
24 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
25 The project is available at: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/AXBN-7TCDXV11105525-
en/$File/More%20Project%20Report-%20Shaping%20our%20future.pdf 
26 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/29/ireland-accepts-guantanamo-inmates 
See also: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8174262.stm 
27 See: http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0927/guantanamo.html 
28 See: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-
overviewofrecentrefugeeresettlementprogrammes2000-2011-en 
29 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan op.cit. 
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Comments Adherence to the quota has fluctuated in recent years, apparently due to 
Ireland’s current economic difficulties. It is unlikely that Ireland will fulfil its 
quota in the foreseeable future and expansion of that programme is not on 
the agenda and will not arise unless Ireland is able to again fulfil its quota 
on a regular basis. 
































Country of Origin: 23 DR of Congo, 5 Egypt, 1 Eritrea, 3 Ethiopia, 5 
Iranian Kurd, 4 Liberia, 10 Somalia  
45  
Country of Origin: 23 Sudanese, 1 Moroccan, 6 Iraqi, 6 Ethiopian and 9 
Eritrean 
Gender:21 Male, 24 Female 
Age:16 in 0-14, 9 in 15-24, 14 in 25-44, 6 in Over 45 age  
Maritial Status: 17 Married, 28 Single 
Religion:1 Christian, 40 Muslim, 4 Orthodox 
 
20  
Country of Origin:16 Iraqi, 3 Burmese (Karen), 1 Syrian 
Gender:7 Male, 13 Female 
Age:8 in 0-14, 5 in 15-24, 3 in 25-44, 4 in Over 45 age  
Maritial Status: 8 Married, 12 Single 
Religion:4 Christian, 16 Muslim 
 
192  
Country of Origin:1 Afghan, 3 Cuban, 84 DR Congolese, 8 Iranian Kurd, 
7 Iraqi,4 Jordanian-Palestinian, 82 Burmese (Rohinga), 3 Stateless 
Gender:96 Male, 96 Female 
Age:96 in 0-14, 45 in 15-24, 36 in 25-44, 15 in Over 45 age 
Maritial Status: 35 Married, 143 Single, 14 Divorced/Widow/Separated 
Religion:89 Christian, 110 Muslim, 3 Unknown 
  
101 
Country of Origin: 1 Chinese, 12 Cuban, 2 Eritrean, 3 Ethiopian, 6 
Iranian, 5 Iraqi, 2 Russian (Chechnia), 71 Sudanese, 1 Syrian 
Gender:46 Male, 55 Female 
Age:46 in 0-14, 12 in 15-24, 30 in 25-44, 13 in Over 45 age 
Maritial Status: 24 Married, 71 Single, 6 Divorced/Widow/Separated 
Religion:84 Christian, 17 Muslim  
 
                                                            
30 Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Comissioner. 
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a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase   
Selection criteria  
 







• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
Section 24 of the Refugee Act (as amended) provides that the Minister 
may, in consultation with the UNHCR and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
admit people for resettlement whether or not they satisfy the 1951 
Geneva Convention conditions.  
The majority of the refugees resettled are accepted based on UNHCR 
priorities and are referred through the UNHCR referral systems. Ireland 
does not exclude applications based on health issues unless the specific 
health issue cannot be dealt with by the national health service or it 
poses a threat to public health. 
Group resettlement is preferred. Individual cases are rare. Immediate 
family members are included in the quota. Therefore when an application 
is examined, care is taken to ensure that all of the nuclear family 
members are considered together at the time of application. The 
definition of “family member” for resettlement purposes, which includes 
unmarried children over the age of 18 years, is broader than that the 
definition of “family Member” in the Refugee Act 1996, as amended. 31
Unaccompanied child cases are not accepted. 
 
Ireland favours receiving a “balanced” caseload, which may include a 
mix of “Women-At-Risk” cases, persons with disabilities and other special 
needs cases. There is no specific target for any category, although 
priority is said to be given to cases with Legal and Physical Protection 
Needs .  
In addition to the above eligibility categories, which reflect UNHCR’s 
standard eligibility criteria, Ireland also favours the inclusion of 

















Resettlement is coordinated at a national level by the Resettlement 
Unit of the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI), 
Department of Justice and Equality. Local Authorities and NGO’s play a 
very important role in the resettlement process. The programme must be 
administered within existing budgets using a mainstream model of 
service provision. There are ten government departments involved and 
an Inter-Departmental Working Group at national level has been 
established with representation from all ten Government Departments.34
The decision on who Ireland will accept for resettlement (i.e. the 
country of origin/country of refuge) is taken by the Minister for Justice and 
Equality in consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
UNHCR. The decision is informed by discussions held between 
resettlement countries worldwide at their biannual Working Group on 
Resettlement meetings and by information provided by the UNHCR 




                                                            
31 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
32 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011. 
33 This section is written based on what the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration list as their ‘selection process’ 
on their website. Available at: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/resettlement-
irishresettlementproc-en 
34 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
164 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS

















Applications for resettlement are submitted by the UNHCR and are 
examined by the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. If 
considered necessary, (e.g. cases with medical or special needs) other 
Government Departments, the Health Service Executive and the Garda 
National Immigration Bureau are consulted. 
The resettlement process from an administrative perspective is as 
follows:35
Staff from the Resettlement Unit attend the Working Group meetings 
and Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement where UNHCR 
present their priorities for the coming year. 
  
Based on these priorities, the resettlement team develop a proposal in 
consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and other units within 
the Department of Justice and Equality. This proposal is then submitted 
to the Minister for approval.  
Once the Minister gives approval to proceed, the Inter-Departmental 
Working Group meeting is called to discuss the proposal. The UNHCR 
and IOM are advised and the process of resettlement begins.  
At a later stage when the exact composition of the group is known, a 
second meeting of the Inter-Departmental Working Group is called to 
discuss the challenges of the caseload so that the various service 
providers can be put on notice to make the necessary preparations. This 
Inter-Departmental Working group is also kept informed of developments. 
The UNHCR and IOM have supported ‘selection missions’ in the past 
by providing information on the caseload, organised transport and 
interview space etc. Between 2005 and 2008 Ireland carried out selection 
missions to Jordan (Iranian Kurds), Thailand (Burmese Karen), Uganda 
(Sudanese), Bangladesh (Burmese Rohingya) and Tanzania (D. R. 
Congolese). During the missions, staff of the Office for the Promotion of 
Migrant Integration would present a two day question and answer 
information session. Ireland has conducted joint selection missions in the 
past with other resettlement countries. 
Due to the reduced numbers at the moment, no selection missions have 
taken place since 2008. Selection missions are thought of as the best form 
of selection but an emphasis is placed on being realistic about the benefits 
based on the costs and effort required by many organisations to organise 
such missions. It is thought that the numbers currently being taken do not 
warrant selection missions.36
 
The primary reasons for the Irish authorities 
not undertaking any selection missions more recently is again based on 
economic realities facing the State. The fact that numbers in the 
resettlement programme have dropped means that selection missions are 
not needed for the 45 people resettled in 2011 or the 20 people resettled in 
2010. Dossier selection is seen as adequate for resettling small numbers 
from various countries whereas a selection mission is needed if a large 









The OPMI does not engage the IOM to carry out pre-departure cultural 
orientation. This option was explored and it was decided that it was not the 
best approach. The Irish authorities conduct pre-departure cultural 
orientation. 
 
                                                            
35 The following explanation is based on: ibid. 
36 ibid. 
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• Assistance with travel 
documents 
 
• Medical screening 
The IOM takes responsibility for the health screening of refugees being 
resettled to Ireland, for the securing of visas and travel documents, and for 
making their travel arrangements.  
There is an informal agreement between the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and the IOM in this regard. 
Procedure Timing Approximately 9 months before the arrival of a new group for 
resettlement, the resettlement team of the OPMI begins the process of 
preparing receiving communities.  
Ideally the decision should be taken by May of the year for the next 




The Irish standards for the procedure of resettlement are up to the highest 
international standards, but a greater level of pre-arrival planning would 
help to ensure successful resettlement and integration in the longer term. 
Recommendations: Local authorities are of vital importance to a 
successful resettlement and to this end there needs to be a large degree 
of notice given to local public service providers and authorities, as to the 
arrival of refugees for resettlement in their area. It is recommended that a 
standard set of time be enforced and that this time reflects the need for 
the local area to prepare properly for the arrival. This also allows for local 
government to apply for special funding to be provided in order to allow 
for extra demand in their locality. 
Furthermore, resettlement must take specific account of local 
services. Health facilities in particular must be able to meet this new 
demand and be easily accessible to resettled refugees. In this regard, 
any specific needs of refugees who are to arrive should be identified and 
specific plans made in conjunction with local authorities as to how these 
needs will be met. Educational needs and special requirements for the 
disabled in particular are salient here.  
Overall, feedback from local authorities of both positive and negative 
elements of their experience in resettlement should be actively sought 
for. This feedback should be used as inspiration for forming a loose 
template or planning guide for local authorities tasked with receiving 
resettled refugees for the first time. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
Status granted  
Section 24, “Programme 
Refugees” 
Refugee Act 1996, Number 
17 of 1996 
 
The legal status is as ‘Programme refugee,’ as provided under 
Section 24 of the Refugee Act, as amended. While a Programme refugee 
does not get Geneva Convention Status they get the same rights and 
entitlements that are attributable to a Convention Refugee under Section 
3 of the Refugee Act 1996 as amended.38
After resettlement in Ireland, the status of the resettled refugee is 
specific within Irish legislation; they are what is called a ‘Programme 
refugee.’ Their rights are very similar to the ordinary Irish Convention 
refugee status. They do not receive any other form of protection such as 
subsidiary protection. Even if they have not been declared as refugees by 
the UNHCR, they will still gain ‘Programme Refugee’ status.
  
39
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Rights granted  
Section 3 of the Refugee Act  
Residence 
Airport Arrival 
Info upon arrival 
Preparing local community 
Developing Integration 










Family Reunification  
 
Advice of Accessing Services 
Mentoring 




Provides for “The extension to refugees of certain rights” and applies the 
programme refugees the same way as ordinary status refugees. 
The right to reside in the State and to travel in or out of the State 
n/a  
n/a 
Local befriending programmes 
The same medical care and social welfare rights as an Irish citizen. 
Access to education and training like Irish citizens. Health screening after 
arrival. 
Culture/information/law and order; Money management; paying bills; 
Using banks, Post offices, Public transport.40
Professional counseling for survivors of torture provided by the NGO 
SPIRASI, part-funded by the government. This NGO specialises in 
helping victims of torture. 
 
Language training  
 
The right to seek and enter employment, to carry on any business, trade 
or profession like Irish citizens. 
Should an applicant decide to omit a member of the nuclear family at the 
time of application, and then seek to be reunited with that family member 
at a later date, this type of application would be at the discretion of the 
Minister. 





Comments The rights awarded to resettled refugees are to the highest international 
standards. Full rights of convention refugees are given. In certain 
circumstances, resettled refugees have an advantage over a convention 
refugee such as in terms of family reunification. 
Recommendations: It is suggested that the Office for the Promotion of 
Migrant Integration should consult with local authorities before making a 
decision to resettle a group to that area and more information should be 
provided pre-arrival to the local authority co-ordinating integration at the 
local level, to enable them to better plan to meet the refugees’ needs. 
One way in which this may be done is to facilitate formal contact between 
local authorities of the proposed resettlement and other local authorities 
who have already had experience of refugee resettlement. In this way 
best practice can be more easily identified for the benefit of all. 
A further suggestion is that during refugees’ time at the initial 
reception centre, detailed assessments of their educational and health 
needs should be undertaken, so that the local authority and local service 
providers can better prepare for their arrival. This is particularly true of 
more vulnerable cases or cases which have proved challenging in the 
experience of other local Irish authorities. The suitable integration of 
teenagers is an example of one such demographic. Language support 
and access to educational opportunities are a priority for these cases. 
                                                            
40 Presentation slides of Martina Glennon, Resettlement Unit, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 167
 KNOW RESET Country Profile:Ireland 
Finally, while it is appreciated that the ‘low key’ media strategy 
adopted by the office is with the intention of facilitating integration and 
allowing resettled refugees to go about their new lives in a private 
fashion, it is suggested that this approach could be balanced with some 
media coverage. This would be with the aim of preventing misinformation 
to spread among the public and indeed promoting a more pro-active 
awareness and sympathy raising strategy within the public. 










The budget for resettlement is prepared as part of the budgetary process 
for the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration which is part of the 
Equality Division. The amount required is estimated based on the projected 
numbers to be accepted and actual costs in preceding years and the 
anticipated costs in the coming year. This is then put into the mix when 
preparing the budget for the whole Department. Negotiations then take 
place at Departmental level between this Department and the Department 
of Finance and the approved budget is redistributed accordingly. If the 
Department of Finance does not provide financing for the project then the 
project cannot proceed. This has not occurred to date.41













The figures are total figures for the ERF contribution to three Irish 
strategic priorities. One of these priorities specifically stated that “An 
objective of the strategy will be to enhance the resettlement programme 
at present being implemented in cooperation with the UNHCR.”44
Costs 
 That 








Ireland could start resettling more refugees or at least fulfil its own quota 
again. “Of course, the Government could if approached by the UNHCR, in 
exceptional circumstances decide to provide additional resettlement places 
but this would require a Government Decision. I think that this is unlikely in 
the current economic environment.”45 The economic situation of the Irish 
state means that even the unfulfilled existing quota must be considered at 
risk. Since the rise of uncertainty over the State’s finances, to a certain 
degree, there has been a general hardening of attitude to immigration.46
                                                            
41 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
  
42 An overview of the ERF in Ireland can be found at: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/funding-
fundforintegration-erf-en 
43 These exact figures are taken from: 
http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/funding-fundforintegration-erf-ModelMultiAnnual-en 
44 Available at: http://www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/funding-fundforintegration-erf-
ModelMultiAnnual-en 
45 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
46 For example, the tightening of the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK. See: 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/1220/border.html 
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The economic deterioration can be seen as a threat to the continued 
existence of the programme: “The resettlement programme, like all other 
Government programmes is currently under review as part of the 
spending review taking place in each Department.”47
The incoming Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 will not 
impact on resettlement but focuses on streamlining the existing asylum 
process through a single procedure whereby all forms of protection are 
considered simultaneously. In the personal opinion of the interviewee: “I 
think it will have a positive impact. The status, rights and entitlements will 
be more clearly stated. It will separate large scale emergency situations 
(such as the Kosovan and Bosnian situation) from annual resettlement 
programmes. The new act clarifies entitlements with regard to travel and 
travel documents. Furthermore: “The period of waiting to apply for 
citizenship will change. At the moment there is an administrative 
arrangement whereby programme refugees can apply after three years. 
This will be normalised and will revert to 5 years residency before being 
eligible to apply. This is the same that applies to everyone else but there 
was an administrative arrangement that programme refugees could 
apply after three years. Other than that, I can see no major difference.” 
  
 
                                                            
47 Interview with Martina Glennon and Elaine Houlihan, op.cit. 
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Country Profile: ITALY 
Italy underwent major changes during the 20th century which had a fundamental impact on its asylum 
profile. First, there has been the evolution from being a country of emigration to a country of immigration 
and from being considered a poor country to having wealth in the country. Second, the evolution of 
European integration has also had important effects on Italian asylum law. Finally the most recent evolution 
has seen Italy strengthening its control measures against illegal migration (the so-called, Pacchetto 
Sicurezza) in the face of a wave of irregular migration from the ‘Arab spring’, the resulting humanitarian 
crisis shows some of the limits of the current Italian framework for immigration and asylum.  
It was not until 1989 that Italy issued a framework law for its asylum and immigration policy. This 
legislation was passed with an eye to future Italian participation in the Schengen system.1
Decentralisation of the system was also promoted by the Legge Bossi-Fini in the context of reception 
through the creation of “Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati” (SPRAR). The SPRAR 
system continues in the tradition of the Italian government to involve private actors (NGOs) into its 
reception and assistance activities. The SPRAR also conducts further decentralisation through the 
involvement of local communities especially in efforts for integration. For the moment, the system suffers 
from budget constraints and capacity limitations. These capacity limitations were especially felt after the 
‘Arab Spring’ and the consequent migration flows toward Italy. As a result, the government issued various 
urgency measures to cope with the humanitarian crisis and adapt the capacity. The government requested 
and obtained help by the European Commission to sustain these efforts.  
 The decreto 
legge 416/1989, implemented in law by legge 39/1990, also called “legge Martelli”, lifted the reservations 
that Italy had on the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and introduced the first main framework for 
asylum law in a single article on asylum. During the 1990s, with the increasing numbers of request for 
refugee status, the centralised system for the determination of refugee status was in general acknowledged 
to be overburdened and inefficient. The Legge 30 luglio 2002, N°189, also known Legge Bossi-Fini, 
“Modifica della Normativa in Materia di Immigrazione e di Asilo” decentralised the procedure and provided 
for the creation of the Territorial Commission and in the process creating a simplified procedure. 
Following the insertion of resettlement as part of the EU priorities in Decision n. 537/2007/CE, Italy 
included resettlement in its 2009 and 2010 National Programmes in which it committed to resettled 50 
refugees in 2009 and 2010 from Libya/Syria. The 2011 National Programme does not make mention of 
resettlement and focuses on the emergency situation that has evolved from the ‘Arab spring’.2
Italy does not have a specific legal basis for resettlement projects but it still has resettled on an ad hoc 
basis. The first project, called Oltremare I, was started in 2007 as a pilot. It was followed by a second 
Oltremare project (Oltremare II), which took place in 2008/2009 mainly for the purpose of allowing family 
reunions with the first group of resettled refugees. The third project, promoted by the European 
Commission, involved Palestinian refugees from the camp Al Tanf situated at the frontier between Syria 
and Iraq who were resettled in Italy in 2009. The last project was the result of two ‘humanitarian 
resettlement’ operations which took place in 2011 and saw Eritreans resettled from Libya.  
 
                                                            
1 Christophe Hein links the Legge Martelli to the Schengen process at the European level. See: Christopher Hein, “Storia 
del diritto d´asilo in Italia”, in Christopher Hein (ed.) Rifugiati vent´anni di storia del diritto d´asilo in Italia, 2010 
2 For the National Programmes, see: http://www.serviziocentrale.it/?Inglese&i=13; SPRAR reports: 
http://www.serviziocentrale.it/?Documenti&i=7 
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Asylum Profile 

















I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Legge 39/1990, also called 
“Legge Martelli” 
Decreto Legislativo 286/1998, 
also known as “Testo Unico” 
Legge 189/2002, known as 
Bossi-Fini, implemented by 







Decreto Legislativo 25/2008 
Decreto Legislativo 159/20086




There is no specific provision on resettlement, neither is there a 
provision explicitly allowing for resettlement procedures.  
The procedure for requesting international protection has to start from 
the Italian territory and cannot be started from abroad. Therefore, 
resettled persons have to apply for a protection status having already 
arrived on Italian territory.  
 
 
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
/ 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
Since 2006-2007 there have been several proposals for asylum law 
reform oftentimes initiated by the CIR and with the involvement of other 
NGOs acting in the field of asylum (such as the Centro Astalli) and 
various groups of deputies and senators. The draft proposals of law aim 
at simplifying the legislative framework and at creating a single code of 
law for Asylum and Refugee Law distinct from the legislative framework 
on immigration. The projects include a specific provision on 
resettlement. This provision would provide for the abolition of the 
distinction made between “pre-arrival” (selection) and “post-arrival” 
(determination of status) phases and would allow a single procedure for 
                                                            
3 SPRAR report 2010-2011. Note: In Italy, both local and national authorities have right to give protection status to 
refugees. Therefore, the numbers in 2010 and 2011 refer to only the protection status given by national authorities. 
4 Document on statistics : http://www1.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/asilo/sottotema009.html 
5 http://www.serviziocentrale.it/file/server/file/D_Legislativo%20n_140-2005.pdf 
6 http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/testi/08159dl.htm  
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the recognition of international protection which could already be 
initiated from abroad. This procedure would only be limited to certain 
categories of refugees who are participating in a resettlement project. 
The “pre-arrival” procedure would then consist both of the selection and 
status recognition phase. The provision foresees that statuses granted 
under this particular resettlement procedure will be identical in terms of 
the rights and benefits as those granted by the ordinary procedure.  
This would effectively make Italy a resettlement country with a defined 
resettlement quota over three-year periods.7
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
 
a) On an ad hoc basis 
Project 1: Oltremare I 
(started in 2007) 
 
Project 2: Oltremare II 
(2008-2009) 
 
Project 3: Reinsediamento a 
sud (2009-2010) 




Pilot project to receive 39 nationals of Eritrea, from the camp of 
Misratah (Libya) where they were detained with a threat of refoulement. 
They were resettled in Cantalice and the province of Rieti (mainly 
women and some children). 
 
30 (circa) Eritreans from Libya to Cantalice and Poggio Moiano, near 
Rieti (mainly family members of the refugees in Oltremare I). 
Commitment to resettle circa 50 Palestinians from the camp of Al Tanf 
(Iraq/Syria) to Riace, Caulonia and Stignano (Calabria). 
Two ‘Humanitarian Resettlement’ Operations for the reception of 
Eritreans from Libya. Resettled to the CARA of Salina Grande 
(Trapani) and from there they were resettled within the province of 
Campania. 



















The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had apparently discussed the 
possibility of resettling a former detainee but there does not seem to 
have been any further developments on the grounds of public security 
issues. Decision rested on the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
 
 
                                                            
7 Proposta di legge N°447 d 'iniziativa dei deputati ZACCARIA, AMICI, D 'ANTONA, FERRARI, GIOVANELLI, Disciplina 
del diritto di asilo e della protezione sussidiaria Presentata il 29 aprile 2008  
http://parlamento.openpolis.it/atto/documento/id/2378#PD;  
Disegno di Legge del 10 Novembre 2008, N 1221, Disciplina del diritto di asilo e della protezione sussidiaria, d’iniziativa 
dei senatori MARCENARO, MARINARO, MONGIELLO,DI GIOVAN PAOLO, DELLA MONICA, DELLA SETA  
8 For Oltremare projects, numbers and details taken from the CIR website: 
http://www.cir-onlus.org/Progetto%20Oltremare.htm; for the other projects number and details taken from the CIR. 
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Intra-EU “Relocation” 
Intra-EU relocation, or at least more burden-sharing between border 
countries and other EU countries, is often discussed in Italian public 
political discourse.9
Comments 
 Considering the recent problems in managing the 
consequences of the ‘Arab spring’, Italy would probably not be opposed 
to starting a discussion on intra-EU relocation, yet from the perspective of 
a sending State rather than a receiving State. As shown by the numbers 
given in the National Program of 2011 and of the SPRAR report 2010-
2011, Italy has problems with its current reception capabilities. 
Discussions were on-going on the fate of the Iranian refugees from camp 
Ashraf in Iraq.10
III. Resettlement Implementation 
 Italy has discussed with UNHCR the possibility for their 











Country of Origin: 108 (Eritrea and Ethiopia)  
Country of First Asylum: 108 (Libya) 
179  
Country of Origin: 179 (Palestine)  
Country of First Asylum: 179 (Iraq) 
30  
Country of Origin: 30 (Eritrea)  
Country of First Asylum: 30 (Libya) 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  












Oltremare I was led by the Ministry of the Interior in partnership with its 
implementing partners, CIR and the Province of Rieti / Municipality of 
Cantalice, and with the support of UNHCR. UNHCR in Tripoli selected 
refugees on the basis of their vulnerability and prepared dossiers that 
were transmitted to the Italian authorities. The refugees were all ex-
prisoners detained in the camp of Misratah in Libya and were at risk of 
being expelled from Libya. 
Oltremare II: UNHCR selected refugees on the basis of their 
vulnerability and the family relationship with those previously resettled 
under the project ”Oltremare I ” who had no possibility to meet with 
family reunification criteria. 
Reinsediamento a sud: The Italian government accepted to resettle 179 
Palestinian refugees recognised under the UNHCR mandate living in very 
harsh conditions in the Al Tanf camp situated at the Syrian-Iraqi border.  
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: As opposed to previous resettlement 
operations, this one took place without the involvement of UNHCR and 
IOM and not all persons had been recognised under the UNHCR 
mandate in Libya. Following an appeal made by the Bishop of Tripoli, 
Habeshia Association and CIR, a political agreement was reached 
between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
urgently evacuate these persons through an operation conducted by 
the Italian Air Force. No visa was issued to these protection seekers 
who were admitted to the ordinary asylum procedure upon arrival. 
• Deploying Staff 













The quotas for the resettlement project are normally decided in 
negotiation. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has had also a role in 
negotiating the quotas but the final decision is taken by the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs. The projects are then initiated on the basis of an 
informal agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
UNHCR. After the informal political decision is taken, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs issues an internal decision which allowed the embassies 
to issue the visas for the resettled refugees.  
The selection procedure of a resettled refugee is mainly done by 
UNHCR and officers of the Ministry only assess the dossiers on 
grounds of national security issues after the UNHCR selection has 
been done. It was only in the framework of the third project that a 
mission was organised. This mission went to Iraq and was organised 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to assess the situation there. Once 
the selection is complete, visas are issued (normally temporary short 
term visa) and the resettled refugees are transported to Italy. 
Pre-Departure Activities 
 
• Cultural orientation (CO) 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 
 




IOM assisted resettled refugees in obtaining travel documents and 
made travel arrangements. Refugees were accompanied to Italy by 
IOM officers. 
IOM 
Procedure Timing  n/a 
Comments  Cultural orientation should be provided before departure in order to 
manage refugees’ expectations. 
The division between “pre-arrival” selection and “post-arrival” 
evaluation of the status makes it too long a process. Some refugees 
refused to apply for their status upon arrival. The draft law proposal 
mentioned above would simplify the matter by arranging for an 
assessment of the status at the same time as the selection process. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
Status granted  
Legislative decree 251/2007 
The law in force foresees the recognition of two different statuses of 
international protection: refugee status and subsidiary protection. 
Resettled persons have to apply for their status upon arrival. 
Procedure to obtain the status follows the simplified procedure foreseen 
in Italian law for requesting international protection. Requests are done 
through the compiling of the document form (“modulo C3”) at the Police 
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Office of the customs. In the first projects, the forms were not provided 
immediately while in the subsequent projects requests were filed 
directly at the airport.  
Decision on the status is decentralised and falls under the 
responsibility of the Territorial Commission. For the resettlement project 
in the province of Rieti, the competent Territorial Commission was 
Rome; for the third projects with resettlement in Calabria, the Territorial 
Commission was the one of Crotone and finally the last project as the 
resettled refugee transited through Salina Grande, the requests were 
assessed to Territorial Commission of Trapani. 
The fourth project also involved an interview by the Territorial 
Commission of Trapani. In the previous projects the Territorial 
Commissions involved did not request an interview but still made an 
appraisal of the documents received to decide on the status to grant the 
applicant. Normally interviews are the central part of the evaluation of 
requests by the Commission but the Territorial Commission can decide 
to omit it if it considers there are sufficient grounds to accept the 
request for refugee status without it. The Territorial Commission of 
Trapani required the interview as, unlike the previous projects, it 
granted diversified statuses (either refugee or subsidiary protection 
status) on a case by case evaluation. 








Info upon arrival 



















Refugee status automatically awards a residence permit for a period of 
five years renewable. It grants rights with regard to family reunification 
and gives a document for Schengen movements as well as access to 
the labour market, study, health assistance and free movement, 
integration and housing. Similar rights are given to those benefiting from 
subsidiary protection, however that status grants a permit of stay of 
three years only.  
Italian authorities, UNHCR, IOM, CIR, RCO’S Habeshia received the 
persons to be resettled at Fiumicino airport for the “ Oltremare 1 and 2” 
projects. Reinsediamento a sud: Ministry of Interior, UNHCR, IOM. 
Info were provided soon after arrival. 
No. However, some events were organised in Calabria by the local 
Municipalities 
 
Municipalities were directly involved in providing integration services in 
partnership with some NGOs. CIR supervised the work of social 
assistants.  
Cultural orientation was provided on the rights and duties of refugees, 
on Italian society, on the ways in which resettled persons could 
establish relationships with the Italian Institutions and local resources 
and services. 
Legal/social/psychological counselling and assistance were provided. 
CIR provided counselling to the social assistants of Municipalities who 
had direct contact with resettled refugees. Counselling and assistance 
for integration (social, labour, housing, schooling, health, etc..) were 
provided. 
Italian classes were provided from teachers with no experience in 
dealing with foreigners in Oltremare 1 and Oltremare 2.  
Refugees benefitted from job counselling, however due to the high level 
of unemployment they had few possibilities for integration. Scarce 
public transportation services contributed to a reduction in the 
possibilities to meet relatives and friends, to access services, qualified 
training courses and to find a suitable job. 
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Refugees do not have to meet the criteria of housing and income for 
family reunification. However, they faced certain bureaucratic problems 
in proving the family/parental relationship. Thanks to “Oltremare II”, in 
fact, many family members could be reunited although they did not 
meet the family reunification criteria.  
Municipalities and NGOs provided these services but they were not 
adequate. 
Social assistants offered mentoring support but it was not always 




Local Municipalities were directly involved in providing independent 
housing. Refugees were living in independent houses in uninhabited 
areas put at their disposal by municipalities due to the fact that Italians 
left these areas due to high level of unemployment. 
Comments Information provided upon arrival was inadequate. Service providers in 
municipalities were not sufficiently qualified/trained to deal with 
refugees and to identify their training and professional skills and offer 
jobs. Vocational training and jobs offered did not correspond to the skills 
and wishes expressed by the resettled refugees. Isolation and the lack 
of public transportation were also obstacles in looking for more suitable 
jobs in distant places. 
With the high unemployment and scarce presence of public 
transportation in the area, refugees faced huge difficulties in having 
access to local services.  
Between May and June 2011, about 150 Palestinians with no job 
opportunities and possibiliy to locally integrate decided to move to 
Sweden where their family members were resettled from the Al Tanf 
camp. They tried to be admitted to the asylum procedure in Sweden 
accusing Italy of having putting them in a very dangerous situation and 
that the local mafia had threatened them. They were informed that in 
Sweden they would obtain better assistance and opportunities of 
integration. However, Swedish authorities decided to send them back to 
Italy. The first return operation started in the middle of March 2012 
when 47 Palestinian refugees were transferred to Italy. 
No job opportunities, isolation and frustration were elements that made 
a large number of refugees, in particular Palestinian, leave Italy and 
move to another EU Member State. Italy points to the lack of funds to 
explain these problems with integration. 
Recommendations: 
− UNHCR, after selecting refugees, should share information on 
individual cases with municipalities and NGOs assisting refugees 
to plan suitable and adequate integration services in line with 
refugees’ needs. This would allow municipalities and NGOs to plan 
ahead and use resources efficiently. The information is vital for 
effectively planning appropriate medical and psycho-social care. 
− Cultural orientation should be provided before arrival and also 
offered after arrival in order to lower expectations. It should present 
the rights and duties of refugees, information about Italian society 
and information as to how to establish relationships with public 
institutions and local services. 
− Trainings should be provided for municipality service providers and 
public welfare officers. 
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− Capacity building and increased resources (staff and budget) 
should be ensured to municipalities involved in managing houses 
and providing services to resettled refugees. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 
− National Level 







The main budget for asylum activities is the Fondo Nazionale per le 
Politiche ed I Servizi dell´Asilo. It is managed by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and it finances the projects up to 80%. The rest is covered by 
local community’s resources.  
Total contributions in 2010: 
Ordinary: 23,396,696.99 Euro 
Vulnerable categories: 6,512,242.18 Euro 
A contribution was also given to asylum projects by the 8 per Mille11. 




(ERF I) period 2000-2004 Euro 11,000,000 (ERF II) period 2005-
2007 Euro 6,500,000. 
 
ERF III:  
• 2008: Euro 2,821,520.30 (for measures of urgency 
7,088,000.00 Euro were assigned) 
• 2009: Euro 4,470,81.00 
• 2010: Euro 7,202,618.28 
• 2011: Euro 7,740,535.42 (for measures of urgency 
6,850,000.00 Euro were assigned) 
Total ERF over the period 2008-2010 was 22,236,080 Euro, 
equivalent to 6.52% of the total Member States contributions. It is the 
4th highest contribution (the first being the contribution to Sweden, the 
second to France and the third to Germany).14
The fourth project was entirely funded by EU funds 
 
15 (ERF III 
contributions and Programma Operativo Nazionale (PON) Sicurezza 
per lo sviluppo).16
Costs 
 It also received EU funds for the third project. 
Nothing available specifically for resettlement, however in both the 
National Program of 2009 and 2010, resettlement of 50 refugees was 




Italy started pilot projects of resettlement under the Prodi 
government in 2007. Proposals of asylum law reforms in Italy since 
then include an express provision on resettlement but this design of 
law has yet to be adopted. 18
                                                            
11 Sandra Sarti, L´Italia dei rifugiati, Settembre 2010. The 8 per mille law allow citizens to choose whether to give 8 per 
thousand from their annual income tax to public or church lead social assistance programs.  
 
12 SPRAR report 2010-2011 
13 http://www1.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/asilo/sottotema010.html 
14 See the document „Figures on the allocation by EU State for each Funds” on the European Commission website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/refugee/funding_refugee_en.htm 
15 Sandra Sarti, L´Italia dei rifugiati, Settembre 2010; see also National Program 2010, which expressly included the 
possibilità of using the PON funds and not only the ERF funds for the resettlement projects. 
16 The PON is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund: http://www.ponrec.it/programma/obiettivi-e-
finalit%C3%A0.aspx 
17 see: http://www.serviziocentrale.it/?FER&i=12&s=21 
18 On the different drafts of law, links can be found on the website of the Italian Council for Refugees (CIR): 
http://www.cir-onlus.org/PROPOSTA%20CIR%20LEGGE%20ASILO.htm 
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However it also shows how a pre-defined procedure would help 
clarify for the situation for all parties in the “pre-arrival” phase of 
resettlement and make resettlement less dependent on political 
circumstance and will. This would in particular benefit officials involved 
in the initial phase of the projects who are not used to proceeding 
without a clear and legally specified mandate for action; until now they 
have relied upon the high level political decision and the absence of 
clear legal prohibition as the main basis for initiating projects. 
The current stagnation, both in terms of resettlement projects and in 
terms of reforms, is due both to a cautious political will19 and to the 
insufficient reception capacity currently operating. This was originally due 
partly to the change in government from the Prodi led government to the 
Berlusconi government which changed priorities in the field. However it is 
also due to the serious humanitarian problems that Italy has faced since 
the ‘Arab spring’. Finally there is a certain perception among officials that 
the projects were not successful. In particular some refugees resettled in 
Italy tried to reach Scandinavian countries where benefits and integration 
are more consistent. This problem is not in reality a problem connected to 
resettlement per se but to reception and integration capabilities (in 
particular due to costs of reception). Italy has been a pioneer in creating 
multi-governance networks involving both private organisations (NGO) 
and local communities in asylum projects.20 However comparable 
programmes provide better integration opportunities and better welfare 
assistance in other EU countries (such as to Scandinavian countries).21
Many Italian NGOs, news websites and also Italian local 
authorities
 
To examine other funding possibilities, the third and fourth resettlement 
projects in Italy used EU funds. Currently resettlement still does not seem 
high on the political agenda notwithstanding the change in government. 
This is probably due to the current economic and financial crisis of Italy 
leading to other political priorities and the continuing emergency from the 
effects of the ‘Arab spring’. 
22
                                                            
19 Italy is currently not among the Member States that will participate in the new EU project of joint resettlement. Still the 
Parliament is discussing the matter with civil society involved in asylum. See:  
 have considered the new European Program on 
resettlement as potentially offering a solution to the humanitarian crisis 
by offering a safer route to ask international protection from abroad and 
share the responsibilities and financial costs for reception with other 
European countries. However the impact of resettlement programmes 
on the inflows of refugee through unsafe channels will largely depend 
on the quotas. So that resettlement can be seen as a way to alleviate 
but most probably will not be sufficient to solve some of the problems 
faced by Italy in assisting refugees, which will require further capacity 
building and improved integration. 
http://www.aise.it/migrazioni/rifugiati/110005-reinsediamento-di-richiedenti-asilo-e-rifugiati-cir-le-tragedie-nel-
mediterraneo-devono-finire-.html  
20 Interview and other documentation : Réseau académique d´études juridiques sur l´immigration et l´asile en Europe, 
Comparative overview of the implementation of the directive 2003/9 of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the EU Member States, October 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/asylum/asylum_studies_en.htm; National Report done by the Odysseus network for the European 
Commission on the implementation of the directive on reception conditions for asylum seekers in Italy, 2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/asylum/asylum_studies_en.htm;  
http://atlas-conferences.com/c/a/m/l/43.htm;  
21 Idem  
22 See footnote 59 but also: http://www.programmaintegra.it/modules/news/article.php?storyid=5693; 
http://www.euractiv.it/it/news/sociale/5088-immigrazione-pe-approva-aiuti-per-asili-una-parte-per-italia.html;  
http://asiloineuropa.blogspot.de/2012/03/il-programma-comune-di-reinsediamento.html#more 
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Country Profile: LATVIA 
Latvia could be characterized as having conservative immigration policy, which is in line with the current EU 
legal requirements in the area of immigration. Latvia belongs to the group of EU Member States, which 
places greater emphasis on addressing labour shortages primarily by utilizing the national workforce, to the 
extent that Latvia has not elaborated a strategy for using economic migration to meet the demand for 
labour. After accession to the European Union, Latvia experienced the emigration of nationals of working 
age to other Member States, which led to notable labour shortages in its domestic labour market1. The 
ensuing debate focused on how to fill the shortages through policies designed to entice back the labour 
which had left and the stimulation of the domestic workforce. Also on the agenda was the use of a migrant 
workforce which resulted in the establishment of the Migration Policies Working Group. In July 2006, the 
Working Group drafted Concept for Migration Policies in Connection with Employment, which had, as one 
of its aims, to simplify admission procedures for third-country nationals2
The current legal and institutional framework for asylum and migration system in Latvia does not 
stipulate any provision for the resettlement opportunities. No special decision making mechanisms exist on 
this issue and the budget for the subject matter is provided. The regulation of asylum and migration issues 
is provided in the Asylum Law and the Immigration Law. In total, 663 persons applied for asylum within the 
period of 1 January 1998 - 7 December 2011. So for the period of 1998 -2010 there were 367 asylum 
seekers, but within 11 months of 2011 alone - 335 asylum seekers. This increase put a lot of pressure on 
the reception services for asylum seekers. Thus, the official opinion is that any resettlement-related 
measures would strain the reception capacity even further
. However it was not been approved 
as the economic crisis of 2008 and the increasing unemployment of Latvian residents ended any significant 
discussion on this point. 
3
According to public officials, a majority of current asylum seekers openly acknowledge the fact that 
Latvia was not their country of destination and that they were en-route to the Nordic countries or Western 
European countries but have been stopped in Latvian territory or at its borders and applied for asylum. 
Some of the persons who were granted international protection left soon after receiving the necessary 
personal and travel documents. It should be noted that Latvia does not have any cases before the Court of 
the European Union in relation to its immigration and asylum legislation and the quality of its transposition 
of EU directives, its application or interpretation of the harmonized national legislation. 
. 
The public institutions of Latvia are still in the process of further optimizing and decreasing their budget 
due to the economic crisis of 2008-2012. These budgetary cuts make the introduction of any resettlement 
programme extremely unlikely4
The consequences of the financial crisis, the absence of large diasporas of third country nationals, the 
absence of NGOs, and high unemployment rates in Latvia put some restraints on integration capacities as 
part of reception capacity in its broader scope.  
.  
There are no political debates about refugee resettlement - and there has been no such debates since 
establishment of the asylum system of Latvia at the end of 1997 - at the level of the Government or of the 
Parliament, which would indicate any particular interest in introducing the resettlement schemes and the 
relevant legal and institutional framework in Latvia.  
Taking into account that so many elements play an important role in a resettlement process and most of 
them are of long term perspective, Latvian officials expressed the strongly held belief that participation in 
resettlement actions should be seen as voluntary that respects reception capacity of a Member State. 
Otherwise permanent resettlement schemes based on statistics will only cause sporadic secondary 
movement within the EU and could endanger the Common European Asylum System5
 
. 
                                                            
1 The European Migration Network, “Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration”, June 2011, pp.33-34.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Based on the records of the major points of interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Republic of 
Latvia, Mrs. Ilze Pētersone-Godmane.  
4Article “Finance Minister: Latvia has consolidated 2.3 billion lats in three years”, December 5, 2011, available at 
http://bnn-news.com/finance-minister-latvia-consolidated-2-3-billion-lats-years-42711 (last time checked on February 
16, 2012). Interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, op.cit.  
5 Based on the records of the major points of interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, ibid.  
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Asylum Profile 














− 6 Refugee Status 
− 12 Other Protection 
25 (2010) 
− 7 Refugee Status 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Asylum Law 27/2008, 30th 
June 2009. 
Immigration Law of October 
31, 2002 (with subsequent 
amendments, which were 
adopted until May 26, 2011).  
 
The current legal and institutional framework for asylum and migration 
system in Latvia does not stipulate any provisions for resettlement 
opportunities. The issues of reception of asylum seekers in accordance 
with the provisions of the Asylum Law are dealt with by the Office of 
Citizenship and Migration Affairs under the Ministry of Interior. 
Other basis of resettlement: / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
No changes to the legal or institutional framework are planned. The 
issue of the resettlement is not a domestic priority at the moment. There 
are no political debates about this issue. It was discussed by the 
institutions, which are responsible for migration and asylum issues, the 
Government and the Parliament as part of EU-agenda related issues 
(e.g. formulating the positions for the Council when the proposal on 
resettlement was examined). 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 










                                                            
6 Source: Latvian Office of the Citizenship and Migration Affairs. 
7 Source: Latvian Office of the Citizenship and Migration Affairs. 
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According to local news agencies in July 2010, Latvia received one 
person from Guantanamo. His identity is not disclosed, there was just 
short announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Interior. No additional information was publicly available on this 
subject. This action did not receive any further continuation8
None 
.  
Comments Latvia is not involved into any resettlement programme and does not 
have any national resettlement plans at present. 
III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
Geographical location obviously matters when it comes to the 
challenges in managing migration and asylum flows. The majority of 
current asylum seekers do not aim to settle in Latvia but just arrived in 
the country in transit. They do not want to stay in Latvia and leave it as 
soon as  they obtain travel documents. 
This, in conjunction with socio-economic conditions in Latvia and the 
fact that Latvia does not have a large diaspora of third country nationals 
from defined resettlement priority regions, means that there is a high 
probability that resettlement to Latvia would simply result in secondary 
movement within the EU as the majority of the resettled persons 
afterwards will most likely move away from Latvia.  
The public institutions of Latvia are still in the process of further 
optimizing and decreasing their budget due to the economic crisis. The 
idea that the EU may grant certain funding to favour resettlement is 
welcomed, however EU funding for the initial transfer of the person to 
Latvia will not cover the substantial costs of their reception and integration.  
In addition, not all of the necessary conditions can be in order to 
carry out successful resettlement activities can be established simply by 
providing financial assistance. 
The limited reception capacity of Latvia also plays an important role. 
A record number of asylum seekers was recorded in 2011 when Latvia 
almost received more asylum seekers than the entire period of 1998-
2010 in total. This has put much pressure on the capacity of the 
reception of asylum seekers.  
The absence of NGOs that would deal with the resettlement is also 
to be noted. The only NGO dealing with some narrow issues of asylum 
seekers and refugees (such as language and legal assistance in some 
cases) is dependent on the projects performed on an EU-funding basis 
and is not funded from the state budget9. Looking from an NGO 
perspective, before introducing any kind of resettlement system in 
Latvia, the country also needs a comprehensive integration programme 
(not just a set of the rights on access to work, unemployment benefits, 
vocational training, education or other social security guarantees etc.) 
for all categories of legally staying foreigners in order to ensure their 
inclusion in Latvian society10
                                                            
8 Article “Guantanamo detainee transferred to Latvia”, available at  
.  
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2010/07/26/guantanamo-detainee-transferred-to-latvia/, (checked on 08.12.2011.). 
The same information was repeated in several publications in Latvian language. 
9 Based on the records of the major points of interview with the president of the non-governmental organisation “Shelter 
„Safe House”, Mrs. Sandra Zalcmane. 
10 ibid. 
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Country Profile: LITHUANIA 
Lithuania is a country of emigration. Emigration rate is among the highest in the European Union. Between 
1990 and 2010, 615,000 residents emigrated from Lithuania. 54,331 residents emigrated from Lithuania in 
20111
Contrary to emigration from Lithuania, immigration to the country is relatively low. Statistical data shows 
that from 2009 to 2010 immigration flows decreased, while comparing the data available in 2010 and 2011, 
a significant increase in immigration is observed: in 2011 15,685 immigrants arrived to Lithuania, which is 
an impressive number in comparison to 5,213 in 2010
. Emigration numbers increased after the country joined the EU in 2004. The most important factors 
explaining emigration trends in Lithuania are comparatively low wages and the high rate of unemployment.  
2. Work is one of the purposes for which foreigners 
arrive to Lithuania (in 2011, 3,330 work permits were issued for foreigners3
Lithuania has a restrictive labour immigration policy. Workers from third countries are considered to be a 
temporary solution and therefore are not allowed to stay after their contract is finished or terminated. They 
cannot change their employer or look for work while in the country. However, in 2011 the admission rules 
were changed in order to facilitate the arrival procedure for those professions of which there are a shortage in 
Lithuania. Furthermore, the transposition of EU Directives has led to facilitation of immigration procedures for 
certain groups of third countries nationals (e.g. students, researchers and highly skilled workers).
).  
4
As a result of its geographical location (two external borders with third countries) and economic 
situation, Lithuania serves rather as a transit country for asylum seekers than as a destination. In recent 
years the number of asylum applications in Lithuania was approximately 450-540 annually. The largest 
national groups were Georgian and Russian nationals. According to the Annual report of Asylum Affairs 
Division of the Migration Department, the number of refused asylum applications is growing (in 2008, 49 
applications were rejected, in 2009 155, in 2010 180, in 2011 280
 
5). This trend is related to the number of 
applications lodged by the citizens of Georgia (in 2011, 213 out of 280 decisions to refuse to grant asylum 
were made only in regard of Georgian nationals6). No Georgian has been granted refugee status up to this 
point. However, Georgian asylum seekers continue to apply for refugee status in Lithuania. Many asylum 
applications (in most cases when asylum seekers left the Foreigners Registration Centre without 
authorisation and failed to return) in 2010 (209 out of 5037) and 2011 (146 out of 5278) indicate that asylum 
seekers have another European destination in mind other than Lithuania. Secondary movement post 
application then is quite common if not the norm. In order to prevent asylum seekers from going to other EU 
countries when they are expecting a negative decision, amendment to the Law on the Legal Status of 
Aliens was proposed by the state authority. According to that law, a foreigner cannot be detained for 
unlawful entry to or stay in Lithuania when he has lodged an application for asylum9
                                                            
1 Migration in Numbers, available on the internet: 
. However, the draft 
amendment to the law intends to change this provision so that the exception from this ground for detention 
is available to aliens who have been granted temporary territorial asylum in Lithuania. So the draft 
amendment narrows down the application of the principle of not detaining asylum seekers to only those 
asylum seekers with regard to whom the Migration Department has made a decision to grant temporary 
territorial asylum. If the Migration Department decides to examine the asylum application through an 
expedite procedure, asylum seekers could be detained until the decision on his application is made. NGOs 
http://123.emn.lt/en/general-trends/migration-10-years-overview 
2 Numbers includes Lithuanian nationals, who came back to Lithuania. Migrations in Numbers, available on the internet: 
http://123.emn.lt/en/general-trends/migration-10-years-overview 
3 Lrytas.lt, available on the internet: http://www.lrytas.lt/-13313134901330484910-u%C5%BEsienie%C4%8Diams-pernai-
i%C5%A1duota-1-9-karto-daugiau-leidim%C5%B3-dirbti-lietuvoje.htm 
4 European Migration Network, MIgration profile: Lithuania,2011, available on the internet: 
http://www.iom.lt/documents/Migration_profile_EN.pdf 
5 Asylum in the Republic of Lithuania, Annual Report 2011, http://www.migracija.lt/ 
6 ibid. 
7 Asylum in the Republic of Lithuania, Annual Report 2010, http://www.migracija.lt/popup2.php?item_id=975 
8 Asylum in the Republic of Lithuania, Annual Report 2011, http://www.migracija.lt/ 
9 Law on the Legal Status of Aliens, 29 April 2004, available on the internet: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=416015  
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expressed their doubts whether such legal provision would be incompatible with the principle of not 
detaining asylum seekers. The debate on the draft amendment is still pending. 
Up to 2012, resettlement was not a big topic of debate in Lithuania. In February 2012 UNHCR was 
informed by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour that discussions on Lithuania’s participation in 
resettlement had started in Lithuania10. As the representative of the Ministry of the Interior was unaware 
of any on-going discussions on resettlement issue, it follows that it is a very initial phase of a possible 
reform in this field.11
Moreover, according to the representative of the Migration Department, the Lithuanian position on 
resettlement issue is clear – Lithuania is in favour of participation in resettlement programmes only on a 
voluntary basis and refuses to participate in any such programmes.
  
12
                                                            
10 Written interview of the representative of Regional Office of UNHCR in Lithuania, 23rd of March 2012. 
 On this basis, it is very difficult to say 
whether there is a coherent and set vision as to Lithuania’s role, if any, in the resettlement of refugees. 
*The number includes foreigners who were granted subsidiary protection repeatedly.  
11 Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, 21st February 2012. 
12 Communication with the representative of the Migration Department, 18th of November 2012. 
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Asylum Profile 













• 7 Refugee Status 
• 88 Other Protection 
111 (2010) 
• 1 Refugee Status 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law on the Legal Status 
of Aliens of the Republic of 
Lithuania, 29th of April 2004 
– No IX-2206 (As last 
amended on the 8th of 




Does not regulate resettlement issue. 
Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
In the Draft Law Amending the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens16
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
, 
which is under the debate at the moment, it is not planned that there will 
be any provision on resettlement.  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 




In the last decade of the 20th century, several refugee families were 
relocated from Lithuania to Denmark.17 It happened shortly after the 
Lithuanian asylum system was established. As the new Lithuanian 
system still had some gaps (e.g. refugee qualification and medical 
assistance) Denmark agreed to accept several families,18
                                                            
13 The Migration Yearbook 2012, available on the internet: 
 
http://www.migracija.lt/index.php?-11716339, p. 70  
14 The Migration Yearbook 2012, available on the internet: http://www.migracija.lt/index.php?-11716339, p. 67 
15 Available on the internet: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=416015  
16 Available on the internet: 
http://www.lrs.lt/pls/proj/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=93543&p_query=&p_tr2=&p_org=&p_fix=n&p_gov=n 
17 Written interview of the previous UNHCR Liaison Officer in Lithuania, the 23rd of February 2012. 
18 Communication with the previous UNHCR Liaison Officer in Lithuania, the 17th of April 2012. 
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− After the European Parliament adopted a resolution of the 2nd 
February 2009 welcoming the decision by US President Barack 
Obama to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and 
calling on the Member States, should the US administration so 
request, to cooperate in finding solutions, to be prepared to accept 
Guantánamo inmates in the Union19, the Foreign Ministry of the 
Republic of Lithuania was obliged by the State Defence Council to 
start a consultation with representatives of U.S. administration on 
legal, security and technical framework in which to accept former 
Guantanamo detainees.20 According to the media, Lithuania has 
consulted with the US about the resettlement of two detainees 
from Guantanamo.21
However, in Autumn 2009, Lithuania’s newly elected president 
reneged on Lithuania’s previous agreement to resettle prisoners 
amid an uproar over reports that the 
 
Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) had run a secret jail in Lithuania.22
On the 28th of October 2011 a Guantanamo detainee filled in a 
complaint against Lithuania in the European Court of Human 
Rights, over its role in facilitating his extraordinary rendition.
 
23
- On the 30th of November 2006 the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania adopted a resolution on relocation of asylum seekers 
from Malta to Lithuania.
 
24 In January 2007, six asylum seekers 
from Malta were relocated to Lithuania; all of them were granted 
refugee status.25 Lithuania’s policy is seen as an expression of 
solidarity with other EU members.26
                                                            
19 Available on the internet: 
 Lithuania considers the 
exercise to have been costly and ineffective, the main reason 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-
0045&language=EN 
20 Lithuania would accept up to 10 Guantanamo prisoners, the 11th of February 2009, available on the internet: 
http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/article.php?id=20525296&categoryID=7 
21 Lithuania will consider the US request to house two prisoners from Guantanamo, the 13th of February 2009, available 
on the internet: http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/article.php?id=20557457&categoryID=7 
Lithuania will consider a possibility to accept two prisoners from Guantanamo, the 13th of February 2009, available 
on the internet: http://www.lrytas.lt/-12345226861233430547-lietuva-svarstys-galimyb%C4%99-priimti-du-kalinius-
i%C5%A1-gvantanamo.htm 
Following the Guantanamo prisoners their families may also move in, the 25th of February 2009, available on the 
internet: http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/paskui-gvantanamo-kalinius-gali-atsikraustyti-ir-ju-
seimos.d?id=20730616 
22 Cables Depict US Haggling to Clear Guantánamo, the 29th of November 2010, available on the internet: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/americas/30gitmo.html?pagewanted=all 
Latvia will host one Guantanamo detainee, Lithuania will not, the 2nd February 2010, available on the internet: 
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2010/02/02/latvia-will-host-one-guantanamo-detainee-lithuania-will-not/ 
23 Reprieve, the 28th of October 2011, Guantánamo detainee takes Lithuania to court over secret CIA prison, available 
on the internet: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2011_10_28_Lithuania_CIA_prison/ 
24 The Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Yearbook of Migration 2006, available on the internet: 
http://www.migracija.lt/ 
25 The Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Yearbook of Migration 2007, available on the internet: 
http://www.migracija.lt/ 
26 Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, the 21st of February 2012. 
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being that the relocated persons were not sufficiently informed 
about Lithuania prior to relocation.27
- In October 2009 Lithuania refused to contribute to the EU initiative 
to relocate more asylum seekers from Malta
 
28
- In 2011, under the resolution No 1082 of the 14th of September 
2011, the Lithuanian Government decided to join the EUREMA 




III. Resettlement Implementation 
 The Resolution has yet to be implemented. 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
Lithuania’s reluctance to receive refugees in the framework of 
resettlement initiatives is influenced by social, financial, cultural, 
administrative and various other factors. There is very little knowledge 
and a dearth of reliable information as to what resettlement, is and what 
it entails as a legal and social challenge. 30
The current economic situation in Lithuania is not supportive for a 




Resettlement programmes are more orientated to regions distant 
and relatively unknown to Lithuanian society, where Lithuania does not 
have any geopolitical interests and, in most cases, no social, historical, 
cultural or economic ties
  
32




Though Lithuania could receive a small number of resettled 
refugees,
. 
34 before that important step should be taken, public 
awareness must be increased, good practices from other EU members 
and beyond must be studied and the needs of the refugees to be 
resettled must be fully understood.35
 
 
                                                            
27 European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for a 
Relocation of Beneficiaries of International protection JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005, Final Report 2010, available on the 
internet: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/asylum/docs/final_report_relocation_of_refugees.pdf 
28 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, Legal information: In the Meeting of Ministers of the Interior of 
Lithuania and Malta Issues of Granting Asylum for Asylum Seekers in European Union were discussed, 28th October 
2009, available on the internet: http://www.vrm.lt/index.php?id=131&backPID=129&begin_at=720&tt_news=2281& 
29 Resolution on asylum seekers from the Republic of Malta, No 1082, 14th of September 2011, available on the internet: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=406687&p_query=&p_tr2=2 
30 Written interview of the previous UNHCR Liaison Officer in Lithuania, op. cit. 
31 bid. 
32 Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, 21st of February 2012. 
33 Written interview of the representative of the Red Cross Society, the 24th of February 2012. 
Written interview of the representative of Regional Office of UNHCR in Lithuania, op.cit. 
34 Written interview of the representative of the Red Cross Society, op.cit. 
Written interview of the representative of Regional Office of UNHCR in Lithuania, op.cit. 
35 Written interview of the previous UNHCR Liaison Officer in Lithuania, op.cit. 
Written interview of the representative of the Red Cross Society, op.cit. 
Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, op.cit. 
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Country Profile: LUXEMBOURG 
Relative to the size of its resident population, Luxembourg was, at the beginning of 2010, the EU Member 
State with the highest share of non-nationals. Non-nationals accounted for about 43% of the total 
population.1
Immigration and asylum law is not codified in Luxembourg. However, all relevant legal acts are 
compounded in the Statut des Personnes Etrangères,
 The vast majority of them (86,3%) are citizens of other EU Member States (by order of size, 
the largest three groups are Portuguese, French and Italian).  
2
The main legislative Acts in the field of immigration are the Act of 29 August 2008 on Free Movement of 
Persons and Immigration
 according to their subject matter.  
3 and the Act of 16 December 2008 on Reception and Integration of Foreigners in 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.4
Regarding asylum, the relevant instrument is the Act of 5 May 2006 relating to asylum and other forms 
of protection.
 The latter notably created the Luxembourg Reception and Integration 
Agency (Office luxembourgeois de l’accueil et de l’intégration – OLAI) which is essential in the process of 
refugee resettlement. It also created the Reception and Integration Contract. 
5 The last significant legal Act adopted in the field of immigration and asylum was adopted in 
July 2011. 6
In Luxembourg, stricto sensu, resettlement is understood as the process covering: 1) the selection in the 
country of first asylum (non-EU Member State) of refugees to be resettled; 2) their transfer to the receiving 
country (Luxembourg) and 3) the initial steps to integration in the receiving country (Luxembourg).
 
7 
Although relocation is not covered by this stricto sensu definition as it refers to the transfer of refugees (or 
people in need of international protection) from one EU Member State to another one, resettlement may 
also refer to relocation for practical use.8 Over the last ten years, Luxembourg carried out one main stricto 
sensu resettlement operation in 2009, to resettle 28 Iraqi refugees from Syria and Jordan.9
                                                            
1 For data and figures, see: Eurostat: 
 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics; Report 
of the European Migration Network (Luxembourg contact point), 2010: 
http://www.emnluxembourg.lu/sites/default/files/Policy%20Report%202010_EN_pdf.pdf  
2 Last update of this document: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/recueils/etrangers1/Complement.pdf 
3 Memorial A, N. 138 of 10 September 2008, p. 2024: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2008/0138/a138.pdf This 
Act notably created the first detention centre of Luxembourg. It became operational since 22 August 2011, following 
the adoption of the Regulation of 17 August 2011 on the conditions and modalities of detention regime of the 
detention centre, Mémorial A n. 180 of 22 August 2011, pp. 3222-3225: 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2011/0180/a180.pdf 
4 Mémorial, A, N. 209 of 24 December 2008, p. 3156 http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2008/0209/a209.pdf 
5 Mémorial, A-No 78 of 9 May 2006, p. 1402 : http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2006/0078/a078.pdf 
6 Act of 1st July 2011 amending the Act of 29 August 2008 on Free Movement of Persons and Immigration and the Act of 
5 May 2006 relating to Asylum and Other Forms of Protection. Mémorial A, N. 151, 25 July 2011, p. 2180 and p. 
2201. http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2011/0151/a151.pdf 
7 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 14 May 2012 
8 Ibid. 
9 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 14 May 2012 and Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012 
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Asylum Profile 














• 57 Refugee Protection 
 
• 7 Other Protection 
62 (2011) 12
• 41 Refugee Protection 
 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act of 5 May 2006 relating to 




Regulation of 1 September 
2006 on the conditions for 
granting social support to 
asylum seekers  
 
There is no provision directly dealing with resettlement. However, this 
Act provides for the legal framework applying to the resettlement of 
refugees, especially on their rights following resettlement. 
Relevant provisions for resettlement: 
Chapter 4 on the content of international protection (articles 42 to 55) 
Rights granted upon arrival before being formally granted the refugee 
residence permit: Housing, healthcare, financial support): Article 113
 
 
Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
In Luxembourg the very few resettlement operations that took place 
happened on an informal basis, mostly carried out on a diplomatic level. 
Resettled refugees arriving under such circumstances do not undergo 
an additional procedure to reassess their refugee status and within a 





                                                            
10 http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/communiques/2013/01-janvier/16-stats/stats.pdf 
11 http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/communiques/2013/01-janvier/16-stats/stats.pdf 
12 Statistiques concernant les demandes de protection internationale au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg de l’année 2011, 
Press conference of 31 January 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Immigration Directorate) 
13 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 23 May 2012 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  




- Mid- 1980s 








Vietnamese Boat People from Philippines and Thailand 
25 Polish refugees from Austria 
Bahaïs Iranian refugees from East Turkey 
Vietnamese refugees from Hong-Kong and Cambodian refugees from 
Thailand 
25 Christian Iraqi refugees from Turkey  
A Somali family living in refugee camp in Kenya joining one of their 
member already settled in Luxembourg 
28 Iraqis refugees: 25 from Syria and 3 from Jordan15
About 10 people to be relocated
 (This is the only 
stricto sensu resettlement operation that was carried out by 
Luxembourg) 
16












Joint selection mission to Thailand. Belgium and Luxembourg were 











Luxembourg took part in one relocation operation of refugees from 
Malta. In July 2010, Luxembourg received six Somalian refugees from 
Malta. They were composed of a couple and two women each 
accompanied by one young child.17
                                                            
14 All information extracted from the interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 14 May 2012. 
 
15 Rapport d’activité 2009 du Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Published in July 2010, p. 60 
16 European Refugee Fund, Annual Programme for Luxembourg, 2011, p. 19: 
http://www.olai.public.lu/fr/publications/programmes-planactions-campagnes/programme_fer/prog-2011-fer.pdf 
In the framework of the 2011 ERF programme, Luxembourg is considering the resettlement and/or relocation of 10 
people. Such actions may include: missions to countries of first asylum, the selections of refugees to be resettled, 
their transfer to Luxembourg and actions related to their reception and integration. 
17 Rapport d’activité de L’Office Luxembourgeois de l’Accueil et de l’Intégration (OLAI) – Luxembourg Office for 
Reception and Integration, 2010, p. 6. 
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28 Iraqis refugees: 25 from Syria and 3 from Jordan18
a) Selection Criteria and 




Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
Luxembourg respects the choice made by the UNHCR following its own 
criteria.  
However, it favours the resettlement of families with children (young if 











• 2009 Operation  
 
Since the early years 2000, two main NGOs were involved in 
resettlement in Luxembourg: Luxembourg Red Cross and Caritas-
Luxembourg 
-Resettlement of 25 Christian Iraqis from Turkey: 
This operation was almost totally initiated and implemented by a 
non-governmental organisation (Caritas-Luxembourg). Luxembourg 
government simply endorsed the operation.21
-Resettlement of 28 Iraqis refugees from Syria and Jordan 
  
This operation was initiated following a request made by the UNHCR 
to the Ministry in charge of immigration. The OLAI was also consulted 
by the Ministry to assess the feasibility of such an operation. 
The OLAI coordinated and organised the transfer as well as the 
reception of the refugees.  
A convention was signed between the OLAI and the International 
Organisation of Migration concerning transport expenses. 
Caritas was directly involved in the pre-selection of refugees to be 
resettled in partnership with the UNHCR. Collaboration with the UNHCR 
in site was very close and lasted about a year. To select refugees to be 
resettled, CARITAS exclusively relied on UNHCR criteria, with particular 
focus on family criteria. The final selection was entirely the responsibility 
of Luxembourg government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Immigration 
Directorate). 
Once they arrive, refugees receive a residence permit within a 
month to six weeks. The administrative management of the issuance of 
such residence permit entirely falls within the competence of the 




                                                            
18 Rapport d’activité 2009 du Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Published in July 2010, p. 60 
19 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 23 May 2012 and Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012 
20 Information is available only for the two main resettlement operations carried out by Luxembourg since the late 1990s. 
21 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 14 May 2012 and Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012 
22 Interviews with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 14 May 2012 and 23 May 2012. Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
 





• Assistance with travel 
documents 
• Medical screening 
 
 
2009 Operation:  
Pre-departure activities were minimal. The OLAI did not have the 
necessary staff in transit country to prepare resettled refugees to their 
integration in Luxembourg. However, the OLAI did prepare some 






Procedure Timing The access to refugee status for resettled refugees is extremely quick 
and usually does not exceed six weeks.24
b) Status and Rights – 




Status granted  
Act of 5 May 2006 relating to 




Rights granted  
Act of 5 May 2006 relating to 




− Non-refoulement: Article 43 
− Family unity: Article 45 
− Residence permit: Article 46 
− Travel Document: Article 47 
− Right to work and professional training (on equal basis with 
Luxembourg nationals): Article 48 
− Right to education, diploma recognition: Article 49 
− Right to social welfare (on equal basis with Luxembourg nationals): 
Article 50 
− Right to healthcare (on equal basis with Luxembourg nationals): 
Article 51 
− Access to integration programme: Article 55 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 




− For the 2009 resettlement operation of 28 Iraqi refugees, all the 
costs were born by the OLAI (public administration budget).25
− For 2011: 10.091,56 € (Priority 3, Action 7 – resettlement)
 
26
                                                            
23 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 23 May 2012 
 
24 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI) 23 May 2012 
25 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 14 May 2012 
26 European Refugee Fund, Annual Programme for Luxembourg, 2011: 
http://www.olai.public.lu/fr/publications/programmes-planactions-campagnes/programme_fer/prog-2011-fer.pdf 
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− For 2010: 26.599,30 € (Priority 3, Action 6- resettlement)27
− For 2009: 25.000 € (Priority 3, Action 7 - resettlement)
 
28
In the framework of the ERF Annual Programme 2009 for Luxembourg, 
the OLAI and the Ministry of Education of Luxembourg both had 50% co-
financing for two projects regarding resettled Iraqi refugees. 
 
29
The first project dealt with the co-financing of transfer expenses of 
resettled refugees to Luxembourg. 
  
The second project concerned a programme of cultural mediation in 




Recently, the flows of asylum seekers to Luxembourg have risen 
sharply since 2011 (mainly Roma from Serbia). Given this situation and 
the high percentage of foreign residents already present in the country, 
Luxembourg is not considering an increase of its capacities for 
resettlement.30
However, following the ‘Arab Spring’, Luxembourg made a political 
declaration asserting its firm intention to uphold its international 





                                                            
27 European Refugee Fund, Annual Programme for Luxembourg, 2010: 
http://www.olai.public.lu/fr/publications/programmes-planactions-campagnes/programme_fer/prog-2010-fer.pdf 
28 European Refugee Fund, Annual Programme for Luxembourg, 2009: 
http://www.olai.public.lu/fr/publications/programmes-planactions-campagnes/programme_fer/prog-2009-fer.pdf 
29 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 14 May 2012 
30 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 14 May 2012 and Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012 
31 http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2011/03/qp-spautz-monde-arabe/index.html 
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Country Profile: MALTA 
Malta’s situation in the Mediterranean, between the islands of Sicily and Lampedusa, means that it is at the 
forefront of migration flows into the European Union. Alongside Greece and Italy, Malta has been 
pinpointed as being under particular strain from the numbers of arrivals to the islands, which constitute the 
Maltese archipelago.1
Malta joined the European Union in 2004. The Refugees Act 2000 provided for the establishment of the 
Office of the Refugee Commissioner and the Refugee Appeals Board.
 Malta is situated 80 km south of Sicily, 284 km east of Tunisia and 333 km north of 
Libya. Asylum seekers make their journey to Malta on oftentimes extremely rudimentary and make-shift 
sailing craft over the Mediterranean.  
2 Initially, cases continued to be 
referred to UNHCR for final determination. In December 2001, Malta lifted its geographical reservation to 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. On 1st January 2002, the Office of the Refugee Commissioner became fully 
operational and started to deal with applications for recognition of refugee status independently. The 
Office’s main responsibility is to receive, process and determine applications for asylum.3
When the Office of the Refugee Commissioner began operations the average number of asylum-seekers 
in Malta was in the region of 150 per annum. In 2002, more than 1,600 ‘boat-people’ reached Malta with many 
seeking asylum and since then the number of immigrants who entered Malta irregularly and sought 
international protection continued to increase steadily. In 2008, 2,775 persons arrived in Malta as compared to 
the 1,702 persons who entered Malta in 2007. Thus there has been an increase of 1,082 (63%) persons in 
2008 as compared to 2007, of which 98.78% (2,760) applied for asylum. The beginning of 2009 was also 
marked by a significant increase in the number of irregular immigrants reaching Maltese territory.
 
4
On 30 August 2008, Italy and Libya signed a friendship, partnership and co-operation treaty for the 
purpose of developing a "special and privileged" bilateral relationship.
  
5 Part of the agreement involved Libya 
strengthening its border controls against irregular migration. The drop in clandestine arrivals to Malta then 
occurred at roughly the same time as this Treaty was ratified (by Italy in February 2009 and by Libya in 
March). Italy repudiated the Treaty in February 2011,6 the month in, which the ‘Arab Spring’ began in Libya. 
During the year 2010, 355 asylum seekers applied for refugee status in Malta. Compare this to 2,591 in 2009 
and 1,586 in 2011.7 Numbers of arrivals boomed during the Libyan unrest, the UNHCR put the figure at 1,530 
arrivals. 63% of these arrivals came from Somalia, Eritrea or Nigeria with Somalia leading the way on 27%.8
Irregular arrivals by sea is the single greatest influence on Maltese migration. Any law and policy 
changes will be influenced by consideration of the scale of numbers arriving in this way. In view of the 
relatively large number of arrivals over the last decade, the UNHCR considers that resettlement and 
relocation of refugees can provide Malta with opportunities to make progress also in improving the situation 
for those who remain in the country.
  
9 From the perspective of the authorities: “Malta has consistently made 
the case for a sharing of responsibilities of persons in need of protection.”10
                                                            
1 See for example: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48e726 
 
2 Available at: http://www.mjha.gov.mt/page.aspx?pageid=160 
3 Key facts, dates and information in this paragraph can be found at: 
http://www.mjha.gov.mt/page.aspx?pageid=160#Background 
4 See: http://www.mjha.gov.mt/page.aspx?pageid=160&printonly=true#Staff_Compliment_and_Procedural_Improvements_ 
5 Officially known as: “The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and Great 




7 UNHCR Malta: http://www.unhcr.org.mt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=110 
8 UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org.mt/media/com_form2content/documents/c12/a313/f45/libyacrisis_facthseet_last__update.swf 
9 http://www.unhcr.org.mt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=110 
10 Email interview for Know Reset with the Maltese Ministry for Home and Parliamentary Affairs (Nathalie Attard, 
Customer Care Coordinator, sent email on behalf of Ministry) conducted on the 16th of March 2012.  
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The EASO was established in Valletta and became operational in 2011. This was largely seen as an act 
of solidarity with EU Member States in the south which are under particular pressure from irregular 
migration.11 The office is not set up to assist the Maltese authorities specifically but the work of the Office 
does impact on Malta.12 Added to this is that a potential role for the EASO in evaluating the relocation pilot 
project has been mooted in March 2012.13
Being on the frontline of migration flows to Europe has meant that Malta has called for resettlement, not 
as a country which would receive refugees but as a country from which the refugees should be relocated. 
“Malta already faces specific and disproportionate pressures in view of its geographic and demographical 
situation with regard to the number of asylum seekers arriving on its shores, a fact also attested by 
comparisons published by the UNHCR and EU bodies, to consider resettlement options to its territory.”
  
14
                                                            
11 See: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110618/local/Malta-based-EU-asylum-office-opens-tomorrow.371111 
 
12 See: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/asylum/asylum_easo_en.htm 
13 See: http://easomonitor.blogspot.com/2012/03/what-role-for-easo-with-intra-eu.html#!/2012/03/what-role-for-easo-with-
intra-eu.html 





14 Email interview with the Maltese Ministry for Home and Parliamentary Affairs, op.cit.  
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Asylum Profile 













• 72 Refugee Status 
• 824 Other Protection 
223 (2010) 
• 46 Refugee Status 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  











Legal Notice 243 of 2008 





Provides for a definition of refugee status at Article 2. “Humanitarian 
Protection” is also defined in this article. 
Article 8 deals with the application process. 
Rights of refugees are contained in Article 11. 
Article 13 provides for ‘resettlement’. At the written request of the 
applicant or a recognised refugee, the Minister and the High 
Commissioner will facilitate the ‘resettlement’ of that person to another 
country.  
On this point, the Maltese authorities state: “The Article in question 
specifically makes reference to the term ‘resettlement’. However the 
Maltese text speaks of persons granted refugee status or subsidiary 
protection who leave to reside in another country (persuna biex tmur 
tgħammar f’pajjiż ieħor).”17
The title of this regulation is the Procedural Standards in Examining 
Applications for Refugee Status Regulations. 
 
Article 2 states that the purpose of the amendment is to transpose the 
provisions of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons 
as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted and the Council Directive 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
Article 4 deals with the application process. 
Rights of refugees and those who are granted subsidiary protection 
status are contained in Article 14. 
 
                                                            
15 UNHCR Maltese Office.. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Email interview for Know Reset with the Maltese Ministry for Home and Parliamentary Affairs (Nathalie Attard, 
Customer Care Coordinator, sent email on behalf of Ministry) conducted on the 16th of March 2012.  
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Other basis of resettlement / 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
Speculation or calls for legislative reform have not been found. 
Maltese refugee law is now seen as being up to date with high 
international standards. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 




















The European Relocation Malta (EUREMA) is the first and foremost 
EU run relocation project. EUREMA was first launched in 2009 (EUREMA 
I) as a pilot project, and in April 2011 the European Commission decided 
on its extension (EUREMA II). The duration of the programme is planned 
from the beginning of 2012 till the middle of 2013.  
Refugee relocation is jointly implemented by the Ministry of Justice & 
Home Affairs, IOM, UNHCR and the Emigrant's Commission.18
Comments 
  
While resettlement does not occur in Malta, it does participate in 
relocation. While an important distinction must be made between 
relocation and resettlement, the two often overlap in the eyes of different 
Member State authorities and thus Malta’s continued contribution to 
relocation is of interest. Malta has absolutely no intention of contributing 
toward actual resettlement in the near future. 
III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  
 
It seems certain that any motivation to resettle in Malta would be 
linked to the number of irregular arrivals. If arrivals by sea are greatly 
reduced then that may influence a decision to resettle. Media coverage, 
and consequent public opinion, focuses on this aspect of migration. The 
nature of Malta, as two small islands with a small population but high 
population density makes this the focus. In light of this, any political 
decision to begin resettlement is extremely unlikely unless the numbers 
of irregular arrivals by sea drops dramatically19




19 “With resettlement, I don’t envisage this ever happening. In a situation with no boat arrivals of asylum-seekers Malta 
would still maintain that its size, population density and limited resources prevent it from resettling…I don’t see any 
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Malta’s involvement in resettlement through relocation seems certain 
to continue with an appetite for relocation certainly strong in Malta and 
being supported by EU partners and hesitantly supported by other 
Member States who, in the spirit of solidarity, are allowing relocation to 
their territories. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
room for advocating for resettlement.” Email interview for Know Reset with Dr. Neil Falzon (Founder of Aditus NGO), 
conducted on the 1st of February 2012. 
202 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
KNOW RESET – BUILDING KNOWLEDGE FOR A CONCERTED  AND    
 SUSTAINABLE APPROACH TO REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
 IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
Co-fi nanced by the European Union




and reviewed by the Know Reset team
July, 2013
© 2012. All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be distributed, quoted 
or reproduced in any form without permission from 
the KNOW RESET Project.
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 203
KNOW RESET Country Profile: Poland 
Country Profile: POLAND 
Poland experienced immigration in 1989. Poland had not experienced inward migration since the 2nd World 
War. As a result of socio-political changes and the liberalization of the principles for the entry and stay of 
foreigners and taking into account the geopolitical location of Poland, it became a transit and target country for 
certain categories of migrants. For example, in 1985 the number of people crossing Polish borders was about 
3.5 million non-Poles, in 1991 this number reached 37 million and achieved 90 million at the end of the 90s1
Taking the geographical position of Poland into account as well as it having with one of the longest EU 
external borders, it became a target of migrants coming mainly from the former Soviet republics. 
Furthermore, Poland became an important point on routes of smuggling illegal migrants and persons trying 
to get to Western Europe, with Poland being a country of transit.  
.  
Poland ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol in 1991. The government decision 
for ratification was mainly influenced by a change in the social-political situation, which started in 1989. It 
has to be emphasised that until that time there had been almost no refugees and asylum seekers in 
Poland. Applications for refugee status have been made since 1989. It became apparent that the necessary 
procedures had to be put in place that would bring the Polish asylum system into line with international and 
European standards. Taking this into account, several competent national institutions have been created, 
i.e.: Office for Foreigners and relevant departments in the Ministries. At present, Department of the 
Migration Policy in the Polish Ministry of Interior is responsible for migration policy. The Office for 
Foreigners implements that policy.  
The scale of migration to Poland is still insignificant. According to the statistics revealed by the 
Central Statistical Office as of 31 December 2011, 100,298 foreigners had valid residence permits2
However, in the opinion of some experts, in spite of the fact that the migratory movements do not play a 
great role in the Polish society, their importance increased on the Polish labour market. It is then possible to 
assume that this tendency will become more established taking into consideration some social, economic 
and demographic changes in Poland
 
(about 3,218 more than in 2010, and 7,724 more than in 2009). In 2011 there were 6,887 applications 
submitted for refugee status (an increase of 5% in comparison to 2010); in 2009 this number amounted 
to 10,587 applications.  
3
Polish asylum policy has its legal basis in the Constitution of Poland adopted on 2 April 1997. The legal 
provisions regulating the asylum and refugee status proceedings have a statutory rank and are formulated 
in the Act on granting protection to foreigners in the territory of the Republic of Poland.  
. 
The resettlement concept is a very new idea in Poland and has been recently introduced by the 2011 
amendments to the Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the 
Republic of Poland, which entered into force on 1 January 2012. The Council of Ministers will be able to 
decide, in a form of regulation, the number of foreigners who can be resettled to Poland in a year, the 
countries from where they will be arriving, the amount of funds to be made available, which cover the 
envisaged costs, etc. However since the new legal provisions entered into force there has been no 
resettlement of foreigners in Poland.  
                                                            
1 The Study on “Polish Migration Policy - State of Play and Proposed Actions” drafted by the Inter-ministerial Team for 
Migration, recent version published on 18 March 2012. 
2 The data collection does not include citizens of the EU Member States and members of their families, illegal migrants, 
and foreigners with visas. 
3 The Study on “Polish Migration Policy - State of Play and Proposed Actions” (…), op.cit. 
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Asylum Profile 












• 157 Refugee Status 
• 37 Other Protection 
448 (2010) 
• 84 Refugee Status 
• 364 Other Protection 
6,887 (2011) 
6,534 (2010) 
Ad hoc  
/ 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act of 13 June 2003 on 
granting protection to 
foreigners within the territory 




Act of 13 June 2003 on 
Foreigners  
 
New provisions related to the resettlement and relocation have been 
introduced by the Act of 28 July 2011 on the legalisation of stay of some 
foreigners in the territory of the Republic of Poland and on amendments 
to the Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the 
Republic of Poland and to the Act on Foreigners. 
Chapter 5a: 
“Resettlement and relocation” 
Lays down the principles and conditions governing entry, transit, 
residence and departure of aliens from the territory of the Republic of 
Poland, as well as procedures and authorities competent in these 
matters. 
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
The Study on “Polish 
Migration Policy - State of 
Play and Proposed Actions” 
drafted by the Inter-ministerial 
Team for Migration - recent 





Describes in general the possibility to resettle/relocate migrants in EU 
Member States. The role of Poland in this area is considered with the 
main motivation being solidarity with other EU Member States. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
None 
                                                            
4 http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/sy_demographic_yearbook_2012.pdf 
5 Ibid. 
6 This document is planned to be supplemented by the action plan, which will insert the proposals of solutions aiming at 
realization of accepted assumptions, along with a description of entities responsible for their implementation and 
determination of costs and sources of financing. 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis 
 
There is no formal resettlement organised by the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (before the new legal provisions entered into force):  
On his way back from the visit in Tunisia on 16 June 2011 the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs took on board of his plane a group of refugees, 
who after fleeing Libya, had sought temporary shelter in Tunisia7







During Balkan wars, Poland twice received 1,000 persons and provided 
them with protection till the end of conflict8














After collapse of the authoritarian regime in Greece, Poland received a 
group of people with Greek nationality (quasi resettlement).9
n/a 
 
Poland is a participant of an on-going pilot programme of the European 
Commission, i.e. "Relocation of foreigners, beneficiaries of the 
international protection, staying in Malta” (“EUREMA”). The first action 
is in a preparatory stage; an official of UNHCR in Malta has recently 
visited Poland with the aim of collecting information on the potential for 
relocation; this planned relocation concerns migrants from Somalia.10
However, up to this point no refugees have been accepted and 
transferred to the territory of Poland.
 
11







16 resettled persons:  
3 Christian families - 6 adults and 10 children; country of origin: Eritrea 
and Nigeria 
                                                            
7 Sources: 1) Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - note available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/foreign_minister_radoslaw_sikorski_brings_home_north_african_refugees and in the 
press and radio: http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/387167,Sikorski-wroci-do-Polski-z-uchodzcami-z-Libii; 2) 
Interview with Mrs Agnieszka Kunicka, Head of the Refugee and Repatriates Counselling Centre, Polish 
Humanitarian Action, and Mr Maciej Fagasiński, Amnesty International (Poland), May 2012.  
8 Interview with Mr Marek Szonert, Director of the Office of International Cooperation, Office for Foreigners, May 2012. 
9 Interview with Mrs Agnieszka Kosowicz, Head of Polish Migration Forum, May 2012. 
10 ibid. 
11 Sources: 1. Study on “Polish Migration Policy - State of Play and Proposed Actions”, op.cit.; 2) Interviews with: a) Mr 
Marek Szonert, op.cit. ; b) Mr Maciej Fagasiński, op.cit.  
12 http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/foreign_minister_radoslaw_sikorski_brings_home_north_african_refugees 
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a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase   
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 




According to the new legal provisions, the Polish government is 
authorized to issue a specific regulation relating to resettlement.  
The Council of Ministers may determine, in a form of an ordinance: 
1. A number of foreigners, who can be resettled or relocated in the 
given year; 
2. Countries from which they will be arriving; 
3. The funds that are to be allocated for the costs covering 
resettlement or relocation, including costs associated with 
activities undertaken by relevant authorities outside the 
Republic of Poland, costs of assistance provided for resettled or 
relocated foreigners and costs associated with their integration, 
as well as the sources of covering these costs. 
In the ordinance, the Council of Ministers considers the humanitarian 
aspects of a decision regarding resettlement or relocation, the necessity 
to satisfy the essential needs of resettled or relocated foreigners in the 
course of granting refugee status or subsidiary protection, as well as 
actual costs of individual programmes of integration. 
Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 













An application for granting refugee status is submitted to the Head of 
the Office for Foreigners via the officer of the Border Guard delegated 
to do this task outside of Poland. 
The above-mentioned Officer of the Border Guard: 
1. immediately delivers the application for further examination to 
the Head of the Office for Foreigners; 
2. issues an attestation of identity valid for 30 days starting on the 
day of the foreigner’s entry into Poland; 
3. notifies a relevant national health inspector about the refusal of 
the foreigner, or person on behalf of who a foreigner is acting to 
undergo medical examinations and sanitary treatments. 
In principle, no. 
Interrogation of a foreigner, in order to explain relevant facts for settling 
the matter, is held in a place of his/her stay. 
After arrival in Poland, the resettled or relocated refugee gives his 
travel documents to the Head of the Office for Foreigners. A resettled or 
relocated refugee is obliged to appear at the centre within 2 days of the 
day of his/her entry into Poland. 
S/he has to apply for refugee status once s/he is in Poland. 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
• Cultural orientation (CO) 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 





 Procedure Timing Issue of a decision in the case of granting refugee status for a foreigner 
entitled to resettlement or relocation comes in a period of 30 days from 
the day of his/her entry into Poland. 
Social and medical care is provided for a period of 6 months from 
the day the decision on refugee status is made. 
Comments  Effective resettlement was not possible to organise until now mainly due 
to the absence of the adequate legal provisions regulating the 
procedure and steps of the process.  
Furthermore, migrants did not have much interest in being resettled 
to Poland who considered it rather as a transit country rather than a 
more permanent home. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
Status granted  
Act of 13 June 2003 on 
granting protection to 
foreigners within the territory of 
the Republic of Poland 
Act of 13 June 2003 on 
Foreigners 
 
Refugee Status or Subsidiary Protection. 
Right of Residence. 
Social and Medical Care. 
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 






The Council of Ministers may determine, in a form of a regulation, the 
amount of money to be allocated to cover resettlement or relocation, 
including costs associated with activities undertaken by relevant 
authorities outside Poland, costs of assistance provided for resettled or 
relocated foreigners and costs associated with their integration as well 
as the sources of covering these costs. 
It seems probable that additional resources (e.g. for public institutions 
and non-governmental organizations) will be made available in the 
framework of the European Refugee Fund. A call for applications in the 
framework of this project was made at the end of 2011 and beginning of 
2012. However, the projects associated with the voluntary resettlement 
were not one of Polish priorities. Therefore, it was not possible to 




                                                            
13 Interview with Mr Maciej Fagasiński, op.cit.  
More details available at: 
http://www.wwpe.gov.pl/index.php?params[section_id]=9&params[category_id]=39 
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Comments  
 
According to the latest examinations of the Polish Institute of Public 
Affairs, 30% of refugees in Poland are homeless. They are struggling 
with immense problems in the labour market. Resettlement of a new 
group of refugees without a fundamental change of integration policy 
and an increase of public assistance is not an appropriate movement. 
Resettled foreigners are very likely to be contending with poverty, 
unemployment and homelessness.  
As regards the actual tendency, the majority of refugees in Poland 
are wishing to leave Poland. Unfortunately, it is very likely that the 
resettled refugees will do likewise.14
Polish participation in the resettlement and relocation projects is 
hoped to express solidarity with other Member States of the EU. 
Considering the fact that Poland has the longest external border of the 
EU, it is likely to occur in the future that Poland will need the 
assistance and support of other EU Member States in solving similar 
migratory challenges. Moreover, an experience gained from the 
cooperation based on the organisation of resettlement and relocation 
can turn out to be useful in the successful integration of all foreign 





                                                            
14 Interview with Mrs Agnieszka Kosowicz, op.cit. 
15 Study on “Polish Migration Policy - State of Play and Proposed Actions”, op.cit. 
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Country Profile: Portugal 
The concerns of the migration policies in Portugal have been mainly twofold: respond to new migratory 
flows and the need to comply with EU legislation1. The influx of immigrants in Portugal has changed over 
the years: in the mid-1980s, it was mostly constituted of citizens from former African Portuguese colonies; 
from the 1990s onwards, influxes from Eastern European countries, as well as Brazil, were observed. The 
growing number of immigrants in irregular situations in Portugal around the same period led to the 
implementation of special legalisation programmes in 1992, 1996 and then again in 19982
Law 23/2007, of 4 July, establishes the legal framework for the entry, stay, exit and removal of foreign 
citizens from the national territory. Since 2008, the annual quota of visas to be issued for reason of a 
subordinated professional activity has significantly decreased, which has been justified by the scenario of 
economic crisis
. 
3. In 2010 the foreigners living in Portugal were in number of 445 262, representing a 
decrease when compared to the previous year. The prevailing countries of nationality were, in this period, 
Brazil, Ukraine, Cape Vert, Romania (the EU Member State with more citizens living in Portugal), Angola 
and Guinea-Bissau4
The responsible body in Portugal for implementing the immigration and asylum policies
. 
5 is the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. The Aliens and Borders Service6
Portugal has signed and ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 
and in 1976 accessed to the 1967 Protocol. The 1976 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic was the first 
Portuguese Constitutional text mentioning the right of asylum
 (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras - SEF), under the 
tutelage of this Ministry, has the responsibility of controlling persons movements across the borders (entry 
and stay), of preventing and restraining any criminal activities related with illegal immigration and human 
trafficking and of issuing assessments regarding applications for granting visas. 
7. Although not being one of the European 
countries receiving more asylum applications, Portugal has been aware of the importance of having 
measures that ensure a degree of care to asylum seekers in conditions of human dignity8. The conditions 
and procedures for granting asylum, as well as subsidiary protection and the statuses of asylum applicant, 
refugee and of subsidiary protection are nowadays established in the new Asylum Law, which has also 
transposed EU directives into the Portuguese internal legal order9
The role of the Portuguese Refugee Council (Conselho Português para os Refugiados - CPR), a non-
governmental development organization, which is also representing the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Portugal
. One of the main changes introduced by 
this Law was the clear and direct reference to the principle of non-refoulement (in art. 47). 
10
                                                            1 SEF/European Migration Network, “The Organisation of Asylum and Immigration Policies in Portugal”, 2008, p. 3, 
available at 
, is certainly to highlight when it comes to asylum related-matters, 
having as a main purpose that of promoting a more human and liberal asylum policy, both at national and 
international levels. 
http://www.sef.pt/documentos/56/PTHowpolicieareorganized.pdf [accessed 13 May 2012]. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, pp. 7 and 17. 5 Decree-Law No. 126-B/2011, of 29 December (Organic Law of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), article 2, available at 
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/media/381580/lo_mai.pdf.  6 It is also common to see the translation of “Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras” to “Portuguese Immigration Service”. 7 OLIVEIRA, Andreia Sofia Pinto, “O Direito de Asilo na Constituição Portuguesa: Âmbito de Protecção de um Direito 
Fundamental”, Coimbra Editora, 2009, p. 74. 8 Commission Decision C(2008) 6432 final, Annex I, p. 3. 9 Law 27/2008 of 30 June 2008, Establishes the conditions and procedures for granting asylum and subsidiary protection 
and the statuses of asylum applicant, refugee and of subsidiary protection, transposing into internal juridical order 
Council Directives ns 2004/83/CE, of 29th April and 2005/85/CE, of 1st December [Portugal], 27/2008, 30 June 2008. 10 This organization is a UNHCR partner since July 1993 and in December 1998 it began also to represent the latter in 
Portugal (due to the fact that UNHCR ceased to have its own representation in Portugal), by means of a cooperation 
agreement. - CPR, “Apresentação”, http://www.refugiados.net/_novosite/apresentacao.html [accessed 13 May 2012]; 
Commission Decision C (2008) 6432 final, Annex I p. 19. 
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The number of asylum applications increased significantly and suddenly from 2010 (160 applications11) 
to 2011 (275 applications12). This increase on the number of applications caused a serious humanitarian 
situation of refugees in Portugal, since the capacity of the Reception Centre for Refugees (Centro de 
Acolhimento para Refugiados - CAR)13
In 2006, in a strong link with the UNHCR, and following its appeals on these matters
 was exceeded. Resettled refugees are, in like manner, 
accommodated in reception centers.  
14
                                                            11 The Aliens and Borders Service. Available at 
, Portugal started 
resettling on an ad hoc basis. In 2007, the resettlement of at least 30 people per year had proved to be 
essential, giving origin to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 110/2007, of 12 July 2007, which 
defined a quota of at least 30 refugees per year, “namely to face refugee resettlement requests” (recital 7). 
http://www.cpr.pt/ under Estatísticas. 12 Ibid. 13 Information on this Centre can be found at http://www.cpr.pt/. 14 “The Organisation of Asylum and Immigration Policies in Portugal”,op.cit., pp. 8 and 18; and Cabinet of the Secretary 
of State for Internal Affairs, e-mail interview for Know Reset, 24 February 2012. 
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Asylum Profile 















Programme-Based (since 2007) 
30 persons/year (since 2007) 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  




Establishes the conditions and procedures for granting asylum and 
subsidiary protection and the statuses of asylum applicant, refugee and of 
subsidiary protection, transposing into internal juridical order Council 
Directives numbers 2004/83 EC, of 29th April and 2005/85 EC, of 1st 
December – hereafter Asylum Law. 
Specific provision on Resettlement: in Chapter III (“Procedure”), Section V 
(“Resettlement of Refugees”) of the Asylum Law. 
 
Other basis of resettlement: 
Resolution of the Council 
of Ministers No. 110/2007, 
12 July 2007 – hereafter 
Resolution 110/2007; 
European Commission 
Decision C(2008) 6432final, 
from 06/11/2008, approving, 
for Portugal, the multi-annual 
programme for the period 
2008-2013, the 2008 annual 
programme for the European 
Refugee Fund and the co-




Defines a quota of at least 30 refugees per year. 
 
Launches a multi-annual programme 
• Continuity in resettlement (following the ad hoc resettlement in 2006 
and 2007);  
• Privilege to citizens coming from the African continent and from 
Eastern Europe, but not excluding other situations of citizens coming 
from other places, if these justify their priority selection, mainly for 
serious humanitarian reasons; 
Reference to a minimum quota of 30 resettled refugees per year (as 
defined in the Resolution 110/2007). 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
There is no on-going specific project/reform. Notwithstanding, Portugal is 
committed to develop, in an annual basis, “a pro-active planning of 
activities in particular as regards the reception and integration of resettled 
refugees”17
                                                            
15 The Aliens and Borders Service. Available at 
. 
http://www.cpr.pt/ under Estatísticas. 
16 Ibid. 17 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, e-mail interview for Know Reset, 24 February 2012. 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  






Country of Origin: 4 DR of Congo, 1 Congo, 5 Ivory Coast, 2 Liberia, 4 
Eritrea, 1 Ethiopia. 
Country of First Asylum
 
: 17 Morocco. 
b) On a programme basis 
Since 2007 
 




















In 2010, Portugal received 6 persons coming from Malta, where they had 
previously been recognised with the international protection status. 
In 2007 Portugal had already received persons coming from Malta. If 
these people had been granted international protection in Malta, they 
would have fell under the category of relocation. Since they had not 
been granted the mentioned protection status, they could not be eligible 
for relocation in Portugal. Only the UNHCR had recognised them as 






                                                            18 Sources: The Aliens and Borders Service, “Reinstalação em Portugal, 2006-2009”, table available at 
http://www.cpr.pt/reinstalacao/ [accessed 13 May 2012]. 19 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, op.cit. 
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Country of Origin: 23 Eritrea, 5 Iraq, 2 Mauritania 
Country of First Asylum: 2 Senegal, 4 Syria, 23 Tunisia, 1 Ukraine 
Gender:13 Male, 17 Female 
Age:12 in 0-15, 2 in 16-20, 9 in 21-40, 6 in over 40 age brackets. 
Religion
33 
:15 Christian, 14 Muslim, 1 Orthodox 
Country of Origin: 6 Afghanistan, 7 DR of Congo, 1 Ethiopia, 1 Iran, 13 
Iraq, 3 Somalia, 2 Uganda 
Country of First Asylum: 1 Belarus, 1 Libya, 9 Mozambique, 13 Syria, 9 
Ukraine 
Gender:11 Male, 22 Female 
Age:10 in 0-15, 5 in 16-20, 9 in 21-40, 9 in over 40 age brackets 
Religion
 
:14 Christian, 19 Muslim 
30 
Country of Origin: 10 Afghanistan, 12 DR of Congo, 3 Ethiopia, 4 Iraq, 1 
Somalia 
Country of First Asylum: 4 Syria, 12 Tanzania, 14 Ukraine 
Gender:13 Male, 17 Female 
Age:15 in 0-15, 5 in 16-20, 3 in 21-40, 7 in over 40 age brackets. 
Religion
11 
: 12 Christian, 15 Muslim, 3 Orthodox 
Country of Origin: 6 Eritrea, 5 Iraq 
Country of First Asylum
 
: 6 Angola, 5 Syria 
                                                            20 Sources: The Aliens and Borders Service /Departamento de Planeamento e Formação (Núcleo de 
Planeamento), Coordenação João Ataíde e Pedro Dias, “Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo – 2011”, 
Oeiras, Portugal, p. 52; SEF. 21 Sources: The Aliens and Borders Service /Departamento de Planeamento e Formação (Núcleo de 
Planeamento), Coordenação João Ataíde e Pedro Dias, “Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo – 2010”, 
Oeiras, Portugal, p. 54; SEF. 22 Sources: The Aliens and Borders Service /Departamento de Planeamento e Formação (Núcleo de 
Planeamento), Coordenação João Ataíde e Pedro Dias, “Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo – 2009”, 
Oeiras, Portugal, p. 79; SEF. 23 Source: The Aliens and Borders Service, “Reinstalação em Portugal, 2006-2009”, table available at 
http://www.cpr.pt/reinstalacao/ [accessed 13 May 2012]. 
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a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
 
















Portugal follows the same criteria as UNHCR, as well as the ones 
resulting from the multiannual programme (2008-2013)24, namely in the 
categories identified in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of FERIII25
− “persons from a country or region designated for the 
implementation of a Regional Protection Programme” (par. 3, (a)); 
: 
− “unaccompanied minors” (par. 3, (b)); 
− “children and women at risk, particularly from psychological, 
physical or sexual violence or exploitation” (par. 3, (c)); 
− “persons with serious medical needs that can only be addressed 
through resettlement” (par. 3, (d)). 
In 2011, however, priority was not anymore given to persons with serious 
medical needs26
There have been some criteria considered to be of preferential or priority 
relevance in each year. More specifically, in 2008 privilege was to be 
given to citizens coming from the African continent and from Eastern 
Europe
. 
27; in 2009 the selection of Iraqi refugees coming from Syria and 
Jordan, particularly children and women at risk, were subject to 
preferential selection28; and in 2010 privilege was to be given to people 
from countries subject to a Regional Protection Programme, emphasizing 
the categories of people who are in situations of obvious vulnerability, as 
women alone or with children and individuals from ethnic minorities29
 
. In 
any of these years it was, however, always recognised that these 
preferential or priority criteria would not exclude citizens from other 
countries or in different situations that would justify the priority selection, 
mainly for serious humanitarian reasons. 
                                                            24 Commission Decision C(2008) 6432 final, of 06/11/2008, Annex 1. 25 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, interview, op.cit.. 26 UNHCR, Division of International Protection, “Resettlement handbook”- “Country Chapters - Portugal”, July 2011, p. 4. 27 Commission Decision C(2008), Annex II, p. 8 and Annex II, p. 18. 28 Commission Decision C(2009) 3330 final, from 05.05.2009, Annex, p. 17. 29 Commission Decision C(2010) 2656, of 27/04/2010, Annex, p. 17. 
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Selection Process 
 
• Deploying Staff 
















Processing of resettlement cases shall be carried out by the Immigration 
Service – in practice by its Refugee and Asylum Cabinet (Serviço de 
Estrangeiros e Fronteiras/Gabinete de Asilo e Refugiados). 
According to art. 35 of the Asylum Law, the stakeholders involved in the 
procedure are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Portuguese Aliens and 
Borders Service and the Portuguese Refugee Council. The Immigration 
Service/Refugee and Asylum Cabinet relies on UNHCR’s prior refugee 
status determination when considering an individual application for 
resettlement. The requests for the resettlement of refugees under the 
mandate of the UNHCR shall be presented to the Government member 
responsible for the internal affairs area. 
The selection process on a dossier or mission basis is not specifically 
provided for in Portuguese legislation. Portugal has been carrying out the 
resettlement decisions only on a dossier review basis30
To underline is the position of the CPR on this issue, which has already 
alerted for the difficulties inherent to this selection method, supporting an 
















• Medical screening 
 
 
(Non systematic) distribution of a “Cultural Orientation Leaflet for Resettled 
Refugees in Portugal”, prepared in 2008 by the CPR and the Immigration 
Service with the support of the ERF32
The CPR has already considered of great importance to have specific 
programmes of “awareness before the departure”, in order to better inform 





No cooperation agreement with the IOM to date on travel arrangements, 
hence all travel arrangements are organised by the 
Immigration Services in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
 
Affairs/Directorate-General for Consular Affairs and UNHCR. 
No agreement with IOM. 
 
 Procedure Timing  The time frame for the procedure is legally defined in Article 35 of the 
Asylum Law: 
2. The Portuguese Immigration Service shall ensure the necessary 
proceedings for the course and the decision on applications 
within a period of ten days. 
                                                            30 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, interview, op.cit; UNHCR, op.cit. 31 CPR, “Programa Nacional de Reinstalação: reflexões sobre a sua operacionalização”, August 2008, p. 4. 32 UNHCR, op.cit. 33 CPR, “Programa Nacional de Reinstalação: reflexões sobre a sua operacionalização”, August 2008, p. 4, p. 5. 
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3. The Portuguese Refugee Council shall be informed on the 
lodged applications and may render an opinion upon said 
applications within five days. 
4. The Government member responsible for the internal affairs 
area shall decide on the acceptance of the resettlement request 
within 15 days.  
 






Another issue herewith related is the timing of arrival of resettled refugees 
(and whether they arrive in groups or alone). The President of the CPR, 
Dr.ª Maria Teresa Tito Morais, has shared the desire to see the minimum 




b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
Asylum Law, article 35, pars. 
1, 4 and 5, the latter referring 
to Chapter VII of the same 
Law (“Refugee and 
subsidiary protection status”) 
 
Refugee or subsidiary protection - It is the Minister of Internal Affairs 
who determines (based on legal provisions) which of the two statuses 
to grant36
The respective status is granted with the acceptance of the resettlement 
request (Asylum Law, art. 35, par. 5) and is therefore not dependant on a 
specific and separate application for that purpose. 
. 
 
Rights granted  
Article 65 of the Asylum Law 
 








“Beneficiaries of the refugee status and subsidiary protection are entitled 
to the rights and must comply with the obligations of aliens living in 
Portugal.” 
Specific provisions on rights of the refugee status and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries: 
Information, residence permits, maintain family unit, travel documents, 
access to education, access to employment, social welfare, healthcare, 
access to housing, freedom of movement within Portuguese territory, 
Integration programmes. 
The CPR is the NGO responsible for providing independent legal 
counselling to asylum seekers and refugees at all stages of the asylum 
procedure (article 49 (4) of Asylum Law 27/2008) 
                                                            34 UNHCR, op.cit. 35 “Portugal recebeu apenas três refugiados ao abrigo do Programa de Reinstalação” [Portugal has only received three 
refugees under the Resettlement Programme], article in the newspaper Público, 20.06.2010, 
http://www.publico.pt/Sociedade/portugal-recebeu-apenas-tres-refugiados-ao-abrigo-do-programa-de-reinstalacao-
1442781. 36 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, op.cit. 
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Info upon arrival 
 
 












Family Reunification  
 
Advice of Accessing Services  
Resettled refugees are met by a member of the CPR staff accompanied by 
a translator. They receive basic information on transfer and reception 
arrangements. Transportation to the Reception Centre located in Bobadela, 
located circa 10 Km from the airport. 
At the Reception Centre, resettled refugees are provided with initial 
information on its functioning rules, staff composition, rights and duties 
during their stay, and service provision. The pre-departure information 
pamphlet prepared by the CPR and the Immigration Service is distributed. 
Provided by the CPR. 
Accommodation in the reception centre for up to 6 months, with all the 
services. The transition of resettled refugees into private housing is 
prepared by the CPR in cooperation with local social security services. 
Financial assistance granted to resettled refugees by social security 
services covers accommodation, food and other private expenses, 
transportation, education and health care. 
At the reception centre. 
Provided by NGO members of the“Rede Alargada”, notably the 
“Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima –APAV” and the “Centro de 
Apoio à Vítima de Tortura em Portugal – CAVITOP”. 
 
In the reception centre. Assistance provided by the CPR. 
In accordance to Article 68 of Asylum Law 27/2008 refugees are entitled 
to the extension of their status to family members residing either in 
Portugal or abroad. 
Provided by the CPR in the reception centre. Upon his accommodation in 
individual housing, a social worker of the Institute of Social Security (ISS) 
is designated to follow-up on the refugee’s integration. 
 
Comments The tripartite (State, UNHCR, NGO) nature of the resettlement programme 
from the onset – in particular NGO involvement in planning and 
implementation as core reception and integration service providers - is 
highlighted as a positive feature. Despite instances of insufficient 
coordination and duplications in service provision, role setting at 
operational level between relevant stakeholders seems quite well 
established. For post arrival this setting stems from the structure that was 
already in place for the reception and integration of spontaneous asylum 
seekers. It is rooted in both legal attributions, particularly in the case of 
international organisations (e.g. UNHCR) and public services (immigration 
service, social support services, health services, education, employment 
and training); partnership and funding agreements (e.g. European Refugee 
Fund) between the government and the main service provider (CPR); as 
well as on operational coordination among relevant stakeholders in the 
framework of existing coordination structures (e.g. Rede Alargada). 
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c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 








25% of the national budget38
 
 
75% of the ERF contribution39
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
ERF 120,000.00 120,000.00 120,000.00 120,000.00 
National 
Funding 40,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 
% ERF 





The institute of resettlement is, for the Portuguese State, “an essential 
element of the common asylum policy, which is based on solidarity 
among Member States”40. Recognising this importance, Portugal is now41 
“(...) promoting a wider debate, identifying all the institutions that could 
play a role in various stages of a resettlement program, including local 
authorities in order to articulate and frame all the activities concerning 
resettlement within a broader policy.” At this moment, it is not, however, 




                                                            
37 Commission Decision C(2008) 6432 final, from 06/11/2008, Annex I, p. 24, table 7.2.1. 38 Ibid, and Annex II, pp. 17 and 18, C(2009) 3330 final, from 05.05.2009, pp. 18 and 20, C(2010) 2656, of 27/04/2010, p. 
19, and C(2011) 2745 final, of 18/04/2011, pp. 17 and 18. 39 Ibid. 40 Resolution 110/2007, preamble. 41 Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, op.cit. 42 Ibid. 
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Country Profile: ROMANIA 
In 1991 Romania ratified the UN Convention (1951) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1967).1 In June 1995 it presented its official application for EU membership, thus starting a process of 
significant modifications of its asylum system with a view to harmonising it with EU standards. On 27 
February 2003, the Emergency Government Ordinance no. 194/2002 on the legal status of aliens in 
Romania entered into force.  
Approximately half of Romania's borders are with non-EU countries: Moldova, Ukraine, and Serbia. In 
addition, Romania is sharing borders with two EU countries: Hungary and Bulgaria. The number of asylum 
applications has fluctuated from year to year, with 15,605 applications being received between 1991 and 
the end of 2006.2
On January 1st 2007, Romania became a member of the EU and consequently part of EU common 
asylum policy. Approximation/transposition of the EU acquis in the field of migration and asylum became 
one of the priorities of the Romanian authorities. Thus Law no. 122/2006 on asylum in Romania was further 
amended in 2007 in order to update that legislation with EU directives related to asylum. Access to the 
Schengen Area has been postponed, officially because of gaps in the border security system. 
 On May 4th 2006, Romania adopted its main law governing the asylum procedure, Law 
no. 122/2006 on Asylum in Romania. This was done as part of the process of Romania’s alignment with EU 
legally binding norms on asylum policy.  
In 2008, 931 people applied for asylum in Romania, an increase of 45% from 2007 when 657 asylum 
requests were submitted. 87 people obtained refugee status and 7 were granted subsidiary protection. In 
court, 15 people obtained refugee status and 28 were given subsidiary protection.3
The overall political, social and economic situation in Romania remains challenging. In 2011, the general 
economic situation was characterized by a reduction of public sector employees, reduction of some of the 
social benefits, and in general a high level of social insecurity. In spite of the austerity measures taken by 
the government, none of the financial benefits of persons of concern were affected.  
 In the first 11 months of 
2011, a total of 1,862 asylum applications were submitted, out of which some 306 had already applied for 
refugee status. This number of asylum applications is almost double in comparison with the same period for 
2010. During 2011 a new challenged raised, following the impact of the geopolitically context coming with 
the “Arab Spring”. If in the last 20 years (1991-2010), Romania had registered only 65 asylum applications 
from Algeria, during 2011 Algeria represented the first country of origin present in the official statistics 
having a number of 431 asylum applications registered by the Romanian authorities. 
However, some measures taken in the reception/accommodation centres to reduce the costs of utilities, 
prompted reactions among the beneficiaries. The general staff reduction in the Romanian Immigration 
Office - Directorate of Asylum and Integration, as a result of the budgetary constraints is also problematic. 
In terms of legislative improvements, in 2011 specific provisions were adopted in the Aliens Law, 
allowing persons with tolerated status (most of them finally rejected asylum-seekers) to legally work in 
Romania. 
In 2006, six Regional Centres for Accommodation and Asylum Procedures were operating, offering 
shelter for 1,312 asylum applicants and another two such centres were due to open.4
The first Tripartite Agreement (UNHCR, IOM and the State) establishing an Emergency Transit Centre 
(ETC) was concluded by Romania in November 2008. With the help of the Romanian Government and the 
International Organization for Migration, UNHCR is running the ETC for the temporary evacuation of people 
in need of international protection and their onward resettlement to their future home countries. The ETC 
 The Regional Centres 
for Accommodation and Asylum Procedures run by the Romanian Government, are currently located in 
Bucharest, Giurgiu, Galati, Radauti, Maramures, and Timisoara. 
                                                            
1 Law no. 46/1991 on Romania's accession to the Refugee Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 
2 See Focus Migration Romania, available at http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Romania.2515.0.html?&L=1  
3 JRS web site, at http://www.jrseurope.org/countries/romania.htm  
4 http://www.bpb.de/themen/C6FB7C,0,Refuge_and_Asylum.html  
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Timisoara was opened on March 12th, 2009. From the entry into force of the trilateral Agreement until 
present, the evacuated refugees who were located in the ETC have been resettled in the USA, Canada, 
Sweden, the UK, Norway and Germany. The Netherlands have pioneered the use of videoconferencing for 
resettlement interviews at the ETC in Timisoara, Romania. 
Refugees are located in the same camp as asylum seekers who are awaiting proceedings and those 
persons who have already received refugee status from Romania. The capacity of the accommodation is 
200. With regard to transfers to ETCs in Romania, the length of stay should normally not exceed six months 
as provided in the Agreement, although there is the option to extend the period of stay under exceptional 
circumstances.5 More than 600 refugees have transited the Centre.6
Romania had a resettlement programme for 3 years, from 2008 until 2010. That programme planned for 
the resettlement of 40 refugees per year for a 3 years period. Yet, only 38 refugees were resettled during 
the first year of the programme. The programme has not been implemented the following years. In 2012, a 
new Government Decision on resettlement was adopted to launch a resettlement programme for the 




Number of protection 
status granted7











Programme-Based (since 2008) 
40/2 years (2012-2013) 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law no. 122/2006 on 
Asylum in Romania 
 
 
Regulates the asylum procedure in Romania as well as the rights and 
obligations of refugees. Art. 3(5): ‘The Ministry of Administration and the 
Interior, through the Romanian Office for Immigration, can propose that 
Romania accepts refugees that are in other states, who have been 
recognized according to the Geneva Convention. The number and 
conditions of acceptance of these people will be established through a 
Government decision. These people will have the same rights and 
obligations in Romania as the refugees recognized by the Romanian State.’  
In the absence of a specific Government Decision on resettlement, as 
the Government Decision 1596/2008, Art. 3(5) of Law 122/2006 applies 
as lex generalis. Other Articles of relevance for the resettlement 
procedure in Romania are: Arts.2, 3, 17 and 18 (rights of asylum 
seekers), 19 (obligations of asylum seekers), 20 (rights of refugees), 22 
(obligations of refugees), 23, 26. 
 
                                                            
5 According to the Tripartite Agreement. 
6 For an evaluation of their stay, see Machiel Salomons, UNHCR's representative in Romania, declaration of June 8th, 
2010. See http://www.unhcr.org/4c0e76e29.html  
And 2010 Participatory Assessment Report of UNHCR Being a refugee How refugees and asylum-seekers 
experience life in Central Europe, available online at http://reliefweb.int/report/bulgaria/being-refugee-how-refugees-
and-asylum-seekers-experience-life-central-europe 
7 Source: Romanian Office for Immigration. 
8 Ibid. 
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Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Agreement between the 
Government of Romania and 
the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and the 
International Organization 
for Migration Regarding 
Temporary Evacuation to 
Romania of Persons in Urgent 
Need of International 
Protection and their Onward 
Resettlement with UNHCR, 
signed on May 8, 2008  
 
Government Decision no. 
1596 of 4 December 2008 on 
Resettlement of Refugees in 
Romania  
Government Decision no. 
810/2012 concerning the 
amendment of Government 
Decision 1596/2008 on the 
Resettlement of Refugees in 
Romania, published in the 
Official Journal of 10.08.2012 
 
 
Established an Emergency Transit Centre in Timisoara. The ETC, the first 
of its kind in Europe, hosts refugees in urgent need of evacuation from 
their first asylum countries due to life threatening conditions, for a 
maximum period of 6 months, during which they are resettled to third 
countries. 
Under the Agreement, the UNHCR covers all the costs resulting from 
the refugees’ stay in the Romanian ETC. The Ministry of Interior, through 
the Romanian Office of Immigration (ROI), provides the UNHCR with the 
accommodation spaces necessary for the persons covered by this 
Agreement and workspaces necessary to the UNHCR, its partners and 
the IOM. The ROI bears the costs of the accommodation and 
workspaces. 
 
Defines a resettlement quota (120 refugees/3 years) and a procedure to 
be implemented from 2008 to 2010.  
 
Revises the quota (40 refugees/2 years) and improves the resettlement 
procedures to be implemented in 2012-2013. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
UNHCR Protection priorities for the year 2012 aim at reducing the 
shortcomings in the Romanian asylum system, implementation of the 
newly adopted regulations in this field – having as a priority for 2012 the 
new provisions of the Governmental decision regarding the resettlement 
in Romania - and ensuring that the protection offered by Romania is in 
conformity with the 1951 Convention and other international and regional 
standards in refugee protection, including good practice at international 
and European level. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis n/a 
b) On a programme basis 
Between 2008-2010 
2012-2013 
On the basis of the Government Decision no 1596/2008, Romania 
promised to resettle a maximum of 120 refugees for the duration of the 
Programme (3 years), in annual quotas of 40 refugees. 
Committed to resettling 40 refugees over 2 years (2012 and 2013), in 









Relocation of 4,000 Bosnian refugees for resettlement to the USA. 
Romania's agreement to temporarily shelter 439 Uzbek refugees airlifted 
from Kyrgyzstan and eventually resettled to other EU member states, to 
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Canada and the USA. The operation helped to pave the way for the 
establishment of the ETC in 2008. 
Since its establishment in 2008, the Evacuation Transit Centre Timişoara 
had processed 851 refugees. So far, 525 refugees found a new home in 
the USA, 122 in the UK, 75 were received by the Netherlands, 65 by 
Canada and 45 by Sweden. Other 19 refugees went to Finland (8), 
Australia (7) Norway (3) and Germany (1). Most of refugees hosted at the 
ETC were of Palestinian (354), Eritrean (203) and Sudanese (138) origin. 
In April 2011, 30 Eritrean refugees arrived in the Timisoara ETC from a 
camp in Tunisia after having fled from Libya.9











Twining project established between Romania and Australian authorities.  
Dutch selection mission to Jordan with the Netherlands in order to watch 
and learn from the Dutch selection missions. In the framework of “Durable 
Solutions in Practice”, Representatives from Belgium, the Czech Republic 
and Romania also visited the Netherlands, where they were given a 








                                                                                                              
None 
Romania was among 12 European Union states, together with another 
three countries not in the EU, which pledged to resettle 323 refugees who 
arrived in Malta as migrants in May 2011. The announcement was made 
at a special pledging conference convened by Home Affairs 




The quotas due for 2008 and 2010 (80 refugees) have not been 
fulfilled due to the delayed approval of Government Decision no. 
1596/2008 on resettlement of refugees in Romania, as well as due to 
the economic and social situation resulting from the global economic 
crisis.11 The Government Decision no. 1596/2008 expired at the end of 
2010 and the Government of Romania adopted another Government 





                                                            
9 Information available at http://www.ziare.com/articole/centrul+refugiati+timisoara  
10 No specific information was provided by the Romania Office for Immigration on this aspect. 
11 Official reply of the ROI to the KNOW RESET questionnaire (unofficial translation in English by the author of this 
Report), 20 February 2012. 
12 According to ROI and UNHCR Romania. 
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No refugees have been resettled in Romania since 2011. The 
resettlement programme based on Government 1596/2008 ended in 
2010. Romania has not resettled any refugees, except in 2008. 
 38 
Country of Origin: Burma (38) (Kachin origin) 
Country of first asylum: Malaysia (38) 
Gender: Male (14), Female (16), Children (8) (The group consisted of 14 
families (14 women, 14 men and 8 children) and two single women.). 
Age: Adult age was between 23 and 60 years.  
Religion
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
: Christian (38) 
 
Selection criteria  










• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
In order to have been considered for resettlement to Romania (based on 
the 2012 Government Decision), an individual must have met the 
following requirements: 
a) He or she has been recognized as a refugee in accordance with 
Article 1A of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol by a State or by UNHCR; 
b) He or she does not benefit from effective protection on the territory 
of the country of asylum; 
c) He or she does not have integration perspectives in the country of 
asylum; 
d) He or she does not have any prospects for voluntary repatriation to 
the country of origin under conditions of safety and dignity; 
e) He or she does not present a threat to public order, national 
security, health or public moral; 
f) He or she has expressly accepted to be resettled to Romania.  
These conditions were already required under the Government Decision, 
which expired at the end of 2010. The 2012 Government Decision on 
resettlement of refugees in Romania has eliminated the criterion relating to 
the potential of integration of refugees within Romanian society. This 
amendment was made at the express request of the UNHCR, which 
accords great importance to the selection criteria of the refugees and which 
believes that the potential of integration is not an acceptable criterion.14
The 2012 Decision also stipulates that ‘The resettlement operations are 
established taking into account the following criteria: 
 
a) international requirements set by the UNHCR for refugee 
resettlement; 
b) the foreign policy of Romania; 
c) relocation requirements set at the EU level.” 
                                                            
13 Source: Romanian Office for Immigration. 
14 Romanian Office of Immigration formal reply to the KNOW RESET questionnaire, op.cit. 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 











UNHCR, Minister of Administration and Interior, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Romanian Office for Immigration (ROI)  
According to the previous Emergency Government Decision 1596/2008, 
there were two ways of selecting refugees for resettlement, namely a) 
dossier based selections and b) in-country selection missions. 
Whilst selection missions to countries of asylum is considered the 
main method, dossier based selections may be used if a selection 
mission to an asylum country cannot be organised, based on a reasoned 
decision of the Director General of ROI.15
The selection procedure done by both dossier and mission method is 
included in the new decision adopted in 2012. 
  
‘Even in the case of a selection mission, a pre-selection of possible 
candidates (refugees in need of resettlement) is undertaken, based on 
the files received from UNHCR, before interviewing the refugees in the 
asylum country. 
Upon the decision of the Resettlement Committee on the countries of 
origin and the countries of first asylum of refugees to be resettled to 
Romania, and following the authorization by the Minister of Administration 
and Interior and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROI proceeds to draft 
and forward to UNHCR a request proposing possible candidates for 
resettlement to Romania (accompanied by the request for resettlement). 
Upon receipt of the refugees' case (the Resettlement Referral Form - 
RRF) from UNHCR, ROI carries out the following activities: 
a. Receives and registers the resettlement files submitted by 
UNHCR. The files must contain the information note on the 
resettlement proposal together with the identification data of the 
refugees proposed for resettlement and their individual files; 
b. Verifies and analyses the data contained in the files submitted by 
UNHCR according to the competencies of services within ROI. 
The purpose of this verification and analysis is to establish whether 
there are reasons to exclude any of the refugees submitted by UNHCR 
from being interviewed and to identify aspects that shall be kept in mind 
during the future interview proceeding in the country of asylum. 
The results of the verifications and data analysis are included in a 
Report listing the refugees that are to be interviewed in the country of 
asylum. A brief explanation is provided when there is a decision not to 
interview a particular refugee. UNHCR is informed of the names of the 
refugees pre-selected for interview, or where appropriate, of those 
approved for resettlement upon examination of a dossier submission. 
After forwarding the list with the pre-selected refugees to be 
interviewed in country of asylum, the ROI establishes contact with the 
UNHCR Representation in Romania or directly with the competent 
authorities from the country of asylum in order to agree the practical 
details of the selection mission. 
                                                            
15 According to the UNHCR Report on resettlement in Romania and Law 122/2006 and H.G. 1596/2008. The 
aforementioned UNHCR Report is available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&amp;docid=4ecb9c00d&amp;skip=0&amp;advsearch=y&amp;process=y
&amp;allwords=&amp;exactphrase=&amp;atleastone=&amp;without=&amp;title=resettlement handbook country 
chapter&amp;monthfrom=&amp;yearfrom=&amp;monthto=&amp;yearto=&amp;coa=&amp;language=&amp;citation=  
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The purpose of the interviews with the refugees is to evaluate their 
situation in accordance with the resettlement selection criteria. Based on 
the results of the evaluation, the selection mission will propose the 
refugees to be accepted for resettlement in Romania. 
The family members of the Principal Applicant are also interviewed by 
the selection mission. At the beginning of the interview, the refugees are 
explained the purpose of the interview and the selection procedure. The 
medical evaluation is carried out on each refugee by a medical doctor. 
The officer conducting the interview with the refugee, assisted by the 
integration officer, counsels the interpreters prior to the interview on the 
rules which they must observe when interpreting. 
A report is drafted for each individual refugee case which contains the 
conclusions of the evaluation with respect to each of the selection criteria. 
Upon return to Romania, the Head of the selection mission will propose the 
list of refugees to be accepted for resettlement. The list of accepted 
refugees must be approved by the Director General of the ROI. Once this 








• Assistance with travel 
documents 
• Medical screening 
 
Possible cultural orientation and counselling services provided by ROI. 
In order to inform refugees on integration activities in Romania and 
preparing integration programs, NGOs engaged in projects on the 
integration of refugees in Romania, financed by the ERF, participate in 
selection missions by ROI. 
ROI, in partnership with an organisation to be determined. 
Red Cross and ROI, for travel safety purpose. 
 Procedure Timing The Government Decision on resettlement in Romania no 1596/2008 
came into force on December 2008. The decision approving the 
resettlement of the 40 Burmese refugees was adopted in mid-2009 and 
the refugees arrived in Romania (Bucharest) on May 31st, 2010). 
Comments  Within the framework of the first resettlement programme run by 
Romania, one of the criteria used for the selection of the refugees for the 
purpose of their resettlement was their potential for integration. The 2012 
Decision which regulates the conditions for accepting refugees from other 
countries by Romania for the period of 2012-2013 no longer provides 
‘potential integration’ as a selection criterion because resettlement is 
considered primarily as a tool for ensuring protection of refugees.17
Refugee still have to expressly accept to be resettled to Romania as it 
appears that the refugees who were previously resettled in Romania did 




The involvement of NGOs during the selection process (to provide 
preparation for integration) is to be noted. 
. 
                                                            
16 Report on resettlement in Romania written by the Romanian Office for Immigration based on information available until 
July 2011, see UNHCR Handbook on resettlement, Chapter on Romania, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,ROM,,,10.html 
17 According to the Romanian Office for Immigration reply to the KNOW RESET questionnaire, op.cit. 
18 2010 Participatory Assessment Report of UNHCR Being a refugee How refugees and asylum-seekers experience life 
in Central Europe, op.cit. 
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b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
Government Decision no. 
810/2012 
 
After entering Romania, ROI shall issue, within 30 days, decisions 
whereby the transferred persons are recognized as refugees in Romania 
and they will be issued documents according to the law.  


















“All persons granted refugee status or subsidiary protection can register 
for the ROI integration programme. This programme is 6 months long with 
a possible supplementary 6 months, and includes: Romanian language 
courses, cultural accommodation sessions, counselling and support in 
order to have access to rights in Romania, financial support (similar to the 
one granted to asylum seekers). 50% of the rent for accommodation for a 
maximum 12 month period which dependant on the refugee having 
finalized the integration programme. 
Held in the Regional Reception / Accommodation Centres in Bucharest, 
Timisoara, Galati, Radauti and Maramures and carried out by RIO 
counselors twice a week. These sessions are organized in modules: 
History and Geography, Romania - democratic state, The 
human/individual and society and EU Values. 
Within the Integration Programme, the refugee will be explained how a job 
may be obtained. The refugee will be registered at the state institution, 
which assists with searching for employment. The refugee will be assisted 
in obtaining social support if he/she does not have the means to earn a 
living. The refugee will be assisted in benefiting from medical care. 
For adults and children. 
If the National Agency for Employment identifies a job for a specific refugee 
in Romania, the refugee is obliged to go to that locality for attending an 
interview with the employer. If the employer agrees to offer the refugee a 
job, that refugee is obliged to take up residency in the locality in which the 
job is located. The local City Hall will try to offer social housing. If there is 
no social housing available in that locality, the refugee will have to rent a 
house and RIO will contribute 50% of the rent for one year. 
Comments Save the Children Romania and the Jesuit Refugee Service Romania 
were the NGOs that run integration programmes for the refugees 
resettled in Romania and accommodated in the Regional Centre for 
Accommodation and Asylum Procedures in Galati. 
According to a UNHCR Report ‘The group [of 38 refugees resettled in 
Romania] were extremely unhappy about their current situation and what 
they felt was a dire socio-economic condition compared to their lives in 
Malaysia, where there were plenty of jobs and good wages. They claimed 
that the financial assistance and in-kind donations in Romania were not 
enough to sustain a decent living, and that they could not afford even to 
buy milk and diapers for the children. Some rejected the financial 
assistance eventually provided by the Government on the grounds that it 
was too low. 
As some of them had assessed that the initial salaries they might earn 
in Romania would not cover all their needs, most did not want to actively 
participate in the integration process any longer. At the time of the 
interviews, only three families were making an effort to learn Romanian 
and seeking jobs in local businesses. Most families even refused to enroll 
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their children in schools and kindergartens. The refugees claimed they 
had been given confusing information about their new home country by 
the Romanian authorities and UNHCR during the cultural orientation 
course prior to their departure. They criticized Romania for not being a 
good resettlement country and demanded that the UNHCR send them to 
the USA or a Nordic country. 
Group leaders emerged who influenced others to actually oppose 
integration and persuaded them not to bother learning the Romanian 
language. They were convinced that the best option open to them was to 
leave Romania as soon as possible.’19
c) Costs and Funding 
 They were made to believe the 
best option was to leave Romania as soon as possible. Most of them 
decided to leave Romania, after they received the documents as resettled 
refugees and started to apply for asylum, requesting protection to other 
EU countries. At the end of December 2011 they were sent back in 
Romania from several countries and even at the present time they had 
been accommodated in a centre of the Baptist Church, with the rent paid 
by the Jesuit Refugee Service in Romania, under the ERF national 




The transfer to Romania and the cultural orientation sessions for Myanmar 
refugees selected in 2009 was implemented by RIO and the Romanian 






Motivation: The Government’s decision to get involved in the resettlement 
of refugees process was influenced by the political will of strengthening 
Romania's status as an important global partner by undertaking efforts and 
responsibilities incumbent upon the international community in the area of 
refugee protection. Since the resettlement of refugees plays an important 
role in the EU’s external policies on asylum, the involvement of Romania in 
the resettlement programme was driven also by the desire to assume more 
responsibility as an EU Member State.21
Possible evolution and capacity to increase: Initially Romania had a 
programme of resettlement established for the duration of 3 years (2008 – 
2010). Government Decision no. 1596/2008 on resettlement of refugees 
in Romania was drafted on the basis of public policies and resulted from 
the consultation of all governmental and non-governmental factors 
involved in the resettlement process.  
 
The Government decision adopted in 2012 to launch a new 
resettlement programme followed the organization of a Meeting in March 
2012 between the ROI and all the relevant stakeholders (Minister of 
Labour, Minister of health, Minister of Education, Minister for Social 
Protection) and the other partners involved in the integration process 
(including UNHCR and NGOs).  
Romanian NGOs and governmental authorities are all eager to continue 
resettlement activities and enhance capacity for resettlement; the UNHCR 
Representative in Romania stated during the meeting that UNHCR is 
concerned about the Romanian potential for assistance and integration of 
                                                            
19 ibid. 
20 Report on resettlement in Romania written by the Romanian Office for Immigration based on information available until 
July 2011, see UNHCR Handbook on resettlement, Chapter on Romania, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,ROM,,,10.html 
21 Information provided by the Romanian Office of Immigration formal reply to the KNOW RESET questionnaire, op.cit. 
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the future resettled refugees taking into consideration also the impact of the 
economic crisis and if in the near future no progress will be in place, 
UNHCR is going to recommend that all the resettlement programmes to be 
postponed until the moment in which Romania will be enough prepared to 
receive this persons in urgent need of international protection.  
Opinion of the Romanian Office for Immigration on the one and only 
operation of resettlement by Romania: The ROI argued that this first 
resettlement of refugees in Romania was successful. The ROI, in 
collaboration with the UNHCR, have made a number of changes to the 
programme, which seeks to improve the experience for all parties. 
These are: 
− Establishing, for the period 2012-2013, an annual quota which is 
reduced in comparison with the first programme on resettlement; 
− Dispensing the criterion for selection which is based upon the 
potential of refugee to integrate into Romanian society; 
− The children of the refugees accepted to be resettled in Romania 
that have been born in the state of first asylum should be 
considered refugees and accepted for resettlement in Romania 
and transferred together with their parents; 
− The transfer of refugees accepted for resettlement in Romania is to 
be conducted by the ROI in partnership with an organization 
specialized in this field of activity.’22
The NGOs that were consulted for this profile expressed no concern 
with regard to the situation of migrants in general including resettled 
refugees and asylum-seekers. NGOs all felt they did not have the 
capacity to take on more resettled refugees unless new capacity building 
with the government took place. It was felt that some concrete steps 
needed to be taken by the government ministry with responsibility for 
integration. 
 
The only resettlement programme carried out in Romania is 
considered as a successful one by all the actors involved, with the 
exception of the resettled refugees.  
All the actors highlighted several practical issues that need to be 
addressed to improve the resettlement experience for refugees and 
NGOs. Repeatedly, interviewees expressed hope that by establishing an 
annual programme these practical issues could be resolved.  
The view and influence of public opinion on refugee resettlement: 
‘In April 2011, the Foundation Soros - Romania and the Romanian 
Association for the Promotion of Health presented the findings of a public 
survey, according to which 39% of the Romanians said they feel good 
and very good or at least neutral about aliens in Romania. So far, the 
media has been positive with regard to refugee issues in Romania.’23
 
 
                                                            
22 ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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Country Profile: SLOVAKIA 
Due to its geographical location Slovakia was often perceived by asylum seekers as well as the asylum 
authorities as a transit country rather than as a final destination. Added to this is the past experience of 
Slovakia as a former socialist country and it is clear that the trend is that Slovakia is more a source of 
emigration than a destination for immigrants. However, the situation has changed, and Slovakia has quite 
recently become a country of net immigration. This relatively new state of affairs accelerated after 
Slovakia’s admission to the EU in 2004 and after joining the Schengen area in 2007.  
The harmonisation of Slovak asylum legislation with Community law was a complex process starting 
with the adoption of the new Asylum Law 480/2002 which entered into force on 1 January 2003. This law 
has been further amended to comply with accession requirements as well as to facilitate the 
implementation of EU asylum measures into the national legal order. 
While the highest number of asylum applications documented in Slovakia peaked in 2004 at 11,395, 
only 15 people were granted asylum. This figure decreased in 2005 to 3,549 submitted applications out of 
which 25 asylums were granted. Several factors contributed to this sharp decrease - the overall 
improvement of the situation in some regions which were the source of asylum seekers (the Balkans, 
Afghanistan and parts of Africa)1 resulting in a general decrease in the number of asylum seekers within the 
whole EU; as well as stricter asylum measures due to enforcement of the Dublin Regulation and improved 
effectiveness of the state border protection; and also an absence of large foreigners’ communities in 
Slovakia and a less-developed economic environment compared to more developed EU countries.2 This 
declining trend was kept until recently when in 2011 only 491 people were seeking asylum in the territory of 
the Slovak Republic, which is the smallest number since 1996.3
The Slovak Republic joined the EU activities connected with resettlement of aliens from third countries 
through humanitarian transfers, based on trilateral treaties between the government, the UNHCR and IOM. 
In July 2009 and subsequently in December 2010 the government, UNHCR, and IOM signed agreements 
on the transfer of refugees in need of protection and temporarily house them in the Emergency Transit 
Centre (ETC) at Humenné where they are provided with accommodation, food, and medical care until they 
are further resettled.  
 In 2010 there were 541 asylum seekers 
and during the year before there was 822 applications. This number has therefore decreased annually over 
the past few years. 
The ECT4
At the ETC, refugees can consult with social workers and the UNHCR supports the authorities with a 
Field Assistant. The Regional Representation for Central Europe has also produced a leaflet in several 
languages to inform the new arrivals about the purpose of the Centre and about practical aspects of 
everyday life including about the community nearby. 
 was set up in 2009 as a small-scale resettlement scheme promoted by the UNHCR office in 
Slovakia and specifically hoping to help a group of Palestinian refugees from Iraq. It has a capacity of 550 
places on its three-building premises. It provides temporary placement for up to six months for those 
refugees who are in urgent need of evacuation from their country of their first asylum and whose 
resettlement procedure with their future new home country is still under way. After that period they are 
resettled to their new home country.  
Slovakia also participates in another burden-sharing mechanism – the EU pilot project on the relocation 
refugees from Malta (EUREMA) that was launched in 2009. It should be noted that Slovakia does not 
clearly distinguish in its language between resettlement and relocation. It often refers to both terms by using 
its Slovak equivalent “presídľovanie” or “presídlenie” (both meaning resettlement) while for relocation it 
would be preferable to use term “relokácia”. This confusion is confirmed once again by the Ministry of 
                                                            
1 According to the UNHCR´s view, available only in Slovak: http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/sk/novinky/2006/pocet-
ziadatelov-o-azyl-od-roku-2001-poklesol-na-polovicu.html 
2 2007 EMN annual report on asylum and migration statistics in the Slovak Republic 
3 See Statistics of the Ministry of Interior for respective years, available at: http://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20 
4 Based on information of the UNHCR, available at: http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/where-we-work/operations-in-
central-europe/slovakia.html 
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Interior when on its website it refers to EUREMA project as to a project of internal resettlement of persons 
within the EU. On the contrary, in its Migration Policy with perspective until 20205
Based on its experience with migration burden-sharing during humanitarian crises in the Balkans (Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo) as well as with humanitarian aid to citizens of Ukraine with Slovak origin affected by 
the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the form of resettlement to Slovakia in the years 1991-1999, Slovakia 
also reviewed the possibility of resettlement for 2010. This intention was evident from the migration policy 
report
 it uses the term relocation 
when addressing migration burden-sharing with other EU countries. 
6 as well as from the 2008-2013 ERF multi-annual programme7. As potential partners in resettlement it 
considered Ukraine8
Although resettlement action was planned under the 2010 ERF annual programme due to the 
involvement of the Slovak Republic in the pilot project of relocation from Malta, co-funded by the EU, it was 
postponed under the annual programme of 2011. Indeed the 2011 ERF annual programme actually 
revealed that there was no intention to resettle or relocate
 or Malta. Due to its socio-economic conditions Slovakia proposed to resettle about ten 
people over a period of two years (2010-2011), with a focus on vulnerable groups (single women with 
children) from countries according to Government´s decision (e.g. Ukraine, Malta or other countries).  
9
Slovakia is of an opinion that resettlement should be voluntary-based and it should not be the only tool 
of responsibility and burden-sharing among respective countries. It does not resettle. This is a result of the 
lack of political will as well as the unfavourable social and economic situation, which does not attract 
refugees. The final decision to resettle is purely political. Moreover, Slovak legislation has not been fully 
prepared to resettlement process.  
. This policy decision was made on the basis that 
of the current situation in Slovakia. 
                                                            
5 Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic- Perspective until the year 2020, 31 August 2011. 
6 Ibid. 
7 2008-2013 ERF multi-annual programme, issued July 2008 (SK version only) 
8 Reasons: neighbouring country, strategic partner, experience with the resettlement of people from Ukraine. 
9 This confirms also the interview conducted with Mr. Štefan Šidó from the Ministry of Interior on 19 January 2012. 
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Asylum Profile 














• 12 Refugee Status 
• 103 Other Protection 
72 (2010) 
• 15 Refugee Status 





I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Act of 20 June 2002 on 
Asylum and Amendment of 
Some Acts (last amended in 
2008) 
Act of 21 October 2011 on 
Residence of Aliens and 
Amendment and 
Supplementation of Certain 
Acts (entered into force 
1.1.2012) 
 
Nothing in the recent law indicates any possibility of resettlement as 
such. The term resettlement is used in the Asylum law in relation to 
displaced persons (de facto refugees) who have been granted 
temporary shelter in Slovakia under the framework of the Directive 
2001/55/EC on temporary protection12




On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
According to the new political resolution,13
However, the document mentions resettlement activities in general 
terms; specifics will be defined in the Action Plans which are being 
developed.  
 resettlement is foreseen in 
the future.  
However, Slovak legislation has not been fully prepared for 
resettlement, legislative amendments are necessary.14
 
 
                                                            
10 Source: Ministry of Interior.. 
11 Source: Ministry of Interior. 
12 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards of provision of temporary protection in case of 
massive influx of displaced persons and on measures to support burden sharing among Member States in reception 
of these persons and bearing consequences resulting thereof 
13 Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit. 
14 Interview with Mr. Štefan Šidó, op.cit. 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis None 







August 2009 –  
March 2010 
 
May 2011 - January 2012 
 
 
December 2011-  
June 2012 
 
January 2012-  
June 2012 
 
Slovakia offers a humanitarian transfer through its territory. It admits 
refugees selected for resettlement for 6 months in the ETC Humenné 
before they will be resettled to third countries (often the USA or 
Canada). 
98 Palestinian refugees from Iraq (refugee camp Al Waleed), mainly 
families with children (the oldest person was 77 year old and the 
youngest was a baby of 4 months). After 6 months, they were resettled 
to the USA. 
46 Afghani refugees from Iran (24 women and 22 children, the oldest 
woman was 55 years old and the youngest child was 7 months old). 
They were placed in Humenné and resettled to the USA (last family in 
January 2012). 
40 Somali refugees from Eritrea (refugee camp Emkulu), mostly 
families with children (26 adults, 14 children) of whom the youngest was 
only one year old and the oldest refugee was 70 year old woman. 
Resettled to the USA. 
35 refugees from Egypt (31 adults and 4 children from Somalia, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Iraq), mostly young people; oldest is 49 year-old 
man and the youngest was a two month old boy. Resettled to Canada. 
This is a continuation of the Agreement concluded between the 
Government and the UNHCR in 2010 according to which the number 
of refugees will not exceed 100 at any point.  
d) Through other Projects 
Governmental Level 
- PHARE project: Improving 
the administrative structure in 
the field of migration and 
asylum in the light of the 
Slovak Republic´s EU 
membership - Twinning 
arrangement between Slovakia 
and Sweden (GDISC) – 
completed in 200516
- Temporary Desk on Iraq 
(TDI) - an 18-month ERF-
funded intergovernmental 
project (established in 








- aimed to improve the existing administrative structure in the field of 
migration and asylum, 




- to determine how asylum and immigration services can improve 
their practical cooperation on protection/asylum, resettlement and 
return with regard to the Iraqi caseload and develop generic tools 
and mechanisms for dealing with other caseloads 
Regarding resettlement: 
- Exchange of information and practice on resettlement of Iraqi 
refugees. 
- Coordination of submissions for resettlement, joint EU Member 
State missions and mixed EU selection teams. 
                                                            
15 Source: Slovakian Migration Office. 
16 The project does not appear any more in the database of GDISC (http://www.gdisc.org/), but it is mentioned here: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=983969&Site=COE 
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- Joint IOM, UNHCR and 
ICMC project: Promotion of 
resettlement in the EU through 
practical cooperation by EU 
Member States and other 




- Pilot resettlement for interested EU Member States. 
- Slovakia participated as an observer in the Dutch mission to Syria 
in October/November 2009. 
 
- intended to promote refugee resettlement in Europe by 
strengthening the engagement of the EU Member States 
- Slovakia was present as an observer at international conferences, 
















Slovakia accepted three detainees (from Egypt, Azerbaijan, and 
Tunisia) held at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, for 
resettlement in January 2010. They were placed in a detention facility 
for foreigners and asylum seekers in Medveďov, Slovakia. According to 
the UNHCR report they were held here in isolation under poor 
conditions and subsequently following their hunger strike in mid-June, 
they were awarded residency permits in July and placed in an 
integration centre in Zvolen, Slovakia. As of July 2011 two of them 
already left Slovakia for their countries of origin, Egypt and Tunisia. The 
detainee from Azerbaijan has remained on Slovakian territory. 
As part of migration burden- sharing with other EU Member States, the 
Slovak Republic implements aid programs aimed at the relocation of 
aliens with international protection from the most burdened countries. It 
is involved in the EU relocation project from Malta (EUREMA) under 
which it promised to relocate 10 refugees from African countries. The 
project is financed by the ERF. 
III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled None 
Comments  There is no real intention to resettle at the moment. 
Nevertheless, there are hopes based on the political resolution17 
that, after the creation of required legislation and resettlement 
integration mechanisms, Slovakia would be able to resettle on an ad-
hoc basis and even on basis of quota in the future. However, the 
creation of a resettlement mechanism is rather complex and requires 
some reforms in law and policies as well as sufficient funding18
Based on a proposal of the UNHCR Regional Representative Office 
in Budapest, new discussions on continuing the ETC in Humenné have 
begun (new trilateral agreement needed). This has been under 






                                                            
17 Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic, op.cit. 
18 Interview with Mr Štefan Šidó, op.cit. 
19 Ibid (follow-up received on 2 February 2012) 
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Country Profile: SLOVENIA 
Slovenia was one of the six constituent republics of the formal Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) until 1991 when it declared independence. That declaration was followed by a short armed conflict 
with the Yugoslav federal armed forces. In 2004, Slovenia became a member of the European Union. 
Slovenia became part of the Schengen area on 21 December 2007.1
According to the 2002 census, when the total population of Slovenia was 1,964,036, approximately 83% 
of the population declared themselves to be ethnic Slovenians. The three largest minority ethnic groups are 
Bosniaks (21,542), Serbs (38,964), Croatians (35,642). A tiny proportion of the population declared 




In the beginning of 2010, 12.4% of Slovenia’s population
 There are several thousands Hungarian and Italian people whom enjoy strong political, 
cultural and linguistic rights in the territories, and Roma enjoy special rights pursuant to the Constitution. No 
other ethnic groups have been officially recognized or given any collective rights. 
3 and 15.1% of the active population 
(population in employment) was born abroad.4 According to the Ministry of Interior, there were 100,910 
foreigners in possession of a valid residence permit in the Republic of Slovenia on 31 December 2011.5
Since the start of the economic crisis, migrants have been more vulnerable than the local population for 
several reasons (27.8% of the migrant workers were employed in the construction sector which was 
particularly affected by the crisis). In 2010, 25% of foreign born persons aged 25-54 lived below the poverty 
line or were socially excluded, compared to 14% of the same population that was born in Slovenia.
 
6
Slovenia’s legislation on international protection has been evolving steadily since the country has 
achieved independence and written a Constitution which lays emphasis on the respect for human rights. 
The legislation currently in force provides a legal basis for both resettlement from third countries as well as 
intra-EU relocation. However, only a pilot project of refugee relocation has so far been implemented.  
 
The past 20 years – the first two decades of Slovenia’s independence – have been characterized by 
several key moments for migration in which legislation has been enacted or migration policy has changed 
significantly. 
Migration to Slovenia in the 1990s was to a large extent a consequence of the wars in the territory of 
former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Persons coming to Slovenia were mostly in need of 
protection from armed conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The end of large scale 
hostilities in the region coincides with the adoption of a new system of international protection. The period 
of 2000-2001 saw what was referred to as ‘illegal immigration crisis.’ Large numbers of migrants (mostly 
from Iran, Iraq, Syria, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sierra Leone) entered Slovenia. This was met with 
a negative response in the public debate and lead to several changes in Slovenia’s migration laws.7
The preparation for entry to the EU and the entry itself in 2004 brought several amendments to the 
Asylum Act in order to transpose the EU asylum acquis. On that basis, the 2007 International Protection Act 
  
                                                            
1 http://praga.veleposlanistvo.si/index.php?L=1&id=1737 
2 Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.stat.si/popis2002/si/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=15 
3 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.stat.si/eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=3632 
4 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.stat.si/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=4415 
5 Source: Ministry of Interior, Directorate of Migration and Integration, 2011 Statistical Report, p. 12-13, 
http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/DMI/Statisticno_porocilo_-_SLO_zadnja_verzija_-
_popravljena.pdf 
6 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.stat.si/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=4415 
7 Zavratnik, Simona: Contemporary Immigration and Asylum Policies in Slovenia: Rethinking Questions of Entrance and 
Integration, Annales 16 (2006) 2, p. 348.  
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was adopted. Migration to Slovenia from other EU member states has remained at a low level (more than 
90% of foreigners residing in Slovenia come from outside the EU).8
The 1991 Aliens Act,
 
9 adopted on the same day as the declaration of independence, included basic 
provisions on the status and rights of refugees. The first Asylum Act established a much more complex 
system in 1999.10 It was amended several times and finally replaced by the International Protection Act11
The number of applications for international protection peaked in 2000 and was disproportionately high 
in the period of 2000-2005. Between 1995 and end of 2011, 233 persons were granted a form of 
international protection in Slovenia. Many of them came from the ex republics of SFRY. Other important 
countries of origin were Kazakhstan, Russia, Somalia and Iran.
 
(hereinafter: ZMZ). The new act reflects the changes brought about by the accession to the European 
Union and responds to the need to bring the Slovenian system in line with the asylum acquis. In addition, it 
also introduced the legal basis for resettlement.  
12
Slovenia’s approach to resettlement can be described as one of principal commitment that has so far 
lacked practical implementation. The 2007 reform of law of international protection saw the establishment of 
a clear (statutory) legal basis for resettlement as well as relocation and even led to the adoption of an 
executive regulation which regulated the matter in more detail. However, so far, only a small scale pilot 
project of intra EU relocation has been implemented and there has been no resettlement at all. 
 
                                                            
8 Source: Ministry of Interior, Directorate of Migration and Integration, 2011 Statistical Report, p. 13, 
http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/DMI/Statisticno_porocilo_-_SLO_zadnja_verzija_-
_popravljena.pdf 
9 Zakon o tujcih, Official Gazzette 1/1991. 
10 Zakon o azilu, Official Gazzette 61/1999. 
11 Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti, Official Gazzette 111/2007. 
12 Source: Ministry of Interior, Directorate of Migration and Integration, 2011 Statistical Report, p. 41-42, 
http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/DMI/Statisticno_porocilo_-_SLO_zadnja_verzija_-
_popravljena.pdf 
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Asylum Profile 

















I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
International Protection Act 
(Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti) 
Adopted in the original text on 
the 21st November 2007 
Published in the Official 
Gazzette (Uradni list) no. 
11/2011 (official consolidated 
text). 
 
Specific provision on Resettlement 
 
Chapter VIII 
‘Third Country Citizens and Stateless Persons that Fulfil the 
Requirements for the Recognition of Refugee Status and are Accepted 
to the Republic of Slovenia on the Basis of Yearly Quota’ 
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
(Government) Decree on the 
manner of implementation 
of resettlement of persons 
admitted to Republic of 
Slovenia based on a yearly 
quota (Uredba o načinu 
izvedbe preselitve oseb, ki so 
v Republiko Slovenijo sprejete 
na podlagi letne kvote) 
Adopted by the Government 
of the Republic of Slovenia 
on the 20th July 2011. 
 
 
Regulates the manner in which the resettlement of persons that have 
been admitted to the Republic of Slovenia on the basis of Chapter VIII 
of the International Protection Act (Official Gazzette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, no. 11/11, hereinafter: the Act), will be implemented. 
 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
At the moment, projects and/or reforms are not foreseen. The reason 
for this is the economic situation of the country (high public spending 
and consequentially, debt, and low economic growth and employment). 
As a result of this, the country is unlikely to spend money on any new 
programmes; in addition, there is low demand in the labour market, 
which reflects negatively on attitudes toward immigration. 
 
                                                            
13 Source: Annual Report of the Ministry (see link above, footnote 12). 
14 Ibid, p. 32 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis None 











Slovenia participated as an observer in a trans-national project funded 
under the Community Actions Strand of the ERF, Transnational 
Resettlement UK and Ireland (TRUKI), conducted jointly by the UK and 











In its 2011 Work Programme,16
According to the Ministry representative, the quota was originally set 
at 10 persons. This number was determined taking into account the 
financial assistance obtained from the EU, as the pilot project was 
wholly financed by the European Commission. What also played a role 
in determining the number was the support in integration that the 
relocated persons would require. 
 the Slovenian Ministry of Interior reports 
that end of November 2010, 8 persons to whom international protection 
has been granted were accepted to the Republic of Slovenia. This was 
within the framework of the pilot project involving the relocation of 
persons from Malta (“EUREMA”). 
The relocated refugees were accommodated in the Maribor 
integration centre. The Ministry reports that immediately after arrival all of 
the necessary documentation for the integration of these persons into the 
systems of health insurance, social care and employment, was provided. 
The abovementioned persons participated in an orientation programme 
(210 hours) and basic Slovenian language course (90 hours). 
III. Resettlement Implementation 
Refugees resettled None 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival Phase   








No resettlement has taken place in Slovenia. 
The formal requirements to be accepted for resettlement are laid down 
in Article 71 ZMZ: a person has to fulfil the requirements for refugee 
status pursuant to this Act and be located in a country where they are 
safe from persecution and the living conditions are not appropriate for 
refugee integration. 
                                                            
15 International Catholic Migration Commission, Welcome to Europe! ‘A Comparative Review of Resettlement in Europe’, 
http://www.icmc.net/system/files/publication/welcome_to_europe_a_guide_to_resettlement_a_comp_64641.pdf, p. 37, 
16
 http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/KM/Programdela2011_02.doc 
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• Additional National 
Criteria 
The details of the yearly quota, including the country from which the 
refugees would be resettled, etc., would be laid down by the 
Government (acting upon a proposal of the Ministry of interior), as 
foreseen by Article 70 ZMZ and Article 2/III Decree on the manner of 
implementation of resettlement of persons admitted to Republic of 
Slovenia based on a yearly quota. This has not yet happened. 
Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 
















• Assistance with travel 
documents 
• Medical screening 
The Decree foresees the following pre-departure activities: 
• Informative lecture - general information on the Republic of 
Slovenia, cultural characteristics and habits, information on the 
prohibition of polygamy and gender equality, rights and obligations 
of persons enjoying international protection in the Republic of 
Slovenia (see Article 7) 
• Issuing of a travel document (see Article 9) 
• Medical examination (see Article 6) 
Procedure Timing n/a 
Comments  The minor role played by certain stakeholders in the relocation project 
was perceived as problematic17
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
. Also, scepticism was expressed with 
regard to the support for refugees in general in the general public. This 
perhaps calls for a wider strategic approach of interaction with the 
general public regarding refugees that would among other things, i.e. 
influencing the perception of refugees in Slovenia, also result in 
identifying interested stakeholders in the civil societies that might take 
part in resettlement/relocation activities in the future, but also local 
communities appropriate and willing to accept resettled refugees. 
 
Status granted  
Article 71 International 
Protection Act 
 
A person can only be accepted to the Republic of Slovenia on the basis 
of a yearly quota (resettled), if s/he fulfills the requirements for the 
recognition of refugee status (not subsidiary protection) as laid down by 
the International Protection Act. This means that the question as to 
whether the person fulfils the Convention requirements will be assessed 
before the person is even allowed to enter the territory of Slovenia. 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Decree mentioned above, the decision 
granting international protection shall also be served to the person prior 
to arrival. Pursuant to Article 89 in conjunction with Article 91 of the 
abovementioned Act, refugee status entitles the refugee to permanent 
residence (stalno prebivanje) in the Republic of Slovenia). 
                                                            
17 Email Interview with the Director of the NGO Pravno-informacijski center nevladnih organizacij – PIC, 30 March 2012. 
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Rights granted  
Article 89 ZMZ  
 
A refugee is entitled to: 
• information with regard to his/her status, rights and obligations 
as a beneficiary of international obligation;  
• residence in the Republic of Slovenia;  
• accomodation in the facilities of the Ministry of the Interior;  
• accomodation subsidy;  
• health care;  
• social care;  
• education;  
• employment and work;  
• integration assistance.  
International protection beneficiaries are entitled to live in the Ministry's 
facilities for one year from the granting of protection and are entitled to 
receive an accomodation subsidy for three years from the granting of 
the status. For a single person, the monthly accomodation subsidy 
equals a minimum monthly income, which is currently 230,61 EUR. The 
sum of the subsidy is increased with every family member.18
Legally, refugees have the right to free access to the labour market 
as do EEA citizens.
 
19
Beneficiaries of international protection enjoy status equal to citizens 
of Slovenia regarding all levels of education, also cost of the procedure 
to recognise a foreign diploma shall be borne by the Ministry of Interior. 
 The refugees' family members need a work permit 
as do subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Both can apply for a personal 
work permit (osebno delovno dovoljenje), which does not require a 
preexisting agreement with the employer.  
Pursuant to the Decree on conditions for ensuring the rights of persons 
with international protection (Article 14), the personal integration plan 
takes into account the needs, knowledge, capabilities, potentials and 
skills of the international protection beneficiary and can be, in 
cooperation with the beneficiary, changed or complemented. It includes 
various activities regarding education, employment, accomodation, 
arranging documents and participation in Slovenian language classes 
as well as classes on Slovenian history, culture and constitutional 
settlement. The decree provides a legal basis for cooperation of NGOs 
and/or representatives of local communities. 
Comments In 2010, the UNHCR - Regional Representation for Central Europe 
conducted a participatory assessment study which covered Slovenia 
and was presented in a 2011 report entitled ''Being a refugee: How 
refugees and asylum-seekers experience life in Central Europe'' to 
evaluate the living conditions and integration of the beneficiaries of 
international protection.20
Firstly, social or non-profit housing is not available to refugees and 
others with international protection in Slovenia.
 Several integration challenges were 
mentioned in the report.  
21
Refugees who cannot find work are excluded from receiving 
unemployment benefits in Slovenia as they have not had jobs before. 
Others complained they did not have enough information on how to find 
  
                                                            
18 Articles 9 – 11 Decree on conditions for ensuring the rights of persons with international protection (Uredba o načinih 
in pogojih za zagotavljanje pravic osebam z mednarodno zaščito, Official Gazzette no. 55/2011). 
Minimum income data available from the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs: 
http://www.mddsz.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/sociala/denarna_socialna_pomoc/ 
19 Zakon o zaposlovanju in delu tujcev, Official Gazzette no. 26/2011 (ZZDT-1). 
20 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Being a refugee: How refugees and asylum-seekers experience life in Central 
Europe, 3 January 2012, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f02fa252.html [accessed 7 April 2012], p. 62. 
21 Ibid, p.63.  
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work. Despite having the right to work, many of the refugees in Slovenia 
who took part in this study were not confident of their prospects in 
finding stable employment.22
A majority of the refugees who answered to the study reported they 
had individual integration plans.
  
23 The vast majority of respondents 
praised the living conditions and the fact that they were able to preserve 
and practice their own culture, traditions and religion in this European 
country. On the other hand, some asylum seekers have reported 
frequent permit checks by the police which made them feel 
unwelcome.24
With regard to refugee protection, the following was recommended 
by the High Commissioner:  
 
• The current integration plan for individual beneficiaries of 
international protection should be evaluated and revised to 
better accommodate the needs of refugees. 
• All relevant stakeholders should support and promote self-
reliance and self-employment initiatives. 
• Beneficiaries of international protection should have access to 
social housing. 
• Elderly refugees, particularly those who are not able to earn a 
living, need to benefit from a support mechanism. 
• Instead of reimbursing the cost for health insurance to refugees, 
it should be paid directly and automatically by the Ministry of 
Interior. This would ensure patients with no money can still 
access health insurance.25
The problems of integration of refugees in Slovenia are not issues of 
inadequate normative coverage. Statutory provisions confer unto the 
refugee, rights that are equal to those of a citizen of Slovenia. What is 
more problematic is the issue of material equality. Factual 
circumstances prevent the refugees from making use of the rights and 
benefits provided by the legal instruments. The issue mentioned by the 
UNHCR regarding unemployment benefits is a good example of how 
formal equality of refugees and citizens can be inadequate in terms of 
refugees’ welfare and integration.  
 
Employment and integration counsellors should take a person’s 
specific situation more into account when providing information and 
advice and looking for creative ways to provide the refugees with an 
opportunity to enter the job market. The demand for flexible 
approaches to integration counselling and some thinking outside the 
box calls for analysis of possible role of NGOs and local communities 
in the process, as well as perhaps input by foreign NGOs with more 
experience in the field. 




                                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. p. 64. 
25 Being a refugee, p. 67. 
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Comments  
 
The overall impression is that it is unlikely that the country will resettle in 
the future despite establishing a clear legal basis for it. This is mainly for 
economic reasons. If Slovenia was to resettle in the future, this would 
only be possible by obtaining funds from the European Refugee Fund26
However, it is doubtful that even if (hypothetically) all costs of a 
possible resettlement were borne by outside actors (ERF), Slovenia 
would start resettling. Asylum recognition rates so far (since the 
establishment of a modern asylum system after independence and 
democratization) have not been high, which can be probably linked 
back to political wariness with regard to migration and its possible 
consequences.  
. 
This corresponds to the assertion that Slovenia does not resettle, to a 
large extent, due to its attempts to reduce public spending. 
In choosing between intra-EU relocation and third country resettlement, 
Slovenia is likely to bend towards the former. As solidarity has been 
exposed as the motivation for accepting refugees from countries of first 
asylum by the Ministry, it is a valid assumption that Slovenia will prefer 
to display solidarity with countries with which it shares common interest 
in the economic and political union. Slovenia can also expect more 
recognition in exchange for participation in intra-EU burden sharing. 
We can assume that this is not a negligible factor given that high level 
political decision is required to set the resettlement processes in 
motion. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the authorities 
emphasize how both of Slovenia’s experiences with 
resettlement/relocation were opportunities to build the knowledge base 
which can come in useful once the circumstances permit more 
relocation or resettlement. This attitude is promising. Slovenia’s public 
service is small and further relocation - but even more so resettlement - 
will represent a demanding project for the responsible authorities. Such 
a project would need other Member States’ know-how and previous 
experience to be implemented. 
 
                                                            
26 Interview with the Director General of the Directorate of Migration and Integration at the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 14 March 2012. 
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Country Profile: Spain 
Immigration became part of the Spanish government's agenda in 1985. With Spain's admission to the 
European Community in 1986, the country had to conform to EC legislation. In 1985, Spain's first piece of 
immigration legislation, the Ley de Extranjería, or the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in 
Spain, considered immigration as a temporary phenomenon and focused primarily on control over migrants 
already in the country. That 1985 legislation was more restrictive towards immigration and did not award 
any considerable rights to immigrants. A 1996 regulatory development (reglamento) to the 1985 law 
awarded migrants a set of subjective rights (access to education, equality, legal counsel, and an interpreter 
when dealing with authorities). That law strengthened the power of the regional governments to protect the 
rights of immigrant minors and formally established a quota system for temporary workers. Finally, the 
amendment established a permanent resident category and formally included family reunification within its 
framework. A special regularisation procedure on grounds of family reunification took place in 1994.1
The Law 8/2000 was the starting point for the emergence of the Global Programme to Regulate and 
Coordinate Foreign Residents' Affairs and Immigration in Spain. In addition to regularisation programmes, 
the country has experimented with a labour quota system to respond to short and long-term shortages in 
the labour market. Since 2002 the government is required to establish annual quotas for foreign workers. 
Between 2000 and 2010 the population of foreign nationals living in Spain increased significantly.  
 
In general, over the previous decade or so, the Spanish Government has recorded a decrease in the 
number of persons arriving in Spain by boat having departed from different points along the North African 
coast. The number of arrivals through other frontiers (i.e. airport and land borders) continues to be higher 
than arrivals by sea. Increased efforts have been made to monitor and control Spain’s sea borders with 
African States in order to prevent boats of migrants from North and Sub-Saharan Africa gaining access to 
Spanish territory.2
Since 2007, the number of persons seeking asylum in Spain has dropped considerably.
 This practice has been to the fore within the Spanish media, reinforcing the perception of 
the issue of irregular migration as being very topical in Spain.  
3 In 2011, 3,422 
persons sought asylum in Spain, a 20 percent increase from the previous year. However, it should be 
highlighted that from 2007 to 2009, there was a decrease year-on-year. This coincided with increased 
attention being given by the Spanish Government to the issue of border control. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult for persons to reach Spain’s shores as a result of Government policies concerning the protection of 
its sea borders.4 In 2011, in response to the number of Syrian refugees who began to seek asylum in 
Spain, the Spanish Government made changes which would prevent Syrians from landing in Barajas 
Airport, Madrid and seeking asylum there. Notwithstanding at least four rulings by the Andalusia High Court 
of Justice recognising the right of asylum-seekers to move freely throughout Spanish territory, the Ministry 
of the Interior continued to prevent asylum-seekers in Ceuta and Melilla from moving to the mainland.5
Spain has a long history of involvement in resettlement, with the first refugees being resettled in 1979.
 
6
                                                            
1 http://legislationline.org/topics/subtopic/33/topic/10/country/2 
 
Yet, it had no official resettlement programmes in place until 2012. Spain did not have any fixed 
resettlement quotas but it resettled on numerous occasions on an ad hoc basis when requested to do so by 
the UNHCR. In the 1980s, Spain participated in resettlement and humanitarian reception of persons and 
groups with international protection needs. The first cases of resettlement included Vietnamese and 
2 Further information available at: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Gobierno/News/2012/20120202_Immigration2011.htm and 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/idiomas/9/gobierno/news/2011/19012011immigrants2010.htm  
3 The following two links contain statistics on asylum in Spain from 2006 to 2010: http://www.mir.es/publicaciones-17/extranjeria-y-asilo-
967/asilo-en-cifras-968  
http://www.mir.es/publicaciones-17/extranjeria-y-asilo-967/memoria-de-la-oficina-de-asilo-y-refugio-970?locale=es Further 
information is also available in the following link: 
http://www.accem.es/refugiados/inmigrantes/index.php?pag=Refugio_2009&colleft=Col_Izq_Refugio&colright=Col_Der_Refugio_Es
pana_2009  
4 For further information please see the following CEAR report: http://cear.es/files/pdf2011/Informe%202011%20de%20CEAR.pdf  
5 Ibid.  
6 ACCEM Report, p.37: http://www.accem.es/ficheros/documentos/pdf_publicaciones/Estudio_Reasentamiento.pdf  
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Laotians in 1979/80. One of the final acts of ad hoc resettlement was the operation developed in 1999 by 
which 31 countries took part in the “humanitarian evacuation” of Alvano-Kosovars. During this operation, 
Spain received more than 1000 people and families, in coordination with national NGOs.  
In 2004, a platform of four NGOs, Cear, Rescate, the Spanish Red Cross and Accem, together with the 
UNHCR Office in Spain, wrote a common proposal (September 2004). This proposal suggested a National 
Resettlement Programme for Spain. These NGOs have had an active role in a variety of advocacy and 
lobbying activities, which have led to the setting up of the National Resettlement Programme.  
More recently, in October 2009, a new asylum law came into force, which for the first time made specific 
reference to establishing a resettlement programme in Spain.7 Although the new asylum law mentions 
resettlement, and in 2010 and 2011 the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the implementation of a 
resettlement programme,8
On the 17th of July 2012, Spain resettled 80 refugees following the UNHCR Global Resettlement 
Solidarity Initiative in 2011. That initiative called on States to pledge resettlement places for refugees 
stranded at the Libyan-Tunisian border, and to implement an emergency resettlement programme for them. 
This resettlement took place under the 2009 asylum law and according to the quota approved by the 
Council of Ministers in October 2011. It is understood that in the European and international context, 
political agreements and social contexts on the Mediterranean region led Spain to this decision.  
 the approval did not take place until 2012. Despite an official willingness to 
resettle, especially after the formal approval of the resettlement programme in the Council of Ministers, 
Spain has failed to carry out such resettlement. Recent financial constraints have influenced the political 
climate such that politicians now fear a negative backlash from the Spanish population If resettlement 
should proceed.  
For the media and the general public, resettlement remains relatively unkown. The public perception of 
refugees and asylum seekers stands out as a delicate issue. This is especially true in light of the 
unfavourable media coverage.  
The continuing problems in the Spanish economy have led to severe cuts to social services. 
Unemployment remains a serious issue for the Spanish government. The refugees who have resettled in 
Spain as part of this new programme are likely to experience serious challenges to their integration. 
Nonetheless, resettlement to Spain from a camp situation as harsh and insecure as Shousha in Tunisia, is 
a positive step for the people concerned.9




, provided that 
the Council approved the new Resettlement Programme in accordance with the Asylum Act. That 
programme authorizes the resettlement of up to 30 refugees per year for 2013 and 2014.  
                                                            
7 Spain’s new asylum law, in force since October 2009, see First Additional Provision for reference to resettlement. Resettlement is also 
mentioned in the preamble: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2009/10/31/pdfs/BOE-A-2009-17242.pdf  
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Asylum Profile 












o 337 (Refugee protection) 
 
o 651 (Other protection) 
610 (2010)13
o 245 (Refugee protection) 
 





Programme to start in 2013 
30/year 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Law 12/2009, of 30 October, 
regulating the right to asylum 






Law 4/2000, of 11 January, 
regarding the rights and 
freedoms of foreign nationals 
in Spain and their social 
integration. 
 
The new asylum law regulates the right to asylum and subsidiary 
protection as well as making a specific reference to the possibility of 
establishing a resettlement programme. This law replaced the previous 
asylum law, which had been in place since 1984 and did not make any 
reference to resettlement.14
The preamble of Law 12/2009 makes reference to the European 
framework governing refugee and asylum issues. The preamble of this 
law refers to the introduction of a legal framework for the adoption of 
resettlement programmes in solidarity with the international community 
and in search for durable solutions for refugees. The first additional 
disposition makes specific reference to establishing resettlement 
programmes in conjunction with the UNHCR and other relevant bodies.  
  
Law 4/2000 regulates the rights of foreign nationals in Spain. Article 36 of 
Law 12/2009 makes reference to Law 4/2000.15
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
 
Agreement between the 
Kingdom of Spain and the 




The Spanish Government shows its support for UNHCR programmes and 
activities. No specific reference was made to UNHCR’s resettlement 
programmes.  
 
                                                            
11 Ibid, and most recent Government report on asylum dated 2010: http://www.interior.gob.es/file/52/52992/52992.pdf 
12 Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/file/58/58075/58075.pdf  
13 Available at: http://www.interior.gob.es/file/55/55779/55779.pdf 
14 Ley 5/1984, de 26 de marzo, regulador del derecho del asilo y de la condición de refugiado: 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1984-7250 This law is no longer in force 
15 http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2000-544  
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Royal Decree 203/1995, of 
10 of February 1995 
 
Plurianual Plan 2008-2013 
 
Decisions by Council of 
Ministers approving the 
resettlement programmes 
2010 and 2011 
 
Communication of the 
Council of Ministers, 28 July 
201216
Article 4.2 makes specific reference to requests received from the 
UNHCR representative in Spain to the Spanish Government to urgently 
admit refugees recognised under its mandate, who are in a situation of 
high risk in a third country. 
 
Mentions the possibility of resettling a total of 350 people between 2010 
and 2013. The plan states that 50 people would be resettled in 2010, 75 in 
2011, 100 in 2012, and 125 in 2013.  
 
In 2010 and 2011 the Council of Ministers approved the establishment of 
resettlement programmes. The announcement by the Council of Ministers 
in 2010 made reference to the possibility of resettling 75 people, while a 
similar announcement in 2011 mentioned resettling 100 people.  
 
Approval of a new Resettlement Programme to resettle up to 30 refugees 
during 2013 and 2014.  
 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
On 17 July 2012, the country responded to a UNHCR resettlement 
request to pledge resettlement places for refugees stranded at the 
Libyan-Tunisian border. The resettlement of 80 refugees was made under 
the new Spanish asylum law and the quota approved by the Council of 
Ministers in October 2011.  
28 July 2012 marked another commitment by Spanish Government to 
resettle around 30 refugees/year for the coming years: 2013-2014. The 
programme will pay special attention to refugees with particular 
vulnerable profiles such as families, women and minors. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  













Spain has been involved in resettling on an ad hoc basis since 1978.17
  1,000 refugees from Vietnam and Laos.  
 As 
such, resettlements were not conducted as part of resettlement 
programmes and no strict, well-defined selection criteria existed. The 
Government responded to requests from the UNHCR and resettled 
people from a myriad of nationalities. 
500 Cuban refugees were resettled in Spain following the processing of 
applications, which were presented at the Spanish embassy in Peru.  
Spain responded positively to requests made by UNHCR to resettle 
people from a number of different countries including:  
− Kurds from the Iraqi camps. Kurdish -Iranians, Iraqis who were 
victims of the Gulf War and their resettlements were arranged 
mostly from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
− 50 Vietnamese refugees were resettled in Spain 
Refugees from the former Yugoslavia were resettled in Spain: 
− 154 Bosnian refugees of Sefardi origin 
 
                                                            
16 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referencias/_2012/refc20121228.htm#Refugiados 
17 ACCEM report which shows the resettlements, which have taken place in Spain since 1979. (page 37): 
http://www.accem.es/ficheros/documentos/pdf_publicaciones/Estudio_Reasentamiento.pdf  
See also the following link which details the resettlement of Cubans who had fled Cuba and were held in Guantanamo Bay 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_1998/c1303980.htm  
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     2003-2008 
Governmental approval of 1,000 ex convicted persons from Bosnia, as 
well as 700 ex-detainees from Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Resettlement: Medical Evacuation. Ex Yugoslavs. 16 cases. Spanish Red 
Cross 
   20 Vietnamese refugees 
135 “Balseros Cubans”, without UNHCR:  
− 110 Cubans resettled in Spain from Guantanamo  
− 20 Cubans resettled from Guantanamo18
17 Afghan refugees from Uzbekistan 
 
Spain received roughly 50 families from Georgia, in which one family 
member was Spanish.19




b) On a programme basis 
 
2012 
80 refugees, stranded in the Shousha camp in Tunisia for almost a year, 






In response to a request from UNHCR, Spain took part in a UNHCR 
humanitarian evacuation programme by resettling 1,426 Kosovar-
Albanians21
These resettlements were due to be temporary in nature. The first of 
those to arrive landed at Torrejón de Ardoz base, Madrid. From there 
they were taken to a reception centre (Centro de Acogida y Derivación) 
in Sigüenza, Guadalajara. They were then placed in various provinces 
throughout Spain. 
. 




At the national level different initiatives developed in 2007 and 2008 in the 
form of two reports. One done by CEAR under the title of “Estudio 
prospectivo para la búsqueda de alternativas al reasentamiento en 
España”, and other by Accem “Informe Prospective para el Desarrollo de 
un Programa Español de Reasentamiento Accem 2009” with the 
objective of studying alternative solutions for the implementation of a 
Spanish Resettlement programme and the creation and development of a 
national network interested in promoting a resettlement programme 
where apart from the traditionally mentioned NGOs, there was 
representation from IOM, the Ministries of Employment and Interior, the 
local councils and other NGOs such as Save the Children, and Amnesty 
International among others.  
                                                            
18 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_1998/c1303980.htm  
19 Interview with the advisor of the Ministry for Employment and Social Security 
20 See report for figures, p.12. Nationality was verified through correspondence with a member of staff of the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security.  
http://www.unrefugees.org/atf/cf/%7BD2F991C5-A4FB-4767-921F-A9452B12D742%7D/2008StatisticalReport.pdf  
21 The following are a number of links to Government decisions and press releases regarding the resettlement of Kosovar Albanians in 
Spain under the aforementioned humanitarian evacuation programme.  
This link makes reference to Spain helping to set up camps in Albania to welcome and care for Kosovar Albanians who may 
eventually be transferred to Spanish civil organisations: 
 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_1999/c1712990.htm  
This link is to a Government press release which makes reference to the funding which was to be allocated for the relocation of 
Kosovar-Albanians to Spain, among other aspects of the relocation: 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/ruedas/_1999/r2805990.htm  
Agreement to resettle, temporarily, Kosovar-Albanians in Spain: 
 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_1999/c2805990.htm  
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/_1999/c2304990.htm  
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As a result of the collaboration with other European NGOs in the field, the 
Spanish NGO Accem took part in different European projects22
MOST
 of the 
ERF (European Refugee Fund). All these projects were aiming at 
enhancing knowledge and political will in EU member states to engage in 
resettlement. One of these projects was the  (Modelling of 
Orientation, Services and Training related to the Resettlement and 






















In 2010, Spain received three ex-prisoners who had been detained in 
Guantanamo on suspicion of being terrorists. Those resettled were of 
Palestinian, Yemeni, and Afghan origin and were settled in February, 
May, and July 2009, respectively.23
As a last example of a political measure that could be and has been 
named by certain stakeholders as resettlement, it is worth mentioning the 
case of the Cuban nationals that under the framework of the agreements 
between the Spanish Government, the Catholic Church in Cuba and the 
Cuban government signed in July 2010, where it was decided to give 
protection and reception in Spain to a group of dissidents released from 
prison, with and their families to Spain
 
24
Accem, together with other two NGOs – Spanish Red Cross and CEAR- 
were called to assume and organize jointly and in a coordinated way with 
the Ministry of Foreign affairs and the previous Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration – MTIN (current Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs - 
MEYSS) an intervention plan that would include the reception and 
integration of these families in the Spanish Society.  
. 
April 2011 a second group of the released prison dissidents to Spain. In 
total, Spain has received 770 relatives of Cuban political prisoners 
following a petition from the Catholic Church in Cuba. 25
In December 2011 a selection mission composed by representative 
members of the General Directorate of Interior Policy and the General 
Directorate of Integration of the Immigrants from the previous Ministry of 
Labour and Immigration (current Ministry of Employment and Social 
Affairs) travelled to Malta. On that occasion it was decided that there 
would be no relocation. The government representatives in charge stated 
that the potential beneficiaries were not willing to travel to Spain as they 
were waiting for the opportunity to relocate to another State.  
 
Comments Under the previous Government, the Council of Ministers approved the 
establishment of two resettlement programmes. No one was actually 
resettled under these programmes. The Government did not issue any 
formal position about its failure to carry out resettlements under law 
12/2009. While on the one hand it seemed that Spain was anxious to be 
seen to participate in EU and UN initiatives with regard to refugee 
issues, it appears that Spain also feared a negative response from the 
Spanish public.26





“CCME Resettlement – broadening the basis in Europe”  
ICMC. “European Network for Practical Cooperation in Resettlement”  
Welcome to Europe. A guide to Resettlement http://www.icmc.net/pdf/welcome_to_europe.pdf 
http://www.accem.es/ficheros/documentos/pdf_publicaciones/BienvenidoEuropa. 
23 http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ServiciosdePrensa/NotasPrensa/MIR/_2010/ntpr20100504_Guatanamo.htm  
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ServiciosdePrensa/NotasPrensa/MIR/_2010/ntpr20100722_Guantanamo.htm 
24 Suite101: Moratinos y la liberación de presos políticos en Cuba. http://carlosperez.suite101.net/liberacion-de-presos-politicos-en-
cuba-a20701; http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/07/07/cuba/1278525697.html 
25 Interview with the advisor of the Ministry for Employment and Social Security 
26 This was the opinion offered by a member of staff of the Ministry for Employment and Social Security during an exchange of emails in 
January 2012. 
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In July 2012 the Government in place pledged to resettle 80 refugees and 
in December 2012 it committed again to resettle on a programme-basis. 





80 refugees of Eritrean, Sudanese and Somalia origin: 22 men, 25 
women and 33 children originally coming from Eritrea, Ethiopia and 
Sudan. 
- 4 of them were granted refugee status  
- 74 of them were granted subsidiary protection  
- 2 of them were granted family reunification 
Country of first asylum: Tunisia  
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
UNHCR Global Resettlement Solidarity Initiative 27
The criteria for the selection and profile covered by the programme will be 
defined on a yearly basis according to UNHCR recommendations in 
conjunction with EU policies. 
. 
The quota and number of beneficiaries will be decided on a yearly basis 
very much linked to the financial resources available and the political 
priorities, which exist at that moment.  
Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 








Previously the selection of the cases was done through the presentation of 
the cases by UNHCR to the correspondent competent national authorities. 
The acceptation process was coordinated by the Ministry of Interior.  
UNHCR prepared refugees dossiers, which were sent to the OAR – 
Oficina de Asilo y Refugio – Asylum and Refugee Office for examination 
and consideration. 
2011: Selection interviews were carried out in the first semester 2011 by 
OAR representatives on a selection mission to Syria after revising the 
dossiers sent to Spain by the UNHCR. 
2012: Representative of the Ministry of the Interior conducted a selection 
mission in Shousha in June 2012, leaded by the General Director of 
Interior Policy.  
It is generally understood that the cases will be chosen from the dossiers 
forwarded by UNHCR in the future.  
The departure procedures were implemented in close coordination with 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. The 
refugees were documented with a “salvoconducto” (safe conduct) issued 
by the Spanish Embassy in Tunisia, which was used to move them from 
the refugee camp into Spain. 
                                                            
27 http://www.unhcr.org/4e11735e6.html 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
 
• Cultural orientation (CO) 
 
• Assistance with travel 
documents 
 
• Medical screening 
 
2011: Cultural Orientation was provided. Information sessions 
implemented by IOM covering important information about Spain took 
place.  
IOM in close collaboration with the Spanish embassy, has assisted the 80 
refugees with their travel from Shousha camp to Madrid including the 
facilitation of departure and arrival procedures.  
So far and considering the experience in 2012 with the 80 persons 
resettled from Tunisia, no medical screenings were done. All the 
screening took place once they were in Spain.  
Procedure Timing The resettlement process - from selection to arrival - took 
approximately 3 months. 
Comments  Putting in place a cultural orientation programme was brought up by all 
stakeholders at a very early stage. The Ministries in charge consulted 
each other on existing comparative practices. It seems that this may be 
developed more broadly, with a detailed contents outline for the next 
programmes in place. During the 2012 resettlement process, this has 
been implemented by IOM. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
Status granted  
Law 12/2009, of 30 October, 
regulating the right to asylum 
and subsidiary protection 
 
Law 12/2009 states that those resettled will receive the same refugee 
status as other refugees in Spain. 
The 80 refugees resettled in 2012 were granted refugee status or 
subsidiary protection depending on the different profiles.  
Rights granted  
Legal source 
Article 36 of Asylum Law 







Info upon arrival 
 









Refugees accepted for resettlement are granted rights according to 
Article 36 of Law 12/2009 as well Law 4/2000.  
These two laws guarantee basic rights such as health, education, the 
right to seek employment, family reunification etc.  
The resettled refugees have the right to reside and work permanently 
under the terms established by the Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January on 
the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration. 
Government entities: representative members of the Ministry of 
Employment, and Ministry of Interior will meet refugees at the airport. In 
2011, NGOs were also present (Accem, CEAR and the Spanish Red 
Cross). They are then accompanied to different reception centres for 
period of 6 months minimum depending on the situation. 
Information is given in reception centre. 
 
No 
The programme conducted was for all asylum seekers or refugees 
staying on any reception centre in Spain. After leaving the centre, 
refugees benefit from any other general service addressed to regular 
migrants as well as the Spanish general society. This is facilitated by the 
NGOs involved who were also in charge of managing the reception 
centres as they are experienced in the field of integration. Once the 
resettled refugees are in Spain, they will be supported by the government 
for a period of two years. 
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Advice of Accessing 
Services  
Mentoring 








   Medical screening 
Social integration has been divided into 3 stages. The first is within the 
reception centre, the second is called “autonomy” in which financial 
support, guidance and follow up will be carried out by NGOs such as 
Accem, Cear and the Spanish Red Cross. For the third stage, it will be 
decided on a case by case basis whether any additional financial or 
guidance will be required.  
As with all asylum seekers, initial accommodation is available for 6 
months and up to 12 months. This depends upon the level of vulnerability 
and profile of every case in reception centres (“Centros de Acogida a 
Refugiados”), which are directly managed by the Ministry of Employment 
& Social Security or run by NGOs such as ACCEM, CEAR and Cruz Roja 
under contract with the same Ministry.  
They will benefit from the same conditions and financial support as any 
other asylum seeker and/or refugee covered under the Spanish reception 
and accommodation services. Once they leave the reception centre and 
pass the second phase of the programme they will be connected with the 
municipalities. In most cases this will be the same municipalities in which 
the reception centres are located.  
A social orientation class is offered in the reception centre. The contents 
include information on schooling, expenses, food, housing, 
transportation, environment etc.  
Spanish classes are offered upon arrival within every reception centre. 
Once refugees and/or beneficiaries of international protection are in 
private housing, NGOs will help to provide language classes depending 
on and the relevant profiles as well as the existing budget at that time. 
NGOs assist refugees in finding employment. Every refugee case 
presented by NGOs should go through a formal process carried out by 
the employment services. This process would involve advisory 
consultations on the development and implementation of skills and tools 
for job seeking, as well as the facilitation of employer’s contacts.  
In Spain, people with a refugee protection status (for 5 years), and/or 
subsidiary protection (1 year) can apply for family reunification. 
Nevertheless for resettled refugees it is possible to apply for family 
reunification, to which the procedure is easier and shorter with fewer 
requirements for documentation to support it. 
There is no formal programme as such, although support or assistance 
could always be provided in a medium and long term by the NGOs 
addressed if demanded by the beneficiaries. 
No formal or specific training for resettlement is offered. 
 
None mentioned.  
Housing is organized by NGOs organizations (Accem, Cear, and Spanish 
Red Cross) and/or by the Ministry of Employment. The resettled persons 
stay in reception centres for the first 6 months and for up to 18 months (in 
exceptional cases). After the resettled person leaves the centre, 
information about the possible existing services within the local and 
regional territories will be provided and refer to: education and contacts, 
access to public assistance and health care, managing household 
budgets, etc. 
All resettled persons were sent to the General Health Services. 
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Comments Considering that only recently 80 refugees have been resettled under 
Law 12/2009, it is not possible to evaluate how successful it is at 
integrating the resettled refugees into Spanish society. No formal 
evaluation research has been done, this makes it very difficult to evaluate 
whether previous resettlements have been successful or not.28
Though a very recent programme was carried out, few 
gaps/recommendations have been highlighted by all the stakeholders 
interviewed during 2012:  
  
- The development of a detailed programme for the resettlement 
(i.e., stakeholder’s roles, administrative procedures...) where all the 
elements should be defined for each time the programme will be 
implemented.  
- Design and Development of awareness raising and training 
addressed to all stakeholders involved.  
- The different stakeholders involved in the resettlement process 
should have specific training on resettlement as a necessary tool 
to better understand the process.  
- Determination of the resettled refugees through the same 
institution, the CIAR.  
- The involvement of NGOs during the pre- departure and post-
arrival activities of the resettlement programme must be 
considered as being a key element in the integration process.  
- Final reception and integration should be formally coordinated by 
local and regional authorities (the Autonomous Communities – 
CCAA). While all the stakeholders recognised the importance of 
CCAA role, their competences seems to be centralized both during 
the process.  
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 















Resettlement is funded by the budget allocated to the Secretary General 
of Immigration and Emigration, as part of the annual “presupuestos 
generals del Estado”, general State budgets following agreements made 
with the UNHCR and NGOs, and other subsidies agreements.  
The Ministry of Labour and Immigration, which is now the Ministry for 
Employment and Social Security published a communication dated 4 
October 2011, in which the Ministry outlines its draft immigration budget 
for 2011.29
At present ERF can co-finance resettlement efforts and actions, if such a 
necessity arises. 
 The Ministry earmarked a budgetary figure of €268 million for 
the development of immigration and emigration policies in 2011, €7,5 
million of which was to be spent on immigration and €141,4 million on the 
integration of immigrants. It is likely that some of this funding would have 
gone to resettlement projects had they occurred. The text of the 
communication did not however make specific reference to resettlement. 
It stated that the Department’s priorities with regard to immigration 
continues to be: the orderly management of migration flows; cooperation 
and international dialogue with the countries of origin; and the fight 
against illegal immigration and integration policies that favour coexistence 
and social cohesion. 
30
                                                            
28 When information was requested from a member of staff at the Ministry for Employment and Social Security regarding this point, the 
researcher was informed that the staff member did not have such information.  
 
29 http://extranjeros.meyss.es/es/Actualidad/documentos/NOTA_PRESUPUESTOS_2011.pdf  
30 Interview with the advisor of the Ministry for Employment and Social Security 
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 In the ERF Pluriannual Plan 2008-2013
31
Costs 
, funding is to be allocated for 
resettlement. Between 2008 and 2013, the Pluriannual Plan foresaw a 
spending total of €1.997.013, 00 on resettlement initiatives for the 
resettlement of 350 persons. The resettlement mentioned in this plan has 
not happened. It remains to be seen whether those due to take place in 
2012 and 2013 will go ahead.  
The ERF mentions allocating funding for related projects run by NGOs in 
Spain. A refugee resettlement programme by ACCEM is listed as one of 
the projects chosen to receive financial assistance, €102,094.31.32
Using the aforementioned approval of the establishment of a resettlement 
programme for reference, the primary source of funding would have been 
the Ministry for Labour and Immigration which is now the Ministry for 
Employment and Social Security. 
  
The approval mentions that €23,353.18 is the estimated cost of the 
selection mission for this particular programme undertaken by officers from 
the Office of Asylum and Refugee, funded by the Ministry of the Interior.  
In short, taking this approval as an example, the funding would be split 
between the Ministry for Labour and Immigration, now the Ministry for 
Employment and Social Security and the Ministry of the Interior. In the 
approval there is no mention of using funds from the ERF. 
There are no official government figures available regarding the funding 
allocated for previous ad hoc resettlement programmes. Official State 
reports do not provide details on government expenditure allocated to 
resettlement specifically and only provide general figures for ministries, 
government bodies, etc.33
The new Resettlement Programme to be embarked will be mainly 
implemented by Home Affairs and Labour and Social Security Ministries 




Due to Spain’s geographical location, it historically has had strong ties 
with the north of Africa. In recent years Spain has sought to control and 
monitor Spanish sea borders in order to curb the flow of migrants who 
often arrive to Spanish shores. It seems that much of Spain’s time and 
energy with regard to immigrants, has been spent developing tactics 
designed to keep immigrants out rather than letting them in. In recent 
years the number of persons seeking asylum has dropped, as has the 
number of persons gaining access to Spain by crossing the Straits of 
Gibraltar by boat or travelling to the Canary Islands.  
Although Spain committed to embark a new resettlement programme for 
2013 and 2014, it still remains to be seen if Spain will resettle refugees in 
the future. It seems that the focus of the Spanish Government is towards 
bringing Spain out of the economic crisis and therefore, resettlement in 
the future will most likely depend on Spain’s economic performance.  
From the interviews with stakeholders, the importance of a successful 
implementation of the resettlement programme during 2012-2013 was 
stressed on many occasions. This reasoning is linked with choosing a 
certain group of refugees seen as having a lower degree of vulnerability 
in comparison with special case such as medical cases or elderly people 
who could be seen as bring more of an economic burden.  
                                                            
31http://extranjeros.meyss.es/es/Fondos_comunitarios/programa_solidaridad/refugiados/pdf/FER_Plan_Plurianual_2008_2013_MTIN.p
df The following is a link to the Government resolution regarding proposals presented by NGOs etc, applying for funding. 
Resettlement projects are listed as one area that may be financed: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2008/11/18/pdfs/A45909-45925.pdf 
Another link is being included here to a resolution made by the Directorate General for the Integration of Immigrants which makes 
reference to financing programmes using the ERF. There is a specific reference made to resettlement programmes at the end of 
this document in “Anexo A”: http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-15165  
32 http://extranjeros.meyss.es/en/Fondos_comunitarios/programa_solidaridad/refugiado/  
33 This point was communicated to the researcher through correspondence with a member of staff of the ministry of Employment and 
Social Security 
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Questions regarding the European Union are seen as being too distant 
from the issues affecting Spain. The EASO for example was considered as 
having an important role regarding resettlement but with limitations due to 
the lack of funds and human resources. It appears that no European 
policies or any other European institutions address the Spanish issues.  
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Country Profile: SWEDEN 
The Swedish Government officially aims for Sweden to have a humane asylum policy and to be a haven for 
those fleeing from persecution and oppression. This policy has strong support in the parliament.1 Sweden – 
together with France and Germany – receives the largest numbers of asylum-seekers into Europe.2
In terms of party politics, the Swedish immigration policy is characterized by a broad political consensus. 
All parties in parliament, except the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), describe their immigration 
policies as "generous." Curiously, the far-right party the Swedish Democrats is positive towards 
resettlement; basically they want to restrict the reception of refugees only to Convention refugees and 
quota refugees.  
 In 
2001, Sweden became a full member of Schengen and its borders became much more open thereafter. 
These opened borders, together with the new (Öresund) bridge connection to Denmark, resulted in an 
increase of the number of asylum seekers in Sweden in the early part of the new millennium. 
Turning to the Swedish media’s perspective, immigration and asylum issues are high on the agenda, 
while resettlement is not. The Swedish Migration Board would like to raise awareness of quota refugees 
among the public because resettlement is seen as being an important part of Sweden's humanitarian 
responsibility and as being relevant to its development aid and UN activities. However, there is a risk that 
the good-will gained by focusing on quota refugees may reduce the general public’s acceptance of 
spontaneous asylum seekers arriving in Sweden.3 There is an opinion among the general public that quota 
refugees are the only ‘real’ refugees.4 Overall, Swedes’ attitudes toward immigrants have never been as 
accepting as they are now. According to a recent survey from Gothenburg University, Swedish people have 
become less xenophobic in the past 15 years. In 1993, 52 % agreed with the statement "There are too 
many foreigners in Sweden", while in 2009 only 36 % did.5
Resettlement in Sweden started in 1950 when the first annual refugee quota was set. It is a supplement to 
the asylum system and is unaffected by the number of people who apply for asylum in Sweden each year. To 
begin with, the Swedish refugee quota was a contribution to emptying the refugee camps in Europe after the 
Second World War. At the time, Sweden also suffered a labour shortage. In fact, nine out of ten of the 
collective transferred refugees between 1950 and until mid-1970's was of working age and able-bodied. 
Sweden's resettlement activities have since then taken a completely different direction. Sweden was one of 
the first countries in the world that received tuberculosis and disabled refugees for resettlement. In the 1980s, 
resettlement acquired a humanitarian focus. Sweden is not only the "oldest" European resettlement country
 
6 
but also the country that offers most resettlement places in Europe.7 What is more, Sweden is also one of the 
largest resettlement countries (per capita) in the world.8 This generous resettlement practice is in line with 
Sweden’s liberal refugee policy. It is also at one with the overall approach to resettlement in the Nordic 
countries which consider it as a vital tool for international protection of refugees.9
 
 
                                                            
1 The Government Offices website at: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9688 
2 UNHCR website: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48f056.html  
3 Migration Board presentation at the seminar “Sweden’s refugee quota” in Haparanda, dated April 2009. 
4 Migration Board webpage "Quota refugees - the only real refugees"(»Kvotflyktingar — det är bara de som är riktiga 
flyktingar»): http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/4414.html  
5 One of the main Swedish newspapers: Dagens Nyheter (2010). Art. ”Svenskarna blir alltmer positiva till invandrare”. 
Dated 2010-05-24 at: http://www.dn.se/debatt/svenskarna-blir-alltmer-positiva-till-invandrare  
6 Migration Board, “Resettlement to another life” (Vidarebosättning till ett annat liv), Thematic Report 3:2010: 
http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/495.html  
7 The Government Offices of Sweden website at: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9688/a/90410  
8 Migration Board presentation at the seminar “Sweden’s refugee quota” in Haparanda, dated April 2009, op.cit. 
9 Resettlement in the Nordic Countries, Mette Honoré, Danish Refugee Council, September 2003, at: 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=159  
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The legal basis for resettlement is contained in the Aliens Act, which came into force on 31 March 2006 
and replaced the 1989 Aliens Act. The reform was aimed at strengthening the rule of law in the field of 
migration.10 The current Act offers a better distinction between the various grounds for residence permit 
and emphasises the need for protection. The definition of protection has been extended to cover those 
who, because of severe conflicts in their home country, feel a well-founded fear of persecution.11 In 
particular, the Act clarifies that persons accepted for resettlement must be granted a residence permit12. 
Since the current Act came into force, the proportion of persons in need of protection granted residence 
permits has increased with respect to the total number of residence permits issued.13
                                                            
10 Migration Board (2010).“Migration 2000–2010”. Report 2:2010. 
 
www.migrationsverket.se  
11 Parliamentary protocol 2004/05:130, Debate, Speaker: (at the time Minister of Migration and Asylum Policy) Barbro 
Holmberg (social democrat), 31 May 2004:  
http://beta.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Dokument/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-200405130-Tisdagen-den-31-
maj_GS09130/  
12 Government bill (2004/05:170) “New instance and process order in the Aliens and citizenship issues” handed over to 
the Parliament on May 26, 2005: www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/04/55/68/018827d5.pdf  
13 Government communication to the Parliament (2010/11:29), Migration and asylum policy, 28 October 2010: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/webbnav/index.aspx?nid=37&dok_id=GY0329 
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Asylum Profile 












− 2,870 (Refugee protection) 
− 7,960 (Other Protection) 
10,344 (2010) 
− 2,304 (Refugee protection) 
− 8,040 (Other Protection) 
29,648 (2011) 
31,819 (2010) 
Programme-Based (since 1950) 
1,900/year 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
The Aliens Act, 2005 with 
latest amendments in 2012 
 
 
Specific provision on Resettlement: 
The Aliens Act (2005:716), Chapter 5. ‘Residence permit for persons 
otherwise in need of protection’, Section 2: 
“A residence permit shall be given to an alien who has been received in 
Sweden within the framework of a decision that the Government has 
issued on the transfer to Sweden of persons in need of protection 
(resettlement)”. 
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Decision: “Spending 
authorization for year 2012 
regarding the Migration 





- Distribution of places, 
strategic and operational 
assessments for fiscal year 
2012”, Migration Board 








Shapes the resettlement quota and Shapes the resettlement quota and 
from which countries refugees are resettled. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
No planned reform. No change is expected regarding the annual 
resettlement quota, which had been increased by 200 between 2006 
and 2008. The annual resettlement programme has worked out very 
well and the Swedish government does not see any reason for 
changing this.18
                                                            
14 Source: Migration Board, permit statistics. 
 
15 Available at: http://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.78fcf371269cd4cda980004204/tabs2.pdf 
16 ‘Spending authorization’ is an official document placing appropriations at the disposal of the authorities concerned.  
17 The website of the Swedish National Financial Management Authority at: http://www.esv.se/Verktyg--
stod/Statsliggaren/Regleringsbrev/?RBID=13902  
18 Interview with the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 30 March 2012. 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis Sweden has always resettled on a programme basis. 































2012 Countries from which refugees are resettled (country of origin)19
Kenya (Somali citizens)  350 
: 
Sudan (Eritrean citizens, etc.)  150 
Djibouti (Somali citizens, etc.)  100 
Iran (Afghan citizens)  400 
Tunisia (mixed nationalities)  200 
Ecuador (Colombian citizens) 100 
Pool for flexible use (mixed nationalities) 250 
Acute cases (mixed nationalities) 350 
Sweden does not apply any specific sub-quota.  
The Swedish programme allocates a significant number of places for 
urgent and emergency cases each year. For 2008, this number was set 





                                                            
19 “Resettlement 2012 - Distribution of places, strategic and operational assessments for fiscal year 2012”, Migration 
Board decision N° GDA 6/2012, dated 2012-01-23 
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UNHCR Trust Fund for 
Enhancing Resettlement 
Activities 
Mexico Plan of Action 
 
“Spending authorization 
for year 2012 regarding 
the Migration Board”, 





In the framework of the MOST project, Spain took part in the Swedish 
selection missions in order to find out how the resettlement process 
could be organised. Representatives of the Spanish government from 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs participated in selection 
missions to Jordan with the Swedish partner in June 2007. The related 
fact-finding missions created a model that can be used for organising 
similar twinning activities in the future.  
In the past, Sweden has used part of its resettlement funding for 
projects aimed at supporting refugees and promoting resettlement in 
third countries through ‘Regional Resettlement’ initiatives, e.g. the 
Colombian Project (2000-2002); and the UNHCR Trust Fund for 
Enhancing Resettlement Activities (a Nordic initiative piloting regional 
resettlement in Burkina Faso and Benin).20
Until 2009, the yearly spending authorization from the Ministry of 
Justice contained the following wording (translated from Swedish by the 
author): “The Migration Board, in consultation with UNHCR, shall 
explore the possibility of taking measures to facilitate alternative 
resettlement primarily in third countries." This wording was dropped in 
the 2010-spending authorization and currently there seems to be no 
funding of resettlement in third countries. 
 Moreover, Sweden was part 
of a project called the Mexico Plan of Action (2006) aimed at the 











Sweden is very doubtful towards relocation. Institutional stakeholders 
would prefer other instruments than relocation to help EU Member 
States that have limited capacity for receiving refugees21
Comments 
. 
When Sweden was chairing the ATCR and WGR (2009-2010), they 
selected the theme ‘Increased Global Commitment and Capability for 
Resettlement’.22














                                                            
20 Source: International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Welcome to Europe! A Guide to Resettlement: A 
Comparative Review of Resettlement in Europe.  
21 Interview with the Swedish Ministry of Justice, 16 May 2012.  
22 Migration Board (2010). Reporting of completed chairmanship of UNHCR’s Annual Tripartite Consultations on 
Resettlement (ATCR) and Working Group on Resettlement (WGR). Final report. 2010-10-04. (on file) 
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a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  





• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
The yearly resettlement planning is carried out through a dialogue with 
UNHCR. Usually, UNHCR makes concrete suggestions, giving specific 
weight to strategic resettlement and efforts to resolve protracted 
refugee situations. Also of influence is the availability of Swedish 
dossier selection places and other resettlement countries' allocations.23
An applicant must meet the criteria of the Geneva Convention or meet the 
criteria for subsidiary protection to be offered resettlement in Sweden. 
 
The Swedish programme does not specify resettlement criteria or 
special categories. However, the quota for resettlement and the 
countries from which the refugees are drawn was shaped by the 
following considerations: 
1. UNHCR requests for destinations and target groups in accordance 
with “UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2012”; 
2. Sweden's willingness to contribute to solving protracted refugee 
situations and the desire to use resettlement strategically; 
3. Sweden's ability to act quickly to resettle people with urgent needs; 
4. Sweden's ability to use the dossier selection method extensively. 
Sweden offers resettlement also to Tribunal witnesses and their family 
members.24
Sweden does not require any other assessments (of medical needs, 




While there is no specified sub-quota, Sweden accepts limited 




In accordance with the principle of family unity, resettlement is 
generally offered to all family members even if the need for protection 
only applies to one or a few. This applies to the core family - that is 
married or unmarried spouses and their children (under 18 years of 
age). The Migration Board may in exceptional cases decide to offer 
resettlement to only one or some of the family members. 
 
27
Moreover, Sweden uses the Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) in 
Romania in cases when they cannot find places in the Swedish 
municipalities fast enough for the resettling persons. It occurs only in a 
few cases per year. The MB has no agreement with UNHCR on 
receiving a particular number of refugees from the centre. 
 
                                                            
23 Annual program of the European Refugee Fund 2010: Sweden. (Årligt program Europeiska flyktingfonden 
2010).(2010): www.migrationsverket.se 
24 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Country Chapter: Sweden, July 2011.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 




















The Swedish Migration Board (Migrationsverket), acting on behalf of the 
Government, is the main actor responsible for resettlement to Sweden. 
In accordance with the annual government decision, the Migration 
Board draws up the guidelines for the resettlement program and defines 
the proposed composition and any regional focus.28
Cases should be submitted by UNHCR; a Swedish diplomatic mission 
can make submissions only in exceptional cases.  
  
The Migration Board decides on composition of resettled persons – i.e. 
which refugee groups, nationalities and from which countries - in close 
cooperation with UNHCR.29 UNHCR suggests a composition annually 
and the Migration Board makes the final decision after a consultation 
with UNHCR and the Swedish Government Offices 
(Regeringskansliet).30 To further prepare the resettlement programme 
decision, the Migration Board contacts Sweden’s foreign missions in 
the countries from which the resettled refugees are to be taken. They 
are given an opportunity to comment on issues such as security, 
support for Swedish personnel in mission selection and issuance of 
travel documents to the selected refugees. Different units within the 
Migration Board are also asked for input. Finally, the Swedish Security 
Police (SÄPO) is contacted regarding safety-related aspects.31
The resettlement quota is divided almost equally between processing 
via in-country selection and dossier selection. In contrast to other 
resettlement countries, the slight majority of Sweden's quota is selected 
through dossier selection.  
 
The trade-off between mission vs. dossier selection is mainly based on 
the following reasons: 
1. The security situations in the countries of first asylum do not 
always permit missions (in particular, in-country travels of 
refugees coming to selections are deemed as dangerous), e.g. 
in 2012, missions were not judged possible in Eritrea. 
2. In some cases, dossier selection is not sufficient because there 
is a need for in-depth investigations, e.g. in 2012; in-depth 
investigations were judged necessary in the case of Somali 
refugees in Eritrea and Yemen.  
3. Sweden has carried out selection missions in Sudan in 2009 
and 2010. In 2011, dossier selection was applied and had high 
granting frequency of status (98% for Eritrean refugees). On the 
basis of this result, the Migration Board judged that dossier 
selection is both possible and effective in Sudan. Another factor 
that contributed to the choice of dossier selection were previous 
logistical difficulties of missions in Sudan.  
 
                                                            
28 Migration Board webpage "Quota refugees - the only real refugees"(»Kvotflyktingar — det är bara de som är riktiga 
flyktingar»): http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/4414.html  
29 Migration Board homepage: http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/495.html  
30 Migration Board presentation at the seminar “Sweden’s refugee quota” in Haparanda, dated April 2009 
31 Migration board website: Annual program of the European Refugee Fund 2010: Sweden. (Årligt program Europeiska 
flyktingfonden 2010).(2010): www.migrationsverket.se 
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Each year the Swedish Migration Board undertakes 4-5 in-country 
selection missions.32 The Migration Board’s annual resettlement 
programme defines what kind of selection missions are planned for the 
year, when, to which countries, what groups of refugees they should 
select and how many. However, the programme also leaves room for 
flexibility: an unexpected conflict or political complications in any part of 
the world can impede planned selection missions. Hence, priorities can 
be changed in order not to leave unused resettlement places.33
To facilitate preparations, the Migration Board uses the Pre-Mission 
Questionnaire for Resettlement Interview Missions and Pre-Mission 
Checklist for Resettlement Interview Missions supplied by UNHCR. 
Pre-missions are also used to meet with partners on site and to jointly 
discuss timelines, risks and objectives concerning the selection. 
 
All documentation i.e. by Resettlement Registration Form (RRF) 
and all possible supplementary documentation should be provided by 
UNHCR and made available at least one month before the planned 
date of departure. To ensure sufficient scope for selection and avoid 
no-shows, presentations should envisage about 25% more persons 
than will be selected.  
The Migration Board emphasizes that information on special 
medical or other needs or treatment should be mentioned in the RRF in 
order to be better prepared for the refugees’ reception and integration.  
Interviews are carried out on an individual basis and the aim is to 
supplement the information provided in the RRF, hence to provide a 
sufficient base for the assessment of refugee status and final decision 
by the Migration Board. 
Grounds for rejection are given orally and in writing.  
Pre-Departure Activities 
















Up until 2009, Swedish cultural orientation and other pre-departure 
preparations were limited. Refugees selected by missions received 
limited information about Swedish society and what resettlement 
means at the time of their interview. Only a few of those subsequently 
selected have had the opportunity to participate in a cultural orientation 
programme. Reasons for a lack of preparatory initiatives include 
funding issues and insufficient organization. 
Sweden has now developed and included pre-departure cultural 
orientation into the resettlement programme. The scope and length of 
the cultural orientation varies depending on the needs of each target 
group, but generally two types of sessions are used: full cultural 
orientation programmes, ranging between one to two weeks, and 
shorter workshops on a few days. Each refugee is offered between 5 –
10 hours of information within these programs. 
The programmes are carried out by officers from the Migration 
Board together with officials from some of the receiving municipalities 
and officers from the Swedish Employment Service. 
The Migration Board engages the IOM for travel arrangements, e.g. 
ticket purchase, helping the refugees with the purchase of warm clothing, 
and check-in at the airport. The refugees who are travelling in large 
groups are escorted by a person from the IOM all the way to Sweden. 34
                                                            
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Migration Board, “Resettlement to another life” (Vidarebosättning till ett annat liv), Thematic Report 3:2010: 
http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/495.html  
34 Migration Board. Annual program of the European Refugee Fund 2010: Sweden. (Årligt program Europeiska 
flyktingfonden 2010).(2010): www.migrationsverket.se 
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• Medical screening 
Sweden does not require UNHCR or IOM to carry out a medical 
examination of refugees entitled to resettlement in Sweden. However 
Swedish Migration Board considers it is important to clearly indicate the 
individual’s state of health and to include relevant medical 
documentation in the submission from the UNHCR. This will be a 
valuable source of information both for the refugee and for the 
municipal authorities charged with his or her care. 
Procedure Timing The whole process, from selection to the arrival of the refugees to 
Sweden, should not take more than 3 months:  
a) The selection process lasts 2-3 weeks.  
b) After this, a resettlement municipality in Sweden is identified 
(circa 6 weeks).  
c) The Cultural Orientation (Sverigeprogram) is carried out in 7-10 
days.  
d) Departure takes place maximum 2-4 weeks after the 
orientation. The Migration Board has diminished the average 
decision time in resettlement cases from 124 to 87 days 
between 2006 and 2009.35




 from the receipt of the 
dossier to arrival in Sweden. Urgent cases should not take more than 
10 days. Both emergency and urgent cases are usually dealt with on a 
dossier basis.  
Comments  Sweden has recently emphasized the need to (i) improve the 
information for persons selected for resettlement and (ii) to increase 
the participation of resettled persons in resettlement procedures and 
activities (i.e. develop methods that will allow this).37
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
 
People who are resettled to Sweden are not automatically granted 
refugee status. Those who are resettled are either Convention refugees 
or persons in need of subsidiary protection. Refugees have a somewhat 
stronger legal standing, e.g. they can apply for Swedish citizenship after 
4 years’ stay in Sweden, while others have to wait for 5 years. Persons 
in need of protection and refugees also have different eligibility for 
passport documentation, support for family reunification and pensions.38 
However, both these categories are granted a permanent residence 
permit before arriving in Sweden39
Rights granted  
. The decision on status is based on 





Residence permit granted. 
The system of refugee reception is based on the voluntary participation 
of the majority of municipalities in Sweden. 
                                                            
35 Migration Board, “Resettlement to another life” (Vidarebosättning till ett annat liv), Thematic Report 3:2010: 
http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/495.html  
36 Ibidem  
37 ERF. Multiannual programme: Sweden (2008–2013). Annex I. # 111-2008-1744. www.migrationsverket.se 
38 Migration Board webpage “To Sweden as a quota refugee” at: http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/601_en.html  
39 Interview with the Swedish Migration Board, 2 March 2012. 
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Airport Arrival 
 
Info upon arrival 
 
 





























Refugees are received by Swedish Migration Board Staff and Staff 
from the receiving municipality at the airport and transferred directly to 
respective municipalities. 
The municipality is required to provide an individual introduction 
programme for each refugee resettled (This applies to all refugees and 
immigrants). The Introduction program is drawn up in close cooperation 
with the individual concerned, and the Swedish Public Employment 
Service.  
Before the arrival the receiving municipality normally holds information 
meetings with the support of NGOs and Churches. 
A residence permit gives the right to childcare, education, healthcare, 
social security, etc. to the resettled person. The resettled persons also 
have the same obligations as all people who live in Sweden, e.g. to try to 
work and support themselves, ensuring that children arrive at school and 
complying with laws. Like other immigrants, quota refugees are allowed 
to vote in county and municipal elections after three years in Sweden.40
A resettled person receives accommodation, as well as financial 
support from the state during the first two years (provided they follow 
the established plan they agreed upon with the Employment Service). 
During that time, they are given language courses, information about 
society and help to find a job.
  
41
The Migration Board is responsible for the cultural orientation and pre-
departure preparations. The programmes are carried out by Board 
officers together with officials from some of the receiving municipalities. 




Part of the introduction programme. In some municipalities, NGOs and 
Churches provide supplementary social and legal counselling. 
 
All municipalities ought to offer language training within three months 
after the individual's arrival in the municipality. All school-age children 
are entitled to tuition in their native language at school.  
Persons with refugee status or holding a residence permit on similar 
grounds are permitted to take up employment on equal terms with 
Swedish citizens. The Swedish Employment Service is responsible for 
mapping and supporting new arrivals in becoming attractive on the 
labour market. 
The resettled persons have a right to receive allocations for family 
reunification. The categories of family members entitled to a residence 
permit on the grounds of family reunification are the following:43
i. a spouse/cohabiting partner of someone who is either resident in 
Sweden, or has been granted a residence permit to settle in 
Sweden;  
  
ii. a child who is under the age of 18 and unmarried, if the child has 
a parent who is resident in or has been granted a residence 
permit to settle in Sweden, alternatively, has a parent who is 
married to or a cohabiting partner with a person resident in 
Sweden or granted a residence permit.  
                                                            
40 Migration Board website: http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/601.html  
41 Ibid. 




43 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Country Chapter: Sweden, July 2011.  
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Furthermore, a residence permit is given to an alien who is a parent of 
an unmarried alien child under the age of 18 who is a refugee or a 
person otherwise in need of protection, if the child arrived in Sweden 
separately from both parents or from another adult who may be 
regarded as having taken the place of the parents, or if the child has 
been left unaccompanied after arrival.  
A close relative outside the immediate circle of the nuclear family may 
be given residence permit if he or she was a member of the same 
household as the relative in Sweden. 
Included in the introduction programme. 
In some municipalities. 
No formalised training for local service providers in the whole country, 
but in many places local municipalities started to organise cultural 
training programmes for the service providers. 
In many part of Sweden, local NGOs and Churches organise volunteer 
support for refugees. 
Comments There is a strong tradition of municipal responsibility for refugee 
reception in Sweden and municipal refugee coordinators organise a 
large number of initiatives to support newly arrived refugees. This 
strong municipal responsibility, together with the central government’s 
responsibility in the area of integration, has tended to limit the 
involvement of the civil society, such as NGOs and Churches. 
NGOs currently have a limited role in relation to resettlement in 
Sweden, but could play a more active role with regard to advocacy, 
reception and first phases of integration. 
NGOs conduct alternative or supplementary initiatives for newly 
arrived refugees. Swedish NGOs would like to get more involved in the 
resettlement process particularly in the pre- and post- cultural 
orientation programs. In order to better facilitate integration. 
Resettlement provides the opportunity to meet and prepare the 
refugees for their encounter with the new society before arrival. 
Potentially the opportunity exists to impart a sense of security and 
understanding to the refugees, and to ensure that reception can be 
adjusted to individual needs. In order to assume responsibility and 
make active choices, the refugee must have access to knowledge and 
an understanding of what resettlement entails for themselves and for 
their families. By discussing the impact and consequences of 
resettlement with those selected, the refugees are not only given the 
opportunity to change their mind, but to start the transformation from 
the place where they have lived to their new and unknown future. This 
implies both mental preparation and practical issues. NGOs can and 
should play a crucial role in this process.  
The expression “managing of expectations” has turned up in all 
interviews with stakeholders. This concept sums up the need to 
prevent unrealistic expectations connected to resettlement, which may 
cause problems after arrival. False expectations may be due to 
inadequate knowledge or the spreading of rumours and 
misconceptions and may result in disappointments that could block the 
refugees’ capacity to learn and participate in their introduction 
programs. This in turn can create problems both for the individual and 
the receiving community. The catch-phrase “managing expectations” 
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applies not only to refugees but also to the receiving society. Host 
municipalities need to know about the individuals and groups they 
encounter, about their situation prior to arrival, and about the 
information that refugees have received before arriving.  
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 
National budget: The 
Swedish parliament allots 










Each year, the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) allocates funds to 
resettlement of refugees to Sweden. Thereafter, the Ministry of Justice 
(Justitiedepartement) issues the general guidelines for the Swedish 
resettlement programme, which have to be approved by the parliament.44
The total resettlement budget for 2012 is SEK 391,590,000.
  
45 The 
cost of each resettled person grew with about 700 SEK in 2010 with 
respect to 2009 and fewer people were resettled in 2010 compared to 
2009. The cost increase was a result of difficulties in obtaining exit 
permits and the cancellation of flights.46
The Migration Board distributes financial resources to the 
municipalities who are then responsible for the organisation and 
implementation of introduction programmes. Once the quota refugees 
have arrived, the municipality is fully responsible for their resettlement 
and integration.  
 




Costs Budget lines 2012: 
1. SEK 375,440,000 (SEK 197,600 per refugee*1,900 quota 
persons) for flat-rate payments to municipalities.48
2. SEK 16,150,000 for (i) travel and travel-related expenses for 
resettled persons; (ii) pre-departure information and preparatory 
work for the resettled; and (iii) travel, subsistence and other 
expenses for the personnel involved in resettlement missions.
 The 
Migration Board distributes financial resources to the 
municipalities, who are then responsible for the organisation 







                                                            
44 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Country Chapter: Sweden, July 2011.  
45 “Spending authorization45 for year 2012 regarding the Migration Board”, (Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2012 
avseende Migrationsverket). Ministry of Justice, dated 2011-12-22: http://www.esv.se/Verktyg--
stod/Statsliggaren/Regleringsbrev/?RBID=13902 
46 Government’s budget bill for 2012 (2011/12:1), budget category 8: migration, Förslag till statens budget för 2012: 
data.riksdagen.se/fil/230a145e-a40b-4cca-808b-c5be4360e4fd  
47 “Spending authorization47 for year 2012 regarding the Migration Board”, (Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2012 
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The amount per refugee may vary on the basis of refugee category. 
In 2009, municipalities received a state grant of SEK 189.400 (around 
EUR 17.200) for each adult refugee, SEK 116.300 (around EUR 
10.550) for a refugee child (under the age of 16) and SEK 69.900 (EUR 
6.450) for adults 65 and older, for the entire introductory period.50
The Migration Board has a resource efficient administration of the 
resettlement process with just a handful of employees. Other Board 






There is a need for a continuing awareness of resettlement issues in all 
resettlement countries including Sweden. 
There is wide support of the principle of accepting resettlement 
cases and they are even portrayed by anti-immigrant political 
groupings as the really “genuine” refugees. Spontaneous asylum-
seekers are often portrayed as bogus refugees in these circles, which 
would probably wish a refugee policy to be fully oriented towards 
reception of resettlement cases. All the interviewed NGOs voiced 
concern regarding how resettlement of refugees can be used by anti-
immigrant groups against the spontaneous asylum. 
The European Refugee Fund has been used in Sweden to operate a 
Swedish Resettlement Network, aimed at a collaboration among the 
Swedish Migration Board, municipalities, county administrative boards and 
NGOs. This network focuses on the dissemination of knowledge and the 
exchange of experiences through seminars, newsletters and lobbying work. 
 
                                                            
50 International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Welcome to Europe! A Guide to Resettlement: A Comparative 
Review of Resettlement in Europe.  
51 Migration Board presentation at the seminar “Sweden’s refugee quota” in Haparanda, dated April 2009  
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Country Profile: The Netherlands  
In October 2010 a new government was elected after a political crisis that saw several Ministers resign. 
This election race resulted in a renewed discussion on migration and asylum policy and in particular, it led 
to strengthened measures to curb immigration and asylum and to promote integration.  
Between 2003 and 2007 the Netherlands saw a decrease in immigration. The reasons lay mostly in a 
decrease in work opportunities, a decline in the number of asylum seekers and a decrease in the number of 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, probably caused by strengthened conditions for family reunification. 
Immigration subsequently rose again, growing from 101,000 in 2006 to 154,000 in 2010. This was largely 
due to increasing numbers of migrant workers from within the EU and from Asia. Asylum applications rose 
slightly in the period 2005-2009, and in 2008/2009 an increase could be observed in asylum seekers from 
Somalia in particular, due to the categorical protection policy in place concerning Southern Somalia.1
The 2010 Rutte-Verhagen Government Agreement established a more restrictive immigration and 
asylum policy framework. In practice the current government is indeed placing a more pronounced 
emphasis on effective integration and participation in society, which can also be observed in its selection of 
refugees eligible for resettlement. All migrants would be expected to “actively participate in society” through 
the knowledge of the Dutch language, in education and at work. Furthermore the government felt that the 
examination requirements in the integration law should be raised.  
  
In terms of asylum policy the 2010 Agreement stated a preference for the reception of asylum seekers in 
the country or region of origin. Categorized protection (i.e. for asylum seekers from Iraq, Somalia) was 
terminated including its legal basis. In September 2011 the Cabinet approved five proposals made by the 
Minister for Immigration and Asylum Policy (Gerd Leers), aimed at achieving the more restrictive asylum 
and migration policy framework set out in the Government Agreement.  
This collection of measures is designed to achieve a more selective approach toward migration and the 
harmonisation of asylum grounds. The Modern Migration Policy Bill was adopted on the 7th of July 2010, 
and was meant to come into force on the 1st of January 2011. The government has stated that the starting 
point for this modern asylum policy is “selectivity”, with the policy being favourable to those migrants who 
are economically required and who are held to have made valuable contributions to make to the Dutch 
economy or its culture. Since the 1st of July 2010 a new asylum procedure has been in place. The aim of 
the new procedure is to achieve a faster and more careful completion of asylum applications. 
The Netherlands has taken part in the resettlement of refugees for almost 40 years. A resettlement 
programme has been in place since 1977. A specific quota appeared in 1984, which was increased from 
250 to maximum 500 resettled refugees per year from 1987.  
This number remains unaffected, with the current quota being set at 2000 resettled refugees for a four-
year period. Selection of refugees takes place both through selection missions and dossier selection. The 
criteria for selection are generally consistent with those set down in article 29 of the Aliens Act, while 
medical cases are also included. Furthermore the prospect of integration into Dutch society of the particular 
refugee also plays a role in the selection process. 
A new decentralized system for the reception of resettled refugees in the Netherlands became 
operational in 2011. Refugees are now placed with various municipalities across the Netherlands 
immediately upon their arrival without an initial reception centre as had been the case in the pre-2011 
centralized reception system. Local authorities have taken over from the Central Organisation for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) the responsibility for meeting the reception and integration needs of 
resettled refugees. 
 
                                                            
1 http://www.nationaalkompas.nl/bevolking/migratie/verleden/  
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 275
 KNOW RESET Country Profile: The Netherlands 
Asylum Profile 











6,828 (2011)  
• 712 Refugee Status Granted 
• 6,116 Other Protection 
8,003 (2010)  
• 812 Humanitarian Protection 
• 7,191 Refugee Status Granted 
14,631 (2011)  
15,148 (2010)  
Programme-Based (since 1984) 
2000/4 years  
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
Aliens Act 2000 
(Vreemdelingenwet 2000) 
 
No specific provisions concerning resettlement. 
Other basis of 
resettlement: 
Decree of the Minister of 
Justice of 24 June 2010, 
number WBV 2010/10, 
amending 
Vreemdelingencirculaire 
2000, (under CY: 2.1.4. 
“Invited Refugees”)4
Decree of 19 May 2000
 
, 
concerning the transfer of 
responsibility for the quota 
policy for invited refugees5














Sets out Dutch resettlement policy, including quota, selection procedure, 





Transfers responsibility for resettled refugees to the Minister of Justice  
 
 
Sets out changes in the reception policy for resettled refugees. Resettled 
refugees will henceforth be placed directly in the municipalities and will 
no longer initially be placed in the central reception centre in Amersfoort. 
 
The quota is established on a 4-yearly basis by the Minister for 
Immigration, Integration and Asylum. The quota of 2000 resettled 
refugees will be maintained for the period 2012 – 2015. Of these 400 will 
be selected through selection missions and 100 will be selected through 
individual UNHCR dossiers. 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The Netherlands will continue to participate in resettlement, the quota 
for 2012-2015 has maintained the same number as in 2008-2011. An 
expansion of the current quota is unlikely to take place in the 
foreseeable future. 
                                                            




6 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-19637-1390.html  
7 http://tinyurl.com/78hvzz7 
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II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis / 
b) On a programme basis 
1977 – 1980 












2008 – 2011 
 
2012 - 2015 
 
750 invited refugees and asylum seekers/year (approximately 200 
asylum seekers expected and 550 refugees to be invited).  
250 refugees/year  
Subquotas: 
Contingents: 200 (big groups from refugee camps) 
Disabled persons: 40 
Single persons in emergency situations: 10 
Quota increased to 500 refugees/year  
Subquotas: 
Contingents: 200 
Disabled persons: 40 
Single persons in emergency situations: 10 
Quota: Three-yearly quota of 1500 refugees (approximately 500 per year) 
Subquotas: 
Contingents and family reunification: 1200 
Disabled persons: 240  
Single persons in emergency situations: 60 
Quota: Four-yearly quota of 2000 refugees 
Subquota: 30 medical cases Refugees with medical needs and women at 
risk are resettled through the ‘Twenty or More’ programme. 







4,062 ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo evacuated from camps in 
Macedonia.8
d) Through other Projects 
 
Governmental Level 




Mission with Belgium and 
Luxembourg (2008) 
Durable Solutions in 
Practice” (2007/2008) – 






Joint selection mission to Syria with Belgium in May 2009. Five 
representatives from the Belgian CGRS and FEDASIL joined the Dutch 
delegation. The mission was organised jointly between the Netherlands 
and Belgium. A Dutch medic was responsible for the medical examination 
of refugees that were being resettled in Belgium. In October 2009, 
representatives from Bulgaria and Slovakia participated in a Dutch 
mission to Syria as observers. 
Selection mission to Thailand. Belgium and Luxembourg were invited to 
join the Netherlands on this mission in order to promote resettlement. 
Dutch selection mission to Thailand (with Belgium and Czech Republic, 
2007) and Jordan (with Romania, 2008). Delegations from the three 
countries joined the mission in order to watch and learn from the Dutch 
selection missions. In the framework of “Durable Solutions in Practice”, 
representatives from Belgium, the Czech Republic and Romania also 
visited the Netherlands, where they were given a general overview of 
Dutch resettlement policy, including quota and reception. 
 
 
                                                            
8 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,NLD,,3ae6a8cf4c,0.html 
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Non-Governmental Level Transnational projects in which the Dutch Council for Refugees (DCfR) is 
participating include ‘Practical Cooperation for a European Resettlement 
Network’, ICMC Europe; ASPIRE project CCME (Assessing and 
Strengthening Participation in Refugee Resettlement to Europe); 
‘Promotion of resettlement in the EU through practical cooperation by EU 
Member States and other stakeholders' and ’Linking-In EU resettlement', 
both were IOM, UNHCR and ICMC projects.  
University Assistance Fund (UAF) has recently implemented a three-year 
pilot project ‘Resettlement of Refugee Students’, funded by the national 
ERF programme, in partnership with the COA, Dutch Council for 
Refugees, the UNHCR Bureau for Europe, and the Resettlement Unit at 
the Immigration and Naturalisation Department (IND) of the Dutch 
Ministry of Internal and Kingdom Affairs. The objective of this project was 
to develop and test new approaches towards the integration of resettled 
refugee students and develop a methodology for the integration of 
refugee students. That methodology would be developed on the basis of 
the experience of a pilot group of sixty resettled refugees arriving to the 
Netherlands from 2009. UAF was in discussion with the IND on 
possibilities to establish a private-public sponsorship scheme for resettled 
refugees (inspired by the Canadian refugee sponsorship programme by 
the World University Service), and increase the quota, but due to the 
change of Government in early 2011, this was put on hold. The UAF also 








The Netherlands accepted ex-detainee Shamil Khazhiev in 2007. He 
sought political asylum in the Netherlands after having been transferred 
back to Russia where he suffered harassment and abuse. 
Spain 2006: a Spanish boat picked up 51 migrants who were at sea 
between Libya and Malta in July 2006. The Dutch resettlement quota is 
generally not used for intra-Community transfer of refugees from other 
EU countries, but in this case an emergency acute humanitarian situation 
existed and the Netherlands decided to accept 5 refugees for 
resettlement. 
Malta 2005: Under a burden-sharing agreement between the Netherlands 
and Malta, the Netherlands accepted 36 African refugees from Malta. 













Country of Origin: 2 Afghanistan, 97 Bhutan, 28 DR of Congo, 68 Eritrea, 
64 Ethiopia, 74 Iraq, 126 Myanmar, 5 Somalia, 8 Sudan, 84 Other. 
Special Categories: 47 Medical cases, 53 Woman-at-risk, 10 
Unaccompanied minors, 43 Emergency Case. 
Sub-Quota: 481 Selected mission, 69 Dossier selection, 6 Family 
reunion. 
484 
Country of Origin: 7 Afghanistan, 108 Bhutan, 12 DR of Congo, 69 
Eritrea, 29 Ethiopia, 90 Iraq, 53 Myanmar, 1 Somalia, 115 Other. 
Special Categories: 73 Medical cases, 49 Woman-at-risk, 2 
Unaccompanied minors, 2 Regional protection program, 55 
Emergency Case. 
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Sub-Quota: 338 Selected mission, 133 Dossier selection, 13 Family 
reunion. 
401 
Country of Origin: 8 Afghanistan, 2 Bhutan, 1 Burundi, 4 Colombia, 13 
DR of Congo, 20 Eritrea, 50 Ethiopia, 142 Iraq, 17 Somalia, 9 Sudan, 135 
Other. 
Special Categories: 62 Medical cases, 103 Women-at-risk, 8 
Unaccompanied minors, 6 Regional protection program, 18 Emergency 
Case. 
Sub-Quota: 286 Selected mission, 96 Dossier selection, 19 Family 
reunion. 
544 
Country of Origin: 111 Bhutan, 33 Burundi, 11 Colombia, 69 DR of 
Congo, 20 Eritrea, 7 Ethiopia, 144 Iraq, 1 Somalia, 148 Other. 
Special Categories: 68 Medical cases, 115 Women-at-risk, 3 
Unaccompanied minors, 79 Regional protection program, 56 
Emergency Case. 
Sub-Quota: 347 Selected mission, 184 Dossier selection, 13 Family 
reunion. 
a) Selection Criteria and 










• Additional National 
Criteria 
 
Selection takes place based on recommendations by UNHCR. If UNHCR 
recommends an alien who is registered as a refugee for resettlement in 
the Netherlands, the Minister will decide if the alien is eligible for 
residence in the Netherlands. The decision will be taken after 
consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and based on the file and 
the current asylum policy. 
All individuals will be assessed according to the UNHCR dossier 
(including protection need) and country-specific asylum policy of the 
Netherlands. This covers the Refugee Convention, including article 1 F, 
the Aliens Act art 29(1)(a) and individual protection grounds art 
29(1)(c)(b), the general official communications of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and asylum policy concerning the country of origin of the refugee. 
More emphasis will be placed on integration aspects of the resettlement 
process than previously. This means that after assessment according to 
art 29, the integration perspective will be investigated as a basis for 
denial of the dossier. The dossier may be denied on this ground where 
there are indications that integration of the relevant person in the 
Netherlands would be difficult or undesirable. 
The Netherlands like a balanced caseload and have asked UNHCR to 
submit more high or higher profile refugees such as journalists or human 
rights activists or persons who have an academic background who have 
played an active social role. 
 
                                                            
9 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2010-10228.html 
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Selection Process 
• Deploying Staff 











Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Resettlement Unit of the Immigration and Naturalisation Department 
(IND), and the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers 
(COA) 
Resettlement policy 2012-2015: approximately 400 refugees will be 
selected annually through selection missions and approximately 100 
through individual UNHCR dossier selections. 
Dossier selection & in-country selection (maximum four missions) based 
on recommendations by UNHCR.  
Selection missions are organised by the IND. Delegation consists of 
representatives from the IND and the COA, and can also include 
representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and INS 
medical doctors.  
Refugees recommended by UNHCR are interviewed by the IND. 
MFA is responsible for the registration of personal details and family 
relations. IND makes final decisions on refugees to be resettled. The 
decision is not subject to appeal. At the end of a mission, the head of the 
delegation reports the results to the local UNHCR representative. 
UNHCR communicates the decisions to the refugees concerned. 
Medical cases are normally submitted during selection missions 
although urgent medical cases can be submitted on a dossier basis. 
The choice of mission destinations is established according to, 
amongst other things, relevant developments in the multilateral 
framework. This includes the priorities set by UNHCR to solve long-term 
refugee situations, priorities concerning the urban refugee situations and 
policy developments relating to priority areas for resettlement in the 
Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement and the Working Group 
on Resettlement. The choice for destinations also forms part of the 
general migration policy, which seeks links insofar as possible in the 
broader bilateral cooperation with countries of origin amongst others for 
the promotion of return. Resettlement is also seen as part of the policy 
as laid down in the Government Agreement to strengthen refugee 
protection in the regions of origin. Relevant developments at EU level in 
the field of resettlement are also taken into account. Lastly, operational 
issues and interests are also relevant in the selection of mission 
destinations, including the security situation in the country of first asylum 
and the safety of the staff that are to take part in the mission. 
Selection missions were temporarily suspended from 1999 onwards. 
These were resumed in 2005, as it had proved difficult to fulfil the quota 
solely through dossier selection. The large number of rejections was 
based amongst others on a lack of information provided by UNHCR in the 
dossiers a lack of direct contact between UNHCR field officer and those 
assessing the dossiers in the Netherlands. As a result of this failure to fulfil 
the quota, the Government decided to take a more pro-active approach 
and make use of selection missions again. It was thought that the use of 
selection missions would enhance the gathering of necessary and relevant 
information for a large group of people at once, instead of the previous 
practice that made it difficult to establish a good picture of an individual 
resettlement dossier. Furthermore, it was argued that the use of missions 
would place the Netherlands more in line with the approach of European 
partners. Lastly, selection missions were thought to contribute to the 
government policy concerning protection in the region, as it would be 
unacceptable for the Netherlands to ask countries in the regions of origin 
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to provide better protection to refugees if the Netherlands itself was unable 
to maintain its resettlement programme. In the meantime, selection 
through dossiers was also maintained to establish an optimal use of the 
quota and to enhance flexibility10
Pre-Departure Activities 
. 













• Assistance with travel 
documents 
• Medical screening 
 
IOM Netherlands initiated in 2010 the NLCO project (Dutch Cultural 
Orientation Programme) aimed at providing pre-departure cultural 
orientation training to refugees selected on dossier basis. Under the 
NLCO II, the CO trainings have been extended to four days. Within the 
framework of the NLCO project, IOM conducts also social intakes to 
gather a profile of refugees (for example, education background, 
expectations, language abilities etc.), which is shared with the 
municipalities in advance of refugees’ arrival.  
Other CO training sessions are offered by COA. Since the 
introduction of a decentralised system for the reception of resettled 
refugees in 2011, all CO training sessions take place in the pre-
departure stage. The frequency and duration of CO trainings have also 
been extended; there are three trainings.  
The sessions are spread over the period between time of selection 
and time of arrival in the Netherlands, which is normally about 6 months. 
Contents of CO training sessions: elementary Dutch language skills; 
information about Dutch society; information about the municipality where 
the refugees are going; and the future accommodation of the refugee.  
IOM NL 
 
Medical checks are performed by medical doctors from the IND Medical 
Advice Bureau (BMA). 
Procedure Timing For dossier submissions, it takes about six weeks to two months to make 
a decision. 
The 2011 resettled refugees were placed directly in the 
municipalities. This took place within 6 months or, in emergency cases, 
within 3 months. Resettled refugees receive their residence documents 
immediately after arrival. The COA then transfers refugees to the 
municipalities where the resettled refugees will be housed.11
Comments  
 
Capacity building is needed for municipalities in the light of the new 
reception model that made municipalities responsible for the reception 
and integration of resettled refugees. 
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 Status granted  
Decree of the Minister of 
Justice of 24 June 2010, 
number WBV 2010/10 
concerning the amendment of 
the Vreemdelingencirculaire 
Residence permit asylum (refugee status – same rights as refugees in 
the Netherlands): “After arrival in the Netherlands, the alien will be given 
the option to apply for asylum. The alien will subsequently be given an 
asylum residence permit for a specified period of time as soon as 
possible on grounds of article 29, first section, subsection a.” 
 
                                                            
10 Vluchtelingenbeleid, Brief van de Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, 2 Juli 2004, 19 637 / Nr. 841 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-19637-841.pdf  
11 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-19637-1390.html  
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2000, 2.1.4. “Invited 
Refugees”12 Resettled refugees are granted refugee status and a temporary 
residence permit for asylum, which is valid for five years. After five years 
they may apply for a permanent residence permit.  
 





Info upon arrival 
 






























Residence permit is granted immediately on arrival.  
Refugees stay for the first 48 hours at an airport facility during which time 
they are guided by COA.  
The DCfR is sometimes present for individuals arriving for family 
reunification. The IOM offers practical assistance.  
In the municipalities information is provided by mostly DCfR or another 
organisation that provides social guidance. 
This is mainly done by means of information provision through local 
media in advance of refugees’ arrival to a municipality. DCfR (together 
with the municipality) also informs the relevant stakeholders (like schools, 
family doctors, social services, etc) 
All municipalities are obliged to provide housing to resettled refugees and 
are responsible (since 2011) for the reception and integration of resettled 
refugees.  
Municipalities can put a number of integration support services out to 
public tender. 
Part of the integration programme consists of the social guidance 
programme, which is implemented in the vast majority of cases by the 
volunteers of local DCfR offices that are contracted by municipalities to 
implement the programme. There is a countrywide network of over 6,000 
volunteers.  
Social guidance is concerned with assisting refugees with many 
practical aspects of life in a new country including help to create social 
networks and accessing mainstream services (education, employment, 
health care). In general, social guidance supports the process of 
refugees’ integration.  
During the integration programme (in general one to two years’ 
duration), refugees are entitled to social security allowance. Refugees 
have to pass the integration exam within three and a half years. 
Cultural orientation is part of the above described integration programme. 
Psycho-social counselling can be arranged by municipalities, often in 
cooperation with DCfR and the NGO Pharos. 
All refugees (and most non-EU nationals) are obliged to pass an 
integration exam. Municipalities are obliged to offer refugees a civic 
integration programme, consisting of Dutch language courses, knowledge 
of Dutch society and vocational training, offered by a municipality 
(through service contracts). Municipalities are encouraged to offer dual 
programmes, combination of education and work. Alternatively, an 
intensive Dutch language course at an educational institute can be 
offered, particularly for refugees who wish to access higher education 
studies. UAF cooperates with municipalities with regard to negotiating 
joint arrangements for refugees’ education pathways.  
Municipalities’ civic integration programme is complemented by DCfR 
volunteer (home) language coaches who offer additional language 
training for refugees. 
 
                                                            
12 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2010-10228.html 
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Employment  
 
















The municipalities are responsible for employment, but specialised 
assistance can be provided by DCfR and UAF. 
This is subject to an application, which has to be introduced within three 
months. For the purposes of family reunion, spouses and minor children 
(under 18) are considered family members. After three months, family 
reunion can still be considered but not within the resettlement quota. In 
this case, the regular Dutch criteria for family reunification applies. Family 
reunification with non-marital partners or adult children is also possible, 
but only if they are dependants of the person who was granted asylum. 
For unaccompanied minor refugees, family reunion with parents is 
possible. In order to be considered for family reunification, family 
members need to be known to UNHCR at the moment of selection of the 
main applicant and be included in the original documentation submitted to 
UNHCR. DCfR assists refugees with family reunion procedures. 
Provided by DCfR volunteers as part of the social guidance programme. 
Pharos offers health care information and advisory services to assist care 
providers, teachers and other professionals who work for and with 
refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and other migrants. 
DCfR and UAF 
Limited training services by DCfR and UAF. Pharos offers training 
(health-related) to DCFR volunteers.  
DCfR 
Independent housing is provided by municipalities receiving resettled 
refugees. Housing arrangements are made between COA and 
municipalities. Refugees cannot choose where they want to live if they 
wish to make use of social housing. 
Comments From 2011 onward the municipalities will play a greater role in the 
reception of resettled refugees as reception in the central reception 
centre Amersfoort will no longer take place.  
Integration aspects are more emphasized in the 2012 - 2015 policy 
framework than before.  
Changes concerning reception procedure (directly in the 
municipalities) are in place and had to be evaluated in late 2012 by the 
WODC (Scientific Research and Documentation Centre – Ministry of 
Security and Justice). 
Gaps & challenges: 
− On the whole, the decentralised reception system introduced last 
year has necessitated a closer and intensified cooperation 
between NGOs and municipalities but have also created gaps and 
new challenges.  
− Dispersal policy presents an obstacle for an effective transfer of 
COA and DCfR experiences and best practices in resettlement to 
the municipalities. 
− Disparity between refugees’ needs and the availability of local 
facilities to support those needs continues to exist. Although 
improvements have been observed in this respect, refugees 
continue to be placed mostly in small towns and villages, which is 
not conducive to their integration due to the limited facilities to 
promote integration. 
− Social guidance of resettled refugees is more intensive than the 
guidance of other groups of refugees but this is not reflected in the 
funding that the central government allocates to each municipality 
receiving resettled refugees. Specialised social guidance of 
resettled refugees is not available in all municipalities whilst the 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 283
 KNOW RESET Country Profile: The Netherlands 
quality and duration of available guidance varies depending on the 
level of funding and/or the type of provider that municipalities are 
free to sub-contract to deliver social support.  
− Implementation of obligatory integration programmes in general 
varies across municipalities reflecting local governments’ own local 
demands and policy focus resulting in different institutional and 
administrative structures, and language and civic integration 
courses provision. This has an effect on the extent to which 
arrangements can be made for educational and employment paths 
designed to accommodate refugees’ individual needs. 
− Significant gaps have been identified in the provision of health-
related information in both pre-departure and post-arrival phases. 
In addition, there is the lack of provision of health care services 
and psycho-social support in the period immediately after refugees’ 
arrival. In the previous centralised reception system, health-related 
support was organised and immediately available to refugees in 
the specialised reception centre, but this, as yet, is lacking in the 
new decentralised reception model.  
− Refugees are expected to integrate and achieve self-sufficiency 
quickly; however the current government’s policies and inconsistent 
support services in municipalities are on the whole not satisfactory to 
ensure more successful outcomes for resettled refugees.  
− Current political and economic environment in the Netherlands is 
not favourable to the advocacy of NGOs calling for an expansion of 
the Dutch resettlement programme. 
Recommendations: 
− Multi-stakeholder networks should be established at the local level 
to deliver joined-up services that meet the reception and 
integration needs of resettled refugees and the current stakeholder 
base be widened to include refugee community organisations, local 
voluntary organisations, medical professionals, mayors of the 
municipalities which are receiving resettled refugees, local 
churches and religious communities.  
− Health-related information provision for refugees during both pre-
departure and post-arrival stages needs to improve. Local health care 
providers need to be informed about specific health and psychosocial 
needs of resettled refugees and their experiences. Municipalities and 
NGOs supporting refugees need to establish effective referral routes 
for primary and preventative healthcare for refugees. 
− Housing arrangements between the COA and the municipalities 
receiving resettled refugees should take place in consultations with 
NGOs and be based on the availability of integration facilities that 
match specific needs of the individual refugee. Better services 
could be provided and more involvement of stakeholders could be 
achieved if resettled refugees would be placed in groups in middle 
sizes towns. 
− More effective linkages between different phases of the 
resettlement process need to be created.  
− Planning and the quality of integration programmes could be 
improved by creating awareness about a variety of needs specific 
to the experiences of resettled refugees.  
− Resettled refugees’ own views and experiences need to be taken 
into account when planning and implementing integration 
programmes and resettlement practices in general. It is suggested 
that current stakeholders consider the potential role that resettled 
refugees could have in the facilitation of the resettlement process.  
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− Sources of funding for resettlement need to be diversified and 
there should be an adequate structural base for funding 
municipalities so that they can allocate sufficient funds to local 
NGOs or funding for NGOs needs to be allocated directly from the 
central government to NGOs. 
− Effectiveness of the extensive pre-departure CO training sessions 
and the value of large volumes of information in the pre-departure 
stage need to be reviewed.  
c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 






The Dutch resettlement programme is financed from the budget of the 
Ministry of the Interior, including the funds that are available to the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the Central Body for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers.  
The Netherlands also makes use of the European Refugee Fund’s funds 
available for resettlement. 
Grant to COA: reception of resettled refugees (2008): €107.852 13
Costs 
 
COA (Central Body for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) is granted a 
budget of €250,000/year per resettled refugee by Minister Leers 
(reception of resettled refugees in the municipalities). 
The central government has recently made additional funding to 
municipalities for guidance of resettled refugees but this is currently 
only a temporary measure covering the period of two years: An 
additional €2 million was set aside in September 2011 for the 
municipalities who will be receiving resettled refugees. An additional 
€1,000 is made available for a minor. 
Approximately €1,000 will be given to the municipalities per adult 
refugee for the provision of support. For the first arrivals under the new 
model (placement directly in the municipalities) a one-time grant of 




The Netherlands will maintain the 4-yearly quota of 2000 resettled 
refugees (500/year) for the foreseeable future.  
At EU-level the Netherlands supports the proposal for a European 
resettlement programme emphasizing strategic resettlement. The 
Netherlands also support an increase of the number of EU-member 
states participating in the UN resettlement programme and will continue 
to promote this as it has done in the past. The current government 
supports the continuance of the resettlement programme and especially 
the strategic use of resettlement. 
The public is not very aware about the country’s resettlement 
programme and what resettlement entails. Interviewed actors thought 
that those who do know about resettlement view it positively. This is in 
contrast to the public predominantly negative attitudes towards asylum 
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and immigration in general. There is no mass media attention on 
resettlement since the numbers of resettled refugees are low. Media 
coverage is found primarily in local newspapers and community 
newsletters when, for instance, a group of resettled refugees arrives to a 
municipality. Opinions on the role of media differed. Some were of the 
view that there should be more media attention to inform the public about 
resettlement and that raising awareness about this group of refugees has 
the potential to also increase public awareness of refugee issues in 
general. On the other hand, doubts were raised that more awareness 
might actually have a negative impact. Non-compulsory programmes, as 
resettlement is, might be viewed by the public as an economic burden 
and as a result be affected by the current budget cuts by the Dutch 
government. Any discussions and media attention on resettlement need 
to make sure that right messages and information is provided to the 
general public, making clear distinctions between resettlement (and what 
exactly it involves) and other mechanisms for the protection of refugees. 
Both the protection and durable solution aspects of resettlement need to 
be clearly explained. 
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Country Profile: UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK has been a Member State of the European Union since 1973. It does not participate in the 
Schengen area and has a flexible opt-in to EU asylum and immigration law and policy. Despite opting into 
the first round of asylum directives, in recent years, the United Kingdom has favoured practical cooperation 
as a means of collaborating on asylum matters. With the recent opt out of the recast EU asylum directives, 
UK officials have expressed a preference for more informal frameworks of information sharing, rejecting 
new binding legal frameworks. The UK prefers cooperation frameworks, which safeguard its discretion and 
determine the form and content of its domestic asylum provisions. This may be one reason why the UK is 
keen on continuing its commitment to resettling refugees. 
Between the end of the second World War and 2004, the UK had a variety of commitments in 
resettlement. The “Ten or More” (T-O-M) Programme set up in the 1970s aimed to annually resettle ten or 
more disabled refugees or refugees in need of medical attention. During the 1970s, refugees such as the 
Ugandan Asians, the Chileans and the Vietnamese were protected through ad hoc, collective resettlement 
schemes instigated by a discretionary response from the Home Office. Indeed, for many years, the UK 
preferred to resettle refugees on an ad hoc basis, responding to emergency situations, rather than put in 
place a formal asylum procedure for spontaneously arriving individuals.  
The treatment and reception of the individual, spontaneously arriving, asylum seeker in the 1980s 
differed from the collective refugee resettlement undertaken in Britain in the 1970s. While the Ugandan 
Asians, Chileans and Vietnamese had been treated as groups and received into structured programmes set 
up specifically for them, asylum seekers arriving in the UK in the 1980s had their claims treated on an 
individual basis and this soon became the norm. Thus, the old ‘quota’ system, where Britain would control 
the arrival and resettlement of pre-determined refugees on its territory went into decline. 
In the 1980s the UK government began to present the increase in number of asylum seekers as ‘a 
distinct problem requiring resolution by the introduction of new policies to expedite the processing of claims, 
to prevent and deter people from claiming asylum in the United Kingdom and to ensure that unsuccessful 
applicants are removed quickly'.1 In the face of increasing claims, the ‘government has repeatedly sought 
extensive legislative and rule-making powers in order to manage asylum’.2
In 2000, the UK Home Secretary Jack Straw, proposed an EU-wide programme, which would have the 
capacity to impact on the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe. In 2002, the UK government 
published a white paper “Safe Borders, Safe Haven” proposing reforms to the UK's immigration system. 
This included provisions to develop a quota resettlement programme in order for vulnerable refugees to 
have a legal and safe route to the UK avoiding the unacceptable risks involved in travelling with traffickers. 
Today, the United Kingdom is categorised as a “resettlement country”, operating a resettlement 
programme, the Gateway Protection Programme (GPP), with an annual resettlement quota, determined 
each year, of up to 750. The Gateway Protection Programme began in 2004 with Liberians resettled from 
camps in Sierra Leone who were soon followed by Congolese resettled from camps in Uganda. It initially 
had a quota of 500 refugees – although in the early years the actual numbers resettled fell short of the 
quota due to a reluctance amongst Local Authorities to form the local political agreement required for them 
to sign up to the scheme. 
  
The GPP is entirely separate from the asylum procedure applicable to individuals arriving 
“spontaneously” and claiming asylum in the UK or at the border. The Programme is run by the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Beside the GPP, the UK operates the Mandate Resettlement Scheme, which allows a number of 
refugees with a prior personal connection to the UK to enter the country in a resettlement-like way. The 
Immigration Rules do not provide for the possibility of a person who is overseas to be granted entry to the 
UK as a refugee. However, for the UK’s Mandate Resettlement Programme, the UK does examine 
individual applications by refugees to see whether there is a case for admitting such a refugee to the UK 
outside the Rules.3
                                                            
1 R. Thomas, ‘The impact of judicial review on asylum’ Public Law 2003, Autumn, p. 483. 
 
2 Ibid. 
3 UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions on Mandate refugees, p. 3 Available at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis/manadaterefu
gees.pdf?view=Binary   
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The legal basis for the funding of these programmes is contained in Section 59 of the Nationality 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.  
Refugees selected for the GPP are currently being identified largely from the Regional Protection 
Programme areas – the majority in the financial year April 2011 to April 2012 being Somalis and Ethiopians 
resettled from camps in Kenya. This has the impact of directly addressing regions that have the greatest need 
for resettlement while also attracting a greater degree of funding from the European Refugee Fund at a time 
when the UK government is implementing austerity programmes in attempt to reduce its budget deficit. 
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Asylum Profile 












• 4,309 (Refugee status) 
• 1,339 (Other protection status) 
5,195 (2010) 
• 3,488 (Refugee status) 
• 1,707 (Other protection status) 
19,804 (2011) 
17,916 (2010) 
Programme-Based (since 2002) 
750/year 
I. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Asylum law / Aliens Act  
The Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002 
 
Section 59 International projects 
Other basis of resettlement No 
On-going or foreseeable 
project/reform 
The resettlement programmes run as three year cycles and are 
determined in connection with the annual fiscal budget. At present, the 
current government is continuing its resettlement practice in line with 
established practice and no evolution is planned. 
II. Resettlement Policy and Related Involvements  
a) On an ad hoc basis6










• 210,000 Polish Second World War exiles and dependants,  
• 20,000 Hungarians fleeing Soviet occupation,  
• 42,000 Ugandan Asians expelled from Uganda,  
• 3000 Chilean refugees escaping a military coup,  
• 22,500 Vietnamese displaced persons,  
• Over 2,500 Bosnians,  
• Over 4,000 Kosovans, most receiving temporary status. 




Yearly Quota: 500 refugees 
 
                                                            
4 Source: UK Border Agency, Home Office. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Available at http://www.icar.org.uk/briefing_resettlement.pdf 
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Since 2007 
 
Yearly Quota: 750 refugees 
Up to 750 refugees may be resettled under the GPP annually. This 
quota is set each year by Government ministers, who taking into 
consideration available resources, the need for resettlement globally 
and the impact on services at a local level in the UK.7





There are no specific sub-quotas for medical cases, but the UK has 
asked the UNHCR to submit 3% of such cases. For women at risk, 
again there is no specific sub-quota, but the UK aims to consider at 
least 10% of such applications. 
It is not current UK policy to support resettlement in emergency 
situations.8
There is no specific quota for family reunification, but the dossier-
based Mandate Resettlement Programme aims to resettle refugees with 
close family ties from across the world. There is no upper limit for the 
Mandate Scheme, but this is a much smaller programme than the 
Gateway Protection Programme.  
 However, provision was made for up to 40 cases through 





d) Through other Projects 





- Non-Governmental Level 
 
 
Transnational programme concerning reception and resettlement. UK 
and Ireland carried out a joint selection mission to Tanzania to select 
DRC refugees with Belgium (CGRS), Bulgaria and Slovenia as 
observers. 










In the past, the UK has relocated 10 refugees from Malta. However, at 
present, the UK coalition government’s policy is not to support 
relocation of refugees within the EU.  
Comments A consistent problem is that the quota of 750 under the GPP has not been filled. The 750 quota was achieved for the first time in 2011/12.10
The UNHCR considers that a particular strength of the UK’s 
resettlement programme is that it resettles a large proportion of women 
at risk, above the number UNHCR suggests, a group that is considered 
of particular concern by the UK authorities.
 
11
                                                            
7 UK Asylum Policy Instructions on the Gateway Protection Programme (January 2006), p. 2. 
 
8 Interview with Dave Atkinson, UK Borders Agency, Refugee Team (May 2012). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Interview with Alexander de Chalus, UNHCR (May 2012).   
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Selection of refugees with medical needs is limited, due mainly to the 
requirement that the relevant local authority cover the costs of services, 
including healthcare, for the first 12 months. 


























Country of origin: DR of Congo (119), Ethiopia (145), Iraq (75), Somali 
(93). 
Country of first asylum: Kenya (197), Rwanda (119), Syria (75), Yemen 
(41). 
Gender: Male (195), Female (237). 
Age: Under 18 (224), Over 18 (208) 
669 
Country of origin: Bhutan (111), Burma-Rohingya (47), DR of Congo 
(100), Ethiopia (32), Iraq (207), Somali (172). 
Country of first asylum: Bangladesh (47), Jordan (207), Kenya (204), 
Nepal (111), Uganda (100). 
Gender: Male (338), Female (331). 
Age: Under 18 (265), Over 18 (404) 
857 
Country of origin: Burma-Karen (5), Burma-Rohingya (109), DR of 
Congo (120), Iraq (542), Palestine (81). 
Country of first asylum: Bangladesh (109), Iraq (81), Jordan (517), Syria 
(25), Tanzania (120), Thailand (5). 
Gender: Male (432), Female (425). 
Age: Under 18 (375), Over 18 (482) 
642 
Country of origin: Burma-Karen (29), Burma-Rohingya (34), DR of 
Congo (141), Ethiopia (202), Iraq (236). 
Country of first asylum: Bangladesh (34), Jordan (224), Kenya (202), 
Syria (12), Thailand (29), Zambia (141). 
Gender: Male (301), Female (341). 
Age: Under 18 (278), Over 18 (364). 
a) Selection Criteria and 
Process – Pre-Arrival 
Phase  
 
Selection criteria  
• UNHCR Criteria 
 
 
The UK authorities state that selection of refugees to resettle is based 
initially on UNHCR’s annual Projected Global Resettlement Needs. 
However, UK government departments are consulted and affordability 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
12 The following numbers of resettled persons are January to January while the UK records its resettlement quota within 
the 'Financial Year' which runs from April to April. 
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• Additional National 
Criteria 
is taken into account. The main target groups are those where UNHCR 
Priority Need coincides with those countries designated by the EU for 
the implementation of a Regional Protection Programme (RPP).  
The UK is also particularly concerned to resettle a number of 
Women and children at risk as part of each year’s quota. A very 
small number of individuals with intensive medical needs are also 
considered as a priority.13
Detailed selection criteria pertaining to GPP is found in the asylum 
policy instructions, which comprise the government’s policy on asylum 
and are to be followed by UKBA case workers. These asylum policy 
instructions for the GPP have not however been updated since 2006 
and are considered by the UNHCR to be outdated. They are produced 
by the UK, which is responsible for updating them.
 
14
Case owners should generally accept UNHCR’s designation of 
individuals as refugees, unless there are ‘good reasons’ not to, including 
where there are ‘inconsistencies within the information contained in the 
UNHCR Resettlement Referral Form (RRF) or between information 
provided by the applicant and known country information’, or where 
information provided by the application in relation to another of the 
selection criteria suggests the applicant’s account of events is untrue.
  
15
An applicant is to be considered in need of resettlement, according 
to UNHCR criteria: where his/her ‘life, liberty, safety, health or other 
fundamental human rights are at risk in the country where s/he has 
sought refuge, or to provide a durable solution if the applicant’s situation 
is not secure in the long term’.
  
16
Where the exclusion provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention apply 
to an applicant, s/he is to be excluded from the GPP.
  
17
The spouse or civil partner of a principal applicant and any children 
under 18 will usually be considered dependants. Unmarried partners 
may be considered for resettlement where they have been living 
together as a couple for at least two years or can provide strong 
evidence that the relationship is genuine, they ‘intend to live together 
permanently’, and any previous marriage of either party has 
‘permanently broken down’.
  
18 Optional DNA tests may be requested by 
caseworkers who are in doubt about a relationship between a principal 
applicant and a child dependant.19 Non-immediate family members may 
be considered as dependants where they are part of ‘a pre-existing 
family group’.20
According to the asylum policy instructions, ‘[r]esettlement should 
not be offered when, in the opinion of the medical examiner, the 
individual has a disease or illness, which, for the individual’s own 
health, or for public health reasons, currently precludes travel, or 
requires treatment before travel’. Further: Resettlement should not be 
offered to applicants, or dependants, with HIV/AIDS, Multi-Drug-
Resistant-TB, or established renal failure without Ministerial consent. 
Resettlement may not be offered where the applicant, or a dependant, 
has a different medical condition which constitutes a danger to public 
health or a disproportionate cost to the GPP. Decisions in these cases 
  
                                                            
13 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
14 Interview with Alexander de Chalus, op.cit. 
15 UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions on Mandate Refugees, op.cit. p. 3 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
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should be referred to ministers unless the applicant or dependant 
concerned [is excluded on the basis of other criteria].21
Mandate refugees are usually nominated for resettlement by 
UNHCR. To qualify for the Mandate Refugee Programme, the mandate 
refugee must satisfy two conditions. First, the UK must be the most 
appropriate resettlement country. Relevant factors are the applicant’s 
integration potential, living conditions, whether the refugee has physical 
protection needs and whether s/he has close relatives residing in other 
countries. Second, the mandate refugee must have close ties with the 
UK, in particular close family members. The applicant’s historical links 
with the UK may however be considered, such as whether time was 





• Deploying Staff 























Under the GPP, applications for resettlement are lodged with the 
UNHCR and are then referred to the Border Agency. Applications 
cannot be made directly to the UKBA, at UK embassies or through 
other international organisations and, according to the Border Agency, 
‘[a]pplications are assessed individually on their merits’.23
As for Mandate Refugees, the British Red Cross (BRC) administers 
the referrals on behalf of UNHCR. Applications by mandate refugees 
may also be made at a post abroad. The BRC refer resettlement 
applications to the Refugee Resettlement Programmes Unit (RRPU). A 
casework team within the unit deals with these applications.
 The Refugee 
Team in the Asylum Casework Directorate of the UK Home Office is 
responsible for overseeing and managing the GPP.  
24
Only mandate refugees may be resettled under the Mandate 
Refugee Programme, i.e individuals who have been granted refugee 
status by UNHCR. Applications are made at UNHCR and, if they pass 
the first screening, are referred to the UKBA, which makes the final 
decision. Applications can be lodged at the British embassy where there 
is no UNHCR office in the host country.  
 
All applicants are interviewed by UK Home Office officials.25 A Pre 
Mission Questionnaire is sent to the appropriate UNHCR hub. 
Submissions are then received from UNHCR. The Border Agency then 
agrees on the refugees to be interviewed. The mission is carried out 
and Principal Applicants and dependents over 12 are interviewed. 
Biometrics are taken and cases are considered, including a security 
screening and the assessment of the cost of medical needs. Agreement 
is obtained from Ministers for certain cases. Cases are then decided 
and UNHCR is informed. Refugees are met by integration providers and 
a twelve month support package commences.26
Some cases are considered on dossier. In future, some interviews 
may be conducted using remote video conferencing facilities.
  
27
                                                            
21 UK Asylum Policy Instructions on the GPP, op.cit. 10. 
  
22 Fahamu Refugee Legal Aid, Resettlement to the United Kingdom, Available at http://www.frlan.org/node/293 (Last 
visited 31 May 2012).  
23 UK Border Agency, Gateway Protection Programme. Available at  
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/gateway/  (Last visited 13 January 12) 
24 UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions on Mandate refugees, op.cit. p. 3  
25 Ibid. 
26 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
27Ibid. 
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Pre-Departure Activities 
 







• Assistance with travel 
documents 
 
• Medical screening 
 
By UK mission staff to refugees explaining the travel, reception and 
initial integration arrangements. In previous years, a Cultural Orientation 
training programme was delivered to the refugees by IOM shortly before 
departing. Since 2011, a shorter 1 day programme has been delivered 
by staff from the Refugee Resettlement Unit at the UK Border Agency. 
It includes video interviews with refugees previously resettled through 
the programme in which they talk about their experiences of resettling 
and advice they have for new arrivals. Although UK officials believe that 
more intensive and/or follow up Cultural Orientation closer to the time of 





Medical screening is carried out by the IOM within set deadlines prior to 
departure. It includes a detailed medical history and physical 
examination of each individual and additional investigations for health 
conditions specified by UKBA. IOM are also contracted to provide follow 
up treatment for certain health conditions (such as TB) as well as 
testing and counselling for HIV. IOM also provide pre-embarkation 
health assessments shortly before departure and provide UKBA with a 
review of each refugee’s immunisation history and record of 
administration of vaccines. 
This assessment also covers individual special needs for transport – 
such as the need for a medical escort which would then need approval 
from UKBA. 
Procedure Timing The procedure begins with the publication of the Global Needs in the 
summer of each year. The UK Border Agency meets with UNHCR as 
soon as practicable after this in order to begin discussions about which 
refugees are to be resettled in the following programme year (April-
March in line with the UK financial year). There follows cross-
government consultation and Ministerial approval of UK Border Agency 
proposals. There is no strict timing, but the Border Agency attempts to 
implement the steps of the procedure as speedily as possible. The 
timing of the programme is arranged after consultation with relevant 
UNHCR hubs. 
In general, the Border Agency seeks submissions from UNHCR two 
months before missions take place. Security and medical screening 
commences as soon as possible. It is the UK Border Agency’s 
preference that this takes place before missions. Refugees generally 
arrive in the UK from about two months after the Border Agency officials 
return from mission - Local Authorities generally require two months’ 
notice in order to be able to secure suitable accommodation.29
b) Status and Rights – 
Post-Arrival phase  
 
 
 Status granted  
 
All refugees resettled under the GPP are recognised as refugees. All 
Gateway refugees are resettled in a particular region with the 
agreement of the relevant local authority beforehand. Being recognised 
as refugees, they are entitled to use the same services that UK citizens 
can access. NGOs and in some areas, specialist teams within Local 
Authorities are contracted to provide integration services that include 
assisting the refugees with accessing local services. 
                                                            
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
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Resettled refugees are automatically granted indefinite leave to remain. 
This status provides better legal protection than the status granted to in-
country refugees, whose status is reviewed after a period of 5 years 
before indefinite leave to remain may be granted. This reflects the fact 
that resettled refugees have spent long and protracted periods of time 
in refugee camps before their arrival in the UK. 
All resettled refugees are escorted by IOM as far as an airside arrivals 
hall at Manchester Airport. Here the refugees are 'handed over' to a 
small team from one of the three NGOs - Refugee Action, Horton 
Housing Association and the Refugee Council - who currently provide 
reception and post arrival integration support services as part of the 
resettlement programme. The British Red Cross had recently been 
involved in integration support for resettled refugees but this is no 
longer the case. Refugees then board coaches to the relevant 
resettlement area where a cash allowance is administered to them 
before they access their accommodation. 
A brief welcome speech, introduction to the team and overview of the 
support is covered at an arrival venue prior to the refugees departing for 
their accommodation (usually in cars containing each family or 
household unit). 
Upon arriving at their accommodation, staff from that 
accommodation carry out a health and safety briefing, mainly focussing 
on equipment in the house.  
Work to prepare local communities has decreased in recent years as 
less funding per refugee has been available to post arrival services. 
Some providers approach refugees’ neighbours before they arrive to 
explain people will be moving in and give a very basic background to 
the programme. 
Community Development Workers contact relevant community 
groups such as RCOs (Refugee Community Organisations) prior to a 
group arriving. 
Refugee Action and Refugee Council caseworkers use a holistic needs 
assessment and action planning tool called a ‘Personal Integration Plan’ 
with each individual adult refugee. It covers a range of broad headings 
including housing, finance, health, education, employment, relationships 
and legal. Caseworkers work with the individual refugee to establish 
their background before helping them decide on realistic hopes for the 
future and building a plan of how those hopes can be realised. Horton 
Housing caseworkers use a similar tool that assesses needs and risks, 
identifies goals and plans tasks.  
In 2011, the number of refugees supported by each caseworker 
increased as less funding per refugee was available to integration 
support services. The result was the amount of work each caseworker 
was able to carry out with each refugee has correspondingly decreased. 
In 2011, a cash allowance administered to the refugees upon arrival 
was reduced to £50 per person. After discussions at the Gateway 
Forum (see below) on the impact that the reduced cash allowance was 
having on newly arrived refugees, the cash allowance was increased to 
£150 per person from January 2013 onward. 
The 3 integration providers deliver planned group work sessions. 
Cultural orientation can also be carried out on a 1-to-1 or household 
basis by caseworkers as part of the tailored support provided to 
each refugee. 
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Some aspects of the 1-to-1 casework support provided by caseworkers 
can be similar to elements of counselling in that they provide a person-
centred, therapeutic service. While working on the Health and 
Wellbeing element of the Personal Integration Plan, a caseworker and 
client may establish that the client requires further support with their 
mental health. This could lead to the caseworker supporting the client to 
request additional support through their allocated GP [doctor]. Referrals 
can be made to a range of statutory or voluntary providers of 
counselling and related mental health support services. These include 
Freedom From Torture which is an NGO that specialises in counselling 
for survivors of torture and trains counselling services to become 
equipped in delivering services to survivors of torture. 
One of the clearest gaps in the current Gateway Programme is a lack 
of funded English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) courses. 
In previous programmes, ESOL was funded as part of the 
resettlement programme but this has not happened since the 
tendering exercise in 2011. 
Refugees supported by Horton Housing access English classes at 
their training centre which are largely funded from outside of the 
resettlement programme. In some Local Authorities, adult education 
services have funded ESOL courses but this is not consistent across all 
areas. Some refugees have accessed ESOL through referrals made by 
their benefit provider and others are able to access mainstream courses 
which they pay for using their benefit money. However, there have been 
government funding cuts to mainstream ESOL classes which are now 
only funded for people in receipt of certain benefits and many recently 
resettled refugees have not been able to access any kind of English 
language learning. This is particularly the case for parents with childcare 
responsibilities and those who arrive after the start of the academic year 
in September. As of April 2012, 140 of the adult refugees who had been 
resettled in North West England after October 2011 were not accessing 
any kind of English classes. This equates to somewhere between 55% 
and 60% of the adult refugees resettled in this time. 
As part of the Personal Integration Planning process, caseworkers 
identify support that individual refugees require with accessing 
employment and referrals can be made to mainstream employment 
support services. Support with employment can also be provided by the 
caseworker directly or a separate internal project wherever relevant. 
Different providers have devised their own distinct projects for 
supporting refugees in accessing employment. 
Refugee Action carries out an employment assessment with each 
adult shortly after arrival and this helps inform what support they might 
require. 
Some refugees have been referred to work placements in order for 
them to obtain UK work experience with organisations like Manpower – 
a recruitment company that is a global partner of UNHCR.  
Both Refugee Action and the Refugee Council previously had 
specialist employment workers who made links with local employers 
and attempted to strategically break down the barriers to refugees 
entering employment. These roles are not currently part of the models 
operated by either NGO - having been cut in the recent tendering 
exercise as a result of reduced funding per refugee. 
The UK government has a policy of allowing applications for 
reunification with spouses and dependent children. Usually the refugees 
are expected to disclose family members who this may apply to during 
their selection interview and this information then appears amongst the 
information that the NGO receives before the refugees arrive. Their 
caseworker follows this up with the refugee after arrival when working 
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on the legal section of their Personal Integration Plan. From April 2013, 
UK government ‘Legal Aid’ Funding is no longer available for advice on 
family reunion. Refugees now either need to submit applications without 
advice, pay for advice or access limited support from a charity – usually 
with a long waiting list. 
Caseworkers help the refugees understand their relationships with 
services – how to access them as well as what their rights and 
responsibilities are. 
Mentoring is not a standard part of the resettlement programme in the 
UK. Although it is used by some providers. 
In Norwich, the Red Cross previously referred resettled refugees into 
a mentoring service that was funded from outside of the resettlement 
programme and also catered for other refugees and asylum seekers. 
The Refugee Action resettlement programme uses a mentoring 
system that it has developed over many years (during times when 
funding was available for the mentoring of asylum seekers and refugees 
granted asylum after arriving in the UK). It currently focuses on 
matching refugees to mentors who are experienced in a field of work 
that the refugee has identified they would like to access. 
The current funding available to integration services is not sufficient to 
allow for the delivery of much training to local services.  
Volunteers are used in a variety of roles across the different providers. 
‘Arrivals Volunteers’ assist the refugees with intensive support during 
their first week in the UK. 
‘ESOL Volunteers’ work directly with the refugees to help them 
achieve specific learning goals identified by the refugee with help from 
their caseworker. 
‘Volunteer Advocates’ assist refugees with attending appointments 
and accessing services providers. 
All refugees resettled through the Gateway Programme are directly 
accommodated in mainstream housing immediately after arrival. The 
UKBA provide anonymous information about cases to the relevant body 
funded to source accommodation at least 6 weeks prior to arrival. (The 
information includes ages, genders, familial relationships within the 
case, links to other cases and any specific needs such as those relating 
to a disability.) Appropriate accommodation is then sourced for each 
case. The addresses are shared with other relevant bodies such as the 
NGO who will accompany the case to their address upon arrival and the 
local Primary Care Trust who will then allocate a nearby doctors 
surgery. Accommodation for resettled refugees is sourced in different 
ways in different Local Authorities. Some procure social housing from 
housing associations – others source from the private sector and often 
a mix of private and social housing is used.  
The models vary slightly across the country with the housing being 
permanent in some cases and temporary for up to around a year in 
others. Where housing is temporary, support with finding permanent 
accommodation and moving on is also provided. 
Comments Support provided to refugees resettled under GPP originally focussed 
on “reception orientation”. Each resettled refugee is assigned a 
caseworker. Over the years, support has moved from being intensive in 
nature towards a “lighter touch” in order to promote independence.30
                                                            
30 D. Platts Fowler and D. Robinson, ‘An Evaluation of the Gateway Protection Programme: A Report Commissioned by 
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A study evaluating the GPP, found that resettled refugees tended to 
consider themselves satisfied with the support provided to them under the 
GPP on the basis of how easily they can get in touch with their caseworker 
and as a result there was a downward trend in the rate of satisfaction in the 
period between February and May 2009 covered in the report. 
There are a number of challenges facing refugees resettled under 
the GPP. There is limited access in reality to language training, 
especially for women due to greater demand than supply and poor 
coordination of provision of services. Generally after an 18 month 
period, refugee men were found to speak English relatively well. For 
women this was more of a problem, due mainly to problems of access 
to English language courses. This however depended on the country of 
origin of the refugee.  
The UK Borders Agency has stated that although refugees show 
positive signs of integration after an 18 month evaluation period, there 
were low levels of employment.31 A study showed that out of 146 
refugees resettled in the UK, only 3 had experience of paid employment 
after 18 months.32
This study also showed that a large minority of the refugees 
interviewed had been subjected to a physical or verbal attack, some on 
more than one occasion. Almost half of these did not report the attack 
and those who did felt that their complaint was not adequately dealt with 
by the police or the Gateway provider.
 
33
Although the vast majority of resettled refugees who were 
interviewed in the course of this study were registered with a doctor, 41 
per cent reported problems accessing healthcare. This affected women 




Ringfenced funding for ESOL classes should be made available so 
that each adult resettled refugee has a minimum of 640 hours of funded 
ESOL classes in their first year. Funding made available should be 
flexible enough for individual circumstances to be accommodated. For 
the first year after arrival, benefit rules should not restrict the number of 
hours per week a refugee can study English for. 
  
The UK Borders Agency, the UNHCR, NGOs and local authorities 
are the stakeholders involved. The decision to resettle refugees is a 
voluntary commitment by the UK Government, which cooperates with 
UNHCR in determining which refugees to resettle and from where. It 
cooperates with local authorities, who voluntarily agree to receive 
resettled refugees before any refugees are resettled to their area. 
NGOs and some local authorities are involved in delivering the 
programme.35
A national 'Gateway Forum' of actors in resettlement has been re-
established. It met for the first time in September 2012 and has since 
continued to meet regularly. 
  
NGOs and Local Authorities receiving and accommodating resettled 
refugees have expressed that the pre-arrival information they receive is 
not always consistently accurate and thorough enough to enable them 
to fully meet refugees’ needs.36
                                                            
31 Interview with Dave Atkinson, UK Borders Agency, Refugee Team (May 2012). 
 
32 D. Platts Fowler and D. Robinson, note 24 above, p. 2.  
33 Ibid., 3.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Interviews with Victoria Sinclair, Refugee Action, and Andy Hewett, British Red Cross, April 2012. 
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c) Costs and Funding  
Funding 





The GPP is match funded by the UK government (the UK Border 
Agency) and European Refugee Fund.37 The Resettlement programme 
runs in three year cycles in line with fiscal budgets. The current 
arrangement is 2011-2014.38
The UKBA meets the full costs of resettlement in the first year. Costs 
include integration support package which includes housing, healthcare, 
education, language classes and casework support services. NGOs 
work closely with the participating Local Authorities and provide many of 
these services to resettled refugees. NGOs are currently funded to 
provide resettled refugees with a twelve month package of integration 
support. Local Authorities participate on a voluntary and after the initial 
twelve months, the relevant local authority and government department 








The UK aspires to an increased quota of 1000 per year when this 
becomes affordable. However, the present economic climate suggests 
that this increased funding for resettlement is unlikely in the near future. 
According to the UK authorities, in order to expand its resettlement 
programmes in terms of the numbers of refugees resettled, more 
funding would be needed from the EU or the level of support and 
standard of accommodation provided to refugees would have to be 
reduced in order to resettle more within the existing budget. UNHCR 
believes that more refugees could be resettled within the existing 
budget if the process was made more efficient, with NGOs perhaps 
delivering more services, thus cutting costs for local authorities.40
 
 
                                                            
37 Interview with UK Borders Agency, Dave Atkinson, Refugee Team (May 2012) 
38 Ibid. 
39 UK Country Chapter, p. 3. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/40ee6fc04.html (Last visited 31 May 2012).  
40 Interview with Alexander de Chalus, UNHCR (May 2012).  
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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 EU Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as well as thematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
 
For more information: 
 
KNOW RESET project – Migration Policy Centre 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 892 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 770 
Email: know-reset@eui.eu  
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The report presents and compares frameworks and policies relating to refugee resettlement in EU 
Member States. The time-frame of the report is the last decade, i.e. 2003 to 2013. It is based on the 
research conducted for the Know Reset Project and extensively uses the interviews with different 
stakeholders involved in refugee resettlement in the EU, which make valuable contribution to the 
understanding of Member States’ options and policies in the domain of refugee resettlement. 
This report firstly seeks to present and explain the evolution of EU Member States’ commitment in 
resettlement during the last decade by linking it to relevant related initiatives at international 
(UNHCR) and EU levels, most importantly in 2007/2008 and 2011/2012. The report secondly presents 
and compares the content of resettlement-related frameworks and policies in EU Member States, and 
seeks to analyse them in light of common standards and priorities developed by the UNHCR and the 
EU. Last, the report tries to clarify the apparent dichotomy between resettlement and intra-EU 
relocation and the ambiguous relation between the two processes, which may raise priority issues in 
refugee protection burden-sharing. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Member States have long been criticised for their low level of participation in the resettlement 
of refugees from countries of first asylum which are unable to provide the adequate protection. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that very few States had a resettlement policy in Europe up until recently 
and even if legal reference to it was almost non-inexistent, a number of European countries have a 
considerable history of having contributed to the reception of refugees and have responded to 
collective protection needs.  
Initially, the resettlement of refugees was essentially used to respond to the collective needs of 
protection due to war or mass persecution. Once created, the UNHCR came to use resettlement as a 
key tool to finding solutions for European refugees after the 2nd World War.2
While Sweden had adopted a resettlement programme as soon as 1950, it was in the late 1970s that 
European countries initiated resettlement programmes. The Netherlands decided to resettle on a 
programme-basis in 1977 and adopted its first quota in 1984. Finland received a number of refugees at 
the request of UNHCR in 1979 and then launched a programme in 1985. Denmark implemented its 
first programme in 1979.  
 During the Cold War, the 
UNHCR turned to resettlement to respond to the many different refugee crises of that era. Several 
European countries participated to the resettlement of Hungarians who had fled to Yugoslavia and 
Austria after the Soviet invasion of 1956. Likewise, European countries reacted similarly to the 
expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 and to refugee crisis in Chile after the 1973 coup d’état and, 
as a final example, European states also reacted positively to the hundreds of thousands of Indo-
Chinese ‘boat-people’ in the late 1970s. At that time, resettlement was utilised as a t ool in 
safeguarding first asylum in neighbouring countries. 
After the important increase in Vietnamese people leaving their country, the use of large-scale 
resettlement was seen as a p ull-factor for departures and the offer of resettlement places fell 
drastically. It was decided to strenghten the rules for resettlement and the Comprehensive Plan for 
Action signed in 1989 oriented resettlement on individual protection needs.3
From then on, ‘fleeing the Cold War’ would not automatically lead to refugee status and the 
UNHCR took steps in the following years to ‘develop multilateral consultative processes, strengthen 
its resettlement management capacity and articulate resettlement policy and criteria.’ The first 
Resettlement Handbook was released in 1996.
 
4 In 1995, the Working Group on Resettlement (WGR) 
was established to enable the systematic consultation between the UNHCR, resettlement States and 
international organisations like IOM. These partners and invited NGOs then launched the Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) from 1996. It is here that UNHCR’s report on 
Projected Global Resettlement Needs, produced annually, is discussed in detail by the partners5
In the meantime, resettlement was a key tool in the subsequent major refugee crises, such as the 1st 
Gulf War in 1991, the need to transfer inmates in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, followed by the 
war in the former Yugoslavia, and the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Yet, refugee resettlement did not increase 
significantly during the 1990s, and European uptake remained low. Only one new resettlement country 
emerged in the European Union during the 1990s, namely Ireland, which started its first programme in 
 in 
June each year, while the WGR is held in October and March.  
                                                     
2 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.47. 
3 For developments on the history of resettlement, see UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, and Margaret Piper AM, Paul 
Power, Graham Thom, Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, UNHCR Research Paper n°253, February 2013. 
4 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.50 
5 Ibid. p.52 
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1998. Indeed, Ireland responded to the Bosnian crisis of 1992 and to the Kosovan crisis of 1999. Up 
until 2000 it continued to accept relatives of Vietnamese refugees who were initially admitted in 1979 
and relatives of Bosnian refugees admitted between 1992 and 1996. ‘All three of those programmes 
were coming to an end. The UNHCR approached the Department of Foreign Affairs and made the 
case for joining the resettlement quota programme. Decisions were taken in 1998 to bring the Bosnian 
and Vietnamese programmes to an end and to join the annual resettlement quota programme’6
In late 2000, the UNHCR initiated the Global Consultations on International Protection in an 
attempt to revitalise the international refugee regime, bring together Northern and Southern states and 
find some form of convergence between the protection needs of refugees and the interests of states. 
The consultations lasted for two years and resulted in two major outcomes: the 2001 Declaration of 
States Party which reaffirmed UNHCR’s mandate, and the Agenda for Protection which was endorsed 
by the UN General Assembly in 2002. 
. 
The Agenda for Protection called for the expansion of resettlement opportunities due to the extent 
of protracted refugee situations. Together with the Convention Plus Initiative in 2004, the Agenda for 
Protection sought to revive resettlement along a more comprehensive, planned and strategic approach. 
Convention Plus attempted to develop agreements between States to supplement the 1951 G eneva 
Convention and enhance refugee protection at a regional level.  
Yet, revelations of corruption within the UNHCR influenced attitudes towards the management of 
resettlement at this time. As well as this, the terrorist attacks in the United States on the 11th of
 
September 2001 r esulted in resettlement coming to be viewed as b eing a sec urity concern. Public 
perceptions made resettlement from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia more 
“complicated”7
Things started to change in the mid-2000s. One significant factor that influenced changing attitudes 
to resettlement was the fact that there were major changes within the UNHCR
. 
8, such as: The arrival of 
a new High Commissioner, António Guterres, a former Portuguese prime minister who took office in 
2005 and who quickly declared an interest in improving and increasing resettlement; the formation of 
a specialised Resettlement Service and the efforts of senior UNHCR staff who demonstrated a 
capacity to be both more strategic and more effective in the way they dealt with the various 
stakeholders, particularly resettlement States. Supplementing these initiatives was a renewed focus on 
capacity building within the UNHCR, including the revision of the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook.9
The number of EU Member States committed to resettlement has increased significantly over the 
past decade and even more significantly during the past five years.  
 
Five Member States had a resettlement programme before 2003, i.e. Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Finland, and Ireland. While only one new resettlement country emerged in the EU during 
the 1990s, nine were created during the following decade, seven between 2008 and 2013. The number 
of ‘resettlement countries’ in the EU is now fourteen: in addition to the five countries cited above, the 
United Kingdom launched a programme in 2004, Portugal in 2007, the Czech Republic, Romania and 
France in 2008, Hungary, Belgium, Germany and Spain in 2012/2013. Bulgaria is also about to start a 
programme in 2014. Two additional Member States refer to resettlement in law (Poland and Slovenia), 
even though they have not resettled yet, and two other Member States have already joined resettlement 
operations on an ad hoc basis (Italy, Luxembourg).  
                                                     
6 Interview with Martina Glennon (Assistant Principal Officer) and Elaine Houlihan (Executive Officer), Resettlement Unit, 
Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, 5 January 2012. 
7 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.11 
8 Ibid. p.13 
9 Ibid. 
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Besides, Slovakia hosts an Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) for the humanitarian transfer of 
refugees before their resettlement to EU Member States or third countries, as does Romania. Among 
the six EU Member States which have not taken any steps toward getting involved in resettlement, 
Lithuania began discussions in February 2012 on participating in resettlement.10
The past decade has truly been revolutionary in terms of the initiation of refugee resettlement in 
some shape or form by Member States. For that reason, the time-frame of this report is the period from 
2003-2013 and focusses on the current situation relating to resettlement in the EU.  
 
It is based on the research conducted within the Know Reset project between 2011 and 2013, which 
has provided the following research material: 
− A collection of national data on legal and administrative frameworks, resettlement policies at 
EU and national levels; 
− Statistics collected from the national institutions in the 27 Member States; 
− Interviews conducted with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involved in 
resettlement in the Member States;11
− Comparative analytic tools created for the project; 
 
− Country of first asylum reports based on field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. 
In particular, the report utilises the policy positions, opinions and explanations of the different 
stakeholders interviewed in the framework of the project, which allow for an invaluable insight into 
Member States’ law and policy with regard to refugee resettlement.  
This report firstly seeks to present and explain the evolution of EU Member States’ commitment in 
resettlement over the past decade by linking it to relevant related initiatives at international (UNHCR) 
and EU levels. Two turning points have emerged from the observation of this evolution over the past 
decade. In the mid-2000s, the UNHCR was seeking to revive States’ commitment to resettlement, in 
particular through the preparation of ‘group resettlement methodology’ aiming at organising 
Multilateral Resettlement Operations. The possibility of launching a joint resettlement scheme in the 
EU was also considered. The adoption of the European Refugee Fund in 2007 coupled with UNHCR 
and EU’s initiatives around the Iraqi refugee crisis constituted key incentives to expand EU Member 
States’ involvement in refugee resettlement. A few years later, two similar factors – a financial 
incentive at EU level and joint resettlement initiatives – played a similar role in enhancing EU 
Member States commitment in resettlement in a more concerted and sustainable way.  
The report secondly presents and compares the content of resettlement-related frameworks and 
policies in the EU Member States. It seeks to analyse those frameworks and policies in the light of 
common standards and priorities as have been developed by the UNHCR and the EU. This implies 
comparing resettlement in the EU Member States on the basis of a series of criteria, such as the 
following: protection needs when selecting refugees, rule of law and rights granted to resettled 
refugees, responsibility-sharing.  
Finally, the report tries in an additional chapter to clarify the apparent dichotomy between 
resettlement and intra-EU relocation. While it is claimed that the two should be or are unrelated, the 
position of Member States are much more diversified. Some of them consider relocation as a ‘mini-
resettlement’ likely to build their resettlement capacity, both may be merged within the same quota or 
based on the same legal frameworks. The ambiguous relationship between the two processes may raise 
priority problem in refugee protection burden-sharing. 
                                                     
10 UNHCR was informed by the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour about these discussions. Written 
interview of the representative of Regional Office of UNHCR in Lithuania, 23rd of March 2012. Yet, as the representative 
of the Ministry of the Interior was unaware of any on-going discussions on resettlement issue, it follows that it is a very 
initial phase of a possible reform in this field. Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, 21st 
February 2012.  
11 Some names are cited in the report, others are not when the interviewees did not wish to be named. 
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2. The Development of Resettlement-Related Frameworks and Policies in the EU and its 
Member States  
It was during the second half of the 2000s that EU Member States’ commitment to resettlement 
expanded and strengthened. Formal involvement in resettlement in the EU had two major turning 
points during the past decade. Those turning points are in line with important refugee crises and some 
significant initiatives from the UNHCR and the EU, supported by NGOs which reveal the importance 
of advocacy and joint operations to foster resettlement efforts in Member States.  
Different steps can be distinguished in EU Member States’ commitment. The ‘traditional 
resettlement countries’ resettled on a p rogramme-basis long before adopting legislation which 
provided for refugee resettlement in their Asylum law. During the last decade however, the trend has 
been quite the opposite: States have first expressed their formal commitment to resettlement, through 
the reform of their law and/or the announcement of the adoption of a programme, and the effective 
commitment has then followed – or not. 
2.1 The Turning Points of the Last Decade 
a) From 2003 on  
During the first half of the 2000s, both UNHCR and the EU prepared some tools aimed at developing 
multilateral operations and joint initiatives in the domain of refugee resettlement, which were designed 
to have a clear impact on States’ motivation to be part of collective efforts in the following years. 
The UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection and Multilateral Resettlement Operations 
Convention Plus addressed the issue of resettlement through the Multilateral Framework of 
Understandings on Resettlement, a non-binding agreement between states adopted at the High 
Commissioner’s Forum in 2004. The aim of this agreement was to “strengthen the international 
refugee protection system through a more strategic use of resettlement for the benefit of a greater 
number of refugees” and its purpose was “to guide parties to situation-specific multilateral 
agreements.” It was actually attempting to recreate the “comprehensive plans of action” that had been 
used twenty years before in South East Asia and Central America.12
Refugees may be recognised through individualised determination procedures or, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, through group-determination procedures on a prima facie basis.
 From 2003, the UNHCR started 
to develop a ‘group resettlement methodology’ to enhance resettlement through the use of simpler and 
accelerated processing for groups of refugees while it also advocated for the adoption of flexible 
selection criteria that would go beyond the terms of the 1951 Convention. 
13 This latter 
approach has mainly been adopted in situations of mass influx, ‘where the reasons of flight are 
generally known and the number of arrivals would overwhelm capacities to determine refugee status 
individually.’14
Taking into account the need for responsibility sharing in the protection of refugees and a strategic 
use of resettlement, the UNHCR and its governmental and non-governmental partners have tried to 
undertake multilateral resettlement operations. Resettlement states have therefore been called upon to 
offer places to individuals who belong to specific groups and are in a country of first asylum which 
 
                                                     
12 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.11. 
13 ‘Prima facie (‘in absence of evidence to the contrary’) refers to the process of group determination of refugee status, as 
opposed to individual determination, which is usually conducted in situations where a need to provide urgent assistance 
or other practical difficulties preclude individual determination, and where the circumstances of the flight indicate that 
members of the group could be considered individually as refugees’, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.20. 
14 Ibid. p.19. 
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does not acknowledge refugee status for instance or cannot provide an adequate level of protection due 
to the number of refugees in need of protection, leading to protracted refugee situations.  
Among the groups of vulnerables persons to be resettled, some refugees appear to be ‘safer’ than 
others and may compensate for caseloads that are deemed to be ‘risky’ on security grounds. In the 
second half of the 2000s, new sources of ‘safe’ refugees emerged. This was the case of Burmese. For 
many years Thailand and to a lesser extent Malaysia had resisted approaches to allow UNHCR to gain 
access to Burmese refugees to process them for resettlement but in the early 2000s, negotiations 
succeeded in convincing them to change their policy.15
Besides, a number of major repatriation operations, especially those to Afghanistan, Iraq and South 
Sudan faced important difficulties which led some resettlement states to resettle refugees from those 
countries, even though they were considered as being ‘risky.’
 
16
The EU’s Initial Steps toward a Joint Resettlement Programme 
 
At the EU level, the Amsterdan Treaty had created a new area of competence for the European Union 
by transferring asylum policy and the Schengen acquis from the intergovernmental pillar to the 
Community pillar. Within the objective of an EU asylum policy, the European Commission suggested 
in its Communication of 22 November 2000 that ‘Processing the request for protection in the region 
of origin and facilitating the arrival of refugees on the territory of the Member States by a resettlement 
scheme are ways of offering rapid access to protection’ (COM 2000/0755 final). The Commission 
believed that only a joint EU approach could create the necessary political and operational terms for 
accessing European territory and for allowing resettlement to be used for strategic purposes - both to 
assist the EU Member States and attain the objectives of the UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection. 
At the time when the United Kingdom was suggesting ‘transit and treatment centres’ in third 
countries in line with its ‘Safe Borders, Safe Haven’ policy, the Commission’s Communication of 3 
June 2003 (COM(2003) 315 final) presented resettlement as a way to provide for ‘managed and 
orderly arrivals of persons in need of international protection.’ This way of presenting resettlement 
was confirmed in June 2004 in a Communication17
In the Hague Programme of 4 and 5 N ovember 2004, the European Council set a series of 
objectives and priorities with a view to further developing the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) in its second phase. In particular, the European Council underlined the need for the EU to 
contribute in a spirit of shared responsibility to a more accessible, equitable and effective international 
protection system and to provide access to protection and durable solutions at the earliest possible 
stage. The European Council went on t o call for the development of EU-Regional Protection 
Programmes (RPP) which included a joint resettlement programme for Member States willing to 
participate in such a programme. The Commission then set out its action plan for one or more 
Regional Protection Programmes.
 in which the Commission proposed an EU-wide 
resettlement scheme.  
18 Those RPP were not shaped as a humanitarian response19
                                                     
15 Ibid. p.11. As a result, whereas only 246 Burmese were resettled in 2002, by 2009 the number had grown to 24,781, a 100 
fold increase15.  
 but as a 
tool to support and build the protection capacity in third countries. Resettlement from the countries 
16 Ibid. p.12 
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 4 June 2004 on the managed entry in 
the EU of persons in need of international protection and the enhancement of the protection capacity of the regions of 
origin: "improving access to durable solutions". COM(2004) 410 final. 
18 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 1 S eptember 2005 on r egional protection 
programmes. COM(2005) 388 final. (Not published in the Official Journal). 
19 Marcin Pruss, European Commission, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
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covered by an RPP was considered as a way to enhance their involvement in refugee protection and as 
a response to the strategic use of resettlement which attempts to influence the behaviour and attitudes 
in countries of first asylum. 
In the meantime, the European Commission also started to fund ‘twinning projects’ aiming at 
developing joint resettlement processes. The MORE Project (Modelling of National Resettlement 
Process and Implementation of Emergency Measures) was an EU funded Project which ran from 
December 2003 to April 2005 and ‘twinned’ a traditional resettlement country, Finland, with a recent 
one, Ireland, in cooperation with UNHCR, IOM and ECRE. The aim of the Project was to develop 
comprehensive models for the resettlement process, which could be utilised by other EU Member 
States and other countries. The main outcome of the Project was the production of a practical guide to 
the resettlement process.  
Impact at National Level 
Before 2003, only five EU Member States had resettlement programmes: the four ‘traditional 
resettlement countries’, i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, and Ireland which 
legislated for resettlement in 1996 a nd started its programme in 1998. T he Czech Republic also 
introduced a reference to refugee resettlement in its Asylum Act in 1999 but only resettled from 2008. 
The following changes occurred during the first half of the 2000s: 
• The UK introduced a specific provision in 2002 in its Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act and started its programme in 2004, ‘to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to supporting 
UNHCR’s global effort to provide durable solutions to the plight of refugees and increasing 
its international contribution to sharing the refugee burden.’20
• Ireland extended its annual quota in 2005 from 10 cases (around 40 persons) to 200 persons 
to be admitted. 
 
• The three Scandinavian ‘traditional resettlement countries’ of the EU decided to formally 
legislate for their commitment by introducing a specific reference to resettlement: Finland in 
2004, Denmark and Sweden in 2005.  
• Germany, which only resettled on an ad hoc basis at that time, changed its law in 2004, to 
allow admission from abroad and issuance of residence permit.  
• Romania, which had never resettled, introduced a specific provision in its law in 2006. 
Article 3(5) of the Asylum law opened the possibility to resettle on a programme-basis. 
In legislating in this way, Romania is representative of a greater trend among the newer Member 
States, those which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The need to revise legislation to conform to the 
EU acquis on asylum was also an opportunity to legislate for resettlement.  
Therefore, by 2007, only one new resettlement country had been created in the EU since the 
beginning of the 2000s, i.e. the UK. Despite this slow progress, the formalisation of a commitment to 
resettle was already on progress.  
 
b) The 2007/2008 Turning Point 
This turning point is due to Multilateral joint operations initiated by both the UNHCR and the EU and 
the adoption of financial incentives for resettlement by the EU. 
 
                                                     
20 Written interview with Dave Atkinson, Home Office, Refugee Team, 16 May 2012. 
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The UNHCR’s Calls for Group Resettlement and Protracted Situations 
The UNHCR pursued its efforts to incentivise and guide States toward situation-specific multilateral 
resettlement operations. The purpose in its doing this was to encourage states to focus attention on 
situations where it was considered that a strategic resettlement operation could leverage benefits for a 
much larger number of refugees, including creating a better protection environment and opening up 
the possibility of local integration.21
In addition to the ‘classical’ multilateral resettlement operations, the UNHCR launched a Special 
Initiative on P rotracted Refugee Situations in 2008 which focused on f ive situations among which 
three had to be resolved through resettlement: 
 
− Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan; 
− Refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh; 
− Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan.22
Besides, at that time, the refugee crisis due to the 2nd Gulf War began to severely impact the 
countries surrounding Iraq, i.e. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In March 2007, the UNHCR declared that 
Iraqis fleeing their country from five central governorates were entitled to prima facie refugee status 
and called for their resettlement. In addition, it established eleven priority resettlement profiles to help 




The ERF and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis  
 in line with the seven globally defined resettlement criteria. 
The European Refugee Fund (ERF) for the period 2008-2013 adopted Decision 573/2007/EC, aimed, 
among other things, to ‘(…) support the voluntary efforts made by Member States to provide 
international protection and a durable solution in their territories to refugees and displaced persons 
identified as eligible for resettlement by the UNHCR, such as the actions that the Member States 
implement to assess the resettlement needs and transfer the persons concerned to their territories, with 
a view to granting them a secure legal status and to promoting their effective integration.”24
Member States could apply for funding to help implement resettlement programmes, and could 
seek 4,000 Euro per resettled person provided the refugee belonged to one of the four vulnerable 
categories eligible, they were:
  
25
• persons from a country or region designated for the implementation of a Regional Protection 
Programme;  
  
• unaccompanied minors;  
• children and women at risk, particularly from psychological, physical or sexual violence or 
exploitation;  
• persons with serious medical needs that can only be addressed through resettlement. 
Beyond this increase in funding, the funding of twinning projects also continued. The MOST 
Project succeeded the MORE Project from 2006 to 2008. The Ministry of Labour in Finland led the 
MOST project and the project partners were the Irish Reception and Integration Agency, the Spanish 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the Swedish Migration Board in cooperation with UNHCR, 
                                                     
21 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.16. 
22 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.59. 
23 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, ICMC, May 2010, p.12. 
24 Recital 18 of Decision 573/2007/EC. 
25 Article 13 of Decision 573/2007/EC. 
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IOM and ECRE. It aimed at exploring ways to improve the resettlement process and focused on the 
quality of integration services. 
In parallel, a Joint EU Call to resettle 10,000 refugees from Iraq was adopted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council (JHA) on 27-28 November 2008. Help to vulnerable refugees was specifically 
mentioned. The Council Conclusions came about under the French presidency of the EU and under the 
leadership of some Member States that had already been involved in the resettlement of Iraqi refugees 
since 2007.  
Besides, under the Slovenian EU presidency in 2008, EU Ministers from larger resettlement 
countries had signed a declaration where they committed to resettle quantitatively more and prompted 
their colleagues to do the same.26
Impact at National Level 
 
The Joint Call at EU level had a clear impact on several Member States which stresses the importance 
of launching multilateral operations to obtain national commitments. The initiatives of some Member 
States acting as leaders were also key incentives to get their partners involved. The UNHCR’s call to 
resettle refugees from Iraq was actively promoted by some important Member States. The Netherlands 
and Sweden in particular urged other Member States to respond to the Iraqi refugee crisis. The 
adoption of the Council Conclusions was primarily promoted by Germany in early 2008. Then, in June 
2008, France signed an ad hoc agreement with the UNHCR (the ‘IRAK 500’ programme) embarking 
on a two-year programme for the resettlement of vulnerable Iraqi refugees belonging to minority 
groups. On 20-21st November 2008, i n anticipation of the EU JHA Council meeting, Germany 
adopted a key decision to accept 2,500 Iraqi refugees from Jordan and Syria as part of Europe’s 
response to the refugee crisis. The fact that Germany decided to make a significant contribution and 
accept a large number of Iraqi refugees greatly influenced the adoption of the Council Conclusions.27
The number of countries involved quadrupled, from two in 2007 to eight in 2009. Eventually, 
twelve EU Member States participated in the joint effort to resettle refugees from Iraq: Seven 
programme-based resettlement countries (Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal, 
Denmark, Ireland), and five Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg) 
responded the call on an ad hoc basis.  
  
A second significant incentive to resettle also appear to be twinning projects and supportive 
initiatives among Member States. The Iraqi crisis was the opportunity for the EU and some Member 
States to develop and test joint initiatives and pass on lessons from their own experiences. In the 
framework of the MOST project, representatives of the Spanish government from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs participated in selection missions to Jordan and Syria with the Swedish 
partner in 2007 and 2008 to find out how the resettlement process could be organised. The missions 
involved the selection of Iraqi refugees, and was conducted as part of a learning process focussing on 
refugee selection.  
A Temporary Desk in Iraq (TDI), funded by the European Commission aimed ‘to improve practical 
cooperation on protection, resettlement and the return of Iraqi refugees.’ From May 2009 to October 
2010, this pilot project brought together General Directors of Immigration Services from Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Belgium. The expertise was aimed at being transmitted to the EASO in order 
to support its forthcoming activities in the domain of resettlement. As part of the TDI project, Belgium 
and the Netherlands went on a joint mission to Syria in May 2009. Furthermore, Bulgaria and Slovakia 
                                                     
26 Phone interview with Andreas Ollinen, political adviser to the Swedish Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, 
Ministry of Justice, 16 May 2012. 
27 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, op.cit., p.14 
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participated as observers in the Dutch mission to Syria in October/November 2009.28
Belgium and Luxembourg’s 2009 pilot resettlement schemes in response to the November 2008 
Conclusions were preceded by guidance from the Netherlands. In 2008, Belgium and Luxembourg 
were invited to join the Netherlands on a selection mission in Thailand in order to promote 
resettlement. By the end of 2007, delegations from Belgium and the Czech Republic had observed 
the Dutch resettlement process in Thailand under the twinning project entitled ‘Durable solutions in 
practice.’ A Romanian delegation took part in a selection mission to Jordan in February 2008 under 
the same project. Representatives from Belgium, the Czech Republic and Romania also visited the 
Netherlands, where they were given a general overview of Dutch resettlement policy, including 
quota and reception. 
 In 2010, a 
proposal was made for a similar Desk in Afghanistan.  
Twinning projects are not only aimed at promoting resettlement to potential future resettlement 
countries but also to exchange experiences. Ireland for instance benefited from the support and 
experience of Canada and the UK when it resettled Burmese Rohingya in 2009. ‘ I visited Bradford 
where the Rohingya refugees had been resettled and representatives from Bradford subsequently 
visited Ireland to meet the Rohingya community here. This resulted in some members from both of the 
Rohingya Communities making contact with one another.’29 In 2009, Ireland also took some refugees 
in cooperation with the UK, within a transnational EU funded project. Bulgaria and Belgium also 
participated in that initiative as at that time they were considering participating in programme 
resettlement. The Netherlands’ involvement in fostering further commitments among Member States 
appears to be determinative in the above-mentioned cooperation schemes. Ireland stresses that Finland 
had also provided an excellent support during its early years of resettlement and that it then had the 
opportunity to support Slovenia, Belgium and Bulgaria. ‘We learn from each other all of the time and 
it wouldn’t happen without the EU.’30
The financial contribution of the ERF was also a clear incentive to generate EU Member States’ 
involvement in refugee resettlement. Belgium’s pilot project to resettle refugees from Iraq was 
conditional upon a request for European funding. “Concretely, the selection mission and the transfer 
of the resettled refugees took place within the framework of the ERF community actions project 
“Temporary Desk on Iraq”, which meant that up to 90% of the costs of the selection and transfer of 
refugees could be recuperated through the European Commission. Furthermore, 50% of the reception 
and integration of the resettled refugees was co-financed by the national section of the ERF.” 
 
31
Also Portugal established a multi-annual programme (2008-2013) in the context of the ERF which 




The following changes occurred from 2007/2008 on: 
 The financial incentive is still emphasized by the Ministry to further develop resettlement 
in Portugal. 
• Portugal, which accepted an intake of 33 refugees on an ad hoc basis from January 2006, 
then launched a programme in 2007 to receive 30 refugees a y ear, and formalised its 
commitment through the adoption of a legal provision in 2008. Though Portugal never 
formally responded to the November 2008 Conclusions, it accepted an urgent case of one 
Iraqi family of five who arrived in September 2008 and another Iraqi family who were 
resettled from Syria in 2009. 
                                                     
28 Ibid. p.24 
29 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Written interview with Ewout Adrians, CGRS-FEDASIL, 4 May 2012. 
32 Written interview with the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs, February 2012. 
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• Beside its ‘IRAK 500’ programme, France concluded an agreement with the UNHCR in 
2008 to engage in programme-based resettlement for one hundred files per year. ‘If the Iraq 
issue was an incentive to engage in resettlement, the development of resettlement in the EU 
might have had a positive impact too on the French commitment. France was about to take 
the presidency of the EU (second half of 2008) and prepared the asylum and immigration 
European Pact that included provisions on resettlement and intra-EU relocation. It has to be 
underlined as well that, in 2007, the number of asylum seekers was the lowest of the decade 
(ca 35 000 applications). It might have dispelled a certain reluctance regarding the 
reception of further refugees. Finally, advocacy by Forum réfugiés and France terre d’asile 
might have had an impact too.’33
• In the multi-year plan of the ERF 2008-2011, Spain presented a p roposal to accept 150 
refugees, 50 pe r year. In 2009, M adrid revised its law regulating the right to asylum and 
subsidiary protection and made a specific reference to the prospect to establish a resettlement 
programme in cooperation with the UNHCR and other relevant bodies. It also engaged in a 
resettlement programme during the subsequent years but eventually did not implement its 
resettlement programmes.  
  
• In the UK, the annual quota was increased coinciding with the November 2008 Conclusions 
in 2008/2009 which brought the annual total from 500 to 750 refugees. 
This is all the more on the Eastern side of the EU that the formal commitment is the most 
impressive:  
• Hungary and Slovenia included a reference to resettlement in their respective laws in 2007.  
• The Czech Republic launched its resettlement programme in June 2008 and resettled nine 
Burmese families in October 2008 and February 2009. Twelve other Burmese families were 
resettled during 2010.34
• In Romania, a Government Decision taken in 2008 on t he Resettlement of Foreigners 
provided for resettlement and stated that 120 refugees would be resettled during the period 
2008-2010. Only 38 refugees were resettled in the context of this provision, representing the 
quota due on 2009 and the programme was subsequently suspended. Resettlement was fully 
funded by the ERF.
 
35 The quotas due on 2008 a nd 2010 have not been fulfilled due to the 
delayed approval of Government Decision no. 1596/2009 on the resettlement of refugees in 
Romania, as well as due to the economic and social situation resulting from the global 
economic crisis.36
• After joining the ACTR in 2007, a twinning project with Ireland in the following two years 
and a twinning project with the Netherlands in 2009, Bulgaria established an 
intergovernmental Taskforce on Resettlement in 2010. The objective of this Taskforce was 
to create a draft pilot resettlement programme to be implemented in 2013.  
 
At the end of this period, a new one starts with similar incentives, i.e. group resettlement and 
financial support, being applied in the context of a new refugee crisis. 
                                                     
33 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, France Terre d’Asile, April 2012. 
34 Petr Novak, Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, Know Reset Final conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013.  
35 Written interview with the Romanian Office for Immigration (ROI), 23 January 2012. 
36 Ibid. 
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c) The 2011/2012 Turning Point 
The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean and Group Resettlement Initiatives 
In 2011, a mass influx of refugees began to flow into Tunisia and Egypt as a result of the conflict in 
Libya. In February 2011, the UNHCR made a global call for places for resettlement from Tunisia and 
Egypt. On the 2nd of March 2011, the UNHCR organised a conference of resettlement States and other 
interested countries. That conference resulted in the launching of the Global Resettlement Solidarity 
Initiative for refugees ex-Libya to ease the burden on Tunisia and Egypt which had received tens of 
thousands of refugees. Resettlement was presented as a way to ensure that vulnerable persons did not 
risk dangerous boat journeys across the Mediterranean. The European Commission reacted to the calls 
made by the UNHCR by inviting experts from the Member States to a “resettlement experts meeting 
on refugees stranded in Libya” on the 28th of March 2011.37 The JHA Council of 11-12 April 2011 
argued favourably for the extension of Regional Protection Programmes and claimed that it had the 
objective of alleviating protracted refugee situations, notably through enhancing refugee resettlement. 
The European Commission asked Member States to transfer their annual quotas from the countries 
that they had already pledged to North African countries, if they could not provide new resettlement 
places as the UNHCR and the European Commission requested of them. On the 12th of May 2011, 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström convened a Ministerial Conference, co-chaired with the Hungarian 
Presidency, to discuss and review commitments and pledges from the Member States and the 
Associated Countries in respect of the extension of the pilot project in Malta for the relocation to other 
Member States of persons who were beneficiaries of international protection and the resettlement to 
Europe of refugees stranded in North Africa. The Conference was organised as a co ncrete 
implementation of the solidarity statements included in the Council Conclusions of April 2011.38
In July 2011, the UNHCR stated that twelve countries had pledged 900 places. Almost one third 
were offered in addition to annual resettlement programmes or were an ad hoc contribution. Yet, at the 
end of June, the UNHCR submitted more than 1,000 refugees for resettlement and 80 departed for the 
ETC in Romania for processing by resettlement countries.
  
39 In July 2012, according to the UNHCR, 
twelve countries worldwide had pledged 1,700 dedicated resettlement places, this figure does not 
include the United States of America which offered an open-ended number of places. 5,500 refugees 
were submitted for resettlement worldwide and 1,270 refugees departed for resettlement directly and 
through the ETCs.40
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme (JEURP) 
  
A proposal to establish a Joint EU resettlement Programme was tabled in September 2009 under the 
Swedish Presidency. The aim was to increase the EU’s humanitarian impact, to integrate resettlement 
into external relations policy, to streamline actions of Member States and to make them more cost 
effective.41
                                                     
37 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
 The proposal remained in limbo between institutions mainly because of the annual priority 
setting and because of an argument between the Council and the Parliament about which decision 
procedure to use in connection to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
38 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-295_en.htm?locale=fr Memo/11/295, 13/05/2011 
39 UNHCR Projected Globel Resettlement Needs 2012, July 2011, p.10, http://www.unhcr.org/4f0fff0d9.html 
40 UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2013, July 2012, p.11, http://www.unhcr.org/5006aff49.html 
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 2 S eptember 2009 on t he 
establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme [COM(2009) 447 final) 
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On 29 March 2012, the European Parliament voted on the Joint EU Resettlement Programme, 
already approved by the Council. Decision 281/2012/EU of 29 March 2012 amended Decision 
573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 a s part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows.’  
This decision determined common EU resettlement priorities for 2013 and announced an increase 
in the financial assistance that Member States would receive from the European Refugee Fund for the 
resettlement of refugees. In addition to this, that decision also provided for the following changes: 
− The ERF used to only fund the resettlement of refugees from outside the EU to Member 
States but now also funds relocation between Member States. 
− The general rule is that Member States will receive a lump sum of 4,000 Euro for each 
person resettled according to the agreed priorities. Member States who apply for financial 
support from the European Refugee Fund for the first time will receive a lump sum of 6,000 
Euro per resettled refugee.  
Additional funding is also available for those Member States which have not previously or 
have only once received ERF funding for the resettlement of refugees. Those Member States 
will get a lump sum of 5,000 Euro per resettled person. This is particularly relevant for the 
countries that have not yet received ERF funding, or have only received it once and have 
expressed an interest in undertaking resettlement, most notably, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania. Italy and Spain have made ERF 
pledges in the past, but have not fulfilled these, and in that case would still be eligible for the 
extra funding.42
− The JEURP widens the categories of refugees whose resettlement is supported with EU 
funding in 2013. The amendment to the ERF adds specific vulnerable groups and geographic 
priorities to the existing categories of refugees whose resettlement is funded under the ERF.  
  
To facilitate the calculation of funding needs through the European Refugee Fund for 2013, 
Member States were asked to provide the Commission with an estimate of the number of persons per 
category they planned to resettle in 2013. 
The European Commission continued to fund a number of projects to support and enhance practical 
cooperation relating to resettlement in the EU, such as ‘ Practical cooperation in EU resettlement’ 
jointly implemented from 2010 onward by the ICMC, IOM and the UNHCR and ten Member states 
(Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom, 
Slovakia and Sweden). 'Paving the way - a handbook on the Reception and Integration of Resettled 
Refugees' was produced in 2011 within the framework of this project.43
‘Linking in EU Resettlement’, launched in September 2011, aims at further developing the 
achievements of the practical cooperation project.
 
44
Also significant is the establishment of an EU Resettlement Network, an initiative co-funded by the 
European Refugee Fund and involving IOM, the UNHCR and the ICMC. The objectives of the 
network include the promotion of information exchange, collaboration, and policy development. 
 It aims to strengthen the expertise of European 
practitioners at all stages of resettlement and the integration process, including the capacity of 
municipalities and civil society. It focusses on the reception and integration of refugees at the local 
level and linking the pre-departure and post-arrival phases in order to make resettlement more 
successful.  
                                                     
42 Written interview with UNHCR Hungary, April 2012. 
43 See : http://www.icmc.net/pubs/paving-way-a-handbook-reception-and-integration-resettled-refugees 
44 http://www.resettlement.eu/page/linking-eu-resettlement-project 
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Activities undertaken by the Network include stakeholder meetings, training for practitioners and 
pilots of innovative activities.45
Impact at National Level 
 
The UNHCR and the EU’s call to resettle refugees from the Shousha camp in Tunisia was responded 
to by Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Spain. Ireland also resettled some refugees from Tunisia 
within the existing quota, as well as Portugal and Sweden. Again, group resettlement initiatives with 
financial support were key incentives in convincing Member States to commit to resettlement both in 
responding to the refugee crisis and in making a st rategic use of resettlement and thus utilising 
resettlement in a more sustainable fashion. Indeed, Belgium, Germany and Spain took the opportunity 
to engage in programme-based resettlement. 
The following changes occurred in 2011/2012: 
• In 2011, Germany agreed to launch a resettlement programme from 2012 on, pl anning to 
resettle 900 refugees over three years. 195 refugees were resettled from the Shousha camp to 
Germany in September 2012, and 105 Iraqi refugees arrived from Turkey in October 2012. 
• In preparation for the European Commission meeting on 28 March 2011, the inner cabinet 
of the Belgian federal government decided on 24 March 2011 to resettle 25 African 
refugees who fled from Libya to Tunisia after the outbreak of the revolution. Furthermore, 
the new Belgian government agreement of December 2011 stated that Belgium would 
participate in resettlement programmes on a European level. Belgium pledged to resettle 
100 refugees in 2013.  
• In 2012, Spain resettled 80 refugees from the Shousha camp and renewed its engagement to 
resettle on a programme-basis in 2013-2014, 30 refugees a year. Already at the end of the 
1990s, UNHCR announced that Spain was among the newly emerging resettlement 
countries.46 It was then removed from this list since Spain never implemented any 
programme. In 2008, it presented a proposal to accept 150 refugees over three years, but this 
provision was never carried out.47
• Poland reformed its Aliens Act in 2011 which now refers to resettlement. The UK has been 
developing a twinning arrangement with the Polish government to support them in their 
aspirations to become a resettlement country 
 During the subsequent years, the Council of Ministers 
approved an annual programme and even raised the quota from 75 refugees planned in 2010 
to 100 r efugees planned in 2011. N one of these programmes have been implemented. 
Nevertheless, in 2012, t he Spanish Council of Ministers again approved an annual 
resettlement programme for 2013-2014 and also resettled refugees from Eritrea, Sudan, and 
Somalia in July 2012 in response to a call made by the UNHCR. Instead of considering the 
latter resettlement as an ad hoc resettlement which it seemed to be, Spain claimed that it was 
based on the 2009 Asylum law and counted within the quota approved for 2011. 
• Romania adopted a new programme. In 2012, a Government Decision was proposed for the 
Amendment of the 2008 Government Decision on the Resettlement of Refugees in Romania and 
set the number of refugees to be resettled over two years (2012 and 2013) at 40.  
                                                     
45 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.20 
46 Joanne van Selm, Tamara Woroby, Erin Patrick, Monica Watts, The feasibility of setting up resettlement schemes in EU 
Member States or at EU level, against the background of the Common European Asylum System and the goal of a Common 
Asylum Procedure, Migration Policy Institute, Tender n°. DG.JAI-A2/2002/001, 2003, executive summary, p.vii 
47 Written interview with an advisor to the Spanish Ministry for Employment and Social Security, also the former sub-
director for Immigration, under the Office of the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration, April 2012. 
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• The Hungarian Government announced its decision to become a resettlement country in 
October 2010 and confirmed its commitment through a pledge submitted to the Ministerial 
Conference organized by UNHCR in Geneva in December 2011. In response to the “Arab 
spring” in 2011 a Governmental Decision (No. 1139/2011) was adopted on the launch of an 
asylum solidarity programme in relation to the situation in North Africa. On this basis, 
Hungary intended to focus its resettlement commitment to the North-African region.48
• In Bulgaria, the instability of the government as well as practical difficulties had postponed 
the official launching and the implementation of the resettlement programme prepared since 
2010.
 
Hungary promised to resettle a family of five to eight persons in 2012-2013 as a pilot 
programme but eventually resettled only one refugee.  
49
• Slovenia promised to resettle on a programme-basis in 2014.  
 Yet, in June 2012, the political decision on the submission of a pilot resettlement 
quota of 20 persons in 2013 was adopted. Unfortunately, the application for EU funds was 
deposited after the deadline. 
For some Member States, the EU’s financial incentive is determining their commitment. In 
Belgium, the 2011 de cision was, like in 2009, c onditional upon s ecuring European funding. ‘The 
choice of countries has until now not been based on strategic choices connected to Belgian Foreign 
Policy. In 2011 the decision was made to resettle from Tunisia and not Egypt for a pragmatic reason: 
European funding was only available for “urgent resettlement”, while in Egypt UNHCR focused on 
resolving the “protracted refugee situation”‘50
Being part of a joint effort is also a clear motivation. For Belgium, participating in worldwide 
and EU operations is a key incentive. This was the case when it resettled in 2009 and 2011.
. The European Commission indeed included “urgent 
resettlement” in its annual priorities for the ERF programme for community actions for 2011 through 
which up to 90% of the operation could once again be financed by Europe. 
51 This is 
also true of Bulgaria52 and Italy. The Italian government has been involved in discussions with the 
UNHCR regarding the closure of the Iraqi refugee camp named Camp Ashraf and the resettlement of 
the Iranians refugees that were hosted there. It seemed that Italy was not going to bind itself unless 
others were willing to join53 - the general attitude of waiting unless others follow shows that 
resettlement probably would be more efficiently organised at the European level as it would 
automatically involve burden sharing among Member States and therefore they might be more willing 
to cooperate in such a context. In Romania, ‘the Government’s decision to get involved in the 
resettlement of refugees process was influenced by the political will of strengthening Romania's status 
as an important global partner by undertaking efforts and responsibilities incumbent upon the 
international community in the area of refugee protection. Since the resettlement of refugees plays an 
important role in the EU’s external policies on asylum, the involvement of Romania in the resettlement 
programme was driven also by the desire to assume its obligations as an EU Member State.’54
 
 
                                                     
48 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
49 Anna Andreeva, Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
50 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Anna Andreeva, Know Reset Final Conference, op.cit. 
53
 Phone interview with the head of unit VII of the Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation in Migration, International 
Protection and International Adoptions, DG Italians abroad and migration policies at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
February 2012.  
54 Written interview with ROI, op.cit. 
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An evolution has occurred in resettlement law and policy and has led to Member States 
increasingly committing to resettling refugees. However, an extension of the commitments in 
resettling refugees in the EU is not linear and does not necessarily mean that the number of refugees 
resettled in the EU will steadily rise. As mentioned above, some commitments may be postponed, not 
implemented or revised.  
2.2 The Development of a Formal Basis for Resettlement in the EU 
The adoption of a legal basis for resettlement was not considered as necessary by many stakeholders, 
as resettlement is a voluntary practice rather than a legal duty. Numerous stakeholders insist that the 
resettlement decision is political. The impact of changes in governments on State involvement in 
resettlement confirms the political nature of the decision to resettle. This was the case recently in both 
Bulgaria and Belgium. Yet, for Oskar Ekblad, Head of Resettlement Activities in Sweden, a barrier for 
many EU countries seems to be the lack of necessary legislation.55
Thirteen EU Member states now refer to refugee resettlement in the law governing Aliens and/or 
Asylum
 During the past decade, most of the 
resettlement countries have undertaken to formalise their practice or prepare a future practice with the 
adoption of a formal framework.  
56 and fifteen have adopted government acts. Among these, sixteen57
Although they have a formal basis to do so, Slovenia and Bulgaria have not yet resettled any refugees 
while Poland has resettled without using the legal basis relating to resettlement. Contrary to this, 
Scandinavian countries have long had the experience of resettlement before they undertook the step of 
adapting their legislation accordingly. The Netherlands have not included any resettlement-related 
provision in their Aliens law despite the fact that that State has been resettling for over forty years. 
 have already effectively 
resettled and thirteen have resettled on a programme-basis (see Annex 1). The legal framework is very 
diverse from one EU Member State to another. Besides, the existence of a formal basis does not imply 
the effective practice of resettlement and its absence does not prevent a Member State from resettling. 
Most of the ‘new’ Eastern EU Member states have adopted a specific provision related to 
resettlement: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia. The Baltic states, on the other 
hand, are reluctant to join any resettlement activity. Those five ‘new’ Member States have taken the 
opportunity of adapting their asylum legislation for the EU acquis to introduce a r eference to 
resettlement. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, no provision has been introduced in law but in 2010 a 
Intergovernmental Task Force on Resettlement (RWG) was created, with the objective of creating a 
draft pilot resettlement programme. It required two years before the Council of Ministers issued a 
decision in 2012 to launch the Pilot Resettlement Programme to be implemented in 2014. In terms of 
implementation, only the Czech Republic has effectively undertaken its resettlement programme. 
Romania has been only able to resettle for one year, 2008, ou t of the three years initially planned. 
Despite a specific provision introduced in 2007, Hungary has not resettled any refugee up to 2013 
when it resettled one person. Slovenia has not resettled yet and Poland has not resettled on the basis of 
the legal provision introduced in 2011.  
Those new Member States were approached by the UNHCR, which used accession to the EU in 
order to advocate for refugee resettlement in countries, which were eager to show their good will and 
commitment in EU and international affairs. They are also particularly motivated by the financial 
                                                     
55 Phone interview, op.cit. 
56 Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (2005), Finland (2004), Germany (2004), Hungary (2007), Poland (2011), Portugal 
(2008), Ireland (1996), Romania (2006), Slovenia (2007), Spain (2009), Sweden (2005), UK (2002). 
57 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK. And even eighteen if we add Hungary which planned the resettlement of one 
family in 2012-2013 and eventually resettled one person, and Poland which resettled 16 pe rsons through a personal 
spontaneous initiative of its Prime Minister in 2011. 
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incentives introduced by the EU which explains the wave of commitments after the adoption of the 
ERF for the period 2008-2013. Indeed, while the lump sum granted to States upon resettling a refugee 
may seem low and insufficient in Member States with a high cost of living, it is considered as being 
important in countries where the receiving and integration capacity is a work in progress.58 In contrast, 
the Irish management team argues that ‘resettlement cannot be based on an “incentive” because there 
are costs to the State not just first year costs but ongoing costs for many many years. For medical 
cases the costs can be serious but it is a decision to save a life. The incentive to resettle has, first and 
foremost, to be humanitarian. People, and particularly children are living in dire circumstances and 
they are in need of an opportunity to build a life. The EU gives €4,000 per head for taking from their 
RPPs (Regional Protection Programmes) and other vulnerable groups. It is good to get it but it would 
not be a reason to join.’59
Only a few other Member States have adopted a specific provision to prepare for a commitment to 
resettlement: this was the case of the UK, which changed its legislation in 2002 and started a 
programme in 2004; the same for Ireland, which introduced a provision in 1996 a nd started a 
programme in 1998. 
 
The law sometimes comes afterwards. In Portugal, the 2007 pr ogramme was launched by a 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers, and its sustainability was confirmed by the corresponding 
revision of Asylum law in 2008. T he Scandinavian countries have inserted some references to 
resettlement in law during the 2000s, long after their programmes had started. 
In a majority of EU Member states, the formal basis for resettlement has primarily and 
exclusively come from the executive authorities rather than from the Parliament. This confirms the 
voluntary, and thus political dimension of resettlement. The commitment in refugee resettlement is 
seen as a governmental decision, in addition, it is based upon political considerations more than any 
legal obligation.  
Moreover, a legal reference to resettlement is generally accompanied or followed by executive 
measures, in order to specify the conditions in which resettlement shall be undertaken: the quota 
(Ireland, Slovenia) and sometimes the target (Czech Republic) or geographical allocation of 
resettlement (Finland, Sweden). Some executive measures are the basis for an ad hoc resettlement in 
response to a specific call for resettlement. This was specifically the case in 2009 in response to 
UNHCR’s call related to the Iraqi refugee crisis (Belgium, Germany) and in 2011 in response to the 
refugee crisis in Libya (Belgium, Germany, Hungary). In some other states, an executive measure is 
taken to shape a programme, like in Bulgaria.  
Nine EU Member states have absolutely no formal basis for resettlement and for some of them, this 
is clearly linked to a refusal to commit to resettlement. With the exception of Austria and 
Luxembourg, all of these states are situated at EU’s external borders: the three Baltic states 
(Lithuania60
                                                     
58 Anna Andreeva, Final Conference, op.cit. 
, Estonia, Latvia), plus Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus. They invoke certain socio-
economic difficulties (Baltic states) and in the reception of aliens (Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Italy) to 
refuse resettlement. Instead, the latter have called for the relocation of refugees from their territory to 
other EU Member states. The absence of legal basis however did not prevent Austria and Luxembourg 
to resettle some refugees on an ad hoc basis. Yet, Austria considers the reception of 31 Iraqis in 2011 
as being the Church’s initiative and as a humanitarian evacuation. Luxembourg resettled 28 Iraqis in 
59 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
60 According to the representative of the Migration Department, the Lithuanian position on resettlement issue is clear – 
Lithuania is in favour of participation in resettlement programmes only on voluntary basis and refuses to take a part in 
any such programmes. Communication with the representative of the Migration Department, 18th of November 2012. 
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2009. In Slovakia, according to a recent political resolution,61
France and Italy are interesting examples of by-passing a lack of basis for granting asylum outside 
the territory. The lack of national legislation explains the need for a subsequent post-arrival process for 
resettled refugees to obtain a status. In both countries, the procedure of resettlement has to start 
abroad. In Italy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must first agree to the resettlement project and allow 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue visas to the selected refugees so that they can apply for refugee 
status once on Italian soil. In normal circumstances, issuing a visa to someone requesting asylum is 
prohibited and considered as being favourable to irregular migration.
 resettlement is expected to begin in the 
future years, it is also committed to relocation and to humanitarian reception through its ETC.  
62
While legal and other formal basis enabling refugee resettlement have been adopted in a growing 
number of EU Member States, the different provisions relating to resettlement are all country specific. 
There is no standard model shared in the EU. Those provisions can be divided between those which 
mention the UNHCR and those which do n ot; those which specifically mention the word 
‘resettlement’ and those which do no t; those which address the possibility to resettle without any 
details and those which specify the procedures to follow and/or the rights granted. Paradoxically, the 
countries which detail resettlement the most are also the countries which have not resettled yet, such 
as Poland and Slovenia. 
 On Italian soil resettled persons 
can ask for refugee status and the request is assessed, and generally confirmed, through priority 
procedures by the relevant Territorial Commission. Similarly, in France, the government has 
committed, through an agreement with the UNHCR concluded in 2008, to annually resettle a hundred 
cases on a dossier-basis. Yet, it gives OFPRA (Office Français Pour les Réfugiés et Apatrides) the 
responsibility to grant the refugee status on the basis of the resettled persons’ application when they 
arrive in France. 
The diversity in the formal basis for resettlement is even greater in substance, when looking at the 
content of resettlement frameworks and policies in the EU Member States.  
3. Diversity in the Content of Resettlement Frameworks and Policies 
While ‘being part of the club’ is a k ey motivation for Member States getting engaged in refugee 
resettlement, Member States are extremely unreceptive to any proposal to harmonise the selection of 
refugees to be resettled. The ERF is a w ay in which the selection of refugees may be influenced. 
Nevertheless, the EU is unlikely to develop a common selection procedure nor is it likely to reach an 
agreement as to how to divide the resettled refugees amongst Member States . Even more problematic 
is the diversity in the status and rights granted to the resettled persons and the integration capacity of 
Member States. 
3.1 Diversity in Selection Criteria and Procedures  
The UNHCR has developed standards to identify and select the refugees who are most in need of 
protection. EU funding instruments have partly supported those standards. 
According to UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, ‘Refugee status determination is a precondition to 
resettlement.’63
                                                     
61 Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic- Perspective until the year 2020, 31 August 2011 
 The 1951 Convention and its Protocol constitute the primary refugee protection 
instrument which provides the definition of a refugee. The UNHCR was initially established to seek 
62 Interview with Counsellor Fiammetta Milesi Ferretti, agent for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on t he National 
Commission for Refugees (Commissione Nazionale per il diritto d’asilo), 5 May 2012. 
63 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 p.21. 
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solutions for refugees, as they were be defined in the 1951 Convention.64 On the basis of the ‘soft law’ 
which has made refugee law evolve, through Declarations and Resolutions adopted at inter-state level on 
the one hand, and regional legal instruments adopted in Africa (the 1969 OAU Convention governing the 
specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) and in Latin America (the 1984 Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees) on t he other hand, the UNHCR has extended its mandate to persons affected by the 
indiscriminate effects of armed conflict or other events which have seriously disrupted public order: ‘In 
addition to individuals who meet the criteria in the 1951 Convention definition, UNHCR recognises as 
refugees persons who are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and unable to return 
there owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from 
generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.’65




− Legal and/or physical protection needs of the refugee in the country of refuge (this includes a 
threat of refoulement); 
 
− Survivors of torture and/or violence, where repatriation or the conditions of asylum could 
result in further traumatization and/or heightened risk; or where appropriate treatment is not 
available; 
− Medical Needs, in particular life-saving treatment that is unavailable in the country of 
refuge; 
− Women and Girls at Risk, who have protection problems particular to their gender; 
− Family Reunification, when resettlement is the only means to reunite refugee family 
members who, owing to refugee flight of displacement, are separated by borders or 
continents; 
− Children and Adolescents at Risk, where a best interests determination supports resettlement; 
− Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions, which generally is relevant only when 
other solutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future, when resettlement can be used 
strategically, and/or when it can open possibilities for comprehensive solutions. 
Some EU Initiatives have come in support to UNHCR resettlement standards and policies. 
The EU considers and funds resettlement operations only when they follow the UNHCR’s requests 
(Decision No 573/ 2007/EC (Article 3 (1) (d)). The transfer of refugees from a third country to an EU 
country would not be considered resettlement and funded as such if it is carried out independently 
from the UNHCR. The EU also supports the resettlement of specific categories of vulnerable persons 
on the basis of the UNHCR’s selection criteria and prioritizes the resettlement of some refugee groups 
identified by the UNHCR as being in urgent need of group resettlement. 
Decision 281/2012/EU of 29 M arch 2012 amending Decision 573/2007/EC has extended the 
funding of resettlement to the following categories of vulnerable groups: 
− women and children at risk,  
− unaccompanied minors,  
− survivors of violence and/or torture,  
                                                     
64 ‘A refugee is any person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’. 
65 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 p.19. 
66 Ibid., p.37. 
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− persons having serious medical needs that can be addressed only if they are resettled,  
− persons in need of emergency or urgent resettlement for legal and/or physical protection 
needs. 
The amended ERF also prioritizes the resettlement of persons from a geographical location on the 
list of common priorities. For 2013, this list includes: Congolese refugees in the Great Lakes Region 
(Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia); Iraqi refugees in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan; Afghan 
refugees in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran; Somali refugees in Ethiopia; Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Thailand; Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. 
The amended ERF still funds resettlement of persons from a country or region designated for the 
implementation of a Regional Protection Programme, and these programmes have been extended. The 
first two Regional Protection Programmes targeted the Newly Independent States (NIS) (Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus) and the Great Lakes Region (Tanzania). They now also cover the Horn of 
Africa (Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen) and North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia and Libya). 
 
a) The Selection Process 
During the last decade, most of the resettlement operations carried out in EU Member States have 
relied on UNHCR pre-selection, with some exceptions: 
− In 2011, Austria resettled 31 Iraqis directly from Iraq where they had been selected by the 
Church, through representatives in Iraq of the archdiocese of Vienna. This operation was 
following the initiative of the Cardinal Christoph Schönborn.67 The Austrian authorities 
emphasize that the resettlement activities of these Christians from Iraq were a humanitarian 
evacuation and not resettlement. Austria defines resettlement only those evacuations where 
refugees are evacuated from a third country and not from their country of origin.68
− In 2011, on his way back from a visit to Tunisia, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs took 
a group of refugees on bo ard of his plane, who after escaping from Libya, had found a 
temporary shelter in Tunisia.
 The 
activities that have been carried out by Austria were an expression of solidarity and not a 
commitment to any further resettlement in the future. 
69
It should be noted that these two countries are not considered as being resettlement countries. 
 
Apart from these isolated examples, EU Member States select the refugees to be resettled from a 
list referred to them by UNHCR. Yet, only six Member States refer to the UNHCR in their laws as one 
of the basis or as the basis of resettlement, i.e. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland and Spain.  
Section 7§(5) of the Hungarian Asylum Law provides that the Minister may grant refugee status to 
an alien who was granted recognition as a refugee by the competent authorities of another country or 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Czech law, Section 90 
(Chapter XII, Joint, Delegating and Temporary Provisions) is similar: ‘The Czech Republic may grant 
asylum to an alien without previous proceedings if he/she has been recognized as a refugee according 
to an international agreement by a decision of the Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR).’ Also 
                                                     
67 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium/pressenews/presseaussendungen/2011/ankunft-von-30-irakischen-christen-in-
oesterreich.html (February 2012). 
68 Interview with the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, 6 February 2012. 
69 Sources: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - note available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
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Section 8 of the Danish Alien Act: ‘Upon application, a residence permit will be issued to an alien 
who arrives in Denmark under an agreement made with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees or similar international agreement (…).’ Section 90 of the Finnish Act (Refugee quota) 
stipulates ‘Under the refugee quota, Finland may admit for resettlement persons considered refugees 
by UNHCR or other aliens in need of international protection (…)’. In the Irish Refugee Law, the 
following subsection was inserted in 2003: ‘The Minister may, after consultation with the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enter into agreements with the High Commissioner for the reception and resettlement 
in the State of refugees.’ The Spanish Law on a sylum makes specific reference to resettlement 
programmes in the First Additional Provision: ‘The protection framework envisaged under the present 
law shall apply to persons who gain entry to Spain through resettlement programmes developed by the 
Government, in conjunction with the UNHCR and in some cases, other relevant international 
organisations (…)’ (unofficial translation). 
The other Member States do not mention UNHCR in their national laws.  
When referring some cases to resettlement states, the UNHCR takes into account the preferences 
and criteria previously discussed with and indicated by the Member States. Then, resettlement States 
generally add their own selection process, either on a dossier-basis or through selection missions, and 
may search for certain criteria which the refugees must satisfy.  
The selection process in different States is extremely diverse. Criteria and procedures vary from 
one country to another. They may also vary from one year/period to another.  
While Luxembourg and Portugal have exclusively resettled on a dossier-basis, for some Member 
States, dossier selection has become the rule after experiencing selection missions. In Ireland, face-to-
face interviews are considered as the best form of selection. ‘You get a feel for the people to be 
resettled, can gather specific information, correct bio data etc. hear stories of their experiences first 
hand, explore family links that are not always visible on the RRF. With this information you can better 
prepare for their arrival and reduce surprises for service providers. You also have the opportunity to 
dispel myths and reduce unrealistic expectations and answer questions through a short cultural 
orientation programme held in association with the interviews. We also talk separately to the 
teenagers, the women and men as separate groups so that each one could ask their specific questions. 
That can be very interesting and enlightening.’ Yet, Ireland conducted selection missions only from 
2005 to 2008 ‘due to the reduced numbers (of resettled refugees) at the moment.’ ‘We too must be 
realistic about the benefits based on the costs and effort required by many organisations to organise 
such missions. The numbers we are currently taking do not warrant missions.’70
Spain, which organised selection missions to Tunisia in 2011 and in 2012 to Syria, decided to base 
its 2013-2014 programme on dossiers. Italy only had selection missions in Iraq in 2009 to assess the 
local situation. Future resettlements to Bulgaria will be selected on a dossier basis.  
  
Selection on a dossier-basis does not necessarily mean an easier and faster process. For instance, 
France refuses half of the dossiers submitted.71
 
 Around eighty percent of all refugees from Iraq 
selected were accepted through selection missions, and twenty percent were selected based on dossiers 
provided by the UNHCR. Selection missions enable the authorities to have a clear and more realistic 
idea of how refugees live in their country of first asylum. Yet, selection missions come in addition to 
interviews already carried out by the UNHCR and may be considered by refugees as being an endless 
and exhausting process.  
                                                     
70 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
71 Matthieu Tardis, France Terre d’Asile, 31 May 2013. 
Delphine Perrin - Frank McNamara
328 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
Most of Member States use both selection methods. Among the ad hoc resettlement countries, 
Belgium selected on a dossier-basis from Tunisia in 2011 while it organised a selection mission to 
Syria and Jordan in 2009. ‘For reasons of objectivity and verification it was decided at the time that a 
selection mission was necessary and that a dossier-based selection was not desirable. An important 
reason for this was the specificity of the refugee population: a section of the nominated dossiers 
involved persons with possible ties with the Ba’ath-regime of Saddam Hussein. The interviews carried 
out on location delivered additional and relevant information, that made it possible for the CGRS to 
make final decisions in questionable or complex dossiers, in both a positive and a negative manner.’  
For the resettlement of Eritrean and Congolese refugees from the Shousha camp in Tunisia in 2011, 
a selection mission was also planned initially. ‘However, it was decided that this mission would be 
cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation in the Shousha camp and the subsequent request 
by UNHCR not to organise a selection mission. Because the protection need, primarily that of the 
Eritreans, was overwhelmingly clear and the RRF’s of UNHCR were in general sufficiently extensive 
and detailed for profound analysis of the credibility and the refugee criteria, the Secretary of State 
Wathelet decided to follow the advice of UNHCR. This dossier-based selection was evaluated as 
positive and after arrival no cases of abuse where established. Cost cutting and speed of execution are 
the most important advantages of dossier-based selection.’72
The Czech Republic has opted for a policy of selection missions but dossier selection is still 
possible. Slovenia has taken the exact opposite stance for future resettlement. In Denmark and 
Finland, the rule is to select through missions but urgent cases can be selected through dossiers. 
Similarly, Belgium foresaw that if ‘it were to evolve to a resettlement country with a set programme, it 
would be possible for example to opt to reserve a number of places for dossier-based selection and 
urgent or emergency resettlement places. Another part of the quota, more specifically the priority 
groups, could then be selected through missions.’
 
73
In the UK, refugees are generally selected for GPP resettlement during selection missions. Some 




The Netherlands, which suspended missions from 1999 to 2005, chooses a hundred refugees a year 
on a dossier-basis and four hundreds through missions. Sweden has a specific approach, and selects 
more than half of its quota though dossiers and less than a half through missions. 
 Finland accepts around one hundred emergency cases a year on a dossier basis 
as an exception to the normal procedure which is to organise selection missions conducted by MIGRI 
officials, representatives of Employment and Economical Development Centres and, if necessary, 
security officials. In recent years, local municipalities have also taken part in the missions.  
Four Member States have opted for a selection on a mission-basis only, namely Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
Selection missions are conducted in countries of first asylum, but may also be organised in an ETC 
in Romania or in Slovakia. The UK for instance selected some Palestinians from Syrian/Iraqi border 
camps in the ETC in Romania in 2009.  
Whether or not they select on a d ossier or mission basis, some Member States may require the 
selected refugees to apply for their status after arrival. This is the case in France and in Italy, as 
already mentioned above. This decision has most likely been made on the basis of legal reasoning: the 
law does not allow the granting of status abroad. France terre d’asile notes that, even if OFPRA (the 
French Office for Stateless persons and Refugees) tries to examine the applications on an accelerated 
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basis and always provides a positive answer, this additional application process has a psychological 
impact on the refugees. Added to this, the additional application process also represents extra work for 
integration stakeholders. The process of integration is also postponed.75 In 2013, F rance made a 
number of commitments to reduce the obstacles that exist for refugees. As a result, resettled persons 
will not need to wait for their refugee stay permit – which takes months – before being able to access 
integration programmes, including French language classes. They will be able to sign their integration 
contract upon arrival. On top of this, OFPRA may no l onger interview refugees and only apply a 
‘transfer of protection’.76 This is already the case in Belgium, where the resettled refugee, upon arrival 
in Belgium, must also go through the same steps as a regular asylum seeker even though this is merely 
a formality (i.e. no interview is carried out by the Immigration Service, nor by the CGRS).77
The post-arrival application process in addition to the pre-arrival selection process exists in nine 
Member States, i.e. Belgium, Italy and France as have been already mentioned, as well as the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Romania, Hungary and Poland where it is foreseen in the future. Finally, in 
Sweden the post-arrival application process is optional. The majority of those countries have 
committed to resettlement on a p rogramme-basis. Only Sweden, among them, is a traditional 
resettlement country, and the post-arrival application process is not a requirement but a p ossibility. 
The resettled persons receive their permanent residence permit independently of their status. The 
status of refugees can enable the resettled persons to have better access to some rights, such as family 
reunification. The requirement of a post-arrival process is not based on the fact that resettled persons 
have been selected on a dossier-basis since Sweden, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and 
Romania also organise selection missions. This additional application process still prolongs the road to 
protection for vulnerable persons who have already followed an extremely long process to be 
recognised as refugee by the UNHCR, then being selected by UNHCR to be resettled, then by the EU 
Member State in the country of first asylum. It is thus recommended to abandon this additional 
process or at least to make it optional like in Sweden. 
 
 
b) The Selection Criteria 
Some resettlement states have advised the UNHCR that they are only prepared to accept refugees from 
certain locations or that they wish to exclude or favour certain categories of refugees. The UNHCR 
takes these profile restrictions into account when referring refugee cases to the different receiving 
States. In addition, those countries may add some other criteria in selecting refugees on a dossier or 
mission-basis. Those selection criteria thus vary from one Member State to another. They may be 
based on a series of national factors, that can be political, economic, legal, etc.  
Geneva Convention and Mandate Refugees 
Some Member States do not wish to depart from the refugee definition provided by the Geneva 
Convention and would not resettle refugees who do not meet its criteria. This is, for example, true in 
the case of the Czech Republic. This is also a legal requirement in Hungary (Asylum Law, Section 
7§(5)). The Romanian Law (art.3(5)) similarly requires that resettled persons meet the requirements of 
the Geneva Convention. However, other Member States include the possibility to resettle persons who 
would meet the conditions to be granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection (e.g. 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden). In contrast, the Irish Refugee Act states that the person does not need to 
meet the definition of a refugee. In Section 24, ‘“A programme refugee” means a person to whom 
leave to enter and remain in the State for temporary protection or resettlement as part of a group of 
persons has been given by the Government and whose name is entered in a register established and 
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maintained by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whether or not such person is a refugee within the 
meaning of the definition of “refugee” in section 2.’ The wording of the Finnish Act is also quite 
open: Section 90 s tates that ‘Under the refugee quota, Finland may admit for resettlement persons 
considered refugees by UNHCR or other aliens in need of international protection’; Section 92 
stipulates among the Requirements for admitting aliens into the country under the refugee quota, that 
‘1) The alien is in need of international protection with regard to his or her home country, 2) The 
alien is in need of resettlement from the first country of asylum, 3) The requirements for admitting and 
integrating the alien into Finland have been assessed, 4) There are no obstacles under section 36 to 
issuing a residence permit.’ 
ECRE advocates that ‘the determination of a protection status for resettlement within a European 
Resettlement Programme should be flexible, involving an inclusive interpretation of both the refugee 
definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention and of persons qualifying for subsidiary protection 
according to the EU Qualification Directive. Refugee Status Determination should also strongly (…) 
allow for resettlement to be extended to refugees recognised under the UNHCR mandate, including 
those recognised under the extended mandate.’78
As stated in the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, ‘the prima facie group determination is more 




Group Resettlement and Strategic Use of Resettlement 
 Most of the Member States would actually accept the resettlement of persons 
who do not necessarily fulfill the Geneva Convention criteria but would correspond to the subsidiary 
protection or humanitarian protection criteria. Yet, the status granted to those resettled persons would 
thus very likely be less protective than refugee status.  
As mentioned above, the UNHCR has an active role in identifying “priority caseloads” for 
resettlement to orientate resettlement states’ attention on certain refugee situations.  
Recently resettled groups have included: Liberian refugees from Guinea and Sierra Leone, Somali 
refugees from Kenya, Burundian refugees from Tanzania, Congolese refugees from Burundi, Eritrean 
refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees from Saudi Arabia, Afghan refugees from Tadjikistan, 
Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan, Burmese refugees from Thailand and Malaysia and Bhutanese 
refugees from Nepal.80
The observation of national statistics clearly shows the participation of EU Member States to group 
resettlements and the sharing of the same groups among some Member States. Iraqi refugees have 
been resettled in eleven Member States, with the largest contributors being Germany, France, the UK 
and Finland. The same groups of refugees may be resettled over several years. Like Germany and 
France, the Netherlands has resettled Iraqis for many years from the early 1990s. In 2010, t he 
Netherlands’ quota allocated 150 places for Iraqi refugees. Likewise in the UK, which had pledged 
that two-thirds of the 750 annual places would be reserved for Iraqis in 2008. The UK continued to 
resettle refugees from Iraq in 2010 and 2011.
 The caseloads identified for 2012 were: Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; 
Iraqis and Iranians in Turkey, Afghans in Pakistan; Afghans in Iran; Somalis in Dadaab Camp in 
Kenya; Colombians in South America; Eritreans in East Sudan; North Africans displaced from Libya. 
81
Burmese refugees have been resettled in Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and have represented the 
largest number of resettled persons in the Czech Republic, Denmark and Finland during the past 
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decade.82
A strategic use of resettlement can become part of a State’s foreign policy. The Czech Republic 
explains the focus of its resettlement programme on the Burmese by the long-term support for the 
Burmese democratic movement. Burma has long been a priority country for Czech foreign policy – 
former President Václav Havel nominated Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for the Nobel Peace Prize.
 Congolese have been resettled in Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, the UK and 
Belgium; Bhutanese refugees have been received in Denmark and the Netherlands, and Afghan 
refugees have been resettled in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, among others.  
83 The 
Netherlands is also deeply influenced in its choice of mission destinations by the potential to make 
strategic use of resettlement. In their view, resettlement should contribute to the improvement of 
refugee protection and resettlement and should be the final cornerstone of the three durable solutions 
(return, local integration in the region and resettlement). The Dutch mission to Sudan in 2012 is a 
good example of the strategic selection of a mission destination.84
Among refugee groups, certain caseloads have been labelled “risky”, such as the Somalis in Kenya, 
and others have constituted “favoured” caseloads, such as the Burmese from Thailand. The latter are 
deemed to be a low security risk and are believed to have attributes that make it easier for them to 
adjust to life in the resettlement country.
 
This has led to situations where resettlement states actively 
compete for some groups of refugees while ignoring others in equally vulnerable situations.
 The Dutch Minister for Immigration 
and Asylum recently proposed that resettlement be used as strategically as possible with regard to the 
other objectives of the country’s migration policy. 
85 As a 
result, Afghans were the largest refugee population in 2011 but were ninth
 
when it came to 
resettlement. The Burmese, on the other hand, were seventh
 
in overall population size but second in 
terms of the numbers resettled. Some larger refugee groups (the Sudanese, Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Serbians) did not feature at all in the top ten resettlement caseloads whereas the largest resettlement 
caseload (the Bhutanese) is from a numerically small community.86
Bulgaria announced that the priority groups of its resettlement pilot programme would be Afghan 
and Iraqi refugees from Turkey,
  
87
In Ireland, the preference is for group resettlement, particularly if there are five or more families from 
the same region where they can be a self supporting group. ‘Group resettlement allows us to place the 
refugees outside of the Capital in smaller communities without the risk of isolation. We tend to resettle 
individual cases in Dublin or Cork where they may find members of their own community. From an 
economy of scale point of view, group resettlement allows for the provision of a centralised reception, 
orientation and language training programmes post arrival to prepare the group for independent living. 
Service providers will be more inclined to engage in preparation activities for groups.’
 which appear among the 2013 priority groups of the amended ERF. 
The financial incentive provided by the ERF evidently influences some Member States’ contribution 
to group resettlement. 
88
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In contrast, France does not currently want to engage in group resettlement. Indeed, a commitment 
such would imply a commitment in terms of capacity that France says it does not have.89 Moreover, it 
decided not to respond to the UNHCR special Call for North Africa and explained to the European 
Commission that the reason was the “generosity” of France for the plight of refugees in the world as 
evidenced by the high number of asylum seekers.90
Geographical/National Origin and Regional Protection Programmes 
 
Member States may have some preferences in selecting refugees from particular countries of origin or 
of first asylum. The preference for some national origin can be dictated by a search for continuity in 
the foreign communities already present in the receiving country. Some Member States believe that a 
sustained concentration of resettlement and reception on a  particular group improves integration 
potential. In other words, if a State continues to resettle from the same group then an existing 
community is ready to welcome newly resettled refugees of that same group. Some Member States, 
like Portugal, favour a continuity in the origin of the refugees to be resettled. In Finland, the annual 
geographical allocation of the quota is also based on the need of continuity in the chosen refugee 
groups. France prioritized cases that have links with France or knowledge of French in the Iraq 500 
and EU relocation schemes – even if, in practice, NGOs did not notice that these refugees had specific 
links with France.  
Then, the selection of refugees hosted in some countries of first asylum can be influenced by the 
development of Regional Protection Programmes (RRPs). The 2005 Communication which provided 
for RPPs91 set out that RPPs should be brought forward with the intention of enhancing the protection 
capacity of the regions involved and better protecting the refugee population by providing durable 
solutions, one of which is resettlement. The Communication stated that the resettlement of refugees 
from countries covered by an RPP to EU Member States was seen as an important factor in 
demonstrating the partnership element of RPPs to third countries.92 Since that 2005 Communication, 
RPPs have continued to be an important element in how the EU has approached resettlement. RPPs 
were again central to the landmark establishment of JEURP in 2009.93 That Commission 
Communication stated that in RPPs which will be developed in the future, ‘resettlement should be 
more effectively incorporated and its implementation should be closely monitored.’94
The UK’s regional preferences are influenced by the situation of the RPP.
 The Council and 
Parliament’s Decision in 2013 on the EU’s resettlement priorities for 2013 further underlines the 
continued influence of RPPs in how the EU resettles. 
95 This is also the case for 
Belgium96
Resettlement countries wish to favour the integration of the resettled refugees, not only at the post-
arrival stage with integration tools but through selection. This can be done through opting for 
continuity in chosen groups, or through choosing certain UNHCR categories like women-at-risk and 
unaccompanied minors, who might be more expensive in a financial sense but are also more easily 
inserted into the receiving society.  
 and Portugal as additional European funding is available if resettlement takes place from a 
country/region where a Regional Protection Programme is in place.  
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UNHCR Submission Categories and EU Priority Funding 
The role of European funding in targetting the categories of refugees to be resettled may be 
determinative in some Member States. In Portugal, the selection criteria for 2008-2013 followed the 
categories identified in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the ERF. Cases accepted by the Government have 
been routed, so far, in legal or physical protection needs and in the absence of local integration 
prospects in the first country of asylum.97
While a recent research paper was wondering: ‘Why is it that the acceptance rate of submissions 
relating to women, children and adolescents at risk has the lowest acceptance rates when it can easily 
be argued these are some of the most vulnerable refugees?,’
 
98
Belgium prioritized Palestinians and women-at-risk in 2009. In 2011, i t favoured families with 
children and single women. The UK also decided on the resettlement of a small percentage for 
medical cases and a h igher percentage for women-at-risk.
 this category of vulnerable refugees has 
been prioritised by several Member States and has also been prioritised by the ERF. 
99 Most Iraqi refugees arriving in the UK 
through the GPP between the end of 2008 a nd 2010 were families, in addition to some cases of 
women-at-risk.100 There are no so-called “important target groups” to be found in the Dutch policy, 
these depend on the mission destinations and as such can change on an annual basis. However, persons 
with traumatic experiences (victims of violence or torture), women “at risk” and persons with serious 
medical conditions do receive special attention.101 Similarly, for France, protection needs are the main 
criteria for the Ministry and more particularly the lack of protection and integration prospects in the 
country of first asylum. Vulnerable groups such as women and children at risk, victims of violence and 
medical needs are prioritised.102
The proportion of resettled women (not only at risk) seems to be higher than the proportion of men, 
This is also the case in the refugee population as a whole in at least in five EU Member States where 
the information has been made available. In Belgium, women have accounted for 79% of the total of 
resettled people over the past decade. This figure stands at 60% in Portugal, 55% in Germany, 53% in 
Romania and 51% in the UK.
  
103
In contrast, some categories of vulnerable persons, like elderly persons, may be deemed unlikely to 
integrate and therefore may not be accepted for resettlement. This is the case in Ireland. ‘In the past a 
small number of unaccompanied older persons were accepted and while their safety and security was 
taken care of they were very isolated and lonely.’ Rather, ‘many older people are admitted as a part of 




‘Likewise, in general, cases with serious mental health issues are not accepted. This is due to 
difficulties accessing appropriate services in the Irish Mental Health sector. Issues arise as many of the 
cases referred through resettlement have minority languages and it can be difficult to provide services 
through an interpreter that is not specifically trained to interpret in a mental health environment. 
Therefore, in the best interests of the applicant we do not accept persons with serious mental health 
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issues.’105 In France too, authorities and social workers are making a l ink between the selection 
criteria, and the refugees’ integration. Namely, they consider that vulnerable refugees (medical cases, 
aging refugees) are more difficult to accommodate and to integrate.106
Unlike the other Nordic countries, Sweden does not have special provisions for special categories 
like urgent medical cases.
 
107 Sweden prioritises maximum flexibility in filling the quota. It considers 
that, if a specific number of places is established for women for example then one has to deny places 
to this category after the ceiling has been reached. Moreover, if there are fixed places for a category 
e.g. unaccompanied minors, it can be difficult to find places for this category in municipalities.108
Strategies designed far in advance of programme resettlement can result in certain difficulties in 
responding to emergency situations. When a crisis develops, such as the situation that occurred when 
resettlement was urgently required for large numbers of refugees who had fled to Egypt and Tunisia 
from Libya in 2011, the response was extremely slow. On a macro level, it is relevant to note that 
during 2011, only 72.7%
 
of cases that the UNHCR had submitted to Member States and that were 
deemed as having “emergency priority,” were accepted. This compares to 86.1% of the ”urgent 
priority” cases and 94.1% of the “normal priority” cases and reflects a situation where refugees with 
relatively lower protection needs have a greater chance of being resettled in a timely manner.
  
109
Some Member States allocate part of their quota for urgent and emergency cases, like Sweden (350 
places). Other countries such as I reland do not have a r eserved number of places for emergency 
resettlements, such cases are included in the quota. The UK, for its part, does not support the 
resettlement of refugees in emergency situations and argues that its policy is to provide help and 
advice in alleviating the situation in situ.
  
110
Some Member States resettle specific categories of refugees, independently of UNHCR and the EU 
priorities. Sweden for instance has an agreement with the International Criminal Court in The Hague 
to offer resettlement to Tribunal witnesses and their family members. 
 It considers that resettlement programmes are aimed at 
relieving the burden of refugees in protracted situations where resettlement is the only viable solution.  
Denmark agreed in 2007 to resettle Iraqis, following an initiative by Danish soldiers in Iraq. It 
decided to resettle Iraqis who had formerly worked for the Danish Coalition forces in response to 
reports that the safety of a number of employees and their families was threatened because of their 
association with the troops. The decision to resettle preceded the withdrawal of Danish troops by 
approximately one month. International media sources reported that two hundred Iraqi aides and 
translators were secretly airlifted out of the southern region of Basra in July 2007. Likewise, in 2007, 
the British government began to resettle Iraqis that were formally locally employed (LE) with the 
British Armed Forces or civilian missions. The UK decided to reserve 600 of  the 1,000 places 
allocated for Iraqis from the end of 2008 to March 2010 to LE and their dependants, provided they 
meet the UK resettlement programme criteria. The UK government stopped accepting LE Iraqi 
applications for resettlement in May 2009; although not all of those who were accepted had arrived. A 
smaller number of Iraqis, who were not former employees of the British Forces in Iraq, have been 
accepted for resettlement based on referrals from the UNHCR. In 2013, the UK announced the same 
priority for former locally-engaged staff in Afghanistan111
                                                     
105 Ibid. 
.  
106 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
107 Interview with Oskar Ekblad, op.cit. 
108 Phone interview with the Swedish Ministry of Justice, Division for Migration and Asylum Policy, 30 March 2012. 
109 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.13. 
110 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
111 See for instance here http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22620207 
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National preferences for certain refugee categories, when they do not compete, can be 
complementary. From 2008, when refugees having fled from Iraq were resettled in EU Member 
States, some Member States opted to resettle Palestinians while others preferred Iraqis, most of the 
time on the basis of a pre-existing community in the country. The UK and Italy made Palestinians a 
resettlement priority in 2009, while Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal have not integrated 
Palestinians into their ad hoc or quota resettlement programmes for Iraqi refugees. 
The objective of having a concerted approach to resettlement in the EU should not necessarily be to 
have the same targets in all the Member States, except when a group situation urgently needs to be 
resolved. Currently, despite the apparent diversity in selection criteria, there is a c ertain amount of 
common ground in relation to profile restrictions, which results in “competition” for the favoured 
caseloads while those in the excluded groups can be left out in the cold.112
The ‘Integration Potential’: A Criteria for Refugees or for the receiving society? 
 This situation is partly due 
to resettlement states’ focus on the ‘integration potential’ of refugees. 
One important consideration is the introduction of the so-called integration potential criteria into the 
selection process. It has been adopted by the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, 
France, Germany, Slovenia. In Romania, the potential for integration was applied in 2008, but dropped 
in 2012 in the revised resettlement programme after discussions with the UNHCR. Denmark has even 
incorporated the integration potential criteria into legislation and
 
added supplementary criteria of 
influence: language qualifications, education and work experience, social network, age, motivation.113
Actually, several Member States which have committed to resettlement, expect a return on their 
investment. In Spain for instance, ‘the incentives could be to obtain some form of compensation for the 
participation in European Resettlement programmes, financial compensation alone would not be 
enough because these programmes should be co-financed by each EU Member State. Perhaps the 
selection of highly qualified/skilled persons who would be more likely to integrate into Spanish society 
may positively determine an eventual decision to resettle. The most important factors may include the 
necessity to obtain skilled workers suitable for the labour market of each country, as well as a profile 
of resettled people who won’t run up excessive expenses in the health care or social system of EU 
Member States.’
 
The Dutch Minister for Immigration and Asylum recently proposed to the UNHCR that they select 
higher profile refugees such as human rights activists and academics. 
114
This is a reminder of resettlement policy after WWII, as ex plained by Sweden: ‘Resettlement in 
Sweden started in 1950, when the first annual refugee quota was set. To begin with, the Swedish refugee 
quota was a contribution to the international ambitions to empty the refugee camps in Europe after the 
Second World War. At the time, Sweden also suffered a labour shortage. In fact, nine out of ten of the 
collective transferred refugees between 1950 and until mid-1970's were of working age and able-bodied. 
Sweden's resettlement activities have since taken a humanitarian direction.’
 
115 Today, Sweden does not 
use integration criteria, and ‘believes that the integration element can be evaluated in cases of labour 
migration but not in the case of refugees, where the need for protection should be decisive.’116
 
 
                                                     
112 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.13. 
113 Section 8 (4) of the Aliens Act: In the selection of aliens issued with a residence permit under subsections (1) to (3), the 
aliens’ possibilities of establishing roots in Denmark and benefiting from the residence permit, including their language 
qualifications, education and training, work experience, family situation, network, age and motivation, must be 
emphasised, unless particular reasons make it inappropriate. 
114 Interview with an advisor to the Spanish Employment Ministry, op.cit. 
115 Interview with Oskar Ekblad, op.cit. 
116 Interview with Andreas Ollinen, op.cit. 
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While basing the selection of refugees on criteria that is supposed to favour integration rather than 
vulnerability is problematic, the frontier between both considerations can be tiny. In 2008, Germany 
was considering helping Iraqi refugees suffering religious persecution and sought specific measures to 
help Christian Iraqis. Since the Christians were persecuted because of their religion, governments 
easily argue that the reason for their selection was their particular vulnerability. Yet, choosing 
Christians instead of Muslims may also be motivated by some EU Member States’ wish to limit the 
reception of a culture deemed to be a threat to the main culture of the country. In 2008, after much 
internal and external debate and negotiation involving UNHCR and the EU, Germany agreed to admit 
not only refugees from persecuted minorities but also vulnerable refugees with specific medical needs 
and female headed-households.117 Likewise, in France, the Iraq 500 programme was adopted by the 
President of the French Republic after a visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iraq and his meeting 
with a h igh representative of the Chaldean Catholic Church there in 2007. The scheme was first 
dedicated only to Christian Iraqis. Some organisations, including France terre d’asile, protested against 
the scope of this humanitarian programme and underlined the contradiction between, on the one hand, 
the target of the programme and, on t he other hand, the principle of secularism and the protection 
grounds. Finally, the programme was opened to all “persecuted minorities.”118
A specific situation that seems to particularly impact upon Eastern European countries is that most 
of them argue that refugees do not want to be resettled in their countries. Bulgarian experience with 
relocation, considered as a test for further resettlement, revealed that no refugee in Malta was ready to 
go to Bulgaria.
  
119 The refugees resettled in Romania in 2009 are said to have left the country after they 
received a residence permit. ‘The group of 38 refugees resettled in Romania were extremely unhappy 
about their current situation and what they felt was a dire socio-economic condition compared to their 
lives in Malaysia, where there were plenty of jobs and good wages (…) The refugees claimed they had 
been given confusing information about their new home country by the Romanian authorities and 
UNHCR during the cultural orientation course prior to their departure. They criticized Romania for 
not being a good resettlement country and demanded that the UNHCR send them to the USA or a 
Nordic country.’120
In Italy too, the Palestinian refugees resettled in Riace fled to Norway, where they are said to have 
received a more attractive social package and would have better socio-economic opportunities.
 Hungary had a si milar experience. In 2007, i t provided refuge to 29 C uban 
nationals who were living on the US base in Guantanamo. The majority of the refugees had already 
left Hungary only a few months after arrival and settled down in Spain. Hungary has also participated 
in the EU relocation pilot project in Malta (EUREMA). The relocated couple spent only three days in 
Hungary before returning to Malta. Having assessed the reception conditions actually offered by 
Hungary the relocated couple found that they were not given what had been promised to them.  
121
These countries actually share several gaps in their integration capacity and probably a lack of 
qualified resettlement/relocation planning that takes place before the arrival of the resettled/relocated 
 
They were then brought back to Italy even though they were not brought back to Riace but were 
reinserted in other reception facilities in Italy. Italy considers that it is the lack of money available 
which led to the Palestinians leaving the country. 
                                                     
117 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, op.cit. 
118 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
119 Anna Andreeva, Final Conference, op.cit. 
120 2010 Participatory Assessment Report of UNHCR Being a refugee How refugees and asylum-seekers experience life in 
Central Europe, available online at http://reliefweb.int/report/bulgaria/being-refugee-how-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-
experience-life-central-europe 
121 According to the Counsellor Milesi Ferretti, op.cit. 
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refugees.122 Most of all, they share a p roblem of “managing refugees’ expectations” which is also 
underlined in France123
The 2012 D ecision in Romania, which dropped the integration potential criteria, nevertheless 
requires refugees to express their consent to be resettled in Romania before being moved there. This 
option is the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the Romanian State as to the reasons why 
refugees leave the country post resettlement and as to the purpose of resettlement in the first place. 
The decision suggests that refugees should be grateful to be resettled in the EU, regardless of the 
situation that they find themselves in once they have been resettled. If there was better information as 
to the reception conditions available and as to life in the receiving country then expectations would be 
more realistic.
 despite the better integration capacity available there. 
124
Besides, ‘resettlement should not be about what the entrants can do for a country but more about 
what the country can do for them. The raison d’ȇtre for resettlement is and always should be 
protection. (…) Who is to say that people determined not to possess “integration potential” will not 
settle well? There is ample evidence that this need not necessarily be the case – providing refugees are 
given the right sort of assistance.’
 
125
In selecting refugees for resettlement, the UNHCR urges countries not to use integration potential 
and other discriminatory criteria (e.g. family size, age, health status, ethnicity and religion). Such 
discrimination undermines the protection and needs-based approach to resettlement, creating 
inequalities and protection gaps, and limits access to resettlement for some of the refugees who are 
most at risk. The integration of refugees in a country of resettlement is therefore a sep arate 
consideration, which involves the refugees’ adaptation and active participation in the new society.
 Resettling governments that focus on the ‘integration potential’ 
of refugees justify their position by claiming that it makes it easier to provide services and that 
integration will be more successful. These criteria, however, are hard to meet for displaced persons 
who were born in camps or who have been living there for a long time. They are also likely to rule out 
some of the most vulnerable refugees. 
126
Recently, the UNHCR has called for the resettlement of 2,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2013. 
People with serious medical needs and the disabled are set as being resettlement priorities by the 
UNHCR.
 
127 The UNHCR announced that it will discuss the selection with each resettlement country 
to avoid the application of discriminating criteria such as religion. It has called the resettlement 
countries to be flexible in their selection criteria.128
‘Instead of discussing the integration potential of refugees it might be useful to move forward to a 
focus on the integration capacity of (the receiving country). This way, the responsibility rests on the 




Yet, as stated above, the more EU Member States that are open to flexibility in selecting refugees, 
the more those States may provide flexibility in the status and rights granted to refugees. Indeed, 
recent resettlement experiences have led to the resettled persons being granted a temporary protection 
and rights that are not similar to those offered with the refugee status. 
  
                                                     
122 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
123 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. and Interview with the Ministry for Integration, Asylum Service, 3 April 2012. 
124 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
125 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.23. 
126 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
127 UNHCR – Responding to protection needs of displaced Syrians in Europe – June 2013. 
128 Newsletter 59 France terre d’asile, September 2012. 
129 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
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3.2 Diversity in Status and Rights Granted130
According to the UNHCR, resettlement involves ‘the selection and transfer of refugees from one state 
in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – 
with permanent residence status. The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and 
provides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights similar to those 
enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a 
naturalised citizen of the resettlement country.’
 
131
The ERF has voiced support for this set of objectives. According to the Decisions establishing the 
ERF III ( 2008-2013), an action is considered a resettlement and only funded as such if the persons 
transferred from a t hird country to a Mem ber State are permitted to reside with refugee status.
 
132
This means that granting subsidiary protection or another status on the basis of national law would 
not preclude an ERF support if this status grants the same rights as refugee status. 
 
Alternatively, a status which offers the same rights and benefits under national and Community law as 
refugee status may be awarded. 
The EU law and accordingly national laws in the EU Member States, stipulate that two forms of 
protection can be granted: refugee status and the subsidiary protection. In most of EU Member States, 
the rights attached to the refugee status are different from those granted with the subsidiary protection. 
Moreover, the rights attached to both statuses vary from one Member State to another. 
While all EU Member states may grant the refugee status to resettled refugees, some of them may 
instead only grant a subsidiary protection to part of them. This is the case in the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
This is not always applied in conformity to national law. The Polish Act foresees that resettlement 
applies both to persons meeting the requirements of refugee status and of subsidiary protection – and 
leads to one of those statuses - like most of the Member States. In contrast, the Hungarian law, like 
Spanish law 12/2009, only mentions refugee status as regards resettlement: ‘Refugees who are resettled 
in Spain will have the same status as refugees who are recognised as such under the provisions of this 
Law.’ Yet, among the 80 refugees resettled from Tunisia to Spain in 2012, 74 w ere granted subsidiary 
protection, only four received refugee status and two were family reunifications. The impact on the right 
of residence is significant, as a refugee receives a five-year residence permit in Spain while a person who 
has received the subsidiary protection will only receive a one-year stay permit. 
In many Member States, the rights attached to refugee status differ from those granted with the 
subsidiary protection. The Portuguese Asylum and International Protection Law (Law 27/2008 of June 
30) issues residence permits for refugee status for five years, renewable for similar periods, and 
residence permits for subsidiary protection are issued for a minimum of 2 years, renewable for similar 
periods. In Italy, subsidiary protection leads to a three-year stay permit, instead of a five-year 
residence permit for a refugee. It is in France that the difference between residence permits are best 
highlighted, refugees receive a ten-year residence permit and a beneficiary of the subsidiary protection 
receives a one-year residence permit. 
Granting status that is different from refugee status does not necessarily mean that the resettled 
person is only temporarily protected. Those who are resettled in Sweden are divided into three 
categories and may be granted one of the following statuses: (i) convention refugees (ii) persons in 
need of subsidiary protection or (iii) individuals “otherwise in need of protection.” Yet, they all 
                                                     
130 For an exhaustive comparison of the status and rights granted to resettled refugees in the EU, see the country profiles of 
the 27 Member States on Know Reset website, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00003 
131 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.3. 
132 Within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 2004/83/EC. 
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receive a permanent residence permit before arriving in Sweden, whatever their status.133
The ERF’s financial incentive can clearly orientate the decision. This was the case for Belgium in 
2009 and 2011: ‘Amongst others because of the funding regulations of the ERF, refugee status must be 
granted in Belgium and as such, persons who are only eligible for subsidiary protection are excluded. 
In the future, expanding to include subsidiary protection could be considered, including the relevant 
criteria, or potentially the development of a completely parallel resettlement procedure with its own 
criteria and a status sui generis.’
 A right to 
permanent residence, in conformity with the UNHCR’s standard, is also provided in Belgium and in 
the UK. In most of Member States, the residence permit is time-limited but renewable, and in some of 
them, it is common to all resettled persons, whatever their status. This is the case in Denmark and 
Finland, which grant a four-year stay permit to resettled persons. The Netherlands deliver a five-year 
residence permit, which then leads to a right to permanent residence. In Romania, the law stipulates 
that resettled persons ‘will have the same rights and obligations in Romania as the refugees 
recognized by the Romanian State’ (Art. 3(5)). 
134
This is already happening in Ireland, where resettled persons have a specific status, the ‘programme 
refugee,’ which provides similar rights to those offered to the refugees, but also some specific rights, 
such as some facilities for family reunification. Under the current Irish resettlement programme, 
members of the family are dealt with in two ways. Immediate family members are included in the 
quota. Therefore when an application is examined, care is taken to ensure that all of the nuclear family 
members are considered together at the time of application. The admission of any other family 
members such as siblings of the applicant, are at the discretion of the Minister. Should an applicant 
decide to omit a member of the nuclear family at the time of application, and then seek to be reunited 
with that family member at a later date, this type of application would be at the discretion of the 
Minister. The definition of “family member” for resettlement purposes, which includes unmarried 
children over the age of 18 years, is broader than the definition of “family Member” in the Refugee 
Act 1996, as amended. This avoids a situation where the act of resettlement actually results in other 
family members becoming “vulnerable” in their current environment and reduces the number of 
family reunification applications later.
  
135
In contrast, resettled persons in Germany have less rights in terms of family reunification than 
those of the refugees, which may inhibit the integration of the refugees. This is a reason why the 
country has been criticised by some stakeholders, despite Germany’s recent significant commitments 
in refugee resettlement. The national legislation for the future resettlement programme will be the 
same as for the ad hoc resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010, which does not provide a refugee 
protection status. The resettled refugees will receive temporary three-year residence permits, 
renewable where deemed necessary. After seven years, provided the applicant meets the relevant 
requirements, a settlement permit may be granted. 
  
Some recent changes in some Member States have tended to favour the integration of resettled 
persons. They concern the placement upon arrival. The placement in camps may postpone or even 
impede integration prospects.136
                                                     
133 Interview with Oskar Ekblad, op.cit. 
 France has therefore decided that resettled persons would now be 
134 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
135 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
136 An illustration with the reception conditions in Hungary: ‘As for reception conditions in general, refugees and beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection are accommodated in the open OIN integration facility in Bicske (…). The present system has 
proven to be ineffective in equipping beneficiaries of international protection with the skills required for integration. Living 
in Bicske for up to one year keeps people isolated from the local community. Most of the residents do not have any contacts 
with Hungarian people except for the social workers. They often do not have any other ties to people living outside the camp 
who could ease their integration into the society. This also slows their process of learning the language and how different 
institutions and services operate. After having lived in Bicske for 6 months most of the refugees do not dispose of the features 
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placed in houses.137 This important reform nevertheless prolongs the resettlement process as the 
reception of refugees is decided as and when houses are getting available. A recent change has also 
taken place in the Dutch resettlement policy, aimed at the direct placement of refugees in the 
municipalities. From the moment of selection of the refugee that is to be resettled, contact is made 
with local and regional authorities in relation to the preparation for housing and support.138
For Hungary, ‘a positive Finnish experience was not to try integration in the capital, but in a 
smaller place, where local community can take a part in the integration. The families or groups this 
way integrate really in the society and not in their local diaspora, from which they might have wanted 
to detach anyways.’
  
139 This interpretation goes against the Irish experience for instance. As mentioned 
above, resettlement is organised in such a way that the refugees can be in contact and maintain the link 
with their fellow nationals. Individual cases are generally resettled in the greater Dublin area while 
groups are resettled in smaller places. In addition, ‘one thing unique about the Irish programme is that 
the Resettlement Unit, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration provide direct support to 
individual cases resettled in Dublin while local authorities and NGO’s provide direct support services 
for those resettled outside of the Capital. This keeps the National Coordinating team in touch with the 
day to day issues arising and helps us to understand the challenges faced by both the refugees and the 
service providers. Each year the learning informs the process for the coming year. The country is also 
smaller than most EU Member States.’140
The support and monitoring of refugees by service providers are indeed essential for refugees. In 
Italy, the placement in individual houses did not favour the integration of the resettled refugees since 
they were situated in uninhabited areas with no public transportation facilities. Isolation and the lack 
of employment perspectives led to a number of resettled persons leaving Italy. 
 
In most Member States, the resettled persons get permission to work and access to all social 
benefits. Yet, even in countries where the resettlement experience is described as a success, like in the 
UK or in Ireland, a low level of employment and of economic independence among the refugees has 
been noted.141
A growing concern applies to the possible development of a lower reception quality, which may be 
a result of a greater number of places being available for resettlement. The UK for instance aspires to 
increase its quota of 1,000 refugees per year when this becomes affordable, but ‘the present fiscal 
climate suggests that additional money for resettlement is unlikely in the near future and the focus will 
need to be either: increased funding from Europe; or reducing the levels of support and 
accommodation to refugees in order to increase the numbers resettled within the existing budget.’
  
142
Does accepting a greater number of refugees necessarily mean offering less rights?  
  
The UNHCR itself has had to call for temporary shelter in order to get more resettlement States to 
respond to major refugee crises. Apart from calling for the durable resettlement of 2,000 Syrian 
refugees -who do not appear among the priority groups of the EU as listed for 2013 and as proposed 
(Contd.)                                                                  
– detailed knowledge on employment conditions, satisfactory health condition, own financial resources, language etc. – that 
are needed for finding employment. After being released from Bicske, refugees do not have any realistic prospects on access 
to accommodation or employment. Access to language courses is also of great concern. As a result, some refugees opt to 
move to other EU Member States, upon recognition of their refugee status. If returned to Hungary, they often become 
homeless. Homeless refugees reportedly face various violations of their physical integrity, with single women and the 
vulnerable particularly at risk’. Interview with UNHCR Hungary, April 2012 
137 Matthieu Tardis, 31 May 2013, op.cit. 
138 Interview with the Dutch Ministry of Interior, op.cit. 
139 Interview with the Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), April 2012. 
140 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
141 Interviews with Dave Atkinson and Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
142 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
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for the future AMF (Asylum and Migration Fund) - it also called for the ‘humanitarian’ temporary 
reception of 10,000 S yrian refugees in 2013. Germany responded to the call by offering to receive 
5,000 Syrians, some of whom already have family links with Germany. This valuable German 
contribution to protecting refugees and alleviating the effort of the countries of first asylum is double 
the number of refugees that Germany resettled during the Iraqi refugee crisis five years ago. In terms 
of protection however, this contribution may be more comparable to the temporary protection granted 
during the Kosovo war in 1999, and is therefore linked to the hope of a rapid return of Syrian refugees 
to their country of origin – which appears to be unlikely, given the current situation there. 
While the integration of refugees in general and resettled refugees in particular, has become the 
focus of the UNHCR together with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involved in the 
field, opting for the temporary protection of refugees in situations which call for durable solutions may 
raise additional difficulties both for refugees and the receiving societies. 
‘Resettlement is a process which only begins with the transfer of a refugee and her/his family and 
dependants to a new country. Just as with the other durable solutions, integration is thus essential 
to the durability of resettlement. UNHCR only supports the resettlement of further persons of 
concern once there is a proven system in place addressing in a comprehensive manner a reception 
and integration system. The status provided in the country of resettlement should provide a 
resettled refugee and her/his family and dependants with a durable solution: integration requires 
the receiving country to ensure that refugees have access to resources required for their longer 
term stability and adjustment to the new society, while fostering a sense of belonging and 
participation.’143
4. Responsibility-Sharing and the Resettlement/Relocation Dichotomy 
 
This report has already established that a considerable revolution has occurred in the approach taken 
by the EU and its Member States toward resettlement over the course of the past ten years. However, 
in the past few years a parallel system has emerged which has, at times, overlapped and at other times 
been obvious in its differences. That parallel system of ‘intra-EU resettlement’ is most commonly 
referred to as relocation. 
Resettlement has already been set out above in a quote from the UNHCR as being "the selection 
and transfer of refugees from one state in which they have sought protection to a third state which 
has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status."144 In the EU, it should be 
added that that third State must be the country of first asylum which is not a Member State of the 
EU. Relocation on t he other hand refers to the transfer of persons from one Member State to 
another. A Commission Communication from 2009 s ets out a further explanation as to what 
resettlement is and also provides an explanation as to relocation. Resettlement is a h umanitarian 
exercise concerned with solidarity with third countries i.e. those States which are not Member States 
of the EU.145 Relocation on the other hand is a 'burden sharing' exercise, the purpose of which is to 
share the responsibility of receiving refugees among Member States of the EU. Thus, relocation is 
concerned with intra-EU solidarity.146
 
  
                                                     
143 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
144 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.3 
145 Based on t he wording of the Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme. Page 3. See:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0447:EN:NOT 
146 Based on t he wording of the Commission communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Establishment of a joint EU resettlement Programme. Page 3. See :  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0447:EN:NOT 
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4.1 The Emergence of Relocation 
The intra-EU solidarity which led to relocation can be traced back to the intense strain on southern 
Member States in dealing with mass arrivals of irregular migrants. In 2009, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
Malta adopted what is now commonly known as the Quattro Paper147. This was a document 
highlighting these Member States’ concerns with their asylum and migration situations, coupled with a 
list of recommendations primarily addressed to the EU. On 19th April 2011, the same EU Member 
States together with Spain adopted a Joint Communiqué, which reiterated their concerns in relation to 
the flows of migrants and asylum-seekers reaching their territory and calling the EU for 
‘responsibility-sharing’ among the Member States148
The European Council Conclusions of June 2009 called for the coordination of voluntary measures 
for internal reallocation of beneficiaries of international protection present in the Member States 
exposed to specific and disproportionate pressures, starting with a pilot project for Malta. This project, 
called EUREMA for European Relocation Malta, targeted a total of 255 beneficiaries of international 
protection hosted in Malta. France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the UK joined the initiative to re-allocate beneficiaries with a view to 
integrating them in their respective societies
. Those southern States made multiple requests 
for assistance from the Commission and their EU partners and have spoken in favour of relocating 
refugees from their territories.  
149
In April 2011, the European Commission decided to extent the project (EUREMA II). The 
programme is set to run from the beginning of 2012 until the end of 2013. To bolster uptake for 
EUREMA, the EU made financial assistance from the European Refugee Fund available to both 
resettlement and relocation. This report has already considered how influential ERF funding can be as 
an incentive to resettle or not to resettle. It is certainly also the case with regard to relocation. 
. 
While the first EUREMA project was a pilot experiment in relocation, the second EUREMA can be 
seen as being a response to a specific crisis. On the 12 May 2011, the European Commission organised a 
Ministerial pledging conference for relocation of migrants from Malta and resettlement of migrants from 
North Africa. Commissioner Malmström stated that ‘The situation is very serious in both North Africa 
and in Malta’ and hailed the positive response from Member States as a sh ow of solidarity both in an 
intra-Member State sense and also in the sense of solidarity with international partners150
Participation in EUREMA was considerable. Several Member States pledged their assistance, 
including Germany, Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria as well as Associated States such as Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein with a total pledge for 356 persons. Whilst some countries have chosen to conduct 
relocation on a bilateral level, other Member States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovakia) are participating in the EUREMA II project, for EU financing under the 
European Refugee Fund, Community Actions 2011
.  
151
The overwhelming reason given for uptake was to express solidarity with their fellow Member 
States that were under a particular strain from mass arrivals at the southern borders.’
. 
152




148 See EASO Monitor, http://easomonitor.blogspot.fr/2011/04/southern-eu-ms-publish-joint-communique.html 
149 See the website of the Maltese Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, http://mhas.gov.mt/en/MHAS-
Information/EUREMA/Pages/EUREMA-I.aspx 
150 See her statement on 13 May 2011, Memo 11/295, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-295_en.htm?locale=fr 
151 http://mhas.gov.mt/en/MHAS-Information/EUREMA/Pages/EUREMA-II.aspx 
152 The EASO fact-finding report on intra-EU relocation activities from Malta stated that a number of Member States said 
that relocation was a co ncrete example of intra-Member State solidarity: http://easo.europa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-finding-report-EASO1.pdf  
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explanation was particularly strong among the newer Member States which are also eager to 
participate to intra-EU solidarity and show by this way their commitment in EU affairs. Certain among 
the newer accession States have supported relocation while ignoring any call for resettlement. The 
feeling that it is more important to show solidarity with States which are partners within the EU than 
with those States outside of the Union, is tangible. Finally, relocation has also been considered by 
some potential resettlement countries as a testing ground for the future resettlement of refugees, as was 
the case with Bulgaria.153
Some EU Member States support both relocation and resettlement - Bulgaria; Denmark: France; 
Germany; Hungary; Ireland; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Spain. There are States which support resettlement but not relocation - Belgium; Czech 
Republic; Finland; Italy; Sweden; UK. One State supports relocation but not resettlement - Lithuania. 
Finally, there is also the States which have not voiced a strong preference or support for either 
resettlement or relocation: Austria; Cyprus; Estonia; Greece; Latvia; Malta. 
  
The key question considering the merits of relocation must be whether or not relocation is been 
done to the detriment of resettlement. The question relates to the potential and actual overlaps that has 
occurred between the two terms. 
4.2 The Distinction between Relocation and Resettlement 
This section examines the potential overlap between the distinct strategies of refugee protection – 
relocation and resettlement. Relocation and resettlement can quite easily be distinguished by 
considering the circumstances in which a refugee is transferred to a Member State. If that refugee is 
moved from a country of first asylum beyond the borders of EU Member States then that transfer is a 
resettlement. If a refugee has already reached the EU and is transferred from one Member State to 
another then that transfer is relocation.  
The distinction therefore is extremely simple but nevertheless, there has been a certain overlap and 
confusion between the terms. The danger is that relocation is used instead of resettlement. 
Resettlement has a protection focus. Taking refugees from a co untry of first asylum is focussing 
efforts upon the most vulnerable of refugees. Relocating refugees from one Member State to another is 
effectively transferring a refugee within an area which should have a uniform protection for refugees 
anyway. Conducting relocation in place of resettlement therefore takes the protection focus away. The 
choice for Member States may be expressed in terms of solidarity. Resettlement has been conducted to 
express solidarity with international partners while relocation is carried out on the basis of intra-EU 
solidarity. Member States are faced with the choice of expressing solidarity with their partners on the 
EU level (relocation) or with third States (resettlement). The choice of Member States and indeed 
other important stakeholders, has confirmed that relocation and resettlement both suffer from certain 
overlap and a lack of clarity with regard to the distinction between them.  
Slovakia for instance does not clearly distinguish between resettlement and relocation. It often 
refers to both terms by using its Slovak equivalent “presídľovanie” or “presídlenie,” both meaning 
resettlement. However, for relocation it would be preferable to use term “relokácia.” The Slovak 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Solidarity with other Member States was the categorical reason given to Know Reset for relocation by many Member States, 
see for example: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania. 
153 In May 2011, the Interior Minister Tsvetan Svetanov announced that Bulgaria would be accepting two to four North 
African refugees from Italy. The Minister stated that this relocation should be considered as an act of solidarity with Italy 
which was experiencing an influx of irregular migrants at that time and also as a training ground for future resettlement. 
See: The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Iliana Savova, “Do We Have a Quota on Humaneness”, 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/publications/obektiv/iliana-savova/2011-08/do-we-have-quota-humaneness  
However, despite the Bulgarian pledge for relocation, no persons decided to relocate to Bulgaria. Anna Andreeva, Know 
Reset Final Conference, op.cit. 
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Ministry of Interior’s website refers to the EUREMA project as a project aimed at the resettlement of 
persons within the EU. Slovakia did plan on participating in resettlement under the 2010 ERF annual 
programme; however, due to Slovakia’s involvement in the pilot project of relocation from Malta, it 
was postponed under the annual programme of 2011.154
Ireland has relocated refugees from Malta. These refugees were categorised as being part of the 
programme resettlement quota which exists in Ireland.
 In this instance, priority was given to 
relocation over resettlement.  
155
Internal rules within Member States can in certain circumstances dictate that refugees must be 
regarded as being resettled rather than relocated. In 2007, refugees were transferred from Malta to 
Portugal. These people had not been granted international protection in Malta. If they had been 
granted international protection in Malta then the Portugese would have categorised them as having 
been relocated. The UNHCR had recognised them as refugees. The Portugese State then considered 
these refugees as being resettled refugees.
 Places which otherwise would have been 
taken by resettled refugees were thus taken by relocated refugees. The distinction between 
relocation and resettlement is not made in the context of the Irish resettlement quota. However, even 
when the distinction is made, resettlement numbers can be substituted for relocation. When a 
Spanish boat picked up fifty-one migrants who were found at sea between Libya and Malta in July 
2006, the Dutch resettlement quota, which is generally not used for relocation, was utilised. An 
emergency acute humanitarian situation existed and the Netherlands decided to accept five of the 
refugees for resettlement.  
156
These examples detail how the terms have overlapped among Member States implementing their 
refugee protection regimes. However, the overlap does not begin and end with Member States alone, 
other stakeholders have also met with some overlap. Take the example of the recent announcement by 
the German State that it was pledging five thousand places for refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria.
 Internal rules as to a refugee’s status pre-departure have 
therefore dictated what category that refugee fits into and the distinction between terms is not made on 
the basis of where the refugees are coming from. 
157 
In September of 2013, the UNHCR called that German pledge ‘…the biggest relocation programme in 
existence…’158 The UNHCR here referred to it as b eing relocation on the basis that those refugees 
were a “humanitarian admission” rather than, sensu stricto, resettlement.159
From the perspective of EU policymakers and refugee stakeholders, making the distinction remains 
a challenge. The EASO has already identified that challenge. The EASO’s fact finding report on 
relocation from Malta stated that ‘…concerns were expressed about the possible implication of 
relocation on the resettlement quotas in the EU. It was stressed that intra-EU relocation should not be 
confused with resettlement of refugees from third countries.’
 Most other Member 
States have chosen to resettle Syrians in response to the conflict. The German action is clearly not 
relocation in the sense outlined in this report. The UNHCR of course are free to define relocation in 
whatever terms it sees fit. What this reporting by the UNHCR does illustrate is that there is a lack of 
uniformity internationally as to how distinguish relocation from resettlement.  
160
                                                     
154 Please see the Slovakian country profile on the Know Reset website, available at:  
 That Agency, of course, has a limited 
mandate and cannot direct Member States as to how they should approach relocation and resettlement. 
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00166_20130919160632_knowresetcountryprofileslovakia.pdf 
155 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
156 Written interview with the Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, 24 February 2012. 
157 See: http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00697 
158 See: http://www.unhcr.org/523076919.html 
159 See: http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00715 
160 See page 16 of  the EASO Report, op.cit.: http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-finding-report-
EASO1.pdf 
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However, the EASO can take a r ole in raising awareness that these two protection strategies are 
distinct and should not be confused.  
4.3 Relocation as a Complement to Resettlement 
The last section underlined the wide variety of ways in which resettlement and relocation can overlap. 
This section seeks to emphasise that priority must be put on resettlement. While relocation can be a 
valuable tool in complementing resettlement, it should never replace resettlement. Relocation can 
complement resettlement by providing a support to Member States which are under a particular strain 
from mass arrivals and perhaps also do not have the reception and procedural conditions necessary to 
secure the appropriate protection for refugees. However, relocation’s complementary role should 
remain just that – complementary. The evidence suggests that relocation may have, on occasion, 
impacted upon the numbers of refugees being resettled from a country of first asylum, such 
interference in resettlement’s full potential in the EU cannot be allowed to occur. This section will first 
turn to consideration of problems of relocation as highlighted by Member States in the course of Know 
Reset’s research. It will then consider the approach of the EU as a collective before offering a 
concluding paragraph as to how relocation can accomplish its task as a co mplement to resettlement 
without interfering with the success of the EU’s resettlement regime. 
In Sweden, the Ministry for Justice stated that it is hesitant towards relocation and has assumed a 
‘wait-and-see’ attitude. Sweden clearly seems to see resettlement as having twin priorities which 
should not be compromised by relocation. Firstly, resettlement is seen as being a burden-sharing 
operation with States of first asylum.161 Secondly, the priority of providing protection to the most 
vulnerable refugees should always remain the focus. It is felt by Sweden that there is a big difference 
between resettling people from troubled countries and resettling them from a Member State where 
those people should already have a reasonable level of protection. Moreover, investing in relocation 
would probably mean that financial means are being redirected from resettlement to relocation. 
Sweden has voiced support for a proper evaluation study of the pro and cons of relocation before 
giving any consideration to committing to relocation. The Ministry further stated that one of the 
reasons for relocation put forward by countries like Malta and Italy is that the refugee pressure on 
them is too high, but looking at the statistics, the pressure on them is not stronger than that 
experienced in Sweden.162 The Netherlands added its voice to the Swedish view that it is important 
that Member States express solidarity with developing countries who receive large numbers of 
refugees.163 Many Member States find themselves in the position that relocation and intra-EU 
solidarity comes into conflict with this more international solidarity with countries of first asylum.164 
The argument could be extended that alternative measures of intra-EU solidarity exist and a Member 
State could make alternative offers of solidarity.165
The problems with relocation indeed go beyond the limited confines of possibly impacting upon 
the uptake and effectiveness of resettlement in the EU. The Czech Republic voiced the opinion that 
relocation involves substantial administrative and logistical burdens. Perhaps even more interesting 
than this though is the claim by t he Czechs that relocation is a potential risk of becoming a "pull 
 Solidarity with the country of first asylum must 
remain the clear priority for Member States. Financial support or special expertise might be offered in 
a show of intra-EU solidarity, which does not come at the price of resettlement places available.  
                                                     
161 Interviews with the various Swedish stakeholders. 
162 Interview with Swedish Ministry of Justice, op.cit. 
163 Interview with Janneke van Etten, op.cit. 
164 This conflict between solidarity priorities is touched upon in an MPC blog post, available here: 
http://debatemigration.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/between-solidarity-and-the-priority-to-protect-where-refugee-
relocation-meets-refugee-resettlement/ 
165 Interview with Andreas Ollinen, op.cit. 
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factor" for illegal migration.166 This allegation is made on the understanding that migrants may believe 
that upon reaching EU territory, they will get the opportunity of being relocated to a more desirable 
Member State, perhaps even the Member State of their choice. Romania and Lithuania voiced their 
belief that more needed to be done to ensure that the relocated refugees knew more about their 
destination pre-arrival. Lithuania considered the exercise to have been costly and ineffective.167 In 
October 2009 L ithuania refused to contribute to the EU initiative to relocate more asylum seekers 
from Malta168. However, in 2011, the Lithuanian Government decided to join the project, prepared by 
Malta and funded by the European Refugee Fund and committed to accept up to six asylum seekers.169
Another important concern of Member States which receive internationally protected persons 
through relocation is that the system of relocation will act as a disincentive to Member States to 
improve their national asylum systems. In other words, if refugees are relocated to Member State A 
because the reception conditions in Member State B are overwhelmed, then will Member State B look 
upon that relocation as being a temporary assistance or as a solution?  
  
As recently as the September of 2013, Commissioner Cecilia Malmström convened a ‘Relocation 
Forum’ to discuss the way forward for relocation and address any misgivings that Member States had 
about relocation. In the Commissioner’s address170 to the Forum, she stated that ‘Relocation is not a 
quick fix, it will not solve all the problems. It is one of many tools to alleviate and assist a Member 
State under pressure and in severe difficulties. Other types of assistance include funding, technical 
and human resources, training, contingency planning, EASO etc. Relocation is also not an alternative 
to get your house in order. It is however a true expression of solidarity and I do hope that many 
Member States can take part.’ The Commissioner thereby reinforced relocation as an act of solidarity 
in light of the fact that ‘five Member States take 70 % of all the asylum seekers,’ but importantly said 
that it is not an alternative to national asylum responsibility i.e. each Member State developing and 
maintaining their own functioning asylum system.171
                                                     
166 The Czech Republic ́s position on migration prepared by working group for a Parliament, to be announced to the EU 
Institutions, 5 June 2011. 
 The Commissioner did not address the 
relationship that has developed between relocation and resettlement. The Commissioner stated that she 
had taken the decision some months ago that there could be no C ommission proposal in the 
foreseeable future for a permanent legal mechanism for relocation – either voluntary or compulsory. 
The Commissioner thus allayed any Member States fears that relocation was about to become 
compulsory. The Commissioner stated that while EUREMA II, the second relocation scheme from 
Malta, was coming to an end, financial assistance would be available in the future for relocation 
through the Asylum and Migration Fund. ‘We understand that Member States don’t necessarily want 
EU project-managed relocation with rigid administrative requirements – that is why we will no longer 
have a EUREMA project, but instead we will have money available under the Asylum and Migration 
Fund for relocation activities that will be much easier to implement.’ Relocation shall continue to 
make an important contribution toward the provision of protection for refugees in the EU.  
167 European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for a 
Relocation of Beneficiaries of International protection JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005, Final Report 2010, available on t he 
internet: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/asylum/docs/final_report_relocation_of_refugees.pdf 
168 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, Legal information: In the Meeting of Ministers of the Interior of 
Lithuania and Malta Issues of Granting Asylum for Asylum Seekers in European Union were discussed, 28th October 
2009, available on the internet: http://www.vrm.lt/index.php?id=131&backPID=129&begin_at=720&tt_news=2281& 
169 Resolution on asylum seekers from the Republic of Malta, No 1082, 14th of September 2011, available on the internet: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=406687&p_query=&p_tr2=2 
170 The Commissioner’s full address is available here: http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/refugeerelocation/ 
171 The Commissioner quoted the statistic in her blog post, available at: 
http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/refugeerelocation/ 
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In the absence of clear and cohesive guidance as to how to approach relocation so as not to impact 
upon resettlement, it is left to Member States to implement these distinct terms in a way which seeks 
to place protection for the most vulnerable at the heart of all measures. Relocated refugees should not 
be counted as part of a Member State’s resettlement quota. Relocation should only be encouraged 
secondary to resettlement. Funding should prioritise resettlement above relocation. The Hague 
Programme, referred to earlier in this report, called for a spirit of shared responsibility to a more 
accessible, equitable and effective international protection system. It seems that resettlement best 
satisfies these objectives as its primary concern is to provide protection while the priority of relocation 
is to express intra-EU solidarity. Resettlement is also an expression of solidarity but this solidarity is 
with countries of first asylum. Countries of first asylum, beyond the territory of the EU, play host to 
much larger numbers and are under a greater strain than any Member State.  
Resettlement can also be used to support the EU’s Regional Protection Programmes. Sweden was 
one Member State which stated that solidarity with countries of first asylum must take preference over 
southern Member States that have the same responsibilities to protect as Sweden. Resettlement 
undoubtedly remains the preferable response to those most in need. The priority to protect those who 
have not been able to gain access to European territory should remain the primary objective. Providing 
such access negates the need for people to become irregular migrants during their journey to Europe, 
the journey that many refugees who are relocated have been forced to undergo. Intra-Member State 
solidarity, while an understandable objective in its own right, must not come at the expense of 
protecting those most in need. Relocation then, must only come as a co mplement rather than as a 
replacement to the numbers who are being resettled. Clarifying the important difference between the 
two schemes must be an important objective into the future. As Commissioner Cecilia Malmström has 
outlined plans to incentivise relocation through funding in September of 2013, it seems certain that 
relocation will continue as an option for Member States. This means that oversight of the different 
problems outlined here must be considered by Member States and the EU so as to impact upon 
resettlement as little as possible. 
5. Conclusion 
The development of resettlement-related frameworks and policies in the EU and its Member States is 
undeniable and has accelerated during the past five years. This is mainly due to the combined effect of 
joint operations to respond to major refugee crises and to the EU’s increased support to UNHCR 
efforts to encourage States to begin to resettle refugees. EU led initiatives for multilateral operations 
has been the main incentive for Member States to get involved in refugee resettlement which have no 
history in resettlement. 
A small majority (fourteen) of Member States are now resettlement countries, insofar as they have 
committed to resettling refugees on a programme basis. Moreover, while refugee resettlement depends 
on voluntary governmental decision, exclusive from any legal duty, it is not only based on an 
administrative framework any longer. Refugee resettlement is growingly based on asylum and refugee 
law. A quasi majority of Member States (thirteen) have included a reference to refugee resettlement in 
their asylum legislation, eleven of them did so during the past decade. This does not make resettlement 
a legal duty for those States, nor a right for refugees. Yet, the adaptation of legal frameworks may 
facilitate refugee resettlement. This may be the case by allowing the granting of refugee status outside 
the territory for instance, or designing the procedure and determining the competent institutions. 
The absence of legal reference to refugee resettlement has not impeded certain Member States from 
resettling in the past (in Scandinavia) and still currently (in the Netherlands) in a sustainable and 
regular manner. Equally, the existence of a legal reference to refugee resettlement is not a guarantee 
that the State does or will resettle. It does not constitute an evidence of but can help and support 
sustainable commitment.  
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It has now become easier than in the past to legislate on refugee resettlement, since a set of 
practices and experiences have been developed. Most of all, the UNHCR has published some 
handbooks to guide the selection of refugees, the resettlement process and procedures as well as the 
granting of status and rights and the integration of resettled refugees. The EU has come to give support 
to UNHCR guidelines in prioritising and funding resettlement activities when they follow UNHCR 
standards, such as the selection of refugees falling into some of UNHCR submission categories or the 
granting of a status similar to refugee status. Despite those efforts to standardize and streamline 
refugee resettlement, the diversity in the content of resettlement-related frameworks and policies 
among Member States is still striking. Even basic standards of refugee resettlement such as t he 
UNHCR mandate and its role in pre-selecting vulnerable refugees, or the granting of permanent 
residence are not shared by the majority of legal references to refugee resettlement. 
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme has been a g reat support to the development of 
commitments in resettlement and plays an important role in the search for a concerted approach to 
resettlement. Indeed, through requirements for the funding, it influences the selection targets of 
Member States as well as the procedure and the rights granted. Nevertheless, its impact is limited. It is 
based on a financial incentive which does not convince all Member States, and on the positive impact 
of joint initiatives. The JEURP could go further, as could the EU. 
The overlap between resettlement and relocation has been a n egative development in respect of 
both of those distinct procedures. The evolution of resettlement in the EU has become susceptible to 
the strategic use of relocation by Member States as the ‘soft’ option when it is under pressure to stand 
up to its responsibility as an EU partner. Relocation can be more attractive to Member States and can 
be preferable to the challenge of resettlement. It is perhaps this conflict in terms which, more than 
anything else, has highlighted the need for strong central governance of how resettlement is handled 
by the Member States. Relocation, if it is to succeed must complement resettlement and not replace it.  
The lack of reporting of refugee resettlement in independent news and media is an obstacle to 
improving resettlement in quantitative and qualitative terms. Apart from the media, resettlement can 
be promoted and publicised as being a public issue to be discussed by all of those which have a stake 
in resettlement – policymakers, NGOs, migration authorities, lawyers and refugees themselves. All 
stakeholders state that resettlement is not openly discussed and that the majority of society are simply 
not aware of it despite the fact that ‘it is an issue that can be explained and advanced among the 
population very easily.’172 It may be difficult to convince policy makers for a structural commitment 
since not everybody knows about resettlement, including among policy makers.173
‘In the Swedish context, it is very important that politicians are not afraid to stand up for refugees. 
They dare saying that it is an important issue and that Sweden needs to show solidarity. Moreover, 
the Minister of migration always mentions resettlement when he talks about asylum issues. Often, 
at the EU-level, Sweden stands out as the odd country proposing to improve asylum policy, to 
receive more refugees etc. This positive approach is considered peculiar by the other Member 
States. The Member States often have to deal with negative public opinion and politicians/parties 
that are unreceptive towards the asylum issue.’
 A heightened 
public understanding of resettlement would assist greatly in improving how resettlement is conducted 
in all Member States.  
174
‘In the context of growing anti-immigration atmosphere, the influence of the media would be to 
make the public opinion understand why we need to protect refugees. The key factors are to be 
found in a public discourse more open to foreigners and refugees.’
 
175
                                                     
172 Interview with the Swedish Justice Ministry, op.cit. 
 
173 Ewout Adriaens, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
174 Interview with the Swedish Justice Ministry, op.cit. 
175 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
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5.1 Recommendations 
− The EU should fund and prioritize all UNHCR submission categories and not only five of 
them. 
− Geographic priorities should be defined on a m ore flexible basis, be easily revised and 
extended when new refugee crises, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, occur. 
− The EU should seek to make an impact on Member State resettlement laws and policies not 
only through funding and rallying, but also through its own legislating.  
− A legal framework for resettlement is needed in all of the Member States. 
− Even if Member States want to keep resettlement voluntary, an EU Directive could 
standardize some basic and fundamental elements of refugee resettlement, such as: 
• Resettlement shall aim at receiving vulnerable refugees on the basis of UNHCR 
submission categories, and should not include integration pre-considerations, 
• The persons to be resettled should not necessarily meet the Geneva Convention 
definition. A common definition of refugee could be adopted on t he basis of the 
Mandate refugee definition. 
• Resettlement should be carried out in cooperation with UNHCR. 
• Resettled refugees should be granted a permanent residence status. 
• Resettled refugees should be granted rights similar to those granted with Convention 
refugee status. 
• Resettled refugees should not be submitted to an additional application process upon 
arrival or only as an option to gain more rights. 
− Refugee Resettlement could be incorporated in the broad protection system. It should be 
linked to and based on a number of minimum requirements. 
− An EU Resettlement System should be developed on the model of the Common European 
Asylum System. 
− The distinction should be made and promoted by the EU between contributing toward 
refugee protection internally (relocation) and externally (resettlement). The emphasis in 
financial terms should be on resettlement. 
− Being an Agency which has a responsibility for monitoring both relocation and resettlement 
within the EU, EASO should be fully utilised as a monitor but also to give assistance as far 
as this is possible. 
− The EU should contribute to raising awareness and generating public support to refugee 
resettlement and refugee reception as a whole through media campaigns and the diffusion of 
information. Awareness-raising towards policy-makers will also facilitate the commitment of 
Member States in resettlement programmes. 
− The EU should favour more cost-effectiveness and efficiency as a result of economies of 
scale in resettlement. In particular, joint resettlement selection missions should be promoted. 
In addition to reducing costs and organisational constraints, it would lower refugees’ waiting 
time and interviews.  
− The EU should continue to encourage twinning arrangements and projects favouring 
knowledge and information exchange with regard to refugee resettlement, as well as the 
exchange of practices and sharing guidelines (on the model of the Temporary Desk on Iraq), 
in particular when it comes to reception and integration.  
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Annexes 




Formal Basis for Resettlement Date of resettlement 
Specific provision in Law Governmental Act Ad Hoc Resettlement 
Programme based 
Resettlement 
Austria None None 2011 None 
Belgium 
None *Decision of the Council of Ministers on a 
specific resettlement – Iraqi and 
Palestinians from refugee camps in Syria 
and Jordan (2009) 
 
*Decision of the Cabinet on a specific 

















None *Council of Ministers draft decision 
(2012) - Pilot programme  
None  
 
Planned for 2014 
Cyprus None  None None None 
Czech 
Republic 
Asylum Act (1999), Section 90  
 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
resettlement – Burmese (2008) 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
resettlement – Burmese (2009) 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
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Denmark 
 
Aliens Act (2011), as amended in 
2005, Section 8 
None None Since 1978 
Estonia None None None None 
Finland 
 
Aliens Act (2004), Section 90, 91, 92. 
 
 
*Decision on the geographical allocation 
of the refugee quota, 17 February 2012 







*Framework Agreement between France 
and the UNHCR (2008) 
Since 1948 












Residence Act (2004), Section 22.  
*Ruling of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior about Iraqi refugees (2008) 
 
*Decision on the launch of a permanent 
resettlement programme and on 















Greece None None None None 
Hungary 
Asylum Act (2007), Section 7  
*Governmental Decree (2011) Refugee 
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Latvia None None None None 
Lithuania None None None None 
Luxembourg None None 2009 None 
Malta None None None None 
Netherlands 
None  
*Decree (2000) transfers responsibility 
for the quota policy for resettled refugees 
to the Minister of Justice 
 
*Decree of the Minister of Justice (2010) 
outlines Dutch resettlement policy 
 
*Government Decision (2012) Policy 
Framework for Resettlement (2012-2015) 
None Since 1984 
 
Poland 
Act on granting protection to 










Asylum Law (2008), Chapter III 
Section V  
 
*Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
(2007)  




Refugee Act (1996), Section 24.  
*Cabinet Decision (1998) – Quota 
decision 







Law on Asylum (2006), Article 3(5)  
*Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 
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*Decision on the Resettlement of Refugees 
(2008) – Sets out regulation of 
resettlement and states how many 
refugees will be resettled during the 
period 2008-2010  
 
*2012 Decision to amend the 2008 










Planned for 2012-2013 
Slovakia 
 
None *Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 
(2009): Emergency Transit Centre in 
Humenné 
 
*Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 




International Protection Act (2007), 
Chapter VIII Section 70 
 
*Government Decree on implementation 








Law regulating the right to asylum 
and subsidiary protection (2009) 
 
 
*Royal Decree (1995) – makes reference 
to UNHCR requests to resettle 
 
 
*Decision of the Council of Ministers 
(2010) – Approves the 2010 programme: 
75 refugees 
 
*Decision of the Council of Ministers 
























Delphine Perrin - Frank McNamara
354 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
*Communication of the Council of 





Planned for 2013-2014 
Sweden 
Aliens Act (2005), Chapter 5 Section 2  
*Spending authorization for the Migration 
Board (2011) –by the Ministry of Justice, 
defines the resettlement quota for 2012 
 
*Migration Board Decision on 
Resettlement (2012) - Distribution of 
places, strategic and operational 
assessments 
None Since 1950 
United 
Kingdom 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act (2002), Section 59 




13 EU countries refer to 
resettlement in Law. 
15 EU countries have adopted 
government acts related to 
resettlement. 
10 EU countries have 
resettled on an ad hoc 
basis. 
14 EU countries have 
resettled on a 
programme basis. 
 18 EU countries have had a formal basis for resettlement. 16 EU countries have already resettled. 
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Annex 2. Pre-Arrival and Post-Arrival Phases of Refugee Resettlement in the EU Member States 
i. Pre- arrival phase  






EU countries  





Dossiers Missions Actors involved 
Before 
arrival 
Upon arrival Cultural orientation 
1 Austria No 2011: Christian Iraqis  Selected by 
representatives 





-Ministry of the 
Interior 
Yes  n/a 
2 Belgium  No  
(2009, 2011) 
2011: Family with 
children and single 
women.  
 

















2011: CO not provided. 
Information pamphlets 
covering information 
about Belgium were 
printed but not given to 
refugees.  
                                                     
176
 Yes: The State accepts obligations towards refugees recognised by UNHCR according to a broader definition – Mandate Refugee Status – No: Geneva Convention criteria and generally 
Subsidiary Protection criteria.  
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3 Bulgaria  Yes (possible) Bulgaria is interested 
in resettling 
Afghani and Iraqi 
refugees from 
Turkey.  
/  /  -UNHCR 
-State Agency for 
Refugees 
/  /  /  






persons: seriously ill 
persons, children, 
women at risk and 




aspects are also taken 
into consideration.  











Done by the Resettlement 
Group when interviewing 
the people in need of 
resettlement in the country 
of first asylum –initial 
information about what 
they can expect from 
resettlement in the Czech 
Republic and to what 
extent they will receive 
assistance on arrival. 
6 Denmark  No  Sub-quotas: 75 urgent 
cases; “Twenty-Or-
More” for specially 
sick or handicapped 
refugees.  
Integration criteria 
included in 2005.  
Supplementary criteria 
of influence: language 
qualifications, 







Yes  -UNHCR  
-Danish 
Immigration 




Yes  Yes done by DIS and 
Danish language teachers. 
Offered to all refugees 
accepted on selection 
missions but not to 
refugees on dossier basis. 
Over one week. 
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7 Estonia / / / / / / / / 




allocation of the 
quota, based on the 
need of continuity in 
the chosen  
refugee groups.  
 
Capacity to integrate is 
a factor. 
10% of the quota are 
reserved for 
emergency cases and 













Yes  Cultural orientation is the 
remit of IOM. The 
arrangement was 
established in 2001 and ran 
until the termination of the 
contract in 2010.  
 
The co was not arranged in 
2011 and the contract is 
currently being negotiated. 
Currently no c ultural 
orientation is organized. 
9 France Yes  
 
2008 (Iraq 500):  
Belonging to a 
religious minority 
(especially Christian) 
and link with France 
(either through family 
ties or knowledge of 
French by at least one 
family member). 
Residence either in 
Iraq or in a 
neighbouring country: 
Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon or Turkey. 
 
 




Pre-Selection Yes Sessions of cultural 
introduction can be 
organised by IOM. This 
has been done only for 
Iraqis and EU relocation.  
When such activities 
cannot be organised, the 
IOM may distribute an 
information package, of 
which the Information 
Leaflet for People 
Resettled in France. 
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consideration of the 
reception and housing 
capacity in the 
country. 
 
10 Germany Yes  2008: Focus on 
members of 
persecuted (religious) 
minorities, victims of 
violence and with 
special medical needs, 
single women with 
children.  
Other criteria such as 
capacity of 
integration, ties with 
Germany and family 
unity.  
 
2011: Priority to 
refugees with Sub-
Saharan origin who 
fled from Libya. 
Pre-
Selection 
Yes  -UNHCR  
-BAMF 
 Yes No 
11 Greece / / / / / / / / 
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12 Hungary No No specific 
admissibility criteria. 
A family (5-8 persons) 
from the North-
African region. 
Aspects to consider 
when doing 






/ Yes -UNHCR  
-OIN 
 
 Yes No  
13 Ireland Yes Preference 
-Group resettlement 
-“balanced” caseload 



















Yes  Yes 
Through the Irish 
authorities 




Yes No, except in 












15 Latvia / / / / / / / / 
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16 Lithuania / / / / / / / / 
17 Luxembourg No 2009: Families with 










Yes  OLAI did prepare some 
leaflets concerning rights 
upon arrival, including 
healthcare and education 
18 Malta / / / / / / / / 
19 Netherlands No Subquota: 30 Medical 
cases. 
Refugees with medical 
needs and women at 




More emphasis will be 
placed on the 
Integration potential 
which has been 
applied since 2005.  




be used as 
strategically as 
possible with regard to 































- Central Agency 
Yes No Organised by COA, 
consisting of three 
trainings. Content: 
elementary Dutch language 
skill; Information about the 
Dutch society; Information 
about the receiving 
municipality; and the 
future accommodation. 
For dossier-based refugees, 
CO trainings are developed 
and offered by IOM in 
cooperation with COA. 
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migration policy and 
UNHCR to select 
more higher profile 
refugees such as 






20 Poland n/a Humanitarian aspects, 
necessity to satisfy the 
essential needs of 
resettled refugees, 





n/a In the future: 
Interview by 









-Head of the 
Office for 
Foreigners via 




Yes Yes n/a 
21 Portugal Yes Programme: 
Continuity in 
resettlement;  
Privilege to citizens 
coming from the 
African continent and 
from Eastern Europe, 
but not excluding 
other situations of 
citizens coming from 
other places, if these 
justify their priority 




















Yes  Non systematic distribution 
of a “Cultural 
Orientation Leaflet for 
Resettled Refugees in 
Portugal”. 
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2011: People from 




minors, children and 
women at risk. 
22 Romania No 
 
Potential for 
integration applied in 
2008, dropped in 2012. 
2012 Criteria: Express 
consent of the refugee 




requirements at EU 
level. 
Minimum medical 
















Pre-Selection Yes Yes 
Romanian NGOs involved 
in integration programmes 
will participate to the 
selection missions to 
inform refugees on 
integration activities in 
Romania and prepare 
integration programmes. 
In addition, possible 
cultural orientation and 
counselling services 
provided by ROI. 
23 Slovakia / / / / / / / / 
24 Slovenia n/a Global migration 
trends, crisis areas 
around the world, 
integration capacities. 




Yes  Yes 
Informative lecture  -  
general information on 
Slovenia, cultural 
characteristics and habits, 
on the prohibition of 
polygamy and gender 
equality, rights and 
obligations of persons 
enjoying international 
protection in Slovenia. 
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25 Spain Yes (possible) The criteria will be 
defined on yearly 
basis.  






2012 (Tunisia)  
-UNHCR  
-OAR (Office of 
Asylum and 
Refugees) 
Yes  Yes (2011) 
By IOM – Information 
sessions about Spain  
26 Sweden Yes No additional criteria. 
Number of places by 
country of first asylum 
decided annually.  
350 places for urgent 






Yes, for less 




Yes Possible Yes (Migration Board 
Officers) 
For more than half of the 
refugees selected for 
resettlement, mainly those 
selected via in country 
selection missions. 
Generally, cultural 




Yes Regional allocation 
targets, including 
RPP. 
Small percentage for 
medical cases and a 
higher percentage for 
women-at-risk. 
For Mandate refugees: 
integration potential 
and links with the UK. 




- Refugee Team 




Yes No By UK mission staff to 
refugees explaining the 
travel, reception and initial 
integration arrangements. 
Previously by IOM.  
Since 2011, a  1 day 
programme has been 
delivered by staff from the 
Refugee Resettlement Unit 
at the UKBA. It includes 
video interviews with 
refugees previously 
resettled through the 
programme in which they 
talk about their experiences 
of resettling and advice for 
new arrivals. 
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II-Post- arrival phase 




EU countries  





status or other 
Specific status 
The same as national citizens 
The same as 
refugees 
The same as persons 
under the subsidiary 
protection status 
Other specific rights under 
national law 
1 Austria X    X   
2 Belgium  X    X for health care and social 






  Right of permanent 
residence. 
3 Bulgaria  X   Potential to become 
naturalized at a later phase 
 
X    
4 Cyprus / / / / / / / 




  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Citizenship may be granted 
on request after 5 years of 






6 Denmark  X X   X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 








X  4 year- residence permit  
7 Estonia / / / / / / / 
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8 Finland    X (Quota Refugees) X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment, after the 
‘integration period’. 




 4 year-residence permit 
Direct access to 
immigrants’ benefits upon 
arrival 
9 France X 
 
X  X for health care, social 
welfare and housing, access to 





(1 year-stay permit) 
 
10 Germany   X X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
  3 year-stay permit. After 7 
years a settlement permit 
can be granted. 
Strict conditions for 
family reunification.  
11 Greece / / / / / / / 
12 Hungary X / / / X / / 
13 Ireland    X (Programme 
Refugees) 
X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 3 
years – to be extended to 5 
years by future reform. 
X 
 
 Facilities for family 
reunification 




 X for health care and social 






(3-year stay permit) 
 
15 Latvia / / / / / / / 
16 Lithuania / / / / / / / 
17 Luxembourg X   X Social welfare and 
healthcare 
X   
18 Malta        
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19 Netherlands   
 
 X (Invited Refugees) X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 5 






 5 year residence permit.  
20 Poland X X   X X  
21 Portugal X X  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 






(2 year-stay permit) 
 
22 Romania X   X for health care, access to 
education and employment. 
X   
23 Slovakia / / / / / / / 
24 Slovenia X   X for health and social care, 
access to education and 
employment. 
X  Right to permanent 
residence 




 X for health care and social 






(1 year-stay permit) 
 
26 Sweden X X  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 4 
years for refugees, after 5 










x   X for medical care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 




 Indefinite Leave to 
Remain 
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Austria No No / / 
Belgium Yes No / / 







Republic Yes No / Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes / / 
Estonia No No / / 
Finland Yes No / No 
France Yes Yes / Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Yes  
Seems to merge both 
data within resettlement. 








Hungary Yes Yes / / 






Latvia No No / / 
Lithuania No Yes    / / 












Netherlands Yes Yes / 
Usually Yes (but used 
its resettlement quota 
for a emergency 
relocation in 2006) 
Poland Yes (in theory) Yes (in theory) 
Yes 
Same legal basis, same 
quota 
/ 
Portugal Yes Yes / / 
Romania Yes Yes / No 
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Slovakia Yes (in theory) Yes (in theory) Yes (terminology) Yes 
Slovenia Yes (in theory) Yes 
Yes 
Same legal basis, same 
quota  
/ 
Spain Yes Yes / / 






Totals: 20 Yes 15 Yes 5 Yes 5 Yes 
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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 EU Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as well as thematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
 
For more information: 
 
KNOW RESET project – Migration Policy Centre 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 892 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 770 
Email: know-reset@eui.eu  
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Know Reset was an EU-wide research project1
The report is illustrated with examples from various Member States. Drawing from the collated 
country profiles, the findings illustrate capacity for resettlement in four areas: funding; the different 
actors involved; political will; and the methods used. The paper looks at each of these areas and starts 
by assessing the capacity of EU Member States to commit or not to resettlement; to expand their 
efforts (more resettlement places); and to conduct more effective (better quality) resettlement. This 
makes up the first section. Secondly, the future of resettlement across the European Union is explored. 
Finally, we formulate recommendations to improve the quality of national resettlement and to promote 
a better resettlement policy in Europe.  
 that aimed to analyse how resettlement is currently 
conducted in the European Union, and in what ways it can be improved. The purpose of this report is 
to make the case for the increased use of resettlement by European countries on two levels: firstly, 
through the establishment of new national resettlement programmes in different countries and the 
expansion of national programmes where they already exist; secondly, to continue common efforts at 
national and EU level for a harmonized European resettlement programme, the future of which will be 
negotiated in the context of the EU financial perspectives for the period 2014-2020.  
                                                     
1 Know Reset is co-funded by the European Commission through the European Refugee Fund (ERF) 2010 
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I. Introduction 
i.  Resettlement Capacity in Europe at a glance 
The scale of resettlement has changed dramatically over the last thirty years. The phenomenon of 
resettlement in the international arena originated and evolved in the context of the Cold War.2 
Historical efforts across nations were exerted to help the large numbers of displaced people in the 
aftermath of Second World War. Since then, Europe has been offering resettlement as a protection tool 
for refugees, albeit not at a scale comparable to other countries3 like the US, Canada and Australia. 4
UNHCR set a goal to increase the number of countries conducting resettlement and their 
encouragement of new programmes had already showed some success by 2000.
 
5 Their programmes 
were relatively small but their involvement was very important in giving new strength to this policy 
tool. Since then individual EU Member States have responded to resettlement as a protection tool in 
different ways. In 2002 the UK Home office announced its plan to establish a resettlement 
programme.6 By that time there were seven7
After years of a solely national approach to carrying out resettlement, momentum began for a 
combined European approach in 2008, which demonstrated that Europe was ready for a collaborative 
approach to resettlement. Through Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council that year,
 EU Member States with some form of resettlement 
programme or who had established the firm ambition to carry out resettlement. However, in addition 
to this, several other Member States were in fact already resettling some refugees on an ad hoc basis at 
the specific request of UNCHR. These resettlement cases were often people with an immediate need 
for protection, often with a family member, in the state in question.  
8 the 
EU committed to resettle up to 10,000 Iraqi refugees, after a call was released from UNHCR. This 
commitment represented the first joint effort of EU Member States to offer international protection to 
a specific refugee population through resettlement.9 The response of the EU to the Iraqi refugee crisis, 
however, showed some of the difficulties of a joint EU response without an existing decision-making 
mechanism or any corresponding infrastructure.10
                                                     
2 More info please see also the introduction “ Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in 
Legal and Policy Frames” Delphine Perrin and Frank McNamara, pg.7 
 The ICMC report “10.000 refugees from Iraq”, May 
http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00013 
3 A comprehensive database on Resettlement in the EU, and throughout the Member States can be found at the Know Reset 
Website < http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=2>  
4 Know Reset, Country of First Asylum Report: Tunisia, 2013 p13: “burden sharing is spread unevenly between the 27 EU 
Member States, since the EU received 5,000 refugees between 2011/2012 (4,700 in 2010), the vast majority are hosted by 
the USA, Canada and Australia., http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00012 
5 Joanne van Selm, Tamara Woroby, Erin Patrick and Monica Matts, Study on The Feasibility of setting up resettlement 
schemes in EU Member States or at EU Level, against the background of the Common European Asylum system and the 
goal of a Common Asylum Procedure. 2003 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/pdf/resettlement_study_full_2003_en_en.pdf, 
6 Ibid.  
7 Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.  
8 European Council (2008), JHA Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on the reception of Iraqi refugees, Brussels, 27-28 
November 2008.  
9 International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 10,000 refugees from Iraq: A report on joint resettlement in the 
European Union, May 2010. 
10 Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) Twelve Arguments and Seven Proposals for the EU Refugee 
Resettlement Scheme, 2009. 
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2010, concluded that the pledge to resettle up to 10.000 refugees from Iraq had not been met and by 





Building upon the public consultations carried out in the framework of the Green Paper on the 
future of the CEAS in 2007, the EC announced in its policy plan of 17 June 2008 that it would make 
proposals to develop an “EU Resettlement Scheme” in the course of 2009 (in which Member States 
would participate on a voluntary basis). The new European Refugee Fund (ERF III),12
The second half of 2009 was of crucial importance for the future of the of EU policy on refugee 
resettlement. In September 2009, during the Swedish Presidency, the EU Member State with the most 
extensive experience in refugee resettlement, the EC presented its proposal for an EU Resettlement 
Scheme.
 which became 
operational in 2008, provided financial assistance for the resettlement of refugees from third countries 
to the EU Member States.  
13
In addition, on 18 February 2009, the Commission adopted a proposal for the creation of a 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which became operational in 2010. EASO is tasked with 
providing a structural framework for the carrying out of practical cooperation activities in the field of 
asylum, including activities related to resettlement.  
 The Stockholm program welcomed the initiative by inviting the EU institutions to 
encourage the voluntary participation of Member States in the EU resettlement scheme’. The 
Stockholm Programme was another step further and one that reached a strong institutional consensus.  
The year 2011 was very important on the worldwide political arena, due to the uprisings in 
North Africa and the war in Libya both of which created massive flows of people fleeing their 
countries to seek asylum elsewhere. During the height of the 2011 Libyan civil war, Tunisia absorbed 
                                                     
11 ICMC “10.000 refugees from Iraq A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union”, op.cit. 
12 Decision No 573/2007/EC. 
13 Commission proposal (2009) 447 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0447:FIN:EN:PDF 
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over a million people seeking sanctuary — Choucha alone received upwards of 18,000 people a day.14 
In response to that, the European Commission organized a pledging conference on resettlement in 
May 2011 for Member States to pledge places for the thousands of refugees waiting in camps with 
poor living conditions. The pledging conference was a decisive step towards the adoption of the Joint 
EU Resettlement Programme (JEURP).15
The conference was soon followed by another call for a resettlement plan
 
16 for refugees stranded in 
Choucha unable to return to their country of origin, to which a number of MS responded collectively. 
Thus began a political drive across the European Union for more collaborative resettlement approach, 
continuing the joint commitment that had already started with Iraqi refugees that resulted in offers to 
resettle 5000 refugees fleeing the civil war in Libya17
This on-going momentum for resettlement led to the adoption of the JEURP,
 who were residing in the Tunisian Transit camp, 
near Choucha.  
18
Up until the adoption of JEURP, resettlement was carried out by EU Member States without much 
consultation and coordination among each other. There had been several trans-national resettlement-related 
projects, including “twinning”, which were carried out within the EU over the past few years, using 
European Refugee Community funds (including ERF). 
 although it was almost 
two years later, during which time the proposal remained stuck between institutions mainly due to annual 
priority setting and because of an argument about which decision procedure to use in connection to the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. During these two years, it is important to emphasise the 
importance of the role of the European Parliament in advocating for the adoption of the JEURP.  
19 These projects covered a wide range of activities, 
such as the selection process and reception and integration of resettled refugees. Many different actors, both 
governmental and non-governmental (international and local NGOs, UNHCR, IOM), from both 
resettlement and non-resettlement countries participated in projects of this type, with the aim of facilitating 
the collection of information and the exchange of practices between Member states. These projects and a 
few joint missions, which took place between 2008 and 2009, paved the way for creating a more 
favourable environment for resettlement and encouraged more Member States on board.20




 is a mechanism allowing for the setting 
of common priorities on resettlement for 2013, as well as more effective use of financial assistance 
available through the  which is designed for resettlement activities. The 
JEURP allowed for closer political and practical cooperation among the Member States, so as to 
increase the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of their resettlement activities, and the humanitarian and 
strategic impact of resettlement. The JEURP also provided the impetus for other Member States to 
take part in resettlement. This political and financial incentive allowed some Member States to move 
from ad hoc resettlement to annual/programme-based resettlement, for example, Belgium and 
Germany, and for other Member States new to resettlement such as Hungary, to begin their efforts.  
                                                     
14 Kristopher Sobo, 2013 http://www.mediaglobal.org/2013/07/31/unhcr-helps-tunisia-with-refugees-in-wake-of-libyan-
civil-war/ 
15 European Parliament, ‘Comparative Study on the best practices for the integration of resettled refugees in the EU Member 
States’, pg.17 http://www.resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/EP%20study.pdf 2012 
16 European Parliament (2011), Debate on Support to Refugees in Tunisia, 28 September 2011, Strasbourg. 
17 Wafa Baba, Know Reset, Country of First Asylum Report: Tunisia, pg. 8, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00012 
18 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:092:0001:0003:EN:PDF 6444/12;  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st06/st06444-ad01co03.en12.pdf.  
For more information please read “ Joint EU Resettlement Programme” in http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00069 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/refugee-fund/index_en.htm 
20 European Parliament, Comparative Study on the best practices for the integration of resettled refugees in the EU Member 
States, 2012:18 www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/747.html 
21 Decision 281/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 2012. 
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The data gathered in the research points out that there are now more Member States (16) 
conducting resettlement than ever before, however obstacles remain which hinder the capacity and 




Four Member States have only conducted ad -hoc schemes, fourteen Member States have or have 
had an annual or multiannual programme.  
Apart from an increase in committed resettlement places made available by more Member States 
over the last thirty years, another innovative approach is that resettlement is now more regulated 
and framed: 13 EU countries refer to resettlement in Law. 15 EU countries have adopted 
governmental acts related to resettlement.22
In addition to this level of formal commitment, our research has shown that socio-economic factors 
remain an influential part of the decision process on behalf of Member States. This leads us to believe 
that issues and challenges related to resettlement policy cannot be addressed in isolation from 
broader migration trends and issues.  
  
This means that any national public discussion on resettlement does not take place in a vacuum but 
is entangled with other migration issues. The public remain largely unaware of resettlement occurring, 
to the point where there is confusion regarding the difference between asylum seekers, economic 
                                                     
22 Know Reset, Formal Basis for Resettlement and Effective Resettlement in the EU Member States, <http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00700_20130812105725_final.pdf> June 2013  
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migrants and resettled refugees.23
The impact of the economic crisis has been specifically named in a number of cases. Policy makers 
(Governments) in a few Member States (like Spain) have been cautious not to refer to resettlement 
efforts openly due to the economic crisis and the fear of negative backlash from the public. The 
worsening economic situation across and Eastern Europe has affected also Bulgaria and the country’s 
recent initiatives in the area of resettlement.
 Public opinion has shifted even in traditional resettlement countries 
to people being more reluctant to resettle more refugees. This is partly linked with the asylum “crisis” 
in a few countries like Belgium, for example. 
24
Some states have resettlement mechanisms in place and have had such mechanisms for a number of 
decades, whereas other states are new to the process and have not the same level of experience. This 
was reflected in the Know Reset research, in each Member State Country Profile, collated here in this 
paper, where we saw real diversity in capacity. With such diverging capacities across the Member 
States it still remains important that states maintain the high quality of resettlement, as well as the 
fulfilment of the quantitative expectations set by quotas. 
 Other countries not engaged to resettlement are affected 
by this too.  
Recently, with no end to the conflict in sight In Syria, the UN agency has urged EU nations to offer 
asylum to some 10,000 Syrians this year and another 30,000 in 2014.25 To date, Germany, Austria, 
France, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Luxemburg, Hungary and Ireland26
ii. About the report and method research 
 are amongst 
countries who have accepted to resettle Syrian refugees.  
The research undertaken as part of the Know-Reset project examined all 27 EU Member States, both 
those that have resettlement experience and those that do not, in an effort to bring about a better 
understanding of resettlement and the potential expansion of resettlement practices in Europe. The 
different approaches to resettlement, the historical relationship with resettlement, and the legal 
framework of resettlement were thoroughly analysed in each country. As a result of the project, 27 
country profiles, an online database at EU level (EU legal and policy documents directly or indirectly 
linked to resettlement) and of national information27 (on different legal and administrative framework, 
statistic, policy statements and debates, and reports), and tools for quantitative and qualitative country 
comparison have all been published on the Know-Reset website.28
The research covers resettlement and non-resettlement Member States of the European Union 
(MS). Within the MS which conduct resettlement, there are two broad types of resettlement: 
  
• Ad hoc resettlement, which responds to situations as they happen with no pre-defined quota;  
• Programme-based resettlement in which MS set annual or multi-annual quotas. 
In addition to this, the research was guided by two overriding questions:  
• What is the current resettlement policy and practice in Europe and how can EU Members 
states do more and better?  
                                                     
23 Know Reset, Finnish Country Profile,  
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00151_20130705130136_knowresetcountryprofilefinland.pdf 
24 http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00146, pg.1 
25 http://www.unhcr.org/5249282c6.html 
26 Ibid. 
27 For more information please see: http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00002 
28 Know-Reset Website, <http://www.know-reset.eu/> 
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• Do existing resettlement systems in Europe meet the needs of refugees, and what can be 
done to improve these systems? 
To answer to those questions, background research was conducted in each country engaged in 
resettlement, including desk and field research. Field research consisted of a series of semi-
structured interviews29 with relevant authorities in each EU Member States, as well as other 
stakeholders at national level. Desk research also included background statistical research. For each 
EU country, data on resettlement and related phenomena on asylum and immigration were provided 
by national institutions. The on-line database 30
By looking at both types of resettlement (programme-based resettlement and ad hoc) at two 
distinct stages of the resettlement process (from pre-departure to post-arrival of refugees), the research 
enabled us to compile an inventory of the legal frameworks and actual practices of each resettling EU 
member state.  
 now provides statistics for each Member State. 
Background research and interviews were also conducted in other EU countries not committed to 
resettlement for comparison.  
The first part of the paper builds on the major elements in any resettlement programme, which are 
identified and explained in each sub-section. As part of this review the resettlement programmes of 14 
Member States are discussed: four31 of the “traditional” countries of resettlement, which are 
Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden, together with the other ten EU Member States 
implementing programme-based resettlement, which include: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Romania.32
Various trends emerged during the examination of differences between resettlement Member 
States, which also had an impact on identifying the potential for future resettlement in non-
resettlement Member States. These trends can in part explain whether and how resettlement can 
quantitatively be increased (more numbers resettled), whilst at the same time boosting the quality of 
resettlement programmes (better conditions and smoother processes). Trends emerged around four 
distinct categories:  
 Other ad hoc 
programmes and measures in other EU Member States are also considered.  
1. Methods used: How are quotas set by Member States, and how does this affect decisions 
making? How are refugee selected, and by whom?  
2. How is the setting of quotas linked to the country's overall foreign policy (provided that 
there is enough evidence to evaluate this) and development objectives?  
3. Actors involved: Who are the stakeholders involved in the process? What is the division of 
roles between the national government, NGOs and local authorities? What human resources 
are available for resettlement programmes from the national governments?  
4. Funding: Is there enough EU financial assistance and/or national funding to ensure that 
quality resettlement is conducted? Has the economic crisis in Europe influenced decisions to 
resettle? 
5. Political will: What is the overall political debate around asylum in the country, the overall 
asylum situation and needs? Is there a preference for the kind of refugees accepted? How far 
do public opinion and the media influence resettlement decisions? What other factors 
contribute to resettlement decisions? 
 
                                                     
29 Some names are cited in the report, others are not when the interviewees did not wish to be named. 
30 http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00011 
31 Norway is not included in the research as it is not part of the EU.  
32 Bulgaria plans to implement a resettlement programme in 2014. 
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To assess the current and future capacity of Member States carrying out resettlement, and the 
potential of future resettlement in non-resettlement Member States, these four categories, were 
examined further in the first section of the paper, entitled ‘2013: Resettlement capacity at a glance’. 
It should be noted that the capacity for integrating resettled persons is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Other recent reports have covered this issue in depth for example the EP comparative study on 
the best practices for the integration of resettled refugees in the EU Member States33 new 
UNHCR Guide on the Integration of Resettled Refugees
 and the 
.34
As a result, this paper does not focus on material capacities (eg, housing, etc), although it did come 
up in the research that the reception and integration of resettled refugees poses challenges to 
resettlement countries, local authorities, local communities, and partners. Some important elements of 
reception capacities and their impact, however, will be touched upon in the course of the paper as a 
crucial cross cutting issue such as the lack of specific reception/accommodation facilities. 
 The EP study examines the question of the 
integration of resettled refugees in Europe, by analysing the policy framework for resettlement and 
refugee integration and the practices at the national and the European level. The UNHCR Guide 
explains the essentials for establishing a resettlement programme and the fundamentals for achieving 
sustainable resettlement programmes. 
The first part of the paper builds on the major elements in any resettlement programme, which are 
identified and explained in each sub-section. As part of this review the resettlement programmes of 14 
Member States are discussed: four35of the “traditional” countries of resettlement, which are Denmark, 
Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden, together with the other 10 EU Member States implementing 
programme-based resettlement, which include: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Romania,36
The second section entitled ‘The Future of Resettlement in Europe’ explores the possibility to 
conduct more and better resettlement across the European Union. Finally, the conclusions of the Know 
Reset findings are included, followed by a set of recommendations for more effective resettlement in 
Europe.  
 Other ad hoc programmes and 
measures in other EU Member States are also considered.  
II. Resettlement practices and capacities across Europe 
Sub-section A looks at the question of whether the number of resettlement places made available 
has increased or not in parallel with the expansion of the number of EU resettlement countries.37
Sub-section B looks at the method used in selecting refugees and in setting the quotas which from 
the research also impacts on the capacity of host member states to resettle. The national Governments 
are the main actors in this phase.  
 One 
would think that there would be a considerable increase in the number of resettlement places 
automatically with the expansion in the number of EU resettlement countries, but the research 
indicates that is not necessarily the case.  
Although national governments are responsible for the selection of refugees for resettlement, 
Regional and Local Authorities play a central role in offering reception and integration support once 
                                                     




35 Norway is not included in the research as it is not part of the EU.  
36 Bulgaria plans to implement a resettlement programme in 2014. 
37 Please note that the statistics gathered in the framework of this project covers the period 2000-2011. 
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refugees have arrived. The success of national refugee resettlement programmes thus depends on the 
commitment, ability and partnerships of cities, municipalities and regions. In addition to this, it is also 
important to highlight the major role that NGOs play in the whole resettlement process. Sub-section C 
assesses the level of cooperation between these actors, the services they provide and the extent of their 
involvement on the effectiveness of resettlement. The analysis of this section clearly shows that 
cooperation between stakeholders not only varies from one country to another but also within each 
country.  
A further section on the economics of resettlement elaborates upon the type of the information 
necessary to understand how much resettlement costs. Financial incentives continue to play an 
important role in encouraging resettlement across the EU Members States, so the existing funding at 
EU and national level will also be important and is looked at in sub -section D. This section will also 
analyse the impact that the ERF has had in Member States to increase the number of refugees resettled 
in each of them. Going back to the paper “Twelve Arguments and seven proposals for the EU Refugee 
Resettlement Scheme” published by CCME on 29 June 2009,38
Crosscutting aspects of political reasoning and decisions about resettlement are analysed in sub-
section E. This sub-section analyses not only the current political socio-economic factors affecting EU 
Member States engaged in resettlement; but also the future political trends in both resettlement and 
non-resettlement EU countries relating to political decisions regarding their commitment or lack of, to 
resettlement. The impact of public opinion and media is also explored in this sub –section. It seems 
that with strong public support and demonstrable political will, adequate resettlement possibilities and 
good cooperation with the regional and local authorities,
 it is interesting to note that this 
research indicates the same results, namely that: Member states (especially the smaller ones or poorer 
ones) have often been reluctant to engage in resettlement because they believe that the infrastructure 
for a resettlement programme may be too costly. 
39
A. Capacity in terms of numbers: more new resettlement countries, more places?  
 European resettlement efforts may better 
respond to dramatic resettlement needs.  
According to UNHCR the number of people currently in situations of displacement has reached 45 
million worldwide, the highest figure for 14 years. While global resettlement needs now stand at 
691,000, not including the massive outflow of refugees fleeing the crisis in the Syrian Arabic 
Republic, the number of annual quota places from UNHCR submissions40 sits at 86,000. This 
highlights the huge disparity between resettlement needs and state response.41
In the context where the global protection needs are larger than the willingness and capacity of host 
countries to resettle, the question “who to resettle” and “how many” is a pressing and critical one for 
EU Member States. The evidence found in the course of this research highlights many factors which 
emerge around the four distinct categories examined above: method used, actors involved, political 
will and funding. A few of them related to capacity in terms of numbers and methods used will be 
elaborated upon this section. 
 
                                                     
38 These are available at:  
http://www.ccme.be/secretary/NEWS/090629%20RR%20CCME%20considerations%20and%20recommendations%20E
U%20RR%20scheme%20FINAL.pdf 
39 Interview with Janneke van Etten, Senior Policy Officer at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Migration 
Policy Department , Asylym, Reception and Return, Netherlands. 
40 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, June 2011 Chapter 6: UNHCR Resettlement Submission Categories 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d464e842.html 
41 UNHCR, Projected Global Resettlement needs 2014. http://www.unhcr.org/51e3eabf9.html 
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The research also suggests that a link between the number of asylum seekers and of resettlement 
arrivals exists, even if it varies from one country to another. Even though the evidence is not clear, 
there seems to be a point at which an increasing number of asylum seekers impacts the government's 
decision to engage in resettlement or vice versa. Resettlement programmes can also impact the number 
of asylum seekers arriving in the EU. For example, France saw the number of asylum seekers 
increasing very significantly over several years (from 35,520 applications in 2007 to 57,113 in 2011), 
which causes difficulties in terms of reception and accommodation. Under these circumstances, it is 
difficult to envisage more cases of resettlement. In an interview, the Finish Refugee Advice Centre 
considered that “It would be good if the EU could create mechanisms through which countries that 
receive less asylum seekers would be motivated to increase their resettlement quota. Refugees and 
asylum seekers are often seen as two separate groups and a holistic approach is lost”. More evidence is 
found in the Belgian case where the number of persons to be resettled is a political decision. Various 
factors are relevant, including the number of regular asylum seekers and the situation of the reception 
network. In 2009 but especially in 2011, the reception network and the national asylum system in 
Belgium were under very severe pressure, which led to a relatively restrictive number of resettlement 
places. Although the choice of countries has not been based on strategic choices connected to Belgian 
Foreign Policy so far.42
In 2000, the UK Home Secretary Jack Straw, proposed an EU-wide programme that would have 
impacted the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe and in 2002 the UK government published 
a white paper “Safe Borders, Safe Haven” proposing reforms to the UK's immigration system. These 
included provisions to develop a resettlement programme based on quotas in order to open a legal and 
safe route to the UK for vulnerable refugees and to avoid them falling into the hands of smugglers and 
traffickers.  
  
The table below gives a snap picture of the number of refugees granted protection during the last 
decade in the European Union. Despite the arguments above, the numbers show that it is the countries 
receiving more asylum seekers who also resettle more refugees.  
 
 
Deciding how many refugees to resettle is in many ways about defining the nature of the 
programme as well as the image43
                                                     
42 Written interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
 of the resettlement country in the global refugee protection system. 
43 Ibid. 
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For example, in the Swedish context, it is very important that politicians are not afraid to stand up for 
refugees and openly say that Sweden needs to show solidarity. In addition to this, politicians always 
include resettlement in the talks about asylum issues as an important issue.44 Since the resettlement of 
refugees plays an important role in the EU’s external policies on asylum, the involvement of Romania 
in the resettlement programme was driven also by the desire to assume more responsibility as an EU 
Member State.45 The research shows that there is no implementable guideline in determining how 
many resettled refugees would be a ‘good’ number for any given state. This is manly linked with the 
way Member States decide on the annual numbers and their levels of setting a ‘quota’, a ‘target’ or a 
‘ceiling’. The decision on the national annual budget also impacts on the annual numbers along with 
political will and the capacity for reception and integration. Sweden, for example, in contrast with 
most other member states, links a specific amount of resources to each refugee entering the country, 
rather than making a standard budget available. The UK is aspiring to increase the quota by 1000 per 
year when this becomes affordable. The present financial climate suggests that additional money for 
resettlement is unlikely to be available in the near future and the focus will need to be either: increased 
funding from Europe; or reducing the levels of support and accommodation to refugees in order to 
increase the numbers resettled within the existing budget.46
The adoption of the Joint EU resettlement Programme, in March 2012, was a positive step towards 
increasing the number of resettlement places made available by EU Member States. However, the 
resettlement capacity has not significantly increased in parallel with the expansion in the number of 
EU resettlement countries. Efforts by EU member states in resettlement are still limited particularly 
compared to the global resettlement needs as well as their potential capacity.  
  
A comparison of the two graphs/maps below proves that although the EU map of resettlement 
countries47 is expanding with more Member States committed to resettlement, the rate has not kept 
pace with the number of refugees resettled. If we refer to the data gathered by the Know Reset project 
in 201148
                                                     
44 Interview with the Swedish Justice Ministry.  
 (4,325 refugees) then the EU resettled 1,062 refugees less in that year than in 2010 (5,387 
resettled refugees). 
45 Interview with the RUMANIAN OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION, op.cit. 
46 Interview with Dave Atkinson, Refugee Team, London and South East Region, UK Border Agency 16/05/12. 
47 Know Reset Website 2013 <http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00001> 
48 Know Reset, Resettlement in the EU in 2011, 2013, <http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00689> 
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As a result, we can say that despite an increase in the number of countries resettling, Europe’s 
overall contribution to global resettlement remained approximately the same (7.9 % of the total 
number of refugees resettled in 2007 as compared to 2011 and 8.3 % in 2012).49






51 implement resettlement programmes, many with relatively small numbers. In 
December 2012, the Hungarian Government announced the establishment of an annual resettlement 
programme thus becoming one of the newest States in Europe to resettle, together with countries like 
Spain, Belgium, Germany and Bulgaria. New resettlement countries are initially able to offer only 
a very limited number of places, as they require time and resources to build their capacity to develop 
and implement their resettlement programmes. However, for resettlement to fulfil its function as a 
meaningful demonstration of solidarity with countries of first asylum and as a useful component of a 
comprehensive durable solutions strategy, resettlement numbers need to be more significant in 
comparison with the number of refugees waiting for resettlement in the country of first asylum. 
It is of paramount importance that Member States at least maintain their pledges. Hungary for 
example, considered the resettlement of a big family in 2012-2013 as a pilot programme but at the end 
resettled only one refugee.52 Likewise, in Bulgaria the difficult economic and political environment 
meant that the official launch and the implementation of the resettlement programme that had been 
approved since 2010, had to be postponed. 53
The graph below demonstrates clearly the share of resettlement within the EU for the last decade. It 





have with regard to the number of resettled refugees.  
                                                     
49 ICMC, ‘Welcome to Europe: A Guide to Resettlement’ 2013 
http://www.icmc.net/system/files/publication/welcome_to_europe_a_guide_to_resettlement_a_comp_64641.pdf 
50 Ibid.  
51 Know Reset, Formal Basis for Resettlement and Effective Resettlement in the EU Member States, <http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00700_20130812105725_final.pdf> June 2013 
52 Hungarian Country profile, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00155 
53 Anna Andreeva, Bulgarian State Agency for Refugess, Know Reset Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
54 Denmark , Finland, Netherlands and Sweden (Norway not included in here it is not part of the EU).  
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The decision to resettle a refugee from another country is taken by the government of the 
resettlement country. The resettlement country decides on the numbers of refugees it intends to 
resettle, on the nationalities of the refugees resettled, on the countries from which resettlement takes 
place and on specific categories of refugees it wants to resettle. Resettlement is generally carried out 
with the UNHCR acting an intermediary. 
While the general and basic decision “to resettle or not” seems to be quite straightforward, another 
question on how to set quotas still remains open: should the Member States apply a quota, a ceiling or 
a multi-year target for resettlement?  
Before going through the challenges as to why the available annual quotas are not fulfilled, it is 
important to emphasise the differences between the settings of levels as described below:  
A quota has an advantage as it gives a precise quantity for measuring the success or failure of 
resettlement programmes. A fixed quota system can also become a disadvantage either when it cannot 
be filled, or proves insufficient to the needs in reality. Similarly, a ceiling sets up an upper limit as 
well as expectations for the programme. European Members States do not currently apply a ceiling, 
but other countries like the US do.55
At present, resettlement programmes in Member States such as Denmark and the Netherlands are 
based on quotas planned on a multi-year basis. Additionally, recently, Germany has decided on a 3 
year-quota. Other resettlement programmes in Member States such as Finland, Sweden, the UK, 
Portugal and Ireland are set on an annual basis, but with fixed quotas, often fixed many years ago. 
France has had the same fixed quota since 2008. Finally, resettlement programmes in Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, and Spain, are based on a quota decided every year. For Hungary, the first "quota" 
was a test so there is no information on how that will be applied in the future. Furthermore, Bulgaria is 
 A target level has the advantages of flexibility and range, with 
less opportunity for any failure (in numbers) in the programme.  
                                                     
55 Joanne van Selm, Tamara Woroby, Erin Patrick and Monica Matts, Study on The Feasibility of setting up resettlement 
schemes in EU Member States or at EU Level, against the background of the Common European Asylum system and the 
goal of a Common Asylum Procedure, 2003 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/pdf/resettlement_study_full_2003_en_en.pdf, 
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a non-resettlement country but will participate in the joint EU Resettlement Programme by developing 
and implementing a small-scale (20 refugees) pilot resettlement programme in 2014.56
As stated in many country reports, the available specified numbers of resettlement places within a 
defined period are rarely fully filled in most of the countries. The numbers are set annually, and any 
places not filled are simply ‘lost’. This may seem to be a common feature yet the research shows that 
the motives differ from one country to another.  
 
Taking the traditional European resettlement countries, which have a long experience of 
resettlement, as examples, they made a quota of over 7,000 refugees available in total during the 




The graphs which also point out that in recent years (e.g. 2009-2011) the traditional resettlement 
Member States have kept more or less the same pace in resettling refugees. However, in some of the 
non-traditional Member States57
 
 there has been an significant decrease in numbers.  
                                                     
56 Declaration of the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, 24 March 2011.”Bulgaria – equal partner in 
the building of the Common European Programme on Resettlement of Refugees, confirmed the 23 and 24 March, 2011 in 
Sofia.” http://www.aref.government.bg/?cat=13&newsid=399 [accessed 14 November 2011]. Available only in 
Bulgarian.  
57 Non-traditional Member States included in this graph are Czech Republic, the UK, Ireland and Portugal. 
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The few examples examined below describe the challenges in filling the quotas. In Finland since 
2001, the quota has been fixed at 750 refugees per year. This quota has never been filled but the 
number of resettled refugees varies from year to year. Ireland is another example, which has fixed a 
resettlement quota of 200 persons per year, which was filled until the economic crisis began (in 2009 
Ireland resettled 192 refuges and during the last few years between 20 to 49 refugees have been 
resettled per year). 
Filling the quotas has also been a consistent problem in the UK, where the quota of 750 was 
achieved for the first time in 2011/2012, mainly because of budget issue. For Sweden unused quotas 
cannot be rolled over to the following year. The quota in Sweden is not always reached mainly 
because of logistical reasons. 
In addition to this Romania also committed to resettle a maximum of 120 refugees for the duration 
of the Programme (3 years), in annual quotas of 40 refugees, which it failed to fulfil. Only 38 refugees 
were resettled in the context of this provision, representing the quota due in 2009 and the programme 
was subsequently suspended. Resettlement was fully funded by the ERF.58 The quotas due for 2008 
and 2010 have not been fulfilled due to the delayed approval of Government Decision no. 1596/2009 
on the resettlement of refugees in Romania, as well as due to the economic and social situation 
resulting from the global economic crisis.59
The exceptions to this are found in Denmark that has a three-year programme quota (1500 
refugees /3 years) and the Netherlands, which has four- year programme quotas (2000 refugees /4 
years). 
  
In the case of the Czech Republic, the system is based on annual quotas and was chosen due to its 
flexibility as it could be changed each year according to the current situation. Between the years 2008 
– 2010, on the basis of the National Resettlement Strategy, 81 Burmese refugees from Malaysia and 
Thailand were resettled; in 2008 9 families were resettled and in 2010 it was 8 families. In 2011 no 
                                                     
58 Interview with the Romanian Office for Immigration (ROI), 23 January 2012. 
59 Ibid.  
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resettlement activities were implemented, in the same year the Ministry of Interior committed to 
resettle- under the Czech ERF annual programme for 2012- 40 persons in 2012. 60
Challenges were also identified in Spain. Despite the willingness to resettle, especially after the 
formal approval of the resettlement programme (2010-2011) in the Council of Ministers, Spain failed 
to carry out any resettlement until 17 July 2012, when Spain resettled 80 refugees following the 
UNHCR Global Resettlement Solidarity Initiative in 2011.
  
61
As mentioned earlier Hungary could not maintain its pledge to resettle one big family and in the 
end resettled only one refugee.  
 
It is also worth briefly mentioning the added value of the past ad hoc programmes that offered 
resettlement to many refugees in need. As many of Member States have moved away from ad hoc 
resettlement to annual/programme-based resettlement, they will not be examined under this 
section.  
The information above and the Know Reset country profiles clearly demonstrate that that 
difference in the numbers of resettled refuges and the “loss” in the quotas can be attributed to a 
number of factors such as reception capacities, socio economic situation, financial means etc. The case 
of Finland deserves particular attention. According to the Finnish authorities, “this is mainly due to the 
lack suitable candidates proposed by UNHCR and the lack of flexibility in changing allocation 
decisions to include candidates from other regions. Since the Finnish Government policy regarding 
selection is explicitly based on humanitarian criteria and not on integration perspectives, it is unclear 
why the set of quota cannot be fulfilled. It may also be linked to the reluctance of the municipalities to 
resettle refugees and the fact that they do not get enough compensation from the state for the 
integration services they provide. The municipalities may also refuse to resettle refugees with special 
needs (medical or other) on the grounds that they are unable to provide adequate services due to a 
lack of resources. There have also been complaints from resettling municipalities that the information 
provided by UNHCR on submitted cases with special needs has been insufficient and, at times, not 
updated. This can lead to expectations of refugees and those of the receiving staff being very different 
and can in turn negatively impact upon the integration process. Some municipalities may also feel 
uncomfortable in resettling refugees with a different skin colour due to negative attitudes locally, both 
among the population and the policy makers. It is important to point out that the Finnish 
municipalities are very independent from the central state and cannot be forced to resettle against 
their will. The decision to resettle is taken through a political process in the municipalities.”62
In the case of Ireland, the resettlement of refugees for the year 2012 has taken place and official 
figures will be released at the end of the year. The reason for the failure to meet the quota in recent 
years has been put down to Ireland’s current economic difficulties. Thus the quota of 200 persons is in 
name only at present, with annual quotas being fixed on a year -by -year basis: for example a quota of 
50 persons was fixed in 2010 (with 5 places reserved for medical cases).
 
63
Furthermore, it is equally important to note that the statistics provided in the above graphs are 
related to the number of refuges already resettled in the host Member States and are not the numbers 
referred to in their pledges or the settled annual quotas. As we shall see, there is a disparity in 
  
                                                     
60 Know Reset, Czech country report, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00148 
61 Know Reset, Spanish country Report, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00168 
62 Know Reset, Finish Country Report, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00151  
    Collated information from the interviews with stakeholders. Ann-Charlotte Sirén-Borrego, (ECRE ) Qualitative National 
report for Finland , May 2012 
 
63 Know Reset, Irish Country Report 2013, http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00164_20130705130333_knowresetcountryprofileireland.pdf>  
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numbers between the established annual quota and the number of refugees effectively resettled 
in each Member States.  
In some Member States, a roll-over of unfilled places can occur. Some other states count the 
number of people selected in a year, regardless of the precise moment of their travel; others count 
people who arrive during a given year, and others the quota committed. For example in Sweden, 
another reason for not reaching the quota is that Sweden counts refugees that actually arrived in 
Sweden as fulfilled quota, not those who were selected but not transferred (because of conflict etc.)64
However, despite the fact that the total number of resettled refuges per year is a “drop in the 
ocean” in view of global resettlement needs, we should not forget that it offers a chance for a new 
beginning for every resettled refugee.  
 
For this reason, the statistics used in this project highlight to some extent the difficulty in comparing 
data. There is a disparity in the yearly figures provided by UNHCR and Know Reset due to this 
difference in counting. Comparing the figures for the year 2010, provided by UNHCR and Know 
Reset project, we see that there is a difference in the number of resettled refugees of 382. UNHCR 
data says that in 2010 4 707 refugees were resettled instead of 4.325 which is the figure provided by 
Know Reset. Therefore, the way the number of resettled refugees is calculated is crucial as it impacts 
what we actually know concerning the total number of refugees resettled. This also impacts the 
judgements made to increase numbers or not of resettled refugees each year.  
If Member States decide to have a common system of level setting for an EU programme, it is 
suggested that they establish a collective target range and a bidding process allowing them to 
determine their own target within the collective target. 
Planning for total arrivals would be useful, particularly if the total number of arrivals might be 
high. Allowing flexibility in distribution of places would be advantageous.  
The following Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of a comparative overview from the 
Know Reset Country Profile data. 
• The research indicates that the existing quotas should be used as baseline figures not as a 
ceiling.  
• Multiyear planning (e.g. three years) should be implemented in terms of numbers (flexible 
quota) and also in terms of priorities. This would give more certainty to UNHCR, local 
authorities and NGOs and enable them to plan their integration efforts more effectively. If 
substantial changes take place in terms of the refugee groups most in need of resettlement, 
the plans could be altered during the period. This would also mean a better allocation of 
funds for different projects run by NGOs. 
• By introducing a multi-year quota, the yearly national and international bureaucratic 
decision- making process could be avoided and resources could thus be better directed into 
planning, developing and implementing the scheme. However, for some Member States, 
especially the smallest and the poorest countries, multi-year budgeting is not yet an existing 
option due to the economic crises.  
• Governments need to secure their annual or multiyear targets of the resettlement quota. 
Establishing the quota and maintaining them. This is especially important in a few new 
Member States engaging in resettlement. For some it might be necessary to conduct an 
evaluation of their resettlement programmes and its different stages to find out the reasons 
for the backlog. Questions such as the following should be taken into consideration: Is it a 
lack of resources? Could the cooperation and coordination between the different 
stakeholders, both national and international, be improved? What other steps could be taken?  
 
                                                     
64 Interview with Mr. Oskar Ekblad (OE) Migration Board, the Unit for Asylum Procedures 
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B. Capacity in terms of methods and tools 
Not being able to fulfil the quotas is linked to the selection methods and selection process. 
As clearly described in the EU comparative legal report “Refugee Resettlement in the EU between 
Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames” 65
Most of the countries view resettlement generally as a tool of international protection for individual 
refugees. The selection criteria/goals are very broad and vary from country to country, but are in 
essence to support UNHCR in providing humanitarian protection for vulnerable refugees. This was 
also the case with the recent approval of JEURP harmonized specific EU resettlement priorities, 
specifying the nationalities of refugees and the countries from which resettlement should take place as 
a priority, and for whom EU funding is available. The new Member States engaging in resettlement- 
along with the more experienced - responded to those priorities and especially to the EU call to resettle 
refugee from the Shousha camp in Tunisia.  
 the decision to resettle a refugee from 
another country is taken by the government of the resettlement country. The legal and political nature 
of this decision is discussed further in the aforementioned report where it usefully reminds us that: the 
resettlement selection decision is in itself administrative in nature and is discretionary.  
While incorporating UNHCR resettlement criteria and case submission as the basis of the selection 
process, some governments shy away from receiving refugees that they think might have less 
integration potential or may require more financial and public services support66. This “integration 
potential” concept has been the subject of much debate among stakeholders in resettlement and 
especially in the Member States in which this criteria it is still present in national legislation. Several 
countries find integration ‘potential’ to be important, though none has a real measure for it. In this 
view, it is worth highlighting the few cases of the application of the ‘integration potential’. In the 
Netherlands for example, the integration potential, viewed as the willingness and ability to integrate 
into Dutch society, has played a role in selecting refugees for resettlement since 2005.67 In the Czech 
Republic, some integration aspects are also taken into consideration such as: the willingness of the 
refugee in question to be resettled to the Czech Republic and the willingness to integrate into the 
Czech Republic.68 For Finland the refugee’s motivation to integrate is seen as an important factor too. 
However, the Danish Government has recently committed to remove the integration criteria69
Despite the fact that the over-riding selection goals are based on UNCHR recommendations/criteria 
and EU priorities, any additional selection criteria adopted by Member States remain an equally 
important factor in implementing both ad hoc resettlement and resettlement programmes. A few 
examples from the country profiles can be taken to illustrate the above statement. The Belgium 
national report states that until now the number of selected refugees for resettlement was a political 
choice and was dependant on a number of factors, including reception conditions. The decisions 
regarding the target groups to be resettled were also based on Belgium Foreign Policy as well as to the 
 and 
Romania recently abolished the “integration potential” criteria. The ‘Integration potential’ can be 
problematic in determining who should be resettled, as there is no clear way of measuring integration 
potential or ensuring it is not discriminatory. 
                                                     
65 Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames, Delphine Perrin & 
Frank McNamara (EUI) http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00013 
66 International Catholic Migration Commission (2008), ‘Welcome to Europe: A Guide to Resettlement’ 
http://www.icmc.net/system/files/publication/welcome_to_europe_a_guide_to_resettlement_a_comp_64641.pdf 
67 Know Reset, Netherlands Quantitative report.  
68 Know Reset, Czech Country Profile, 2013 http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00148 
69 Know Reset, Danish Country Profile 2013, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00149 
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availability of EU funds”.70 For the Czech Republic’s foreign policy, Burma is among the priority 
countries. Since the approval of its national resettlement programme the Czech Republic has resettled 
only Burmese refugees from Malaysia and Thailand. Likewise, the Governments of the Nordic 
countries meet in matters of overall policy for regular consultations within the framework of the 
Nordic Council for Refugee Affairs (NSHF). Sweden does not set clear priorities for resettlement 
selection, though in practice priority might be given to candidates with close family already residing in 
Sweden. Another example is Finland in which a major goal in selecting refugees is the development of 
communities within Finland, leading to a focus on particular ethnic groups, nationalities or refugee 
situations over several years. It has also to be noted that the Finnish resettlement program is part of 
Finland’s humanitarian foreign policy and Finland remain a traditional UN country.71
Based on the aforementioned information, in general, we can conclude that certain countries have 
established their own additional criteria that are taken into account; this includes aspects of their 
country specific asylum policy and foreign policy, the reception capacity and integration services that 
are available. Lastly, it is interesting to see that in some member states security issues are also applied 
as criteria in resettlement procedures. As an example the Finnish Security Intelligence Service as an 
operative police authority responsible for national security issues, is now part of, amongst other state 




Different member states apply also a sub-system of quota places reserved for medical cases and 
urgent cases. For example Denmark has 75 places for dossier submissions, which can be either urgent 
or emergency priority cases.  
. Additionally, security issues are also present in Sweden where bottlenecks occur for not 
reaching the quotas. As mentioned by Oskar Ekblad (OE), now resettlement from Syria is completely 
blocked; Kenya is also considered as a critical area since end-2011; recently protest movements in 
Thailand impeded transfer of quota refugees. 
Selection methods and its impact at national level on quotas 
The vast majority of the countries use a dossier–based (on file only with no face-to-face interview) 
decision process and/ or a personal interview carried out during a selection mission in the country of 
asylum. In addition to selection missions, the face-to-face interview can take first place locally with 
the immigration officers based in their respective embassies.  
In summary, most of countries in Europe choose refugees by using both methods although 
preference is given to selection missions. The exceptions are France and Portugal, whose decision-
making is based only upon dossier review. In the case of Portugal, the selection process on a dossier or 
mission basis is not specifically provided for in Portuguese legislation. Portugal has been carrying out 
resettlement decisions only on a dossier review basis.73 In France the Asylum Service of the Ministry 
of International Affairs takes the decision on individual cases after consulting every year with 
UNHCR. From the interviews with stakeholders it was shown that France refuses half of the dossiers 
submitted. 74
In the case of Finland, a limited number of cases are accepted through dossier submissions, while 
the remaining quota refugees are selected during interview missions, conducted in each location. As an 
 
                                                     
70 Know Reset, Belgian Country Profile 2013, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00145 
71 Interview with Arja Kekkonen, Negotiating Officer, Finish Ministry of the Interior, Migration Department Unit, 
International Protection Unit. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Know Reset, Portuguese Country Profile 2013,  
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00163_20130705130237_knowresetcountryprofileportugal.pdf 
74 Matthieu Tardis, France Terre d’Asile, 31 May 2013. 
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exception to normal procedures, in emergency and urgent cases, refugees are admitted to Finland 
without a personal interview on the basis of a written statement by UNHCR. In Sweden, in contrast to 
other resettlement countries, a small majority of the quota is selected through dossier selection. 
From the review of existing resettlement programmes we can make the following conclusions:  
• Selection missions are considered important in the resettlement selection process as it had 
proven difficult to fulfil the quota solely through dossier selection. A large number of 
rejections are based on the lack of information provided by UNHCR in the dossiers. This was 
the case in the Netherlands where the selection missions were temporarily suspended from 
1999 onwards and resumed in 2005. Now Governments have a more a proactive approach to 
this, by making use of the selection missions, as they are considered to enhance the gathering 
of relevant information for a large group at once, as well as on their region of origin.  
• One disadvantage can be that these selection (interview) missions might only be possible in 
one or two locations and only a few times in a year. For example, countries like NL, FI and 
SE usually undertake 4 to 5 selection missions each year.  
• The dossier based selection can be quick, and (in theory) relatively inexpensive, as no travel is 
involved for selectors or for refugees. As explained above, relying solely on the UNHCR 
submitted dossiers can lead to rejection not only due to the lack of information, but also as the 
selection officers do not become acquainted with the situation in regions of origin. The challenge 
for dossier selection is that the information provided should be precise and up-to-date so that the 
municipality of resettlement is able to organize adequate reception arrangements. 
• Video conferencing: Recently some resettlement countries have begun to explore the 
possibility of using video-conferencing to conduct selection interviews when access to 
refugees is complicated or impossible. By removing the need to travel to a specific refugee 
situation and organising the practical aspects of a selection mission, video conferencing may 
significantly reduce the human and financial resources required for selection interviews.75 
However, the “Welcome to Europe” report indicates that conducting interviews via video 
conferencing present new challenges such as: not being euqippe with the right technical 
equipment, refugees unfamiliar with this type of technology.76In addition to this, video 
conferencing is considered not such an appropriate method for sensitive cases77
In the UK, all applicants are interviewed by UK Home Office officials (in the UK Border 
Agency, UKBA) based on the UNHCR submissions. Where there is a pressing need for the 
resettlement of a particular group and where it may not be appropriate for the UKBA staff to 
travel to a host country to carry out the selection mission, the UKBA can conduct dossier 
selections. Dossiers can be prepared containing details of cases which UKBA can accept 
without conducting a resettlement interview. In future, some interviews may be conducted 
using remote video conferencing facilities.
.  
78 The UK has begun to explore the possibility of 
using video-conferencing to conduct selection interviews when access to refugees is 
complicated or impossible. Moreover, selection interviews through video conferencing (in 
theory) could be less expensive.79
 
 
                                                     
75 International Catholic Migration Commission, ‘Welcome to Europe: A Guide to Resettlement’ 2013  
http://www.icmc.net/system/files/publication/welcome_to_europe_a_guide_to_resettlement_a_comp_64641.pdf 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid. 
78Know Reset UK Country Profile2013, http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00170_20130919160801_knowresetcountryprofileunitedkingdom.pdf 
79 Know Reset, Uk country Report, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00170 
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While considering the methods used, it should be also noted that although a number of very 
important steps have been taken over recent years and the elements of the Joint Resettlement 
Programme are now in place, the current lack of joint activities and practical cooperation between 
Member States increases the financial costs of resettlement in each country. A costly initial 
infrastructure for resettlement was cited as a constraint for several Member states to engage in 
resettlement. The latter has impacted upon the decisions of Member States like Portugal or Czech 
Republic to introduce small resettlement quotas. Some of the activities like selection missions for 
example, could be carried out jointly by, or in close cooperation with other Member States. The 
example of the Netherlands is crucial to this process. The Netherlands has conducted a number of joint 
missions in the past, assisting in the momentum leading up to the JEURP. These have taken place with 
Czech Republic (2007) Belgium, Luxembourg, and Romania (2008), as well as Bulgaria and Slovakia 
(2009). This gave those Member States the opportunity to learn and observe how to conduct 
resettlement, and what is needed in order to carry out resettlement, including the use of quotas and the 
importance of reception conditions.80
As described above, selection missions are usually carried out by government officials, often from 
the Ministry of Interior or Home Affairs. Participation of civil society and municipalities is still very 
limited in the selection of refugees for resettlement.
 
81
The following Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of a comparative overview from the 
Know Reset Country Profile data. 
 It is increasingly apparent that other actors 
should be involved, in order to ensure that the information gathered about refugees can be of benefit 
to the preparations for reception, before arrival in the resettlement country.  
• The effectiveness of quota fulfilment can be improved by strategically planning the whole 
process of resettlement (as all the actors involved have to know exactly what to do in 
specific situations that occur). More specifically, this could include:  
At EU level: 
• Twinning projects with experienced countries and new/potential resettlement countries 
• The EU should coordinate member states resettlement programmes when it comes to the 
priorities and the selection process 
• “Twinning arrangements” between EU Member States would continue to allow for sharing 
lessons learned from many years of experience. Practical cooperation in resettlement should 
continue to be promoted by the European authorities. For example new resettlement Member 
States would learn from traditional resettlement countries and could advise other European 
countries that are starting resettlement programmes. At the same time, NGOs and UNCHR 
should not address resettlement issues without taking into consideration national policies 
towards asylum seekers.  
• The EU should do more to stimulate national governments to focus on the integration issues 
of resettlement rather than on its selection process and criteria. 
                                                     
80 Know Reset, Netherlands Country Profile, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00161 
81 See Chapter B “Capacity in terms of actors”.   
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C. Capacity in terms of actors   
Although national governments are responsible for the selection of refugees in carrying out pre-
departure activities, regional and local authorities and NGOs play an important role in the post–arrival 
stage, primarily in offering reception and integration support once refugees have arrived.  
Every resettlement programme involves a variety of stakeholders. The quality of refugee 
resettlement relies also, amongst other things, on the capacity for Member States to address the needs 
and concerns of the stakeholders in the process: UNHCR, IOM, NGOs, Local Authorities, 
Government Ministries, and finally Refugees themselves. This section will assess the level of 
cooperation between these actors, the services they provide and the extent of their involvement on the 
effectiveness of resettlement.  
The Know-Reset findings have shown that collaboration between stakeholders varies at different 
stages (pre-arrival and post arrival) of the Resettlement process. In most of the Member States the 
government body responsible for the pre-arrival phase (selection of refugees and their transfer) is not 
responsible for the post arrival phase (including here reception and integration). In the Pre-arrival 
phase (i) refugee resettlement primarily involves UNHCR, IOM and the various ministries of the 
Member State, whilst in the post-arrival phase (ii) resettlement involves local actors such as 
Municipalities/Local Authorities, NGOs and in some occasions82
Before discussing the actors involved in the two phases of resettlement (pre-arrival and post-
arrival), it is worth mentioning the partnership mechanism of the resettlement process called the 
Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR). This is held by UNHCR and brings together 
States, NGOs and UNHCR to discuss global refugee resettlement planning. It provides the opportunity 
to raise awareness among states
 Refugee Community Organisations 
(RCOs).  
83 regarding resettlement, and gives a space for all three stakeholders 
to work together and interact. UNHCR has also encouraged the “twinning” of establishment and 
emerging resettlement states to develop and strengthen resettlement and integration programmes. 
Twinning in the context of resettlement can be described as any partnership activity between states, 
NGOs, services providing organizations, international organizations and./or UNHCR which aims to 
encourage a new(er) resettlement state to develop or strengthen its resettlement programme. Twinning 
partnerships have ranged widely in their focus and duration, and while most are funded by states, some 
have attracted external funding, including EU support, for example under the ERF. 84
It is also worth briefly mentioning the emerging role of the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO), which will be fully explored in the last section. Currently assessing its role in the 
resettlement process, it has been suggested that EASO could contribute by establishing criteria for 
quality resettlement. Its exact role is not clear among the stakeholders interviewed, however, 
suggestions include providing and maintaining a space and coordination for the tripartite character 
(NGOs, UNHCR, and governments)
 
85 described above. Some Eastern states would welcome the 
organisational and logistical support of EASO86 but at this time EASO is seen as not having enough 
presence in the area of resettlement.87
                                                     
82 For example, in the Czech Republic these include the Association of Citizens Assisting Emigrants and the Burma Centre 
Prague. 
  
83 International Catholic Migration Commission, ‘Welcome to Europe: A Guide to Resettlement’ 2013 
http://www.icmc.net/system/files/publication/welcome_to_europe_a_guide_to_resettlement_a_comp_64641.pdf 
84 European Parliament, Comparative Study on the best practices for the integration of resettled refugees in the EU Member 
States, 2012. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Know Reset 2013, Czech Republic Country Profile 2013.  
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(i) Pre-arrival Phase 
The main actors in the pre-arrival phase in all cases are UNHCR and the Member State ministry 
dealing with resettlement, which is mainly the Home Affairs department also known as the Ministry of 
the Interior (MoI). For example the Swedish Migration Board acts on behalf of the Swedish 
government and works in close cooperation with UNHCR to draw up guidelines for the resettlement 
programme. In this case, and most others, trained members of staff are needed. This is also the case in 
Portugal where the national reports show that better national capacity would be needed to conduct pre-
arrival planning.88
Working with the national governmental administration are international organisations, notably 
UNHCR and IOM who play important roles in the pre-arrival stages. UNHCR
 For Portugal and in most other cases, this requires a firmer and more structured 
commitment on the part of all relevant public authorities and Ministries – not just the Ministry of 
Interior but also the Ministry of Economy and Employment/Institute of Employment, and the Ministry 
of Education, as there has to be a structured and coherent policy at all levels of administration. 
89 collaborates with the 
governmental ministries during the selection process90
An exception to this is in Denmark where the Danish Refugee Council, an international NGO, 
works closely with the government to select refugees, which are ultimately decided by the governing 
body within the ministry. 
 whilst in most occasions IOM provides medical 
screening and arranges travel documentation. Rarely are NGOs or Local Authorities involved in these 
early stages. 
In most cases the findings have shown willingness for NGOs and Local Authorities to be more 
involved at this stage of the resettlement process. In addition to this, there should be a level of 
collaboration between all actors and pooling their expertise would allow for better identification of the 
integration needs of the groups to be resettled. 
Collaboration was also a key concern for NGOs in the UK, which suggests that collaborating with 
Local Authorities is important particularly in the planning of support for refugee arrival. In addition to 
this, much like Denmark, their inclusion in the pre-arrival phase would be welcome, as they are 
currently only involved at the post arrival phase (see below). In Germany meetings at the local level 
are attempted but this is limited, and collaboration is often unequal. An example of collaboration can 
be found in Belgium, which runs stakeholder meetings three times a year allowing for evaluation and 
planning. Local Authorities and municipalities are however, still not involved to the fullest.  
A rare example of Local Authorities or municipalities being involved in the pre-arrival phase is 
Finland where, in the recent years, they are involved in the selection missions. By including 
municipalities in the selection mission, Finland hopes to resolve some difficulties at the local level, 
such as integration into society.91




Hungary Country Profile http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00155_20130729172455_knowresetcountryprofilehungary.pdf, 
Finland Country Profile  http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00151_20130705130136_knowresetcountryprofilefinland.pdf 
87 Know Reset, Spain Country Profile 2013,  
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00168_20130705130432_knowresetcountryprofilespain.pdf 
88 Portugal quantitative and qualitative reports, João Côrte Real Vasconcelos (ECRE).  
89 In the case of non-resettlement countries who have had some experience in resettlement (Austria, Luxemburg, Poland), 
only Austria and has had no relationship with UNHCR regarding resettlement. From the resettling countries, Hungary has 
not had a relationship with UNHCR. 
90 This is not the extent to which UNHCR plays a role. They will have negotiated with the member states previously, and 
worked with them in an advisory role to ensure resettlement can take place. These include meetings such as the ATCR. 
91 Finish country profile.  
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Similarly, Cultural Orientation (CO) in the pre-arrival phase is a crucial aspect of refugee 
integration; it assists in the expectation of refugees and has potential for local actors to meet refugees 
before they arrive in the territory. In this instance, Local Authorities or local NGOs would be well 
placed to provide this, as in many cases they deal with the integration of the resettled refugees in the 
post arrival phase. Despite this added benefit, CO is hardly present in the pre-arrival phase of 
resettlement. Where it does appear it is often conducted by IOM in the case of Finland, France,92
As with the above, refugees themselves in this phase play no active role, and are passive recipients 
to the decisions of Member States. Member States decide who are settled and where they can resettle. 
Being aware of the new host country before arrival is crucial for the refugee. The Netherlands 
conducts integration interviews to ensure that refugees will align with Dutch society. This however 
should not replace the role of actors in the preparation of refugees for resettlement. Knowledge of the 
local surroundings would also be beneficial and require delivery from local actors not necessarily 
government or international organisations. On the whole, cultural orientation and integration 
screenings can be a tool for refugees also, to avoid misinformation or high expectations. This relies on 
resources at the local level, as well as at the national level. This is not always possible, as in Hungary 
where the stakeholders cannot see the possibility for NGOs to be involved at all in any stage due to 
political and economic reasons.  
 
Spain. In the case of Finland the arrangement with IOM was established in 2001 and ran until the 
termination of the contract in 2010. The orientation was not arranged in 2011 and the contract for 2012 
is currently being negotiated.  
There is a need for a certain level of expertise to conduct effective preparation in the pre-arrival 
phase, which requires training and time. Czech NGOs for example, state that the governmental group 
charged with conducting resettlement is only composed of representatives from ministries and does 
not include other stakeholders who also have expertise in resettlement, affecting the quality of the 
decision–making. For the Czech Republic, as with all Member States that resettle, there is room for 
improvement in the pre-departure activities in particular the selection of people in need of resettlement 
and the quality of information for the host country provided to those people. Consequently, there is 
only a little knowledge about the pre-arrival activities among the stakeholders interviewed.  
Many aspects of the resettlement processes should be addressed by Member States, starting with a 
proper and strategic planning of activities, deep coordination of all stakeholders involved and a 
stronger involvement of NGOs, local groups and Local Authorities. Moreover, the current 
development at the EU level offers some instruments including financial incentives, which would help 
to use resettlement in a more strategic way, which will be discussed in the section C. “Capacity in 
terms of funding”. This is particularly the case in the Czech Republic, but can be said for many if not 
all of the resettling countries.  
(ii) Post Arrival Phase 
In the post-arrival phase, NGOs and Local Authorities emerge as main players, providing essential 
services, as well as ensuring refugee integration.93
NGOs in Spain for example have a very active role once the refugee arrives in the territory: CO and 
integration sessions are carried out, and municipalities are involved once refugees have been 
 The roles and functions of Municipalities and 
NGOs vary from country to country. They usually have different and complementary roles in the 
reception and integration process. During this process it is essential that they are provided with 
relevant information on the refugee’s backgrounds and needs. 
                                                     
92 Pre/Post Arrival Table: Know Reset, http://www.knowreset.eu/files/texts/00717_20131106153806_countrycomparison-
preandpostdeparture.pdf 
93 For more details please read each country profile section « Rights granted ». 
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welcomed into the reception centres. In most Member States, CO is often conducted in reception 
centres, where refugees are placed as soon as they enter the territory. CO in the post-arrival phase is 
considered equally important as the one in pre-arrival as it is the first step in the integration process. 
Most of the Member States provides CO in the post-arrival phase but they apply their own model. 
Due to diversity in the numerous models applied for the CO in European Resettlement countries 
the body delivering CO also varies: from Government to municipalities, NGOs, and in a few cases 
IOM. On occasion previous resettled refugees have also been involved in cultural orientation for 
example in Berlin, the Iraqi cultural association ‘El Rafedein’ was officially incorporated into the 
integration process of newly arrived resettled Iraqis. Refugees already established in Belgium were 
invited for knowledge-sharing during cultural orientation, in addition to representatives from external 
organizations/institutions. Another example is the Burma Centre in the Czech Republic. 
Similarly, refugee communities generally do not have much of a role in the Netherlands. Their 
involvement in resettlement is quite limited but a number of communities were mentioned as being 
involved in providing support to resettled refugees, in particular to the Bhutanese Community. Further, 
IOM involves the Somali community in family reunion cases (mainly in the framework of a CO 
project targeting this specific caseload) and the Burmese community is actively involved supporting 
refugees on arrival.94
Likewise, in Denmark, especially the resettled refugees from Burma have organized themselves all 
over Denmark through the local churches and have established new churches, which is very important 
for their role in society. One of the stakeholders interviewed sees a clear connection between which 
groups are selected for resettlement and their prospects of integrating into Danish society. The Chin 
community from Burma and the Congolese refugees have, due to their cultural background, which is 
similar to the Danish, been able to integrate well. Also the Burmese refugees who fought for 
democracy at home feel more at ease in a democracy such as the Danish.
  
95
Preparing the receiving community for the arrival of refugees is another important part of 
resettlement process. Preparation of the local community is conducted by both municipalities and 
NGOs, as is the case for Finland. In other cases it is conducted by NGOs like in Portugal
  
96or by 
municipalities in the case of Denmark. In the Netherlands, this is mainly done by means of 
information provision through local media in advance of refugees’ arrival to a municipality. The 
Dutch Council for Refugees (together with the municipality) also informs the relevant stakeholders 
(like schools, family doctors, social services, etc).97 The case of Germany is also important to be 
mentioned: in some places a working group was established especially for Iraqi refugees at Länder and 
at local level with all crucial stakeholders (local state authorities and NGOs) involved. Here, all 
relevant information was shared and it proved to be very efficient. However, this was more the 
exception than the rule. It also depended on the Länder and on how fast they would transfer 
information to the local level. Information on special needs, e.g. housing or medical needs, was not 
always communicated.98
Similarly the training by local providers is very important too but even in this case it varies from 
country to country. In the case of Finland, training falls within the competence of different relevant 
ministries. Training is also organized by NGOs and associations such as: the Finnish Refugee Council, 
the Family Federation of Finland, the Finnish Red Cross, and the Finnish Association for Mental 
 
                                                     
94 Netherlands Quantitative Report. 
95 Interview with Hans Henrik Lund, Churches Integration Ministry (abbreviated KIT in Danish),  
96 As in the case for Portugal. Know Reset, Portugal Country Profile 2013, 
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00163_20130705130237_knowresetcountryprofileportugal.pdf 
97 The Netherlands Country Profile.  
98 Germany Country Profile.  
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Health. For the UK the current funding available for integration services is not sufficient to allow for 
the delivery of much training to local service providers. In addition, information received by NGOs 
about refugees before they arrive is not always sufficiently accurate and thorough to plan reception 
services that fully meet the needs.99
Likewise, responsibility for the resettled refugees once in the local setting is hard to identify as 
each Member State operates differently. Again, in the example of Finland, refugees are placed directly 
in the municipalities, rather than in a reception centre, leaving responsibility for the resettlement with 
the municipalities from the start. A similar case is found in Sweden where the municipality is fully 
responsible for refugee settlement and integration, and will prepare an individual introduction plan for 
each refugee in cooperation with the local employment office. 
  
In the Netherlands, placement of refugees has emerged as being not entirely satisfactory. This is 
partly a result of the government policy (the Housing Allocation Act) which obliges every municipality 
in the Netherlands to make part of their housing stock available each year for the accommodation of 
permit holders and the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) ’s housing 
arrangements for resettled refugees are determined by the municipal supply of available living 
accommodation. Resettled refugees are, therefore, placed in small towns and villages which can lack 
facilities to support integration. For example, there is no adequate public transport, individuals are far 
away from their family members, education and employment opportunities might be limited and also the 
opportunities to meet refugees’ mental health needs are limited. It was noted that there were some 
improvements with the new reception system. COA is now more flexible concerning the needs of 
refugees allowing them to be housed closer to their family members. Some progress has also been noted 
by University Assistance Fund (UAF) with regard to housing arrangements and the education needs of 
resettled refugees. Following developments in the new reception system, referrals to the UAF education 
and careers support services are now being made by COA in advance of refugees’ arrival and the scope 
of UAF in housing arrangements has been widened.100 A recent change has taken place in the Dutch 
resettlement policy, aimed at the direct placement of refugees in the municipalities. New changes in the 
policy in the short term are not expected.101
Likewise, the lack of planning and the lack of any specific reception and integration scheme are seen 
as a crucial issue in France. Agencies and NGOs in France who are working on reception and integration 
need better information about resettlement and the profiles and needs of resettlement refugees in order to 
organize the reception conditions accordingly, especially for medical cases. So far, NGOs have received 
this information at the very last minute and there have been quite dramatic situations in many cases as a 
result when refugees have needed serious and urgent treatment upon arrival.  
  
Upon arrival, housing and access to French language have been identified as the main problems by 
the refugees themselves. Indeed, the lack of planning by the authorities has an impact on the 
reception conditions. France believed that its reception and asylum system was good enough for 
resettled refugees and the government did not even consider the possibility to design a specific 
reception system for them. Obviously, this was not the case and it created unfairness within the 
national reception system.102
Education and language learning programmes for resettled refugees is another important pillar of 
the integration processes. Language courses are run by municipalities or/and other contractors, NGOs 
and volunteers in most countries. For example in NL, UAF cooperates with municipalities with regard 
to negotiating joint arrangement for refugees’ education pathways. However, many Member States fail 
  
                                                     
99 UK Country Profile 
100 Ariane Den Uyl (ECRE) National Report, February 2012 
101 Interview with Janneke van Etten, Senior Policy Officer at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Migration 
Policy Department, Asylum, Reception and Return, 
102 Matthieu Tardis,( ECRE) national quantitative national report, April 2012 
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to provide adequate translator services and/ or language classes as they face many challenges. 
Amongst these challenges the lack of capacity of human resources and the failure of the service 
providers103 remains quite similar factor in most European resettlement countries. There is a need for 
more funding and training to deliver language classes, as seen in the UK, where there is a clear gap in 
the national resettlement programme. As integration is seen as a two-way process in the European 
Union,104
The lack of interest of the French authorities in resettlement has been remarkable. Interestingly, in 
France some civil society actors are also reluctant to participate in resettlement operations, which can 
be attributed to a particular ideological and political logic. Indeed, several NGOs working for the 
promotion of immigrants’ rights do not participate in such operations in principle on the grounds that 
they see them as “downgrading” refugee law. Resettlement is viewed as a way to circumvent France’s 
international responsibility and as such may constitute a tool for ‘externalising’ its immigration policy, 
by creating a double process of refugee selection.
 both the refugees and the Member States need to be prepared. 
105
In general, as with the pre-arrival phase, different stakeholders involved in resettlement process need 
specific training in resettlement as a necessary tool to better understand resettlement. In some 
cases problems occurred when staff members of the municipalities and/or immigration authorities were 
uninformed or insufficiently informed about the arrival of resettled persons and/or the legal status of the 
refugees. Sometimes there was no clear division of tasks between involved services, authorities and 
institutions. In addition to this, training for public sector staff on the local level is needed especially when 
a municipally is starting resettlement. The local actors need extensive training to improve, adapt and 
increase structures that are necessary to meet the challenges of a multicultural society.
 
106
Cooperation with different stakeholders is essential, as there are many facets associated with 
successful integration, providing housing, medical care, employment, and training. Each of these 
aspects can often be the responsibility of different actors, NGOs, Local Authorities or State level 
officials. This cooperation varies greatly throughout the Member States. For example, in Finland, 
Denmark and the Czech Republic, the cooperation between municipalities and NGOs is viewed as 
being successful, however in Belgium for example, NGOs and State level cooperation appears to work 
well, with the exception of the local municipalities. For all resettlement member states, ensuring better 
cooperation amongst the central government, local authorities, NGOs and refugees involved in 
resettlement will only improve the process of refugee integration. 
  
In some Member States, there is an absence of a government led coordination structures 
involving all relevant stakeholders (Government, Municipalities, UNHCR, IOM, NGOs, refugees) 
offering on-going policy and operational guidance that impacts on the overall consistency and quality 
of the reception and integration system. In addition to this, collaboration between state authorities 
and NGOs differs from place to place.  
Furthermore, in a few Member States carrying out resettlement, civil society has no influence on 
the selection of the overall groups to be resettled, and often lacks basic  information about the 
government’s and the Ministry’s decisions and activities regarding resettlement. Whereas, especially 
in the Member States new to resettlement, there is limited involvement of municipalities in core 
reception and integration services such as accommodation, language training, and professional 
training or job placement/provision.  
                                                     
103 Other factors, could capacity in time, lack of funding, place of residing etc. 
104 See European Union Common Basic Principles, Principle No.1 http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/EU_actions_integration.cfm  
105 Interview of Matthieu Tardis with Claire Rodier. On the position of GISTI, see especially: La réinstallation des réfugiés, 
instrument européen de l’externalisation des procédures d’asile, Note de travail, November 2005, available at: 
http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/nt_reinstallation-des-refugies_2005.pdf 
106 Finland country profile , http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00151_20130705130136_knowresetcountryprofilefinland.pdf 
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Translators are not often available and authorities in general do not cover expenses for 
translation. In addition to this, volunteers, especially native speakers, were found to be overburdened 
by the great need of complex and time-consuming accompanying and counselling assistance 
The following Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of a comparative overview from the 
Know Reset Country Profile data. 
• There needs to be more collaboration between state authorities and other stakeholders 
throughout the resettlement process. This could include sharing good practices and 
experiences from other EU countries; In addition to this, the cooperation between local 
authorities and NGOs providing integration assistance it is viewed as very important.  
• All relevant stakeholders should be provided with the necessary information about the 
refugees, and the responsibilities of different stakeholders should become regulated. 
UNHCR Dossiers could also be shared in advance with NGOS and Municipalities to plan 
integration measures. This will allow stakeholders to respond adequately to the needs of 
Refugees.  
• NGOs and Local Authorities need to be involved the pre-arrival phase, this could 
include the selection process or cultural orientation. NGOs and local authorities have a role 
to play in creating a welcoming society and States should value the expertise and 
experiences of NGOs to prepare the local communities to welcome refugees and to help in 
the process of integration. 
• Training for stakeholders is needed: this could be organised with topics such as: the 
resettlement procedure, competences of stakeholders, cultural background, specifics of 
providing assistance to resettled people, as well as resettlement and national procedures. 
• In the EU member States that have recently established resettlement programmes it has been 
suggested that there should be training prior to the start of the implementation of 
resettlement programmes; This must include twinning projects, sharing of good practices 
with more experienced countries; 
• Trainings could be organised for service providers in municipalities (communes) and public 
welfare office to explain resettlement and national procedures.  
• Cultural Orientation for resettled refugees is very important prior to departure, focusing on 
the host society and resettlement services provision. This will better manage people’s 
expectations and avoid prejudicial frustrations upon arrival. Cooperation with local 
authorities or local NGOs can ensure this. 
• Translation services for refugees and cultural training for all stakeholders dealing with 
refugees is important to ensure efficient integration. 
• Promotion of resettlement policy and practice within the society in order to receive as 
strong as possible support from the host society. 
• Resettled refugees could have a major role during the post-arrival phase in the facilitation 
of the resettlement process. 
D. Capacity in terms of funding 
In order to encourage resettlement financial incentives will continue to play an important role. 
Furthermore, funding remains crucial to any service delivery by including the costs incurred at all 
levels. Identifying sustainable funding has also an impact in programme planning and using the 
available resources as well as possible.  
The financing of resettlement remains still very complex. From several interviews with government 
and non-government officials and research, it can be concluded that there is a need to know the cost of 
refugee resettlement programme although, in reality, serious data limitations preclude a full 
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estimation of costs of resettlement activities. As a result it is not possible to make a meaningful cross-
country comparison but only to identify the current national and EU funds available in each member 
state. Due to the lack of possibilities to access the specific budget line in national public budgets, it 
was not possible to obtain the following data in each country:  
a) Cost related to pre – arrival activities,107
b) Cost related to post –arrival activities,
 including staff costs. 
108 including staff costs and the costs of integration 
and reception. 109
c) Fixed costs per refugee or fixed levels of compensation to local authorities. 
 
d) Other related costs impacting the whole resettlement process.110
The research indicates that although the refugee resettlement programmes should be essentially 
funded by Member States, many of them still rely mostly on the European Refugee Fund (ERF).
  
111
Amongst many other factors examined in this paper and which have contributed in creating the 
momentum for resettlement, the possibility to obtain funding for resettlement through the ERF has 
played an important role. In general, the ERF with a budget of 630 million for the period 2008-2013 
has supported EU countries to cover diverse activities related to resettlement, such as the selection of 
refugees as well as reception and integration programmes for resettled refugees.
 An 
exception to this is Denmark, which relies on its own national fund as it has opted out from ERF.  
112
ERF funding for resettlement is allocated through three channels:  
  
1) National Programmes- the major parts ERF funds are allocated to national programmes 
(where Member States include refugee resettlement in national ERF programmes113). An 
ERF contribution normally cannot exceed 50% of the total costs of the specific action.114
2) The ERF provides Member States with a lump sum of 4000 Euros for each resettled 
refugee.  
 
3) A small percentage of the ERF (amounting to 4% of available ERF resources) is centrally 
managed by the European Commission and is used to build knowledge, promote practical 
cooperation and political support for resettlement between Member States through the 
transnational projects mentioned earlier in pg.30. 
Some states finance their own structures and activities, while other Member States fund other 
actors (mainly from civil society). While going through each country profile, the research indicates 
that in most countries the budget covering resettlement activities is part of the general budget for 
                                                     
107 For more details refer to the country profiles section III 3 “Resettlement implementation”http://www.know-
reset.eu/?c=00003 
108 Ibid.  
109 Regional and municipal budgets need also to be examined.  
110 Joanne van Selm, Tamara Woroby, Erin Patrick and Monica Matts, Study on The Feasibility of setting up resettlement 
schemes in EU Member States or at EU Level, against the background of the Common European Asylum system and the 
goal of a Common Asylum Procedure. 2003 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/pdf/resettlement_study_full_2003_en_en.pdf, 
111 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l14567_en.htm 
112 For more information : The ERF for the period 2008-2013 established by Decision NO 573/2007/EC enables the 
financing and actions related to resettlement under the article 3(9) and 3(7). In addition article 13(3) provides for 
additional financial allocations of 4000 euros per refugee in case of the resettlement of certain vulnerable categories or 
persons from Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs).  
113 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/allocations_eu_state_for_each_fund_en.pdf 
114. Under specific conditions (for Cohesion Fund countries and actions falling within specific priorities), the EU co-
financing can reach 75 %. In each beneficiary State, the national authority responsible for the management of the Funds 
provides information on programme implementation, on the National Programmes and on the beneficiaries of the Fund. 
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migration and asylum. It is mixed with/ indistinguishable from the whole budget of the relevant 
department or institution in charge of migration and asylum. For example, the Dutch resettlement 
programme is financed from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior, including the funds that are 
available to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the Central Body for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers (COA).115The COA is granted a budget of €250.000 for all resettled refugees. In 
Sweden each year the Government allocates funds, in a separate budget line, to the resettlement of 
refugees.116 Due to this clear budget line it was possible to gather some data regarding the cost per 
refugee, which may vary on the basis of refugee category.117
ERF funds are also “poured into this budget” and no data could be gathered if they are strictly used 
for resettled refugees. In addition to this, some programmes and projects have been directly financed 
through ERF and central governments. For example the Gateway Protection Programme is match 
funded by the UK government (the UK Border Agency) and the European Refugee Fund.
  
118 The 
project for support and reception of resettled refugees (run by Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen) in 
Belgium was similar: It cost 308.405,32 euros of which 154.193,43 were from the ERF.119 The 
contribution Finland currently receives from the European Refugee Fund is directed to the HAAPA 
project120 that supports the education of social and health personnel in municipalities. Money has been 
distributed to 11 municipalities.121
It is should be noted that the above-mentioned projects could not exist without the financial support 
of the ERF (national actions).  
 
While Member States like Netherland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark have a significant national 
budget to finance resettlement programmes, data shows that EU Member States that have recently 
established resettlement programmes will continue to rely heavily upon EU funds. In the case of 
Bulgaria and Portugal the national funds allocated for restatement activities represents 25 % of the 
national funds and 75% are from ERF contributions. 
Furthermore, no national budget is foreseen for resettlement in Belgium, which means that it will 
rely completely on what is available on EU funds.122 The same goes for Hungary: The Office of 
Immigration and Nationality does not plan to complement the ERF support by matching funds 
additional to the basic support provided to all refugees in the country.123
Though Resettlement in France is State-funded, the government is already applying for the 
dedicated funds available under the ERF.
 Resettlement to Romania is 
also funded only through ERF.  
124 However, there is no information about how this money is 
used bearing in mind that vulnerable refugees do not benefit from extra-services.125
                                                     
115 Interview with Janneke van Etten, Senior Policy Officer at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Migration 
Policy Department , Asylym, Reception and Return, NL, February 2012. 
 
116 Netherland country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00161 
117 Sweden country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00169 
118 Interview with UK Borders Agency, Dave Atkinson, Refugee Team (May 2012) 
119 Fedasil, Jaarverslag 2009 (Annual Report 2009), http://www.fedasil.be/home/attachment/i/19890, at pg.29  
120 http://www.resettlement.eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/files/Creating%20Welcoming%20Communities_HAAPA%20Finland.pdf 
121 Interview Arja Kekkonen, Negotiating Officer, Finish Ministry of the Interior, Migration Department Unit, (January 
2012)  
122 Interview with Claudia Bonamini Project Coordinator at Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen, March 2012. 
123 Hungary country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00155 
124 Moreover, 90 % of the EU relocation programme was funded by ERF.  
125 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, France terre d’asile, April 2012, National report, Matthieu Tardis, France terre d’asile 
( ECRE ) April 2012, France country profile, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00152 
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Likewise, Bulgaria is carrying out its first resettlement activities in 2013, which also include the 
development of administrative capacity. These should/are to be fully funded by the 2012 annual 
programme of the ERF and by the state budget. In the course of the research it was not possible to 
secure concrete figures for the amount funded from the state budget line. It has to be noted also that 
the financial stimulus of 6000 Euros for every resettled refugee, provided by ERF, is considered an 
important aspect of Bulgaria’s ambition for small -scale resettlement in 2014.126
ERF funds are also important to Germany, more than half of them are distributed to the Länder.
 
127 
At National level, the Federal State also finances resettlement activities mainly to cover the selection 
and transport costs of the refugees from the countries of first asylum, the selection missions and as 
well as integration courses and other costs mentioned in the country profile128. As mentioned above, 
funds are also distributed at the local level. Municipalities in each Länder cover costs related to 
integration support packages like housing, etc.129
In general, funding for activities are public funds and there are not enough available for specific 
projects. As pointed out also above, the central government allocates funds at the local level to 
municipalities to cover some of the costs related to the post -arrival phase activities. For example in 
Sweden the Migration Board distributes financial resources to the municipalities who are responsible 
for the organization and implementation of introduction programme. In the case of France, authorities 
are co-financing reception and integration projects run by NGOs such as France Terre D’Asile, Forum 
Refugiés with ERF funds.
 Even in the case of Germany it is impossible to give 
precise costs of resettlement activities as there is no separate budget line on resettlement.  
130 In other cases like in Finland and the Netherlands, most of the refugee 
cases are shouldered by the municipalities that receive the financial quota per refugee. In the 
Netherland NGOs are dependent on municipalities for funding their work with resettled refugees. The 
central government has recently made additional funding available for municipalities but this is 
currently only a temporary measure covering the period of two years: €2,000 is allocated to a 
municipality for each resettled refugees with an additional €1,000 for a child. The only funding for 
NGOs from the central government is the national ERF programme.131
In UK, the UKBA meets the full costs of resettlement in the first year. Costs include an integration 
support package, which covers housing, healthcare, education, language classes and casework support 
services. NGOs work closely with the participating local authorities and provide many of these 
services to resettled refugees. NGOs are currently funded to provide resettled refugees with a twelve 
month package of integration support. Local Authorities participate on a voluntary basis and after the 




However, the research also indicated that in most country profiles it was not possible to gather 
information about the funds distributed to the local authorities.  
 
Stakeholders interviewed are largely positive about the achievements of the ERF, in particular 
for its support for resettlement infrastructure. We can conclude that ERF III funding has not only 
improved the existing resettlement activities but it has also increased the number of refugees 
resettled.  
                                                     
126 Bulgaria country profile  
Antoaneta Dedikova, National report summary of interviews, pg. 5  
127 Written Interview with Daniel Stübel Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg, January 2012. 
128 http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00153 
129 For more information please read German country profile. 
130 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, France terre d’asile, April 2012. 
131 Interview with Ariane den Uyl, Policy Officer, Dutch Refugee Council, (March 2012).  
132 UK Country Chapter, p. 3. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/40ee6fc04.html (Last visited 31 May 2012).  
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Nevertheless, the lack of allocation of the necessary financial resources makes it difficult to 
accomplish the objectives of the integration process. For example, for the UK the current funding 
available for integration services is not sufficient to allow for the delivery of much training to local 
service providers. 
Likewise, for most of the EU non- resettling countries the financial incentives remain 
crucial in their decision to pursue resettlement or not. For example, the public institutions of 
Latvia are still in the process of further optimizing and decreasing their budget due to the economic 
crisis of 2008-2012. These budgetary cuts make the introduction of any resettlement programme 
extremely unlikely.133
The following Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of a comparative overview from the 
Know Reset Country Profile data. 
  
• A more detailed and more controlled budgeting of the funds allocated by the ERF for each 
resettled person could contribute to the improvement of the reception and integration 
services and a better functioning of the system itself. This is especially true because of the 
fact that while ERF funding represents one of the biggest incentives to carry out 
resettlement, it is questionable whether the free handling of the sums in question is 
necessarily a positiveelement. As the UNHCR warned, this can result in discrimination 
among refugees.134
• Sources of funding for resettlement need to be diversified and there should be an adequate 
structural base for funding municipalities so that they can allocate sufficient funds to local 
NGOs or funding for NGOS needs to be allocated directly from the central government 
 Is it better to have the funds used for the improvement of refugee 
reception as a whole or for resettled refugees specifically (which could be discriminatory). 
• Less bureaucracy around ERF funding would be helpful – as would increased funding. 
E. Capacity in terms of political will  
The difficult economic situation and the growth of negative attitudes towards foreigners have prompted 
stricter policies towards migrants, including the flow of refugees. Economic difficulties have also cut 
into the availability of State services for the integration of resettled refugees. In addition, the recent 
popular support for restrictive policies, demonstrated in several countries, can be seen to undermine 
political support for efforts to establish any responsibility sharing mechanism for resettlement.  
This section will provide a picture of the political willingness of Member States to provide more and 
better quality resettlement by assessing the following aspects: the political debate; the effect of socio-
economic factors; the influence of public opinion and media. Each of these aspects is a cross-cutting 
theme in the political reasoning for resettlement, which will be apparent throughout this section. 
Over the course of the Know Reset project, the overall political discourse and decisions in the EU 
Member States shifted the view of immigration towards more restrictive policies.135 This can be also 
seen through the tendency to decrease the number of protection statuses granted in comparison to the 
increased numbers of asylum applicants in a number of Member States.136
Despite this shift in restrictive immigration policies, Member States have continued to commit to 
resettlement. During 2007 in France, for example, a decrease in asylum applications may have 
  
                                                     
133 Article “Finance Minister: Latvia has consolidated 2.3 billion lats in three years”, December 5, 2011, available at 
http://bnn-news.com/finance-minister-latvia-consolidated-2-3-billion-lats-years-42711 (last time checked on February 16, 
2012). Interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, op.cit.  
134 Interview with Zsuzsanna Puskás, UNHCR office in Hungary, April 2012.  
135 See Country Profiles for France, Italy, UK and Netherlands. 
136 Data gathered from the know reset statistics for the year 2010/2011. 
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prompted the government to overcome the reluctance for other forms of protection, such as 
resettlement. Though only the government can provide the real reasons for its commitment to 
resettlement and they could be influenced by many different factors,137 a year later, France, (along 
with other Member States) committed to its first resettlement experience. Another example is in 
Denmark. When the elections prompted a change in political governance in 2011, there was a shift in 
the immigration perspective as the new Government in office pledged to ease up previously strict 
regulations towards asylum seekers. Though Denmark has been reputed to be particularly strict in 
terms of its immigration law and policy, when we look at refugees, Denmark has contributed to 
finding durable solutions through resettlement for many years.138
Meanwhile, in Germany, after observing an extreme rise in the number of the asylum seekers from 
Serbia and Macedonia in September 2012, Germany’s interior minister called for tighter rules for 
processing their applications. Nevertheless, as far as resettlement is concerned, Germany has practiced 
ad hoc resettlement for many years without ever committing to an official annual quota. The adoption 
of a permanent resettlement programme, in December 2011, was an unexpected breakthrough after 
years of lobbying for a permanent resettlement programme by different stakeholders. It seems that the 
most important factors in leading the German government to rethink its position were the mainly 
positive experiences of the ad hoc resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010 at the local level, and 
the developments at the European level with the campaign for resettlement to Europe.
  
139
According to the stakeholders interviewed, Swedish immigration policy is characterized by a broad 
political consensus. Curiously, the far-right party the Swedish Democrats is positive towards 
resettlement; basically they want to restrict the reception of refugees only to Convention refugees and 
quota refugees.
 
140 Generally, the party wants to reduce overall immigration to Sweden by 90 percent.141
On an inter-state level, the JEURP, goes much further than to offer a financial incentive, more 
importantly it determines a common EU resettlement priority, as well as fostering political will 
through cooperation - eventually allowing the EU to pool resources for resettlement, and encouraging 
joint missions based on successful previous ventures. It is worth highlighting the importance of 
twinning projects and joint selection missions between Member States, which have provided 
another method for knowledge exchange on resettlement, and have encouraged Member States who 
were not conducting resettlement to begin the process. For example Hungarian government officials 
participated in a Hungarian-Finnish twinning project and visited the evacuation Emergency center in 
Timisoara several times. In her interview, Ms. Árpád Szép,
  
142
Throughout this report references are made to relevant national practice in which the complexity 
and diversity of resettlement at national level is clearly demonstrated. This leads us to conclude that 
we cannot talk about a uniform EU policy tendency yet. It underlines the fact that the selection 
criteria discussed earlier in this paper have been driven not only by UNHCR and ERF/JEURP 
 stated that the twinning project paved 
the way for the Hungarian government to be prepared to actually carry out a resettlement programme. 
By learning from the Finish experience she highlighted that: “A positive Finnish experience was not to 
try integration in the capital, but in a smaller place, where the local community can take a part in the 
integration. This seems to be working. The families or groups really integrate in society this way and 
not in their local diaspora, from which they might have wanted to detach anyways.” 
                                                     
137 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, (ECRE) France Terre D’asile, March 2012. 
138 Eva Singer, Danish Refugee Council (ECRE) National Report, April 2012. 
139 Margarete Misselwitz (ECRE) Qualitative national report, March 2012 - Interview with Kerstin Becker (German Red 
Cross), March 2012. 
140 Swedish country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00169 
141 Parliamentary Protocol (2011/12:44). Dated 8 December 2011, retrieved at: http://beta.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-
Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-2011124_GZ0944/  
142 Office of Immigration and Nationality in Hungary, April 2012. 
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criteria but also by the criteria and political will at national level. In many cases, this can lead to a 
positive decision such as accepting medical cases,143
As illustrated in several national practices, some States expect refugees to have a certain capacity to 
integrate
 the elderly or unaccompanied children.  
144 in the new host country. Nevertheless, the traditional EU resettlement countries all have 
quotas for emergency cases and it can even be considered a flagship policy for the Nordic countries. It 
shows their willingness to take persons in particularly vulnerable positions.145 In the case of Finland, 
vulnerability criteria are often taken into account already in the allocation decision. UNHCR is informed 
so that they are able to propose certain groups (for example, women-at-risk). The elderly are usually not 
taken alone but as part of a family. Individual children without a caregiver have been admitted if the 
need for international protection has been very strong, although as a main rule this does not happen.146
The same goes for Sweden. While there is no specified sub-quota, Sweden accepts limited numbers 
of unaccompanied children within the resettlement programme. Nevertheless, this category remains 
problematic. Their number has increased dramatically in recent years and they need very particular 
help. The Swedish state offers large sums of money for the resettlement of these children but this type 
of resettlement is often hard to organise as a lot of planning and local resources are needed. This 
category can also ‘compete’ with unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.
 
147
Contrary to the above examples, in general, cases of people with serious mental health issues are 
not accepted in Ireland. This is due to difficulties accessing appropriate services in the Irish Mental 
Health sector. Issues arise as many of the cases referred through resettlement speak minority 
languages and it can be difficult to provide services through an interpreter that is not specifically 
trained to interpret in a mental health environment. In an interview, the resettlement officer in Ireland 




Additionally, few Member States have been known to make their choice on the basis of a particular 
religious background or a particular ethnicity. Where the latter is mostly justified by having previously 
resettled a group of the same ethnicity, the former (selecting particular religions) is seen as 
discriminatory. An example can be found in the German national practice. The German decision to 
give priority to members of the Christian minority for resettlement provoked discussion in the 
countries of first asylum as well as in Germany. Also, the ‘ability to integrate’ in Germany has been 
criticised by different stakeholders. As resettlement is intended for the most vulnerable refugees, the 
humanitarian purpose should have absolute priority.
 
149
The graphs below illustrate the selection criteria based on two target groups: women at risk and 
religion.  
 
                                                     
143 Swedish Country Profile, http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00169 
144 Please see also the subsection “Capacity in terms of methods and tools”, pg 25 
145 Collated information from interviews in Finland, Sweeden and Denmark.  
146 Interview with Monica Harju, Senior Adviser, Asylum Unit, Finish Immigration Service. 
147 Interview with Oskar Ekblad (OE), Head of Unit, Swedish Migration Board. 
148 Interview with Martina Glennon (“MG”) (Assistant Principal Officer) and Elaine Houlihan (“EH”) (Executive Officer), 
Resettlement Unit, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. 
149 German country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00153 
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The worsening economic situation across Europe has had a detrimental effect on political 
willingness to engage in pressing asylum and refugee issues, such as resettlement. Several Member 
States, who have been affected by the crisis, clearly stated that they are relying on an improvement in 
the economic stability of their country to assess what progress can be made in resettlement, but that 
they at least have the political will to continue.  
Members States like Cyprus, Greece and Malta and are not viewing resettlement as an immediate 
option, not only due to the severe financial crisis but especially because of the large number of 
asylum applications they receive.150
                                                     
150 Collated information from interviews and country profiles in those Member States 
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Likewise, flows of asylum seekers to Luxembourg have risen sharply since 2011 (mainly Roma 
from Serbia). Given this situation and the high percentage of foreign residents already present in the 
country, Luxembourg is not considering an increase of its capacities for resettlement.151
The graph below shows that the number of people seeking asylum in the European Union is on the 
rise – and that refugees continue to be confronted with widely diverging standards in the member 






Source: Eurostat, Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data 
(rounded),migr_asyappctza, extracted on 30 July 2013  
In fact, as we will see, public and media opinion are strongly linked to the economic factors that 
states refer to when adopting a more cautious approach to resettlement. In Belgium for example, there 
was a very visible problem for the reception of asylum seekers who could be found sleeping on the 
streets. Public opinion was that Belgium was too generous in granting asylum and this made it too 
difficult for a political decision to accept more refugees through resettlement.153
Despite this example, in many Member States resettlement itself and efforts to resettle refugees are 
relatively unknown to the general public. In Germany, the public has little knowledge of resettlement, 
but during the resettlement of Iraqis were surprisingly welcoming.
 
154
                                                     
151 Interview with Mrs Welter (OLAI), 14 May 2012 and Caritas-Luxembourg, Interview of 14 March 2012. 
 Similarly, in Denmark, although 
the public is generally not aware of the difference between resettled refugees and other refugees, this 
is not seen as a problem. When people are explained there is a generally positive attitude, because it is 
easier to understand why refugees living in camps in some countries need to come to Denmark for 
better protection. The national media do not write very much about resettlement but sometimes local 
152 European Refugee Policy Pathways to Fairer Burden-Sharing For additional information, please visit: www.svr-
migration.de/Research-Unit 
153 Salomé Phillmann (ECRE) Belgium Qualitative National Report, February 2012. 
154Margarete Misselwitz (ECRE) Qualitative national report, March 2012. 
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media may report about the activities of the local volunteer groups.155 Likewise, most people in the 
Netherlands do not know that their country has a resettlement programme. Those who do know about 
it consider it to be something positive. Resettlement is hardly present in the mainstream media and is 
usually covered only by local media when, for instance, a group of resettled refugees arrive to a 
municipality.156
In the case of Portugal, since it has a small number of asylum seekers and an even smaller number 
of refugees benefiting from international protection, this issue does not really attract the attention of 
public opinion and media.
 
157
Additionally, when resettlement is acknowledged by the public as asylum in general (as in Hungary 
below), or a clear distinction is made between refugees (as in Finland below), with both scenarios 
being potentially harmful to increase political will. In Hungary, when asylum seekers cross the border 
they are reported by the media as criminals and not as potential refugees. To this effect, the Hungarian 
Government has considered asylum matters primarily in the context of the fight against irregular 




The Finnish public is less hostile to quota refugees than other beneficiaries of international 
protection since it is widely considered that those persons come from serious conflict situations and 
have been individually chosen by Finland. However, with more immigration into Finland over the last 
few years, this distinction is becoming less clear as there is confusion between refugees and 
immigrants.
 Yet, when it comes to the public discussing a case of resettlement, the 
Hungarian state could be seen by the public as having acted on a humanitarian basis, generously 
offering help and participating in global burden sharing.  
159
Resettled refugees are often bound to be more readily accepted by the general public than their 
spontaneously arriving peers, although the situations from which they flee may not be different. As 
such, resettled refugees can bring positive connotations to the term “refugee” which could also benefit 
asylum seekers.  
 
If relations with the regional media are fostered accurately, local opinion can be favourable to 
resettlement, as in the case of the Czech Republic. When it comes to public opinion in Czech 
Republic, we need to separate the general opinion with the local one. The local community can be 
open towards resettlement and resettled families. No xenophobic behaviour seems to be noticed, 
although there is a difference in reactions towards refugees from well-educated communities and less-
educated ones. People seem to be more sceptical towards those from less-educated communities. 
Nevertheless, relations seem to improve once people get to know each other. The regional media has 
been quite involved in promoting stories of resettled families. Furthermore cooperation with the 
regional and local media is considered excellent.160
It is difficult to define whether political reluctance to migration across Europe has encouraged 
negative media opinions towards asylum seekers or vice versa, or to what extent the economic crisis has 
provided an umbrella excuse to reduce efforts in this area. In both cases, resettlement is difficult to 
justify to the public to a certain extent. In the non-resettling states, such as the Baltic region for example, 
  
                                                     
155 Eva Singer, Danish Refugee Council (ECRE) National Report, April 2012. 
156 Ariane den Uyl, Policy Officer, DRC, April 2012. 
157 João Vasconcelos, (CPR) Qualitative national report, April 2012. 
158 Mária Barna (ECRE) National Report for Hungary. April, 2012. 
159 Ann-Charlotte Sirén-Borrego, (ECRE ) Qualitative National report for Finland , May 2012. 
160 Pavla Merhautova (ECRE) National Qualitative report, April 2012. 
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capacity in terms of financing161 plays a role in this process, as does public opinion.162
Thus, political will for resettlement is dependent on all of the above- mentioned cross-cutting 
factors. However, despite these cross cutting aspects, there is a commitment to resettlement. The final 
decision rests on the capacity of the Member State and its commitment to humanitarian protection. 
 There is no 
political will to increase even knowledge on the topic, and a dearth of reliable information as to what 
resettlement is and what it entails remains, proving a legal and social challenge. These challenges are not 
confined to the Baltic region and feature to greater and lesser extents in other non-resettling states.  
For the new MS engaging in resettlement like Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium and Hungary for 
example, the national Governments163 have demonstrated their political will by deciding to take part in 
the EU resettlement programme, confirming the importance of establishing a mechanism for 
responsibility sharing with other EU Member States and third countries unable to provide adequate 
protection for refugees and to integrate them. In the case of Romania, there is a more specific reason 
because the decision to resettle was influenced by the political will to strengthen Romania’s status as a 
partner in the area of refugee protection. Since resettlement plays an important role in the EU’s 
external policies on asylum, the involvement of Romania was also driven by the desire to assume 
more responsibility as an EU Member State.164 For other countries like Germany or the Czech 
Republic- already mentioned earlier- the main reasons to commit resettlement were based on previous 
experiences successful experiences. 165
During the course of the research several challenges were highlighted from different stakeholders 
interviewed. In many countries the general public is not informed about resettlement allowing for 
misunderstandings about the need for resettlement. There is a huge lack of knowledge about 
resettlement. Most people cannot distinguish between labour migrants, quota refugees and reunified 
family members, for example. These categories are all mixed up in discussions and people feel that 
migrants (independently of their type) are taking their jobs. However, when you start explaining the 
difference, people can show great compassion for refugees and a willingness to help. Additionally, the 
media can confuse resettlement with migration further increasing the confusion of the public. In 
several cases, the local media have not promoted resettlement leading to an absence of local support. 
Likewise, the economic crisis has meant that the issue of refugee resettlement is pushed further down 
the political agenda. In terms of the allocation of places, refugees can be selected on the basis of their 
religion, age or medical condition. Where this can be a sign of generosity of Member States, it can 
also be seen as discriminatory. In addition, migration is seen by some Member States through a lens of 
security. Non-resettlement states may know little about the process or the challenges. 
 
In conclusion, the following Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of a comparative 
overview from the Know Reset Country Profile data: 
                                                     
161 Interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior161, Republic of Latvia, Mrs. Ilze Pētersone-Godmane, 
January 2012. 
162 Interview with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, February 2012. 
163 Collated information from interviews, country profiles. 
164 Information provided by the Romanian Office of immigration formal reply to the Know Reset questionnaire, op.cit. 
165 Collated information from interviews, country profiles for Germany and Czech Republic. 
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• All stakeholders need to devise a media strategy, to ensure that the public is aware of 
resettlement.  
• This strategy must be carefully worded as not to confuse the public on other asylum issues, 
and should avoid creating a division between types of refugee (resettled or otherwise) 
• The local media should be informed of the situation in order to promote resettlement at a 
local level  
• Relations with journalists should be built and nurtured 
• Refugees should engage with the press.  
• Civil society and governments need to work together with the media to ensure that the 
political debate shifts towards protection and humanitarian responsibility rather than security 
and border control. This will increase the public’s positive perception of resettled refugees 
and refugees in general 
• The security aspects of migration and irregular migration should be removed from 
discussions on resettlement.  
III. The future of resettlement in Europe 
How resettlement will evolve in the future still remains unclear both for resettling and non-resettling 
EU member states. Issues still to be addressed include whether there will be an increase in the 
number of places for resettling MS and if more MS will engage in resettlement or not. Depending 
on the different circumstances at national level, the research indicates that even the governments from 
the traditional resettlement countries may be cautious about increasing the number of places they offer 
and may continue to resettle along the lines of numbers to date. The reasons for that vary from country 
to country. The few examples examined below describe the challenges in increasing the capacity in 
numbers. The Netherlands will maintain their 4–yearly quotas of 2000 resettled refugees (500/year) 
for the foreseeable future.166 In the case of Finland, due to the constant challenge in reaching the 
annual quota, it seems that the government will address this issue first.167 As also highlighted in pg 17, 
the UK aspires to an increased quota of 1000 per year when this will be considered affordable.168
For other Member States recently engaged in resettlement programmes, reception capacity and the 
lack of financial resources might impede their governments from maintaining their commitments or 
further committing to increasing quotas for resettlement.  
 
In some Member States, contrary to the governmental view, stakeholders believe that more can be 
done, be it higher numbers or within the process itself, and the aim of being more proactively 
involved.169 Furthermore, public understanding and support, including in the media, will remain a 
factor leading to more political will for resettlement.170
For non-resettling countries, resettlement does not currently seem high on the political agenda and 
this might continue to be the case for the near future.
  
171
                                                     
166The Netherland country profile 
 The impact of the JEURP and the possibilities 
it brings along may still be a push factor towards resettlement for some non-resettling Member States. 
However, countries like Malta or Cyprus not only have no plans for resettlement but are actively 
http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00161,pg. 12 
167 Finland country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00161, pg. 15 
168 UK country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00170 
169 For more information see other sections. 
170 For more information, please see the section on political will.  
171 Please note that the time frame for conducting the interviews was between the end of 2011 till mid-March 2012. 
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engaged in negotiations with the EU regarding the relocation of refugees from their territory.172
(i) Quality vs. Quantity: how to increase quantity and enhance quality?  
 
Likewise Greece and Italy will continue to struggle to manage refugee arrivals and develop their 
reception and protection capacity while dealing with the economic crisis. 
Drawing on the analyses of Member States policies and practices presented in each country profiles 
and on their capacities in different terms, this chapter seeks to highlight the national directions and 
steps taken at national level that could also be taken at EU level. 
The policy developments and the legal frameworks examined in EU comparative reports shows an 
evolution of the framework for resettlement at both EU level and national level for MS engaged in 
resettlement.  
The primary focus of EU policy has until now been to mobilize more Member States to engage in 
resettlement as well as to increase the number of resettled refugees per country and as a total in 
Europe. As demonstrated in sub-section D “Capacity in terms of funding”, the financial contribution 
made available by the EU through the ERF, had also an impact on increasing the numbers and to the 
sustainability of resettlement. At the same time the analysis shows that the quality of resettlement has 
been emphasised less at the EU level but not necessarily at the national level.  
A successful programme?  
Taking into consideration the EP argument173
In most of the Member States engaged in resettlement, different policies have been pursued in the 
last few decades with various level of success. Most of the stakeholders interviewed confirm that there 
is a need to evaluate past resettlement experiences and develop “follow-up measures” at every stage. 
National resettlement evaluations can lead the different stakeholders to initiate new projects or 
policies. A good example of this is the Netherlands. Findings from the 2008 WODC report (Dutch 
Ministry of Justice Research and Documentation Centre on the policy and social position of resettled 
refugees from a national and international perspective) demonstrated that resettled refugees were 
underrepresented in the higher levels of education and that their participation in the labour market was 
low. The report findings were one of the reasons for UAF to initiate the project on resettlement of 
refugee students.
 that the success of resettlement programmes should be 
measured not only on the basis of the number of persons resettled but also on the implementation of 
measures to support their integration, the research tried to evaluate how successful resettlement has been 
in each MS engaged in it. However, it has not been possible to come to any firm conclusion as to the 
success of past resettlement experiences. The experience varied widely from one country to another 
and depended also how success is defined, and there were no standard agreed indicators in place.  
174
Hungary illustrates a different scenario. There have been criticisms of the integration system that 
can be even more crucial for resettled refugees.
  
175
                                                     
172.
 Recent commitments and measures adopted by 
Hungary in the past few months in order to participate in resettlement programmes are a promising 
http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00147, pg. 4 
173 ibid, European Parliament (2010 a). 
174Jasminka Rogic and Ariane Den Uyl, Dutch Refugee Council, (ECRE) National Report “ Resettlement in 
Netherlands”April 2012. 
175 Maria Barna, (ECRE) MENEDÉK – HUNGARIAN ASSOCIATION FOR MIGRANTS 
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start to improve integration across the board. Hungary is now entering a critical period to see how 
resettlement will evolve and how its programme will become more established. 176
When it comes to the Danish example, it is not only the national stakeholders
  
177 who consider the 
Danish refugee resettlement programme successful but also other countries who have referred to it as a 
good model, especially the three-year quota. Similarly, all Swedish stakeholders strongly agreed that 
resettlement is a success by stating that it has helped to protect thousands of people. Paradoxically, 
Romania has the only resettlement programme considered successful by all the actors involved, with 
the exception of the resettled refugees.178 Resettled refugees were in general disappointed by the 
integration system in Romania.179
Likewise, the failure to successfully resettle refugees convinced the Government of Bulgaria after 
sharing expertise with first-time resettlement countries in Europe. Bulgaria took a decision to postpone 
a pilot resettlement programme after learning about the unsuccessful resettlement of Bhutanese and 
Burmese refugees in countries resettling for the first time in Central Europe. The failure was arguably 
due to culture and language barriers and led to an inability to effectively integrate the newly resettled 
refugees in these countries.
  
180 Therefore, officials from the State Agency for Refugees are seeking to 
accumulate knowledge and acquire the necessary expertise. 181
Even though the capacity of integrating resettled persons is beyond the scope of this paper, several 
examples from different Member States show clearly that in order for resettlement to be a truly 
durable solution, states should focus on strengthening their integration capacity and the 




Capacity to resettle more?  
 said in his interview “Resettlement can only be considered successful when the resettled 
refugee is integrated in the resettlement country.” Successful positive experience of past ad hoc 
resettlement programmes can lead to a decision to adopt a permanent programme as happened in 
Germany. 
As mentioned above, in some Member States, contrary to the governmental view, other stakeholders 
believe that more can be done, be it higher numbers or within the process itself, and aim to be more 
proactively involved (pg. 51). The shared opinion is that the current resettlement quota in several 
countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Germany, could be increased and that, on the 
whole, all EU countries should do more to contribute to 'burden-sharing'. NGOs engaged in 
resettlement across EU Member states have been active in lobbying governments to expand the 
number of resettlement places. However, the political will to do so is often lacking. When asked if a 
country had the capacity to resettle, several respondents from the national authorities answered that 
this was a budgetary issue and one of reception/integration capacity. 
Views have also been expressed that, given the current political and economic climate in different 
EU Member States, it may even be preferable at present to keep the current quotas and (at least) 
ensure that the existing resettlement activities will continue.  
                                                     
176 Hungary country profile http://www.know-
reset.eu/files/texts/00155_20130729172455_knowresetcountryprofilehungary.pdf 
177 Different sources, interviews with the stakeholders, danish national reports, country profiles. 
178 Romanian country profile; http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00165 
179 Ibid. 
180 Interview with Mrs. Anna Andreeva, op.cit.  
181 Bulgaria Country profile http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00146 
182 Written interview with Ewout Adrians, CGRS-FEDASIL, 4 May 2012. 
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What is vital to emphasise in any resettlement discussions and possible further developments 
is that resettlement must not impact negatively on other systems of refugee protection.  
Furthermore, the EU definitely has a capacity to resettle more than it does.  
Role of the EU and EASO 
The research also examined the role the EU could play to help member states to resettle refugees. In 
addition, stakeholders were asked to share their views about the role that the EASO could play in 
encouraging more states to engage. 
Besides providing essential funding, it was thought that the EU could also undertake policy work, 
exchange of information on different practices and take on the role of informing governments in any 
future annual programme. The Joint EU Resettlement Programme was also viewed favourably, as a 
chance for countries to work together, to focus on certain groups of refugees, and again, to share or 
exchange practices. MS are eager to share the responsibility of resettling refugees. 
It was felt that the EU should have a role in improving the quality of reception and integration 
programmes. It was observed that national governments are very focused on the selection process 
and not enough on the integration processes for resettled refugees. The EU could do more to 
stimulate national governments to focus on the integration aspects of resettlement.  
The creation of a platform for the exchange of good practices and practical cooperation, involving 
all relevant stakeholders that would be helpful. Certain misgivings were raised about the possibility of 
the EU having any other role than providing funding as there is too much economic and social disunity 
within the EU Member States. The adoption of a common EU resettlement programme was generally 
seen as an important incentive to motivate member states. Likewise, by establishing priorities at EU-
level, the strategic use of resettlement is strengthened. Additionally, interviewees felt the EU could 
“buddy up” actors in resettlement across different EU states and facilitate skills sharing. 
At the same time both UNHCR and NGOs raised their concern that the EU should not 
establish its own resettlement system parallel to UNHCR’s one.  
Denmark is not part of ERF and since the Danish programme has run independently for many 
years, the Danish civil society generally thought that the EU should play a role in promoting 
resettlement in the member states, but that NGOs should not focus on the EU but on national plans. 
With regards to the EASO, the interviewees felt that EASO could have a role in advocating for 
more resettlement – particularly advocating for EU states not currently involved in resettlement to 
consider it. And, also to co-ordinate and push for more resettlement from the ‘Regional Protection 
Programme’ priority groups – possibly using mechanisms linked to funding.   
EASO was largely seen as not having enough presence in the area of resettlement at the moment. 
Potentially they could also have a role in the co-ordination and logistical aspects of resettlement and 
support implementation of resettlement programmes at the local level. EASO can finally play a very 
important coordinating role in the future in the fields of collecting best practices, organising 
workshops/seminars, doing of studies and reports, drawing up training and preparing a module of the 
European Asylum Curriculum concerning resettlement, as well as evaluating operations at EU level. It 
was also noted that EASO is underfunded, which affects its capacity for practical involvement in 
resettlement. It was stressed that its role and policy should not conflict with those of UNHCR and the 
positive achievements so far in resettlement. 
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Future funds: The Asylum and Migration Fund (henceforth AMF) 2014-2020 
EU resettlement policy post-2013 is being negotiated and soon to approved within the framework of 
the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) 2014-2020.183 In November 2011, the Commission issued a 
proposal for a regulation establishing the AMF for the period 2014-2020, which will replace the 
current funds in the area of migration and asylum (the ERF and the EIF and the European Return 
Fund).184 It also aims to cover more comprehensively different aspects of the common Union asylum 
and immigration policy, including actions in or in relation to third countries.185
The AMF proposal, which is still under negotiation at the time of writing this report, foresees a 
system providing a fixed amount to Member states for each person they resettle (€ 6000, instead of € 
4000 currently). A higher amount of € 10 000 will be allocated for each person resettled according to 
common Union resettlement priorities as well as for some categories of vulnerable refugees, such as 
women and children at risk, separated children and persons with medical needs or in need of 
emergency resettlement. These sums will be allocated to the Members States every two years on the 
basis of a pledging exercise and following the establishment of common EU resettlement priorities. To 
encourage the resettlement efforts of Member States, the fund also foresees financial support for a 
wide range of resettlement activities, such as the development of infrastructures and services - 
including transit and processing centres (See Annex 2 of the AMF) – and the conduct of selection 
missions (Article 7 AMF).
  
186
Article 17 of the AMF describes the elements of a Union Resettlement Programme which is 
foreseen and whose aim will be to increase the current figures, to strengthen resettlement systems 
and to enhance resettlement where the EU has an added value. The fund will support the 
establishment of appropriate infrastructure and services, training of staff, joint missions and pre-
departure measures and post-arrivals assistance. The Commission will establish Common EU 
resettlement priorities on the basis of set categories; the regions for 2014-2015 eligible for extra 
allocations have already been identified.  
 
The Asylum and Migration fund needs to be attractive to Member States in order for them to 
increase their resettlement capacities and the number of people they resettle. In August 2012, ECRE 
published a policy paper, which provided comments and recommendations on the Commission 
Proposals on the future EU funding in the area of migration and asylum. With regard to resettlement, 
ECRE stated that the AMF will only reach this goal effectively if the administrative burden for 
Member States is minimal, and if specific incentives are put in place for Member States that are new 
to resettlement. A system similar to the recently amended European Refugee Fund, which foresees 
higher financial incentives for such Member States, could be adopted in the AMF.187
The AMF proposal also foresees funding for Union Actions (see Art. 21), i.e. transnational actions 
or actions of particular interest to the Union, and that these actions could deal with resettlement. 
 Instead of taking 
the form of higher lump sums, these incentives could take the form of a higher EU contribution (90%) 
for resettlement activities carried out by Member States that are starting resettlement.  
From informal information received it seems that the AMF negotiations are in their possibly last 
stages. The discussions will deal among other things with Resettlement (including probably a decrease 
                                                     
183 Com (2011) 751, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund. 
184 Ibid.  
185 Ibid. 
186 ECRE Policy paper (August 2012) COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS on the Commission Proposals on the 
future EU funding in the area of migration and asylum. 
187 Decision No 281/2012/EU of the European Parliament and the Council amending the European Refugee Fund, 29 March 
2012. 
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in funding for resettlement, family members and resettlement, and resettlement vs. humanitarian 
admission). It is quite likely that funding for resettlement and external dimension will be significantly 
decreased. Funding for resettlement would probably decrease by 50 %.  
Additionally, it is noteworthy to mention that initially 3,9 million € were foreseen for the AMF. 
This amount will be reduced following the reductions in the EU’s long term budget 2014-2020 (Multi-
Annual Financial framework).  
Public opinion and the role of media 
Another important cross cutting issue already examined in the sub-section “Capacity in terms of 
political will” is the role of public opinion and the media. As mentioned earlier there is a general lack 
of knowledge of resettlement programmes and what they entail amongst the general public in all EU 
resettlement Member States. This is in contrast to the predominantly negative public attitudes towards 
asylum and immigration in general. Evidence collected during our research suggested that while 
taking decisions to increase support for resettlement and/or expand the number of resettlement places 
or simply to engage in resettlement, national politicians take into consideration the public opinion. 
Therefore, it is also important to have awareness-raising activities and positive media coverage 
of the issue. 
Despite the important role of the media, as highlighted above, the opinion differed in MS as to how 
much they should be engaged. Some were of the view that there should be more media attention to 
inform the public about resettlement and that raising awareness about this group of refugees has the 
potential to also increase public awareness of refugee issues in general. On the other hand, doubts 
were raised because more awareness might actually have a negative impact. Non-compulsory 
programmes, such as resettlement, might be viewed by the public as an economic burden and as a 
result be affected by the current budget cuts by governments. In order to promote resettlement, any 
discussions and media attention on resettlement need to make sure that the right messages and 
information is given out to general public, making clear distinctions between resettlement (and 
what this exactly involves) and other mechanisms for the protection of refugees. Both the 
protection and durable solution aspects of resettlement need to be clearly explained. 
IV. Conclusions and recommendation  
The research has shown that that socio –economic factors remain an influential part of the decision 
process on behalf of Member states and that any national public discussion does not take place in 
vacuum but it is entangled with other migration issues. Going back to the 2005 ECRE paper188
                                                     
188 ECRE paper, 2005 “ Towards a European Resettlement Programme” http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-
work/resettlement/103-the-way-forward-towards-a-european-resettlement-programme.html 
 
“Towards a European resettlement Programme”, you can find a number of interesting 
recommendations with regard of the current resettlement capacity that still hold today such as, for 
example, the confusion between resettlement and asylum in general by the public and media. In view 
of the attention given to asylum numbers in Europe, including by the public, the number of refugees 
resettled to Europe under any expanded resettlement activities will likely be of significant concern to 
European states. For resettlement to fulfil its functions as a meaningful demonstration of solidarity 
with countries of first asylum and as a useful component of a comprehensive durable solutions 
strategy, resettlement numbers need to be significant, and proportional to Europe’s prosperity relative 
to countries of first asylum. At the same time, however, for resettlement to be well managed, reasoned 
consideration needs to be given to the number of refugees that current structures can resettle in a given 
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year, how these structures need to be developed to accommodate additional numbers, and the process 
whereby the level of resettlement commitment should be determined189
The EU has become an important player here and the EU resettlement programme is an important 
incentive to motivate all member states to engage. Likewise, by establishing priorities at EU-level, the 
strategic use of resettlement is strengthened. Recommendations from the EU to resettle should be 
stronger in order to implicate Member States further and remind them their responsibility to provide 
protection to refugees. Similarly, EASO should become an important actor in contributing to the 
increase of the quality and quantity of resettlement. 
. 
As reflected also in the ECRE paper, 2005 “Towards a European Resettlement Programme” at this 
stage, it does not seem possible to answer the question how many refugees Europe should resettle. The 
research indicates that there is no implementable guideline in determining a ‘natural limit’ to the 
number of refugees that a country can resettle. Resettlement commitments have, historically, been 
limited only by the political will to commit the necessary resources. So, an increase in the number of 
resettled refugees might be difficult (but not impossible) to be achieved both practically and 
politically; but any increase in European resettlement activities should be progressive, with multi-year 
programmes, in order to ensure the establishment of the necessary structures.190
From the review of existing resettlement programmes we can conclude that there is great diversity 
in approach towards resettlement. Unsurprisingly, there also seems to be a disparity in numbers 
between the established quotas and the number of refugees actually resettled in each Member State. 
The way the number of resettled refugees is calculated is crucial as it impacts what we actually know 
concerning the total number of refugees resettled. Despite different methods of calculation, the 
research clearly indicates that the numbers of resettlement places available has not increased in 
parallel with the expansion of the number of EU resettlement countries. New resettlement countries 
are initially able to offer only a very limited number of places, as they require time and resources to 
build their resettlement capacity. Furthermore it appears that the available specified numbers of 
resettlement places within a defined period are rarely fully filled in most of the countries. Lastly, it is 
important to remember that resettlement should only be used to complement existing European and/or 
national refugee protection systems and not undermine them.  
 Views have also been 
expressed that, given the current political and economic climate in different EU Member States, it may 
even be preferable at present to keep and fill the current quotas effectively and (at least) ensure that 
existing resettlement activities will continue.  
A number of different measures have been identified as necessary or desirable in order to increase 
support for resettlement: better and faster cooperation between EU countries, transfer of knowledge 
and experiences in resettlement involving all the relevant stakeholders, awareness that resettled 
refugees have many different needs, involvement of municipalities in lobbying for increased support, 
setting up of private or joined sponsorship schemes, and more funding opportunities for NGOs and 
municipalities receiving resettled refugees.  
An essential component of any resettlement programme remains, still, the political will to actively 
engage in this process. Additionally, funding at both European and national levels will continue to 
remain an important incentive. In order for resettlement to be a truly durable solution, states should 
focus on strengthening their integration capacity and the receptiveness of receiving communities to 
improve outcomes. 
NGOs involvement at the decision-making stage should be considered in all Member States 
engaged in resettlement. Moreover an active role should be given to NGOS in facilitating pre-
                                                     
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid. 
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departure activities. The decision-making process should also involve refugee communities to make 
Members states more aware and sensitive to the many issues faced by refugees in need.  
In answer to the still open question “how many refugees Europe should resettle” we can only say: 
with strong public support and demonstrable political will, European resettlement activities may be 
sufficiently generous to better respond to the resettlement needs existing in regions of refugee origin. 
We can and should do more.  
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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 E U Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as w ell as t hematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
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Abstract 
This report presents the findings of field research in Kenya under the KNOW RESET project, which 
maps and analyses legal and policy frameworks as well as p ractices related to resettlement to 
European countries.  The research in Kenya was a component of this broader project, which included 
research in 27 EU member states and three countries of first asylum: Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. 
Research was carried out in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camp between June and October 2012 and 
involved interviews with refugee and resettlement actors, including those participating in resettlement 
to European countries. The report broadly explores and presents Kenya’s resettlement landscape, the 
positions, roles and practices of European resettlement countries within that landscape, and the 
perspectives and experiences of refugees around resettlement. 
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This report is the outcome of field research in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camp which sought to map 
Kenya’s refugee resettlement landscape, with a particular focus on resettlement to European countries. 
The report presents Kenya’s resettlement landscape, the role of European countries within this 
landscape and how European resettlement policies and practices are experienced on the ground from 
the perspectives of UNHCR and its implementing partners. In addition, the report explores refugees’ 
experiences and narratives around resettlement. The report makes recommendations to UNHCR and 
European countries around how European resettlement policies could be improved to ease the burden 
on Kenya as country of first asylum, to increase the efficiency of European resettlement processes in 
Kenya and to render the resettlement process a smoother and less anxiety-producing experience for 
refugees. The research was co-funded by the European Union and managed by the European 
University Institute and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles.  
Background 
Kenya’s refugee population lies at 630,926 refugees and asylum seekers, in addition to an unknown 
but likely high number of de facto refugees. The majority of Kenya’s refugees reside in its two desert 
refugee camps – Dadaab, in North Eastern Province, and Kakuma in North Rift Valley Province – as 
well as a large number in Kenya’s significant cities, most notably Nairobi. 
Kenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees 
as well as the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention. However, up until 2006, 
Kenya lacked any national legislation on refugees. Since the influx of large numbers of refugees from 
neighbouring Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan in the early nineties, Kenya’s official stance towards 
refugees has been characterised by draconian policies aiming to contain the refugee ‘problem’ and 
refugees’ movements, including an encampment policy which restricted refugees and asylum seekers 
to residing in camps. Following sustained advocacy by UNHCR and civil society organisations, in 
2007 Kenya adopted the Refugee Act 2006, through which the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 
OAU Refugee Convention were implemented at the national level. The Act lays out Kenya’s national 
policy towards its refugee and asylum seeking population, yet there continue to be grey areas, such as 
the situations in which refugees are able to reside outside of the camps. Refugees continue to move 
between the camps and the cities unofficially, risking police harassment and arrest. 
Possibilities For Durable Solutions 
UNHCR identifies ‘durable solutions’ to the ‘refugee problem’ as local integration, voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement. In Kenya, opportunities for durable solutions are limited. The country’s 
encampment policy and measures to restrict refugees’ movements significantly curtails opportunities 
for local integration. Refugees face harassment and discrimination in urban centres, especially those 
who have a distinctive appearance, such as South Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians. Furthermore, 
local integration appears not to be an envisaged or desirable solution for the Government of Kenya, 
which regularly makes statements about the burden its Somali refugee population places on the 
country, and has made it clear that the only opportunity it sees for them is repatriation.  
UNHCR facilitated the voluntary repatriation of southern Sudanese refugees from Kakuma 
following the signing of the 2005 CPA between the Sudans, but this has largely been unsuccessful, 
and has since been halted due to large numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan flowing into the 
camp fleeing ethnic violence. Rwandan refugees in Kenya will likely soon face proposals of 
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repatriation, since the country is deemed by the international community to now be safe, and the 
Rwandan government has requested their return from neighbouring countries and for UNHCR to 
invoke the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees. But very few of Kenya’s refugees are actually able 
to return to their country of origin, especially its predominantly Somali population.  
Of the three durable solutions, resettlement is often the only real option for refugees in Kenya. Yet, 
it is an opportunity limited to just a fraction of Kenya’s refugees – less than one per cent. Resettlement 
to a third country is generally highly desired by refugees, but for many remains a dream. This dream 
has been fostered and nurtured by resettlement programmes in the camps, through which resettlement 
becomes something tangible and consequently perceived as attainable. This environment encourages 
refugees to perform vulnerability in order to show their eligibility for resettlement to UNHCR, and to 
make projects out of resettlement seeking, which are actively worked on through certain practices or 
methods, such as regular visits to UNHCR and implementing partners, writing letters to submit to 
UNHCR offices and collecting papers documenting their suffering, mistreatment or the unfairness of 
UNHCR’s policies and practices. For refugees in camps especially who may have little control over 
their lives, daily engagement with such a project may be one of few ways they feel able to gain some 
agency and autonomy, and maintain some hope in an otherwise bleak situation. Agencies are 
constantly navigating this environment, trying to uphold their credibility with UNHCR or resettlement 
countries by identifying which refugees are indeed the most vulnerable. The result is a palpable culture 
of disbelief or doubt, whereby refugees are often assumed to be strategically bending the truth in order 
to be resettled. This is strongly felt by refugees, who can feel that they are constantly suspected of 
lying or cheating, and that agencies are trying to catch them out so as to dismiss their claims.  
Kenya’s Resettlement Landscape 
There have historically been two channels through which refugees are resettled from Kenya: due to 
protection needs where no alternative solution can be identified, and through resettlement programmes 
targeting specific groups. Since 2006, UNHCR has been implementing a protracted refugee 
resettlement programme from Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Refugees are selected for resettlement 
interviews based on their year of arrival, starting with the earliest arrivals from 1992 up t o 2006 
arrivals. In Kakuma, the protracted refugee resettlement programme is currently coming to an end, and 
is to be replaced with a more traditional, protection-based resettlement programme. This programme 
will involve colleagues in the community services unit carrying out needs-based assessments of 
refugees, from which refugees potentially in need of resettlement can be identified for referral to the 
resettlement unit.  
Resettlement from Kenya in recent years has largely taken place from Kenya’s (and indeed the 
world’s) largest refugee camp, Dadaab. In previous years, UNHCR’s targets for resettlement were 
high due to the vast numbers of refugees living in Dadaab, many of whom were protracted cases. In 
2011, 10,000 individuals were targeted for resettlement, with 8,000 of  those refugees selected from 
Dadaab. However, heightened insecurity in Dadaab over the past two years has led a number of 
countries to withdraw their personnel from conducting resettlement interviews in the camp, curtailing 
UNHCR’s target figures from Kenya in 2012 to 3,750, with only 750 refugees coming from Dadaab. 
This has created a real challenge for UNHCR, as resettlement countries scramble for refugees from a 
much smaller pool of candidates in order to meet their resettlement quotas. Furthermore, many of 
Dadaab’s protracted refugees are most in need of resettlement, but remain largely inaccessible.  
In 2011, 3,581  refugees departed Kenya to be resettled in a third country and 10,518 refugees’ 
cases were submitted for resettlement. Of those who departed, the vast majority (2, 083) were resettled 
to the U.S., 541 to Canada, 329 to Sweden, 208 to the U.K., 182 to Australia, 81 to the Netherlands, 58 
to Norway, 10 to New Zealand, and 89 to ‘other countries’. Generally, the U.S. and Canada are 
deemed the biggest players in resettlement, followed by Australia, the UK and Sweden.  
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Resettlement To European Countries 
While numbers of refugees resettled to European countries are low, these countries do offer UNHCR 
important alternatives to the U.S.; although the U.S. offers more than enough resettlement places, it is 
unable to process cases quickly, even in emergencies such as immediate protection needs or medical 
issues. European countries, on the other hand, are in special circumstances able to resettle cases in a 
matter of weeks, or sometimes even days. Sweden is renowned as the fastest country of resettlement, 
and has been able to turn cases around within as little as one to two days.  
While European resettlement is highly valued due to countries’ abilities to resettle cases i n short 
spaces of time and their systems of allocating portions of their quotas to dossier cases and emergencies, 
agencies can experience difficulties around the time and resources spent meeting the resettlement needs 
of European countries relative to the number of refugees that these countries resettle. In addition, the 
U.S. experiences a lull in resettlement referrals at the beginning of the year because UNHCR channels all 
of its resources into responding to the missions of European countries. UNHCR operates in this way 
because, in spite of long security checks, the U.S. will accept large numbers and is relatively open 
compared to European countries, which are often deemed to be more choosey. The U.S. in particular 
then tends to get a surge of referrals towards the end of the year, once all European resettlement places 
have been filled. Since the U.S. is UNHCR’s biggest resettlement ‘customer’, the prioritising of 
European countries which resettle much lower numbers can seem illogical. Nevertheless, especially for 
cases urgently requiring resettlement, or groups or nationalities which are less likely to be accepted by 
the U.S., such as Oromo and Eritreans, UNHCR feels that prioritising European countries’ resettlement 
needs is important and necessary. This can result in a hectic first half of the year as referrals are being 
made, until European countries’ missions are completed and quotas are filled, including for dossier and 
emergency cases. Thereafter, UNHCR is able to continue referring cases t o the U.S., and faces the 
difficult situation of keeping any new emergency cases that arise on hold as they await the new fiscal 
year to begin referring to European countries again. This can be particularly stressful, since some of 
these cases may be in life-threatening situations, and yet there tend to be no immediate opportunities for 
resettlement in the second half of the year.  
IOM reported similar challenges around working with European countries, each of which has its 
own systems and schedules which can prove cumbersome to deal with when the numbers actually 
resettled are relatively few. Except for the UK, which budgets for its resettlement programme three 
years in advance, European countries provide IOM with very tentative ‘hints’ about the numbers they 
might resettle when at the planning stage for the following year. IOM can also experience some 
challenges around a lack of standardised procedures from European countries. For example, some 
countries require thorough medical checks from IOM, while others do n ot. A standard medical 
examination for all refugees which would help prevent outbreaks, better screening to avoid 
complications in flight and prevent problems after arrival.  
Kenya’s resettlement infrastructure, which European countries are able to use to meet their own 
resettlement quotas, is almost entirely funded by the U.S. Although this is logical, since the U.S. is 
UNHCR’s and IOM’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, there is a sense that European countries 
should be more committed to supporting this infrastructure financially, since it depends upon it for its 
resettlement requirements. As it stands, should the U.S. stop resettling from the region, this 
infrastructure could not be maintained with the relatively insignificant and ad hoc funding that 
European countries provide; there is a sense that European funding could not be depended upon for 
UNHCR’s or IOM’s operations.  
While European countries are highly valued for their capacity to take dossier and emergency 
submissions and for the speed with which they can resettle refugees, they are also perceived as being 
somewhat ‘choosey’ about the refugees they accept for resettlement, and not necessarily according to 
individuals’ and families’ vulnerability. For example, the UK’s decision this year to only take Oromo 
refugees from Kenya and the Netherlands’ request for non-Somali refugees were experienced 
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problematically by UNHCR, since third countries seen to be favouring or discriminating against 
specific ethnic groups undermines UNHCR’s efforts to make resettlement appear fair and entirely 
according to need and causes refugees to complain about what they perceive as bias and racism (see 
following section). Countries assessing the ‘integration potential’ of refugees were also criticised, 
since they tend to select refugees according to their education levels and language skills as opposed to 
on a needs-based assessment. 
Refugee Narratives, Experiences And Perspectives Of Resettlement 
Many more refugees seek resettlement than are actually successful in achieving it, and refugees were 
found to have their own explanations for why some refugees are successful and others are not, or why 
some refugees go through the selection process and depart within a relatively short space of time while 
others can wait for a number of years. Many informants felt that selection and rejection of refugees 
occurs unfairly, which they explained in a number of ways. Some informants suggested that 
resettlement occurs arbitrarily and that selection is largely based on chance or luck, often according to 
the officer one is received by. Unfairness was also articulated as being due to UNHCR and 
resettlement countries favouring certain nationalities or tribes, particularly in Kakuma since refugees 
are acutely aware of who is and who is not being resettled due to the close proximity in which people 
live in the camp. Favouring certain ethnic groups was often explained as racism by informants from 
South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer communities; informants pointed out that ‘brown’ refugees such 
as Oromos and Somalis were being resettled but ‘black’ refugees were not, even if, like the Ethiopian 
Nuer, they shared the same nationality with those who were being resettled such as the Oromo. Some 
informants asserted that other refugees bought or stole other people’s resettlement places, especially in 
the camps, or that people would fake situations of insecurity, or change their ethnicity strategically 
having observed that certain ethnic groups were more favoured than others. Refugees also cited 
mistrust of UNHCR, or suspicion of corruption within the organisation, as being behind resettlement 
decisions. Congolese Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi expressed concern that during interviews 
with UNHCR and resettlement countries their stories were not being accurately translated; interpreters 
tend to be Rwandan Kinyarwanda or Kirundi speakers, languages which are closely related but not 
identical to the Banyamulenge mother tongue – Kinyamulenge. 
These explanations, although in some cases seemingly irrational, do not arise out of nowhere. 
Especially for the Oromo, a history of persecution may lead refugees to mistrust and be paranoid about 
the activities of all authorities. Similarly, for South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer who have fled 
countries where their people have been discriminated against racially, it is understandable that refugees 
would make sense of their apparent unfair treatment through the frame of race. In addition, many 
refugees have come from contexts where corruption is part of everyday business, and so to suspect 
agencies of engaging in corrupt activities around resettlement is quite rational. Corruption accusations 
may also be a legacy of the resettlement scandal of 2000. In addition, a general perception of UNHCR as 
working against refugees may be fostered by its role around RSD; from arrival in Kenya, asylum seekers 
are interviewed and their claims questioned and judged by UNHCR. This goes some way towards 
explaining why UNHCR may receive such strong criticism from refugees as compared to implementing 
partners, which are able to focus their time and resources on supporting refugees as opposed to 
determining whether they qualify to receive their support or not. Accusations of corruption, inhumanity 
and mistreatment by UNHCR or inaccurate translation by foreign interpreters are used by refugees to 
make sense of the often frustratingly slow processes they undergo with the agency, not only for those 
who have resettlement cases but also for those who are seeking the most essential protection tool and 
prerequisite to resettlement, the mandate. Informants were also well aware of the culture of disbelief 
within UNHCR and implementing partners, and resented constantly having to perform their vulnerability 
to prove their eligibility for resettlement under the critical eyes of agency staff.  
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A significant number of refugees interviewed had had an initial resettlement interview with 
UNHCR but then had not received any feedback for many months, or even years. In such situations, 
refugees are able to enquire about the status of their cases at field post in Kakuma or resettlement unit 
desking days in Nairobi, though some reported receiving contradictory information from caseworkers. 
For refugees whose cases have moved beyond UNHCR’s assessment and selection process, queries 
about their cases may not be answerable at field post, as t he cases are now with the countries of 
resettlement to which they have been referred.  
A number of refugees who had gone through interviews with RSC and INS had waited for long 
periods of time without any information about their cases, as UNHCR was not always able to inform 
them of the status of their cases. For refugees referred by UNHCR to European countries, acceptance 
is more likely and if they are unsuccessful, refugees are informed within a short space of time. That 
said, one informant who had been recommended for resettlement to the Netherlands was not called for 
interview, which implies that his case was rejected by the Netherlands at the initial screening stage. He 
expressed anger and frustration to have seen others be interviewed without being informed why he 
was not called himself. A number of other informants felt, or had been informed by UNHCR, that their 
complex family situations were causing their cases to be put on hold. Many refugees have come from 
contexts whereby orphaned or abandoned children are absorbed into other family units, whether these 
are part of extended family configurations or wider clan networks. These tend not to be recognised as 
constituting genuine families by UNHCR and resettlement countries, which require proof of their 
authenticity through further investigations.  
Conclusions And Recommendations  
To Unhcr  
• Clearer communication on the statuses of refugees’ cases, especially in situations where they 
are pending for long periods, would help to reduce the confusion and anxiety of this liminal 
period for refugees. Although it is understandable that UNHCR and resettlement countries 
would not communicate the reasons for refugees being rejected resettlement for purposes of 
keeping selection criteria secret (so that refugees are not able to mould their cases to these 
criteria), not knowing why one was rejected, especially after the stress of going through 
multiple interviews, and the resulting lack of closure can be traumatic for refugees. Similarly, 
where refugees are screened out when UNHCR submits the RRFs to a country, they should be 
informed of the fact, and advised why they were not selected for interview.  
• UNHCR and resettlement countries ought to have high standards when it comes to selecting 
interpreters and be mindful of Congolese refugees’ (especially Banyamulenge) concerns 
around translation, ensuring that appropriate interpreters are employed.  
• For refugees and asylum seekers in Nairobi, support with transport costs to multiple interviews 
for both refugee status determination (RSD) and resettlement would ease the financial 
pressures on refugees, especially during the period they await the mandate when they are not 
entitled to other forms of support from UNHCR or implementing partners. UNHCR might also 
establish field offices in enclaves where numerous refugees reside in which RSD and 
resettlement interviews could be conducted.  
To European Resettlement Countries 
• European countries play an important role in Kenya’s resettlement landscape, resettling 
refugees from nationalities which may not be considered by bigger resettlement actors and 
making provisions for emergency and dossier referrals. European countries should increase 
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their quotas for emergency and dossier referrals in order to meet the resettlement needs of 
refugees in acute insecurity and medical situations.  
• European countries coordinating and spacing their missions throughout the year would enable 
UNHCR to spread its attention more evenly between resettlement countries and avoid having 
to channel all of its resources into meeting the resettlement requirements of European 
countries at the beginning of the year to the detriment of larger resettlement actors. If 
European countries coordinated their missions together, sending a mixed team from various 
countries two to three times a year, UNHCR’s preparation for and hosting of these missions 
would be more time and cost-effective.  
• European countries would also make IOM’s work easier to plan and manage should they 
provide more notice on the numbers they intend to resettle each year. 
• Standardised medical procedures, coordinated by IOM, would help to reduce the risk of 
outbreaks, complications in flight and health problems on arrival.  
• UNHCR and implementing partners would benefit from more standardised policies of 
European countries; as it stands, countries each have their own policies and requirements, and 
meeting them can prove cumbersome, especially due to the small numbers of refugees that 
these countries resettle and the relatively little funding they provide for these numbers, which 
is often subject to change.  
• UNHCR would save significant time and resources should there be an agreement between all 
resettlement actors about what information is required in the refugee referral form (RRF). 
Currently, UNHCR completes all forms with the maximum information required since it is not 
always clear which countries these forms will be submitted to. Information on the political 
situation in refugees’ countries of origin, for example, could probably be removed from the 
form, since all countries have information and publications on these countries from their own 
foreign offices. UNHCR would also benefit from more notice from European countries about 
their resettlement numbers and the dates of their missions in order to target the RRFs more 
effectively, tailoring each to the needs of the country of submission.  
• In order to assist UNHCR with its human resources issue, European countries could share a 
small clerical office in Nairobi with a Kenyan team through which to channel RRFs, 
coordinate selection missions and arrange interviews. This would be more cost-effective than 
employing UNHCR staff, who are often overqualified for this kind of work.  
• European countries might benefit from sharing best practices on resettlement, including on 
how to conduct missions and on cultural orientation programming. Countries could learn from 
each other by sending personnel to shadow other countries’ resettlement missions in Kenya 
and cultural orientation classes. This would also apply to countries which currently do not  
regularly resettle refugees, or at least do not currently carry out selection missions in Kenya.  
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1. Introduction 
This report forms a component of the research for the Know Reset Project, which maps policy and 
legal frameworks and actual practices related to resettlement to 27 EU member states. The project’s 
broad aim is to build the knowledge for better policy-making around resettlement at the EU-level as 
well as to individual EU member states. In addition to researchers exploring resettlement policies and 
practices from 27 EU member states, the project also involved research from three countries of first 
asylum – Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. This report presents the findings from field research in Kenya.  
The research aimed to explore and understand how resettlement, and specifically European 
resettlement, is operating in Kenya, and how the resettlement policies and practices of UNHCR and 
resettlement countries are experienced on the ground. The research sought the perspectives from a 
range of actors involved in resettlement, including refugees themselves, refugee agencies and 
European consulates in order to gain a comprehensive view of Kenya’s resettlement landscape and the 
position and role of European resettlement within it. Tying together the perspectives of these various 
actors, the research aimed to provide insights into how European resettlement policies could be 
improved to ease the burden on Kenya as co untry of first asylum, to increase the efficiency of 
European resettlement processes in Kenya and to render the resettlement process a smoother and less 
anxiety-producing experience for refugees.  
2. Methodology 
Interviews were carried out with refugees and resettlement actors in two settings in Kenya – Nairobi, 
where, according to UNHCR figures, 55,581 refugees (the significant majority of Kenya’s urban 
refugees) reside, and Kakuma refugee camp, which currently hosts 102,767 refugees and asylum 
seekers.1
In both Nairobi and Kakuma, informants were accessed via research assistants from the 
predominant refugee communities (often community leaders or interpreters for refugee agencies
 While the Dadaab refugee camp complex hosts the vast majority of Kenya’s refugees and 
asylum seekers – 474, 154 – deteriorating security conditions prevented research in the camp. In 
addition, since these security concerns have recently curtailed resettlement from the camp (explained 
further in the following section), Kakuma was felt to be a more conducive site for the study. 
2), 
who were also able to assist with translation. The sample of informants interviewed cannot, then, be 
said to be representative, since they were selected from assistants’ own pools of contacts and 
associates. In addition, it is important to note that often the most vulnerable refugees perhaps most in 
need of resettlement may not be accessible through such channels. Not all informants in either Nairobi 
or Kakuma were yet officially recognised as refugees in Kenya; a number of informants were waiting 
to receive or renew their mandates, and in Nairobi some had avoided UNHCR entirely or chosen not 
to renew expired mandates out of frustration with the long waiting time involved and transportation 
costs of regular trips to UNHCR’s offices. Informants’ accounts could not be directly triangulated with 
or verified by UNHCR records, in part because not all were known or recognised by UNHCR, as well 
as due to confidentiality reasons.3
                                                     
1 UNHCR, 2012d, ‘Kakuma camp population statistics, 5 October 2012’. 
 The value of the data gained from these interviews can be found in 
informants’ narratives and discourses around resettlement, regardless of whether or not what was said 
2
 With the exception of the research assistant for the Somali refugee community in Nairobi who is a Kenyan Somali.  
3 No names were recorded in order to assure informants of the confidentiality of their information, and pseudonyms have 
been used for all refugees. Some informants, however, did request that I record their name in the hope of some kind of 
assistance and follow-up after the interview. In such cases the informants were advised that this would not be possible, 
and any positive outcomes from the research would be more general in terms of resettlement policy than directed towards 
individual refugees or asylum seekers.  
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was ‘true’ or ‘false’ according to the practices of UNHCR and other agencies around resettlement. It 
should be noted that, as previous studies have found,4 informants’ responses to the researcher (a 
foreigner) may have been especially emotive in order to elicit a sy mpathetic response, with some 
hopes that this might bring them support, whether material, in the form of advocacy, or with 
resettlement itself; some informants, in spite of being advised of the nature and objectives of the 
research, requested that their names be recorded and submitted to European countries for resettlement. 
One should remain cautious of internalising a ‘culture of disbelief’,5
42 refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed in Nairobi. Eleven of the refugees interviewed 
were officially registered in either Kakuma or Dadaab refugee camps but were living in Nairobi for 
livelihood or education purposes, or had medical conditions which could not be adequately addressed 
in the camps. Others were officially registered as urban refugees by UNHCR and had been granted 
mandates in Nairobi, having signed a f orm declaring their ability to sustain themselves in the city 
independently of UNHCR support. Interviews were mainly conducted with the four predominant 
refugee communities in Kenya
 however, and assuming that all 
refugees create stories in order to seek resettlement. Such a culture certainly exists amongst the case-
hardened staff of UNHCR and other refugee agencies, in which refugees are often viewed as story-
tellers, manipulating the truth and reproducing narratives of victimhood in an attempt to be resettled. 
Refugees’ narratives and discourses around resettlement should not necessarily be read as ‘true’ or 
‘false’, but as offering insights into how the refugee situation is experienced, understood and made 
sense of by refugees.  
6
Interviews in Nairobi were mostly carried out in the enclaves in which the various communities 
predominantly reside. For Somali and Ethiopian refugees, all interviews were conducted in Eastleigh, 
a vibrant and multi-cultural neighbourhood with a booming economy, fuelled in part by Somali 
transnational business ties and diaspora remittances.
: Somalis (of various clans, including minority clans such as Somali 
Bantu, Benadiri and Asharaff), Ethiopian Oromo, Congolese (various ethnic groups from North and 
South Kivu, including Banyamulenge) and Southern Sudanese (4 Dinka and 6 Nuer informants). In 
addition, one Eritrean and one Burundian Tutsi refugee were interviewed in Nairobi. Gender equity 
was sought, with18 women and 24 men interviewed.  
7 The Congolese refugee community, as well as 
the Rwandan and Burundian communities, tend to be less concentrated in one neighbourhood or area 
than Somali and Ethiopian refugees, and reside in numerous estates across Nairobi, including Kayole, 
Kangemi, Kawangware and Satellite, dispersed amongst Kenyan nationals.8 Interviews with 
Congolese refugees were conducted in the city centre and in Kayole in eastern Nairobi. The South 
Sudanese refugee community similarly tends to reside in a number of different areas across Nairobi, 
including Donholm, Komorock, Kawangware, Githurai and Ruiru, amongst others.9
                                                     
4 E.g. Campbell at al, 2006, ‘Congolese refugee livelihoods in Nairobi’.  
 Interviews with 
members of the South Sudanese Nuer community were conducted in Donholm in eastern Nairobi and 
the Dinka community in Kawangware in western Nairobi. Interviews were carried out in public places 
such as ca fes, restaurants and salons as w ell as i n informants’ homes. Some refugees and asylum 
seekers were understandably cautious about sharing their stories, especially in cases where their 
security was threatened (particularly for Oromo refugees who often live in fear of Ethiopian security 
agents said to be operating in the city). However, a majority of informants were compelled to tell their 
stories in great detail, especially around their frustrations with the resettlement situation in Kenya.  
5 As described in Trueman, 2010, ‘Ethiopia exports more than coffee’. 
6 According to UNHCR statistics, 2012a, ‘Statistical summary as of August 2012’.  
7 See Lindley, 2010, The Early Morning Phonecall. While the Ethiopian refugee community is particularly concentrated in 
Eastleigh, there are also significant communities of Amhara refugees in particular in the more upmarket neighbourhoods 
of Jamhuri and Hurlingham. 
8 see Pavanello et al, 2010, ‘Hidden and exposed’, 13.  
9 There is also a significant [wealthier] southern Sudanese community in Kileleshwa, Hurlingham and Jamhuri estates.  
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In Kakuma, refugees and asylum seekers residing mostly in one section of the camp (Kakuma 1) 
were interviewed. Refugee community leaders and interpreters were accessed via UNHCR’s Community 
Service unit, who were then able to introduce the researcher to members of their community to 
interview. In total, 41 refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed in Kakuma: Ethiopians (including 
Oromo, Amhara, Tigray and Ethiopian Nuer), South Sudanese (Dinka and Nuer), Somalis (of various 
clans), Congolese (of various ethnic groups from North and South Kivu) and Burundians (Hutu) were 
interviewed. Most refugees in the camp were very keen to tell their stories. As in Nairobi, it was 
necessary to emphasise my inability as an independent researcher to provide any assistance or refer cases 
to UNHCR. The Oromo community was particularly keen to be interviewed, meaning the number of 
interviews from Oromo refugees and asylum seekers are somewhat disproportionate to the other 
communities. Although gender equity was sought and emphasised, only thirteen women were 
interviewed in the camp. While the challenges accessing women are frustrating, they also emphasise that 
men tend to be more active in pursuing opportunities in the camp.10
Research also involved interviews with UNHCR in both Nairobi and Kakuma, with the Senior 
Resettlement Officer in Nairobi, the Senior Protection Officer and Resettlement Officer in Kakuma, 
and with UNHCR resettlement caseworkers in Dadaaab
 
11 and Kakuma. Discussions were held with 
the head of IOM’s sub-office in Kakuma and IOM’s director of non-US movements was interviewed 
at IOM’s headquarters in Nairobi. In addition, the manager of IOM’s Canadian Orientation Abroad 
programme (also working with European countries’ cultural orientation programmes for resettled 
refugees) was interviewed in Nairobi. A member of staff at the Government of Kenya’s Department of 
Refugee Affairs (DRA) was interviewed in Nairobi, along with refugee agencies, including Refuge 
Point, Kituo Cha Sheria, Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), and Heshima Kenya.12
In order to gain insights into the workings and perspectives around resettlement of those European 
countries resettling from Kenya, interviews were conducted with the consulates of European countries 
resettling refugees from Kenya – the UK, Netherlands and Denmark. I was fortunate to be able to 
observe the Netherlands’ second cultural orientation session for refugees who had been selected for 
resettlement from Nairobi and to discuss the Netherlands’ resettlement policies and practices with staff 
from the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). In addition, I was able to meet 
with members of a delegation from the Swedish Migration Board towards the end of their selection 
mission in Kenya. I also met with caseworkers for the Resettlement Support Centre (RSC) of the U.S. 
in Nairobi for sub-Saharan Africa and interviewed the Refugee Coordinator for State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in order to gain a sense of how European 
resettlement is viewed by UNHCR’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, and what European countries 
can learn from the U.S.’s resettlement policies and practices.  
  
3. Contextual Analysis 
Kenya’s refugee population  
Kenya currently hosts some 630,926 refugees and asylum seekers.13 The majority of the country’s 
refugees reside in its two desert refugee camps – Dadaab, in North Eastern Province, and Kakuma, in 
North Rift Valley Province – and a large number also live in Kenya’s significant cities, most notably 
Nairobi.14
                                                     
10
 My sense was that interviews were treated as a means of campaigning for resettlement. 
 In addition, an unknown but likely high number of de facto refugees live unregistered in the 
country, most commonly in urban centres. 
11 By phone. 
12 More on the place of these agencies within Kenya’s resettlement landscape in section 4. 
13 According to UNHCR’s official statistics: UNHCR, 2012a, ‘Statistical Summary as of August 2012: Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Kenya’. 
14 UNHCR, 2012a. 
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Kenya’s refugee history began with the country’s hosting of Ugandan refugees displaced by 
political coups during the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, Kenya’s official refugee numbers stood at 
15,000; the majority of these were Ugandans who had managed to integrate into the country’s socio-
economic landscape relatively smoothly, acquiring Kenyan identity cards and gaining access to social 
services relative to Kenyans.15 Kenya’s refugee situation changed dramatically with the onset of the 
nineties, which saw a surge in the number of refugees entering Kenya in response to regional crises. 
This began with a wave of an estimated 300,000 Somali refugees between 1991 and 199316 following 
the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1992 into camps at the border at Liboi, north coast (Marafa), 
around Mombasa (Utanga) and the Dadaab camps in North Eastern Province. Shortly after, the 
collapse of the Unity government in Ethiopia displaced around 40,000 Ethiopians into Kenya.17 The 
same year, 12,000 Sudanese minors entered Kenya fleeing the insecurity resulting from the fighting 
between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan, resulting in the creation of Kakuma refugee camp. 
Around this time, Congolese fleeing the Mobutu regime after ten years of fighting were also flowing 
into Kenya.18 By 1992, K enya’s refugee numbers had reached around 420,000, as compared to an 
estimated 13,000 in 1991.19
Refugee flows into Kenya continued into the nineties and beyond. New arrivals of Somalis into the 
country persisted through 2006, in spite of the government’s closing of the border, as people fled the 
insecurity brought by the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union by US-sponsored Ethiopian and 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces.
 The majority of these refugees were Somali. 
20 There have been further waves of Somali refugees 
entering Kenya in recent years, with thousands fleeing the devastating drought of 2011 w hich was 
compounded by restrictions placed on aid imposed by insurgent group Al Shabaab who controlled 
some of the worst-hit areas.21 The crisis saw numbers in Dadaab refugee camp swell to 400,000, 
making it Kenya’s ‘second biggest city’, hosting over four times more than its original capacity of 
90,000 people.22 UNHCR’s mid-term objective for South Sudanese refugees since the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been repatriation, though this is generally deemed to 
have been a problematic process to say the least. Although UNHCR supported those who voluntarily 
repatriated with integration grants, they were not given repatriation packages, and many returnees 
found a lack of infrastructure and services and poor living conditions at ‘home’. In addition, ethnic 
conflicts in South Sudan saw significant numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan, which has halted 
UNHCR’s repatriation programme.23
Today, Somalis make up the significant majority of refugees in Kenya, with their numbers 
officially at 535,318, the majority residing in the Dadaab refugee camp complex.
  
24
                                                     
15 Crisp, 1999, ‘A state of insecurity’, 17. 
 Ethiopian refugees 
follow; UNHCR figures state that 35,873 Ethiopian refugees live in Kenya, mainly in Dadaab but with 
significant numbers in Nairobi, though these figures are not disaggregated according to the different 
Ethiopian ethnic groups in Kenya. South Sudanese refugees are the third biggest refugee population in 
Kenya at 32,146, the vast majority officially residing in Kakuma, though fieldwork for this study 
16 Kirui and Mwaruvie, 2012, ‘The dilemma of hosting refugees’.  
17 Hyndman and Nylund. 1998, ‘UNHCR and the status of prima facie refugees in Kenya’, 4. 
18 Konzolo, 2010, ‘An overview of refugee status determination and the rights of refugees in Kenya’, 2.  
19 Odhiambo-Abuya, 2004, ‘UNHCR and status determination imtaxaan in Kenya’, 188. 
20 See Lindley, 2009, ‘Leaving Mogadishu’. 
21 The Kenyan government has tended to portray Somali refugees who arrived in 2011 as economic refugees fleeing hunger, 
with the argument that their repatriation should thus be relatively unproblematic. See Long, 201, ‘Kenya, Jubaland and 
Somalia’s refugees.  
22 Rice, 2011, ‘Somali refugee settlement swells’. 
23 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
24 Made up of Dagahelay, Hagadera and Ifo I and II camps.  
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suggests that unofficial numbers in Nairobi are significant. Congolese are the fourth biggest refugee 
community in the country, officially at 12,742, the majority officially registered in Nairobi, though 
some 5,500 reside in Kakuma. Other refugee communities in Kenya are Sudanese (6,052), Burundian 
(3,808), Eritrean (1,980), Rwandan (1,783) and Ugandan (1,041). The table in Annex 1 presents 
UNHCR’s records for the populations of refugees of different countries of origin in Kenya from 2008 
to 2012, with a breakdown of these figures according to where refugees officially reside.  
Research sites contexts 
Kakuma refugee camp 
The number of refugees and asylum seekers residing in Kakuma currently stands at 102,76725, 
surpassing the camp’s original capacity of 100,000. The camp was established in 1992 to host 
Sudanese refugees, including the ‘Lost Boys’ who were orphaned or displaced during the Sudanese 
Civil War. Populations from South Sudan continue to constitute a large proportion of the camp’s 
refugees; during the first seven months of this year, Kakuma received 12,123 new arrivals, mostly 
from South Sudan’s Jonglei and South Kordofan states.26
Kakuma is located in Turkana District in the arid lands of the north Rift Valley, the poorest and 
most marginalised district in Kenya. 94.3 per cent of the pastoralist host population, the Turkana, were 
classified as living in poverty in a 2011 survey,
 Somalis represent the largest number of 
refugees in the camp, followed by South Sudanese, Ethiopians and Congolese. The camp is made up 
of three main sections – Kakuma 1, 2 and 3. 
27 and have tended to resent the refugee population for 
having a relatively better quality of life as a result of the rations, housing, education and healthcare 
services provided by UNHCR and implementing partners.28 Attacks on refugees by armed Turkana 
have historically been a major source of insecurity in the camp and, though having significantly 
improved in recent years, remain an issue. 29
                                                     
25 UNHCR, 2012d. 
 A number of refugees interviewed in Nairobi who had 
previously resided in Kakuma cited attacks by Turkana as their main reasons for moving to the city. 
Refugees also struggle with the harsh climatic conditions in the camp – high temperatures and dust 
storms render the area an extremely challenging place to live. Although this was also said to have 
improved slightly in recent years due to improved rainfall levels, increased rainfall also brings floods 
to the camp, and refugees’ houses have been swept away during wet seasons. Such challenges account 
for why many refugees choose to reside in urban centres, even as they remain registered in the camps.  
26 UNHCR, 2012b, ‘Kakuma camp in Kenya surpasses its 10,000 capacity’.  
27 Omari, 2011, ‘Kajiado named richest town in new ranking’.  
28 See Aukot, 2003, ‘It is better to be a refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma’. 
29 At the time of fieldwork in Kakuma, a refugee had been killed in the Kakuma 3 section of the camp the previous week. 
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Nairobi 
The official number of refugees residing in Nairobi according to UNHCR’s most recent statistics is 
55,581,30
Somalis, more than other refugee populations, face discrimination from the host population in 
Kenya, in part informed by a historical marginalisation and suspicion of the country’s native Somali 
populations as well as more recent events which have caused Somalis or those with Somali-like 
appearances to be associated with Islamic radicalism. In October 2011, following a sp ate of 
kidnappings of foreigners (aid workers and tourists) on its territory, the Kenya Defence Force 
embarked on a military incursion into Somalia with the objective of removing militant group Al 
Shabaab. Kenya’s involvement in the ‘war on terror’ prompted numerous grenade and gun attacks 
across Kenya, mostly in the north eastern town of Garissa and in Nairobi, targeting bus stations, busy 
streets and churches.
 but the actual number is likely to be significantly higher, since many are registered in the camps 
but choose to live in Nairobi for livelihood and educational purposes, or because of medical needs.  
31 These attacks have seen an increase in xenophobic attitudes towards those with 
Somali appearance32 and police harassment of Somalis in Eastleigh estate, where a large concentration 
of Somalis reside. Ethiopian refugees, often residing in Eastleigh, also face discrimination since they 
have a d istinctive appearance and can be mistaken for Somalis. These groups thus face particular 
insecurity in Nairobi at the hands of the police, who regularly conduct night-time ‘operations’ in 
Eastleigh in order to cleanse the estate of illegal immigrants. This has culminated in recent months in a 
Kenya police project known as Operation Fagia Wageni (literally ‘operation sweep up the guests’), in 
which all immigrant populations residing in Eastleigh are targeted. Police operations in Eastleigh are 
not necessarily entirely aimed at removing illegal immigrants; police have been accused of visiting the 
estate when they are short of cash, knowing that refugees and asylum seekers lacking documentation 
will readily pay a bribe so as to avoid being detained.33 South Sudanese, residing in other areas of the 
city, also experience regular requests for identification from the police due to their distinctive 
appearance. Documentation is a grey area, and few police are clear on what documentation refugees 
should be carrying to allow their residence in Nairobi.34
Some groups cited insecurity in Kakuma as a r eason for choosing to stay in the city. Three 
Congolese Banyamulenge informants talked of relatives who had died during the massacre of 
Banyamulenge refugees at Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi and said that they thus felt unable to 
stay in a camp and could not trust UNHCR to keep them safe.
 Refugees from all communities interviewed 
cited experiencing difficulties with the police, but most notably those groups who were more visible in 
Nairobi; refugees from the Great Lakes region who can be mistaken as Kenyans and sometimes speak 
Kiswahili were less likely to report these kinds of incidents.  
35
                                                     
30 UNHCR, 2012a. 
 Ethiopian refugees described 
particular insecurity and anxiety due to targeted attacks on them, including forced deportations, carried 
out by Ethiopian security agents or Kenyan police funded by the Ethiopian government. Most said that 
31 Note that it is unclear as to whether these attacks have been Al Shabaab-instigated or are rather the activities of 
opportunistic individuals and groups in Kenya.  
32 An extreme example is when Somalis were attacked in the street and their homes in Pangani estate in Nairobi which 
neighbours Eastleigh following a grenade attack on a  church which killed one child and injured several others on 30 
September 2012.  
33 Harper, 2010, ‘Somalis in Kenya: they call us ATM machines’.  
34 Pavenello et al, 2010: 17. 
35 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Marc, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 
August 2012. 
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to live in Kakuma, closer to the border, was more dangerous, and that hence they were forced to stay 
in Eastleigh, though some mentioned seeking safe haven in other parts of the country.36
Legal framework for refugees in Kenya 
  
Kenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees as 
well as the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention. However, up until 2006, Kenya 
lacked any national legislation on refugees. While Kenya’s early refugee policy has been described as 
open and accommodating, since 1990 it has been characterised by draconian policies which aimed to 
contain the refugee ‘problem’ and refugees’ movements. Due to overwhelming numbers of refugees in 
the country by 1992, the Government of Kenya (GOK) assigned all responsibility for registering, 
determining the status and ensuring the protection of asylum seekers during this period to UNHCR. 
The government applied containment policies to its refugee population, targeted particularly at the 
growing Somali refugee population; refugees were allowed to reside only in camps, and those needing 
to travel out of the camps for medical needs, to take up education opportunities or fleeing specific and 
targeted insecurity in the camps were required to carry a movement pass issued by UNHCR.37
Following sustained advocacy by UNHCR and civil society organisations, in 2007 Kenya adopted 
the Refugee Act 2006, through which the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention were implemented at the national level.
  
38 The Act identifies two categories of refugees: 
statutory refugees and prima facie refugees, and lays out the provisions for those who should be 
excluded from gaining refugee status or should have their refugee status withdrawn from them, 
including people who have committed crimes against peace or humanity; have committed war crimes 
or serious non-political crimes outside or inside Kenya; have been guilty of acts contrary to the 
principles of the UN or AU; have dual nationality. In addition, where the circumstances which caused 
an individual to flee have changed, the individual should be excluded from receiving refugee status.39 
The Refugee Act also makes room for some deviation from Kenya’s de facto encampment policy, 
allowing refugees to reside in urban areas provided that they are able to sustain themselves financially. 
However, Pavanello et al argue that Kenya continues to lack the national refugee and asylum policy 
required to assist with the implementation of the Refugee Act, and that there is as a result palpable 
confusion around the government’s official position on where refugees should reside.40
The Refugee Act established a government department responsible for refugee issues, the 
Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA), which operates within the Ministry of State for 
Immigration and Registration of Persons. The Refugee Act declares that the DRA is responsible 
for the management, coordination and administration of refugee issues, including developing 
policies, seeking durable solutions, coordinating international assistance, issuing travel documents 
and managing the refugee camps. The vision for the DRA was to take over from UNHCR as lead 
agency on refugee issues in Kenya; all issues pertaining to refugees should first come to the DRA, 
after which the DRA could then assign responsibility for those issues to stakeholder agencies, 
including UNHCR.
 While some 
refugees are today able to legally reside outside of the camps, there are no official guidelines around 
which refugee groups may or may not.  
41
                                                     
36 Boru, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012. 
  
37 Crisp, 1999: 28.  
38 see GOK, 2006, The Refugee Act 2006, Section 16 (1) (a). 
39 GoK, 2006: 3. 
40 Pavanello et al, 2010. 
41 Interview with DRA official, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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Since March 2011, asylum seekers have been required to register with the DRA.42 On arrival in 
Kenya, asylum seekers have up to 30 days to report to DRA reception centres distributed across the 
country – in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, Shauri Moyo neighbourhood in Nairobi, Nakuru in 
Rift Valley, Mombasa and Malindi in Coast Province, and Isiolo in Eastern Province. Here, asylum 
seekers’ essential information, photographs and fingerprints are taken and they are given a letter 
confirming their registration as they await a government alien ID card.43 The new system is felt to be 
positive, in that it demonstrates greater responsibility-sharing between the GOK and UNHCR. 
However, the system has also been found to be inefficient; refugees wait long periods before being 
issued with the ID card, and one informant reported a current backlog of 60,000 refugee ID cards.44 
Recently, the government announced that all refugees being resettled to third countries are required to 
hold alien ID cards,45
Having registered with the DRA and been issued with an asylum seeker certificate, asylum seekers 
from southern Somalia and South Sudan are automatically granted refugee status as prima facie 
refugees. Asylum seekers from other countries or regions undergo an eligibility interview for statutory 
refugee status (refugee status determination, or RSD). This process continues to be conducted by 
UNHCR, though both the RSD process and issuance of mandates will ultimately be the responsibility 
of the DRA and UNHCR and the GOK are currently engaged in capacity building in order to make 
this transition.
 which will likely be problematic in light of the backlog issue.  
46 There has been some criticism of UNHCR’s role in RSD, with the view that acting as 
‘judge and jury’ compromises UNHCR’s fairness and neutrality, and promotes mistrust in the agency 
by refugees themselves.47 This mistrust and suspicion was certainly a common theme of interviews 
with asylum seekers in both Nairobi and Kakuma. The RSD process can vary; according to UNHCR, 
if one’s case is straightforward, an asylum seeker may be required to go through only one interview, 
but if there are some areas of ambiguity in one’s case, one may be recalled for several further 
interviews before a decision is made approving or rejecting an asylum seeker for refugee status. In 
addition, asylum seekers may be called for an RSD registration interview ahead of an actual RSD 
interview.48 Those who are approved as refugees are issued with a mandate which is valid for two 
years, after which a refugee must seek its renewal from UNHCR. A number of refugees and asylum 
seekers interviewed in both Nairobi and Kakuma spoke of numerous eligibility interviews with 
UNHCR and long waits for a decision, sometimes for several years. This can put a lot pressure on 
refugees in Nairobi in particular, who have to source transport costs to UNHCR’s offices, often only to 
be told to return the following week. Those who are rejected are given a 30 day period to appeal to an 
Appeals Board, after which they are required to leave the country, a policy that was created under the 
2006 Refugee Act.49
                                                     
42 Interview with RCK, Nairobi, 20 July 2012.  
 Those who are successful are granted the mandate and receive a R efugee 
Identification Pass. Those residing in the camps who are granted refugee status are issued with a ration 
card and are entitled to all of the support services available in the camp. Should they wish to leave the 
camps, their reason to do so must be approved by the DRA, after which they are issued with a 
43 The alien card is a p ositive development in terms of refugees’ documentation since it allows for better treatment by 
Kenyan police, especially for urban refugees.  
44 Pavanello et al, 2010: 15; interview with RCK, 20 July 2012. 
45
 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 October 2012.  
46 ‘Refugee Status Determination’ , DRA website, www.refugees.co.ke  
47 Konzolo, 2010: 11. Odhiambo-Abuya, 2004, describes how amongst Somalis the RSD process is known as imtaxaan 
which translates as ‘examination’.  
48 Communication with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 16 O ctober 2012. According to UNHCR, delays occur when a 
refugee’s case is not straightforward – i.e. when there are some areas of ambiguity, e.g. non-biological children. The 
refugee may be called for several interviews, which span a long period of time. What is not clear is the extent to which 
these long waits are because of the complexity of the case alone, or also due to UNHCR’s staffing issues which can cause 
inefficiency in the system. 
49
 Konzolo, 2010: 13 
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movement pass.50 Refugees in Nairobi who are granted the mandate are able to access services offered 
by refugee agencies, such as medical and food assistance (HIAS, Refuge Point, GIZ) and legal aid and 
advocacy (Kituo Cha Sheria, RCK), though it is the policy of UNHCR to advise refugees that they 
will have more reliable access to services in the camps. On receiving the ration card, refugees may 
unofficially go to Nairobi, leaving their card number with family or friends so that they can be 
contacted in the event of being called for an interview, including for resettlement, when they return to 
the camps. Refugees also return to the camps from Nairobi for headcounts in order to maintain their 
official residency there as well as to keep their ration card or their name on a family member’s card.51
Possibilities for durable solutions for Kenya’s refugees 
  
UNHCR identifies ‘durable solutions’ to the ‘refugee problem’ as local integration, voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement. In Kenya, opportunities for durable solutions are limited. The country’s 
encampment policy and measures to restrict refugees’ movements significantly curtails opportunities 
for local integration socially, politically and economically. As mentioned above, refugees face police 
harassment and discrimination in urban centres, especially those who have a d istinctive appearance, 
such as South Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians. Furthermore, local integration appears not to be an 
envisaged or desirable solution for the Government of Kenya, which regularly makes statements about 
the burden its Somali refugee population places on the country, and has made it clear that the only 
opportunity it sees for them is repatriation.52
The role of resettlement 
 As described above, UNHCR facilitated the voluntary 
repatriation of southern Sudanese refugees from Kakuma following the signing of the 2005 CPA 
between the Sudans, but this has largely been unsuccessful, and has since been halted due to large 
numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan flowing into the camp fleeing ethnic violence. Rwandan 
refugees in Kenya will likely soon face proposals of repatriation, since the country is deemed by the 
international community to now be safe, and the Rwandan government has requested their return from 
neighbouring countries and for UNHCR to invoke the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees. Very 
few of Kenya’s refugees are actually able to return to their country of origin, especially its 
predominantly Somali population.  
Of the three durable solutions, resettlement is often the only real option for refugees in Kenya. Yet, 
it is an opportunity limited to just a fraction of Kenya’s refugees – less than one per cent.53 Amongst 
refugees and asylum seekers, the term ‘durable solutions’ is often synonymous with resettlement, or 
used as a eu phemism when requesting resettlement.54
                                                     
50 Pavanello et al, 2010: 15. 
 Resettlement to a third country is generally 
highly desired by refugees, but for many remains a dream. Jansen describes how this dream has been 
fostered through resettlement programmes in Kakuma, during which resettlement has become highly 
visible through the posting of refugees’ ration card numbers on not ice boards calling them for 
resettlement interviews and the flights departing the camp carrying individuals and families who have 
been selected for resettlement. The dream is made even more tangible through modern technologies 
51 Campbell, 2006, ‘Urban refugees in Nairobi’, 400. 
52 Long, 2011. 
53
 According to UNHCR figures for 2011, 0.6 per cent of the country’s refugee population was resettled in 2011. 
UNHCR, 2012a. 
54 While refugees and asylum seekers may not directly request resettlement, knowing that this is not normally favourable 
with refugee agencies, they might say that they are looking for ‘durable solutions’. Discussions with staff at Kituo Cha 
Sheria, 25 July 2012; with staff at the US Resettlement Support Centre (RSC), 7 July 2012. Even those who are not 
recognised as refugees or have not entered the RSD process may be familiar with the language associated with refugee 
situations such as ‘durable solutions’ and draw upon this language strategically when seeking support.  
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such as international telecommunications, the internet and international money transfer, through which 
refugees in the camp are able to communicate with their ‘lucky’ friends and relatives abroad. Jansen 
argues that this creates an environment in the camp that encourages refugees to “cheat” and “negotiate 
vulnerability” through insecurity claims; resettlement is viewed as so mething that can actively be 
attained rather than an option only for the most vulnerable few.55
4. The Resettlement Landscape In Kenya 
 Agencies are constantly navigating 
this environment, trying to uphold their credibility with UNHCR or resettlement countries by 
identifying which refugees are indeed the most vulnerable. The result is a palpable culture of disbelief 
or doubt, whereby refugees are often assumed to be strategically bending the truth in order to be 
resettled. At the same time, this culture is strongly felt by refugees, who resent having to perform 
vulnerability to prove their eligibility for resettlement under the critical eyes of agency staff, and feel 
that they are constantly suspected of lying or cheating with agencies trying to catch them out so as to 
dismiss their claims.  
History of refugee resettlement from Kenya 
There have historically been two channels through which refugees are resettled from Kenya: due to 
protection needs where no alternative solution can be identified, and through resettlement programmes 
targeting specific groups. In cases of referrals due to protection needs, these may be identified by 
UNHCR’s functional units56 such as the Protection and Community Services Units or implementing 
partners who are working with refugees in a supportive capacity (e.g. providing legal aid, food aid, 
accommodation, etc.) and see that an individual or family has protection needs that cannot be met any 
way other than resettlement. In addition, there are avenues through which refugees can make their 
protection needs known to UNHCR or implementing partners via visiting UNHCR’s protection unit in 
Nairobi on ‘desking’ days (days when officers from UNHCR units are able to receive refugees in 
person in order for them to raise any issues they may have) or via field post in the camps (similarly to 
desking days, UNHCR units each have an assigned day when officers are available to receive refugees 
in person to discuss any issues). Refugees in both Nairobi and Kakuma may also communicate any 
protection needs with the police, who may then refer the case on to an appropriate UNHCR unit.57
Resettlement programmes shift according to current political situations and agendas. Towards the 
end of 2000, 3,800 southern Sudanese unaccompanied minors known as the ‘Lost Boys’ were resettled 
to the U.S. from Kakuma under the United States Refugee Programme (USRP). In 2003, 15,000  
Somali Bantu refugees were resettled from Kakuma.
 
Diagrams in Annexes 4 a nd 5 pr esent the pathways through which refugees may be resettled from 
Kakuma and Nairobi. 
58
During interviews with refugees and asylum seekers, references were sometimes made to 
corruption within the resettlement system during the late nineties / early 2000s, whereby refugees who 
were to be resettled had their cases ‘stolen’ or sold to others who were able to go in their places.
 As described below, in recent years refugees in 
Kakuma and Dadaab have been prioritised for resettlement according to their year of arrival in order to 
address the protracted refugee situation in Kenya.  
59
                                                     
55 Jansen, 2008, ‘Between vulnerability and assertiveness’.  
 The 
56
 UNHCR’s functional units comprise of the Protection Unit, the Community Services Unit and the Resettlement Unit. 
57
 Communication with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 16 October 2012. 
58 Jansen, ibid. 
59 Leila and Mohamed [Somali], interview Nairobi, 27 July 2012; Yusuf [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; Sagale 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; James [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012. 
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possibilities for this kind of fraud have more recently been limited by biometric registration systems.60 
There were also allegations of fraud within the resettlement system around this time which were made 
publicly known following an investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, requested 
by UNHCR. The investigation revealed that up to 70 U NHCR employees in Nairobi accepted 
monetary bribes from refugees seeking resettlement in third countries.61 Since, checks and balances 
have been put in place to limit opportunities for corruption.62
Contemporary resettlement situation 
  
In 2011, 3,581 refugees departed Kenya to be resettled in a third country and 10,518 refugees’ cases 
were submitted for resettlement.63 Of those who departed, the vast majority (2, 083) were resettled to 
the U.S., 541 to Canada, 329 to Sweden, 208 to the U.K., 182 to Australia, 81 to the Netherlands, 58 to 
Norway, 10 to New Zealand, and 89 to ‘other countries’.64
While the U.S. is by far the most significant country of resettlement based on the numbers of 
refugees it resettles, the process of resettlement to America is renowned amongst UNHCR, other 
refugee agencies and refugees alike to be long and often drawn-out. This is in large part due to the 
extensive security checks required by the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS).
 Generally, the U.S. and Canada are deemed 
the biggest players in resettlement, followed by Australia, the UK and Sweden.  
65 UNHCR and 
implementing partners refer cases to be resettled to the U.S. via the Resettlement Support Centre 
(RSC) in Nairobi. RSC caseworkers are then responsible for carrying out interviews with these 
refugees, and gathering the information required by the U.S.’s Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(INS), which then select refugees for interview based on the information gathered. At the same time, 
CIS conducts security checks on each of the cases. Through this process, refugees are rarely resettled 
to the US within a year, and Somali refugees usually face a significantly longer waiting period as 
compared to other nationalities.66 UNHCR states that the average processing time between 
resettlement submission and departure of non-Somali refugees in Kenya stands at 358 days, but that 
for Somalis this processing time takes 617 days.67
Numbers of refugees resettled by European countries, as shown in Annexes 4 and 5, appear to be a 
drop in the ocean. European countries do offer UNHCR important alternatives to the U.S., however; 
although the U.S. offers more than enough resettlement places, it is unable to process cases quickly, 
even in emergencies such as immediate protection needs or medical issues. European countries, on the 
other hand, are in special circumstances able to resettle cases in a matter of weeks, or sometimes even 
days. Sweden is renowned as the fastest country of resettlement, and has been able to turn cases 
around within as little as one to two days.
 These figures are heavily skewed towards US 
figures, given the numbers of refugees the US resettles. 
68
                                                     
60 Interview with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
  
61 Kirby, 2002,’Crime did pay in Kenyan UN office’.  
62 Such as protection panels, which ensure that staff from different UNHCR units assess the appropriateness of resettlement 
as a durable solution for an individual or family. Interview with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
63 see Annexes 2 and 3 for tables showing numbers of refugees submitted for resettlement and actual departures from 2007-
2012, showing numbers according to Kenya’s refugee population 
64 see Annex 3 f or a breakdown of refugee departures to different third countries for 2007-2012 and Annex 2 f or a 
breakdown of refugees whose files were submitted for resettlement to different third countries for 2007-2012 
65 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Nairobi, 11 
September 2012.  
66
 Because of the risks associated with Somalis due to the presence of Al Shabaab in Somalia.  
67 UNHCR, 2012c, ‘Updated fact sheets on priority situations for the strategic use of resettlement’. 
68 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 A ugust 2012; Swedish Migration Board delegation, 
Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
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Resettlement processes from the camps and Nairobi 
Camps 
In recent years there have been two streams through which refugees are referred for resettlement from 
the camps. Since 2006, UNHCR has been implementing a protracted refugee resettlement programme 
from Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Refugees are selected for resettlement interviews based on their 
year of arrival, starting with the earliest arrivals from 1992 up to 2006 arrivals. The reason for making 
the cut-off year 2006 was in order for the programme to have a boundary and time limit (as opposed to 
the year 2006 having any particular significance in itself). Cases are most commonly referred to the 
U.S. or Canada, since the numbers are significant and tend not to be urgent. South Sudanese were not 
included in the protracted resettlement programme due to the country’s anticipated independence 
which officially came about in July 2011.  
Alongside the protracted refugee resettlement programme, refugees continue to be considered by 
UNHCR according to their protection needs and if there is no solution other than resettlement can be 
found for them.69 This is the only channel through which urban refugees can be referred for 
resettlement; resettlement programmes tend only to apply in camps. Refugees can be referred to the 
Resettlement Unit via their own self-referral to the Protection Unit or Community Services Unit or via 
UNHCR’s implementing partners. In addition, refugees may be referred to the Resettlement Unit by 
UNHCR colleagues in other units or implementing partner agencies according to their knowledge 
about refugees’ protection needs. Refugees may write and submit letters to UNHCR explaining their 
protection needs, which is often seen as a means through which to ‘apply’ for resettlement. These 
letters are supposed to be read by the Protection Unit, which then proposes a solution for the issue, 
such as referral to the Kenyan police, camp security, Community Services Unit, etc. In general, 
writing letters is not an effective conduit for resettlement, perhaps because it is seen as a way through 
which refugees can actively seek resettlement and is a channel not always accessible to the most 
vulnerable; refugees who write letters must be literate and have knowledge of English, or else know 
someone who can assist them with writing the letter, or even be able to pay for that service.70 In 
addition, UNHCR can be understaffed and when swamped with letters may not always read them. In 
situations where agency workers (UNHCR units or implementing partners) are unable to see 
alternative durable solutions for cases other than resettlement, cases are referred to a protection panel, 
constituted of staff from the protection unit, community services unit and field staff through which 
cases are discussed and a solution agreed to – be it resettlement, relocation to another section of the 
camp, relocation to Nairobi, and so on. The panel functions as a system of checks and balances to 
ensure fairness in the resettlement process and eradicate any opportunities for corruption, and meets 
when a certain number of cases have been referred. On the whole, alternative solutions to resettlement 
are found by the panel, and the resettlement unit receives a relatively small number of referrals this 
way.71
 
 Where refugees have entered the resettlement process through a needs or protection-based 
channel, if they are unsuccessful at the UNHCR stage they are unlikely to be informed why, since that 
would risk information about resettlement criteria leaking to the wider refugee population and people 
adjusting their cases accordingly. My impression was that was also the policy where refugees are 
rejected resettlement at the stage of interviews with third countries. Not being informed why one is 
rejected resettlement is, understandably, incredibly frustrating for refugees.  
                                                     
69
 The pathways through which refugees may be resettled are presented in a diagram in Annex 4.  
70 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
71 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
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In Dadaab, the protracted refugee resettlement programme has been significantly delayed due to the 
current security situation in the camp,72 as discussed below. In Kakuma, the protracted refugee 
resettlement programme is currently coming to an end, and is to be replaced with a more traditional, 
protection-based resettlement programme.73 This programme will involve colleagues in the 
community service unit carrying out needs-based assessments of refugees, from which refugees 
potentially in need of resettlement can be identified for referral to the resettlement unit. The reasoning 
behind this process being conducted by the community service unit as opposed to staff in the 
resettlement unit is to avoid arousing refugees’ awareness that the needs-based assessment is a channel 
for resettlement, and adjusting their statements accordingly. UNHCR is constantly faced with the 
challenge of rendering the resettlement selection process as credible as possible.74
Nairobi 
  
In Nairobi, refugees may be referred to UNHCR’s Resettlement Unit via UNHCR’s functional units 
(Protection Unit or Community Services Unit) or via UNHCR’s implementing partners. Some 
implementing partners have resettlement referrals to UNHCR and agencies with memorandums of 
understanding with third countries to refer refugees to them directly (bypassing UNHCR) as part of 
their mandates, whilst others would only make referrals in situations where they identify extreme 
need. The Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), for example, as well as mainly dealing with the 
provision of legal assistance to refugees, also refers clients for resettlement. RCK may refer clients to 
UNHCR, as well as to partners who are able to make direct referrals to countries of resettlement, for 
example HIAS (to Canada75), and Refuge Point (to the U.S.).76 Kituo Cha Sheria, also a legal aid 
agency, has a collateral agreement with UNHCR to refer cases to UNHCR for further investigation 
vis-à-vis possibilities for resettlement.77 Heshima Kenya, an organisation concerned with the 
protection of unaccompanied refugee children and youth in Nairobi, would refer services users to 
UNHCR only in cases of extreme insecurity.78 The reasoning behind agencies such as Refuge Point 
and HIAS having memorandums of understanding with the larger resettlement countries is in part in 
order to ensure that vulnerable individuals who cannot be reached by or gain access to UNHCR can 
still be given opportunities for resettlement, and in order to help those resettlement countries to reach 
their resettlement targets. This is mainly a service targeting urban refugees as opposed to taking place 
in the camps,79 and operates through other support programmes such as food and medical assistance or 
psycho-social support. Here, opportunities for resettlement are not usually made explicit, though most 
refugees are quite aware that these opportunities exist. As in Kakuma, at the UNHCR offices in 
Westlands, Nairobi, there is a facility through which refugees can submit letters describing their 
challenges in Kenya, though interviews suggested that refugees are rarely given responses. Generally, 
fewer cases are referred for resettlement from Nairobi. This is in part due to the Kenya office’s 
reluctance to resettle urban refugees, preferring to refer them to the camps unless they have high 
profile cases, such as targeted persecution, or medical issues.80
                                                     
72 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Caseworker, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
 In addition, urban refugees are felt to 
73 UNHCR, 2012c; interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
74 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
75 Though HIAS is exploring establishing an arrangement whereby it can also support the U.S. with meeting its resettlement 
needs and refer cases directly to the U.S., because Canada has in recent years curtailed its resettlement numbers, thus 
reducing funding to HIAS. 
76 Interviews with RCK, 20 July 2012; Refuge Point, 24 July 2012. 
77 Interview with Kituo Cha Sheria, 26 July 2012.  
78 Interview with Heshima Kenya, 18 July 2012.  
79 Though in the camps staff may be seconded to support UNHCR with resettlement referrals, such as RSC and Refuge Point. 
80 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
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be less vulnerable than camp refugees, except in cases whereby refugees might face persecution within 
the camps, such as because of their sexual orientation. For a summary of the resettlement process from 
Nairobi, see diagram in Annex 5. 
Decision making 
In the camps and Nairobi there is no standard resettlement process by UNHCR, which operates on a 
case by case basis. Refugees may be called for a number of interviews before a decision is made on 
their eligibility for resettlement. Once cases are found to be eligible for resettlement and UNHCR has 
identified a p otential country of resettlement, UNHCR issues the refugee with a su bmission letter 
which states which country they have been recommended to. In Kakuma, in situations where an 
individual or family is suspected of fraud with regards to their resettlement case (such as inventing or 
fabricating an insecurity claim), UNHCR will keep the case on hold, conducting further interviews or 
investigations and, if the case continues to appear suspicious, ultimately referring the case to an 
oversight panel which conducts its own investigations. Should it be concluded that the refugee(s) in 
question are guilty of fraud, they are called to the office of the Resettlement Officer and informed that 
their case has been rejected for that reason. Officially, UNHCR has a sanctions system which excludes 
refugees from the resettlement process for three to twelve years, though this is not always 
implemented.81
Resettlement from Kenya in recent years has largely taken place from Kenya’s (and indeed the 
world’s) largest refugee camp, Dadaab. UNHCR’s targets for resettlement were high due to the vast 
numbers of refugees living in Dadaab, many of whom were protracted cases; in 2011, 10,000 
individuals were targeted for resettlement, with 8,000 of those refugees selected from Dadaab. 
However, heightened insecurity in Dadaab over the past two years has led a number of countries to 
withdraw their personnel from conducting resettlement interviews in the camp, curtailing UNHCR’s 
target figures from Kenya in 2012 to 3,750, with only 750 refugees coming from Dadaab.
 If refugees have cases pending with UNHCR, they may enquire about the status of 
their case at UNHCR field posts in Kakuma 1 and 3 sections of the camp, held every Friday morning. 
Field posts are run by two UNHCR resettlement caseworkers, who are able to check on refugees’ 
cases via connecting to an online database. Caseworkers are able to serve 45 refugees, who gain a 
place in the queue by taking a token from the field post a week earlier which entitles them to be seen 
the following week.  
82 This has 
created a real challenge for UNHCR, as r esettlement countries scramble for refugees from a much 
smaller pool of candidates in order to meet their resettlement quotas. Furthermore, many of Dadaab’s 
protracted refugees are most in need of resettlement, but remain largely inaccessible. UNHCR has 
been exploring alternative methodologies through which refugees submitted for resettlement can be 
accessed by interviews for third countries, including video conferencing (piloted with Canada in July 
2012).83 In addition, PRM, U.S. State Department has provided funding for the transfer of 2,000 
Somali refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma, facilitated by IOM, for processing by RSC, which has not 
been allowed to access Dadaab for the past two years. Plans are currently in place for the construction 
of shelters in Kakuma to accommodate these families and individuals as they are being processed for 
resettlement to the U.S. Alternatives were also found for Sweden, which interviewed around 250 
refugees from Dadaab in September 2012 in Nairobi, funding IOM’s operation of securely 
transporting two cohorts of refugees to Nairobi by bus,84
                                                     
81 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
 and accommodating them in IOM’s transit 
centre near Wilson Airport. These measures are of course costly, and, in the case of Sweden, meant 
82 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. Countries are unlikely to be willing to 
resettle refugees on a dossier basis, since the security risks associated with Somalis has rendered face to face interviews a 
requirement. 
83 UNHCR, 2012c. 
84 The road from Dadaab is highly dangerous, with frequent attacks by bandits. 
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that the numbers of refugees requested for submission by UNHCR was curtailed from 350 to 300 (50 
of the refugees were selected from Nairobi) because the cost of transporting and accommodating them 
was simply too high. In addition, the cultural orientation programme which takes place during the 
selection mission was cut from three days of classes to just a one hour session.85
5. European Countries’ Resettlement Processes From Kenya 
  
Overview 
In 2012, three EU member states carried out selection missions in Kenya: Sweden, the UK and the 
Netherlands. Sweden has been conducting selection missions in Kenya since 2009 and has prioritised 
the Horn for resettlement for the past two years (previously priority was given to the Middle East). 
The Netherlands have been resettling from Kenya on a r egular basis since 2007. Denmark has not 
conducted selection missions in Kenya for the past two years, but did so in 2010, during which 124 
Congolese and two Burundians were selected for resettlement.86 At the time of this report’s 
completion, the UK Home Office was unable to provide information about the history of the country’s 
resettlement from Kenya. Other EU member states carry out resettlement from Kenya on a dossier or 
emergency basis according to UNHCR’s requests, but it was not possible to capture this data since 
records tend to show the refugees’ countries of origin as opposed to country of first asylum.87 Dossier 
submissions are typically made through UNHCR’s regional hub office in Nairobi. A number of 
European countries allocate a proportion of their annual quota to dossier and emergency cases which 
can be turned around in a relatively short space of time. As described above, this is an important 
facility for UNHCR and urgent cases, and is particularly highly valued since it is not offered by all 
resettlement countries. Of Sweden’s worldwide resettlement quota of 1,900, about half is reserved for 
dossier cases, and 350 of them are reserved specifically for emergency cases.88 For the Netherlands, of 
its global quota of 500, 100 resettlement positions are reserved for medical cases and family 
reunification.89 The UK has no specific quota for emergency or medical cases, but can accept up to 40 
cases via Romania’s Emergency Transit Centre in Timisoara and three per cent of its quota for 
emergency medical cases.90 On a d ossier basis, UNHCR need only submit a file on the refugee 
individual or family, which is considered by the country of resettlement to be adequate information for 
the resettlement process to go ahead. However, in certain cases countries do require doing a face to 
face interview. Sweden, for example, must interview Somali refugees before accepting them for 
resettlement, even in case of an emergency, and the Netherlands is currently piloting video 
conferencing with refugees who are submitted for resettlement on a dossier basis.91
Referral and selection processes 
  
For non-dossier or emergency cases, the resettlement process to European countries begins with the 
countries announcing their plans to conduct missions in Kenya, and the number of refugees they 
intend to select for resettlement. This communication tends to occur in January following decisions on 
                                                     
85 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
86 Email correspondence with the Danish Immigration Services, 27 September 2012. 
87 France, Switzerland and Finland resettle on an ad-hoc dossier basis from Kenya. IOM Operation Manager for non-U.S. 
movements, interviewed Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
88 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
89 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012.  
90 Know Reset data on the United Kingdom. www.knowreset.eu  
91 Interviews with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012, and Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 
August 2012.  
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global resettlement quotas for the following fiscal year, and often involve giving UNHCR relatively 
short notice ahead of the missions.92 The exception here is Sweden, which announced its quota for the 
following year to UNHCR in December and its plans to conduct its selection mission in the spring 
(though this was postponed to September due to the security issues in Dadaab).93 UNHCR sends the 
resettlement country a questionnaire requiring specification of the kinds of cases the country is looking 
for. Sweden, on UNHCR’s recommendation, specified that it wished to select 350 Somali refugees, 
with the majority residing in Dadaab. All cases to be resettled to Sweden are required to need 
alternative protection, described as “ otherwise in need of protection” in Swedish alien law. This 
includes vulnerable families (including female-headed families), minority groups (in the Somali case, 
minority clans and religious minorities), and medical cases (though medical cases are also required to 
have additional protection needs).94 Following an initial plan to also resettle Somalis from Dadaab, the 
UK this year specified that it only wished to select Ethiopian Oromo refugees for resettlement from 
Kakuma and Nairobi, and instead of resettling from Dadaab selected Congolese refugees from 
Tanzania.95 At the time of this report’s completion, the Home Office was unable to provide 
information about the kinds of cases prioritised by the UK for resettlement. The Netherlands specified 
that it w ished to resettle non-Somali refugees.96 Otherwise, priority is given to victims of trauma, 
women at risk and medical emergencies.97 In addition, the Netherlands seeks a balanced caseload, 
consisting of families, women at risk and single men, and refugees’ ‘integration potential’ is a 
determining factor of their selection.98
On receiving the completed questionnaire, UNHCR goes about identifying cases to submit to the 
country of resettlement in response to the requirements that have been specified, and Resettlement 
Referral Forms (RRFs) for each case selected.
  
99 RRFs have seven sections, including information on 
the country of origin, and there is currently some debate on whether all this information is needed for 
all resettlement countries and whether the referral process can be streamlined to save time and 
resources.100 The referral process can be rushed for UNHCR, especially since they tend to be short-
staffed at the beginning of the year.101 Cases may have been earmarked ahead of countries announcing 
their missions, but it is an objective of UNHCR to have pools of RRFs prepared in advance, even if at 
the time of completion no potential country of resettlement has been identified. This lesson was 
learned this year, when the UK specified that it required Oromo cases, and there was a lack of Oromo 
cases prepared for referral since there are often challenges around resettling Oromo to UNHCR’s 
biggest customer, the U.S.102 UNHCR was thus this year faced with preparing over 200 RRFs for 
Oromo refugees in Kakuma and Nairobi for submission to the UK at relatively short notice.103
                                                     
92 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
  
93 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012.  
94 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
95 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012; with IOM Operations Manager for non-US 
movements, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
96 According to COA, the decision to select non-Somali refugees was based on the already significant numbers of Somalis 
seeking asylum in the Netherlands irregularly, and a t endency to experience difficulties with Somalis’ legal claims, 
especially around family compositionInterview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
97 Government of Netherlands, 2011 ‘Chapter on the Netherlands, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011’. 
98 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012.  
99 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012.  
100 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
101 This is due to their contracting of International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) personnel whose contacts tend to 
be 6 monthly and come to an end by December 31st. Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department PRM, 
Nairobi, 11 September 2012.  
102 Oromo often fail to clear U.S. security checks due to the country’s ‘material support’ clause of the Patriot Act, put in 
place by the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11. The clause specifies that no individual who has provided material 
support to any ‘terrorist’ organisations, which includes rebel movements seeking to overthrow ruling governments, shall 
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On receiving the RRFs, countries process the forms, and conduct security checks on the cases. 
Countries may carry out their own screening on the cases based on their own excludability criteria and 
processes if they differ from UNHCR’s. For example, the UK will do their own exclusion assessment 
on receiving the RRFs, and the Netherlands brings an exclusion expert with them on the selection 
mission. Sweden, on the other hand, tends to rely upon UNHCR’s exclusion criteria, and only seeks 
further consultation with UNHCR if during an interview with a refugee there is some contradictory or 
inconsistent information to that on the RRF.104 If at the pre-mission stage countries screen out any of 
the cases referred by UNHCR based on their own excludability criteria or security checks, they may 
contact UNHCR to request submission of additional RRFs in order for the country to meet their 
resettlement quotas. For Sweden, no cases were screened out at this initial stage this year.105 The 
Netherlands did not specify the number of cases that were screened out at this stage, but of the 80-100 
forms they requested, 70-80 refugees were selected for resettlement. One Oromo refugee informant in 
Kakuma reported receiving a su bmission letter from UNHCR stating that his case had been 
recommended to the Netherlands, but was not contacted by the Netherlands for an interview, 
suggesting that this case would have been removed at the initial screening stage.106 The British High 
Commission in Nairobi was not aware of the number of cases submitted by UNHCR to the UK that 
were rejected by the Home Office, which was unable to provide this information at the time of the 
report’s completion.107
Once the RRFs have been screened and verified, countries communicate to UNHCR which 
refugees will be interviewed during their selection missions, and arrangements for the mission are 
made accordingly. This year, Sweden conducted all interviews for the 250 Somali refugees from 
Dadaab and 50 Somali refugees from Nairobi in the IOM transit centre in Nairobi (numbers curtailed 
by 50 due to costs, as explained above). Interviews were conducted by a delegation from the Swedish 
Migration Board.
  
108 The Netherlands conducted its mission in Kakuma and Nairobi, interviewing 30 
non-Somali refugees from Kakuma and 50 from Nairobi. The delegation consists of the Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service (IND), which assesses refugees’ legal claims, the Central Agency for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), which conducts ‘social intake’ interviews during which 
refugees’ integration potential is assessed and information is gathered to create a social file for each 
individual for use in the cultural orientation, reception and introduction programmes on arrival in the 
Netherlands, and a medical doctor who conducts a medical assessment for each interviewee.109 In 
recent years, the UK has been spreading the selection of the number of refugees it pledges to resettle 
from Kenya across two to three missions.110 This year, the UK pledged to resettle 140 Oromo in 
Kakuma and 90 in Nairobi, and during its most recent mission in Kenya in June selected 128 refugees 
from both sites. The delegation consists of officers from the UK Borders Agency (UKBA) of the 
Home Office.111
(Contd.)                                                                  
be able to enter the U.S. This has caused many Oromo refugees to be disqualified from resettlement to the U.S. based on 
their (often tenuous) support of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a separatist group promoting the self-determination of 
the Oromo people of Ethiopia, labelled by the Ethiopian government as a ‘terrorist organisation’.  
 In Nairobi, refugees are interviewed at the IOM transit centre, and in Kakuma, 
interviews are conducted in the IOM resettlement processing centre situated in the Kakuma 2 section 
103 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
104 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012.  
105 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012.  
106 Abdi [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012.  
107 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
108 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
109 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012; information on Netherlands resettlement on EU Resettlement 
Network website.  
110 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
111 Resettlement Inter-agency Partnership, 2004, Understanding resettlement to the UK. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 457
Hannah Elliott 
of the camp.112 In some cases, slight changes can be made to those refugees who are to be interviewed 
ahead of the mission. Sweden, for example, received notification a f ew days before its mission to 
Kenya that five emergency cases would be submitted for resettlement. The delegation conducted 
security checks on these cases during the selection mission, and all five cleared. Due to the costs 
involved in the mission this year for transporting refugees from Dadaab, the submission of the 
additional five cases meant that some refugees on the original list were removed to accommodate the 
emergency cases.113 Because those withdrawn were a family, and two cases did not show up to the 
interview,114
Post-selection 
 the number of refugees interviewed was curtailed to 295 (i.e. it was not possible to 
interview 300 cases as planned).  
Sweden makes decisions on the cases interviewed during the mission, and once all interviews have been 
completed holds a meeting with UNHCR to discuss the decisions made. This year, Sweden accepted all 
295 refugees interviewed for resettlement. The delegation from the Swedish Migration Board this year 
had the technology to communicate directly with its alien database in Sweden and the municipalities to 
which the refugees will be resettled. They had the equipment to process the travel documents of all the 
refugees in country during the selection mission, and deposited the emergency alien passports for the 
refugees with UNHCR towards the end of the mission. Residence permits take longer to process and are 
produced in Sweden, but should reach the Swedish Embassy in Nairobi for delivery to UNHCR within 3 
weeks. This new system has rendered the Swedish Embassy redundant in the resettlement process, and 
makes the resettlement process more efficient, reducing the time that the selected refugees await 
departure.115 That said, the sticking point is the availability of appropriate accommodation in the 
municipalities, especially for medical cases. Since most refugees are resettled in northern Sweden, where 
the concentration of advanced university hospitals is significantly lower than in the south, it can be 
difficult to find municipalities which can meet the needs of those with medical cases. In addition, 
challenges are encountered when trying to resettle refugees with disabilities, since ground floor 
accommodation or apartment blocks with elevators are not always available. For this reason, the Swedish 
Migration Board currently faces a backlog of cases t o be resettled within the year; at the time of the 
study, around half of the cases t o be resettled that year were yet to depart. Since any refugees not 
departing by 31st December are carried over to the following year, filling up that year’s quota, it is an 
urgent priority of the Swedish Migration Board for as many refugees as possible to depart by the end of 
the year. Originally, the group of 295 r efugees selected from Kenya were intended to be resettled in 
January 2013, y et due to delays on t he resettlement of refugees from other regions, the Swedish 
Migration Board is now aiming to have resettled them by the end of the year. The five urgent cases 
remain a priority, as do a number of other cases pending their security situation in Dadaab. As explained 
above, Sweden’s cultural orientation programme this year consisted of a one hour session, which 
included a 15 minute video about life in Sweden and a brief explanation about air travel. In previous 
years, the cultural orientation programme has been conducted over a three day period, conducted by 
teachers from the municipalities in Sweden where the refugees would be resettled.116
 
 
                                                     
112 Interview rooms were funded by the U.S. and are labelled ‘RSC interview room’ 1, 2, 3, etc. since they are mostly used by 
RSC, but may be used by delegations from any resettlement country. 
113 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
114
 One no-show was a family member who had gone missing. The rest of the family were interviewed. The other no-show 
was a Nairobi-based refugee who had been called on several occasions, but appears to have chosen not to attend. Without 
an interview, refugees are not accepted for resettlement. Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 
September 2012. 
115 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
116 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
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The Netherlands accepted around 70 r efugees, the majority of cases interviewed, during their 
mission this year, and held a meeting with UNHCR at the end of the mission to discuss the decisions 
made. All of the refugees selected will be resettled to the same municipality, Freisland, where refugees 
from Kenya were also resettled the previous year. A ‘pre-arrival’ phase of six months’ duration 
follows the selection mission. This includes three cultural orientation courses, each conducted over 
four days. Across all of the cultural orientation sessions, 30-40 per cent of the time is allocated to 
Dutch language lessons, on the premise that language is the most important tool for integration. This 
year, COA has piloted additional language lessons for the refugees residing in Nairobi, led by 
volunteer teachers from the Netherlands. Refugees in Nairobi who were seen to experience difficulties 
in the language classes were identified for two additional language lessons per week between cultural 
orientation courses, held at the IOM transit centre. For the stronger students, one additional language 
class per week is taken. The additional lessons are voluntary, but the majority of refugees are keen to 
take them up. T he first cultural orientation session is carried out six to eight weeks following the 
selection mission (this year held in July) the second around a month later, (this year in August), and 
the final session around a month prior to departure (this year held in mid-October). In addition to 
Dutch language, the cultural orientation courses feature information sessions about various aspects of 
life in the Netherlands. The first course focuses on life at the national level, the second at the level of 
the municipality the refugees will be resettled in, and the third at the personal or family level. Subjects 
taught include Dutch law, human rights issues, education, health, traffic rules and regulations, 
budgeting and shopping and income. During the courses, refugees are closely monitored and their files 
kept up to date with any information required by the municipality in which they will be resettled. 
During breaks between sessions, trainers spend time talking with individuals on a one-to-one basis, 
especially those who appear to be struggling to keep up during the classes. In the final session, 
refugees are advised of the housing they will be given, and are shown the accommodation via Google 
Earth. They are also given information about their nearest medical facilities, and the schools their 
children will attend. This year, departure is scheduled for November. The Netherlands Embassy deals 
with the processing of the refugees’ travel documents.117 IOM conducts a fit for travel check for all 
refugees, but the Netherlands does not conduct a full medical screening until arrival, including for 
TB.118 On arrival, refugees are hosted in a hotel near Schiphol airport and undergo 48 hours of checks, 
which include the medical screening, and during which their photographs and fingerprints are taken. 
Following the checks, they are taken to the municipalities, from where further cultural orientation 
takes place, conducted by the local authorities and local NGOs. This year is the second year to carry 
out this post-arrival programme; until the beginning of 2011, resettled refugees on a rrival would be 
hosted in a resettlement centre for 6 months before being transferred to the municipalities. During this 
programme, cultural orientation pre-departure was just one four-day session, since the majority of 
cultural orientation would be delivered from the resettlement centre.119
The UK also accepted ‘the majority’ of refugees interviewed for resettlement, rejecting just three or 
four.
  
120 During the selection mission, refugees’ biometrics and photos are taken, medical assessments 
are conducted by IOM, and the data is left with the embassy in Nairobi. The decision-making process 
is conducted from the UK, following which the decisions are communicated with UNHCR and the 
embassy in Nairobi and travel documents are prepared for the refugees selected and deposited with 
IOM. Refugees usually travel in groups of around twenty, and are resettled together in the same area. 
They are taken to the IOM transit centre, where final medical checks by IOM are conducted before 
departure to ensure that they are fit to travel and free from TB.121
                                                     
117 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
 Sometimes refugees require medical 
118 Interview with IOM sub-office manager, Kakuma, 23 September 2012. 
119 This programme was delivered for four years, and the shift came about with a ch ange of government. It was felt that 
direct transfer to the municipalities was better for refugees’ integration.  
120 Interview with the British High Commission, 10 August 2012. 
121 The UK does not refuse any individual entry on medical grounds but refugees may not travel if they have TB.  
KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 459
Hannah Elliott 
escorts, and these are provided by IOM. Prior to departure, the refugees receive cultural orientation 
training for a day. The cultural orientation focuses on personal hygiene, how to use flush toilets, baths 
and showers, how to conduct oneself on an aeroplane and what to expect on arrival. The time between 
interview and departure is short – usually between one and two months. Further cultural orientation is 
delivered post-arrival.  
Experiences of UNHCR and implementing partners of European resettlement  
Interviews with UNHCR and implementing partners suggested that European resettlement is highly 
valued due to countries’ abilities to resettle cases in short spaces of time and their systems of allocating 
portions of their quotas to dossier cases and emergencies. However, agencies can experience difficulties 
around the time and resources spent meeting the resettlement needs of European countries relative to the 
number of refugees that European countries resettle. This was also expressed from the perspective of 
U.S. State Department PRM, which experiences a lull in resettlement referrals at the beginning of the 
year because UNHCR channels all of its resources into responding to the missions of European 
countries. UNHCR operates in this way because, in spite of long security checks, the U.S. will accept 
large numbers and is relatively open as compared to European countries, which are often deemed to be 
more choosey. The U.S. in particular then tends to get a surge of referrals towards the end of the year, 
once all European resettlement places have been filled. As mentioned above, this is partly a h uman 
resources issue on UNHCR’s part, since the contracts of many of its staff come to an end in December 
which means they are understaffed at the busiest times of the year. Since the U.S. is UNHCR’s biggest 
resettlement ‘customer’, the prioritising of European countries which resettle much lower numbers can 
seem illogical.122 Nevertheless, especially for cases urgently requiring resettlement, or groups or 
nationalities which are less likely to be accepted by the U.S., such as Oromo and Eritreans,123 UNHCR 
feels that prioritising European countries’ resettlement needs is important and necessary. This can result 
in a h ectic first half of the year as r eferrals are being made, until European countries’ missions are 
completed and quotas are filled, including for dossier and emergency cases. Thereafter, UNHCR is able 
to continue referring cases to RSC, and faces the difficult situation of keeping any new emergency cases 
that arise on hold as they await the new fiscal year to begin referring to European countries again. This 
can be particularly stressful, since some of these cases may be in life-threatening situations, and yet there 
tend to be no immediate opportunities for resettlement in the second half of the year. The only way to 
begin addressing this issue would be for those countries which offer resettlement on a dossier basis to 
significantly increase their dossier and emergency quotas in order to make options available for 
emergency cases throughout the year.124 In addition, European countries providing UNHCR with more 
prior warning ahead of missions would enable UNHCR to plan more effectively for the coming year. 
Spacing missions throughout the year would allow UNHCR to spread its time more evenly between the 
various countries resettling from Kenya. This may involve communication between European countries 
conducting resettlement, so that they can plan their various missions through the year accordingly.125
IOM reported similar challenges around working with European countries, each of which has its 
own systems and schedules which can prove cumbersome to deal with when the numbers actually 
resettled are relatively few. Except for the UK, which budgets for its resettlement programme three 
  
                                                     
122 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012; discussions with RSC caseworkers between 
June and September 2012. The Refugee Coordinator, PRM, commented that he repeatedly reminds UNHCR that no 
business survives that gives preference to the smallest customer.  
123 Due to any associations or affiliations with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), also based on the ‘material 
support’ clause referenced above.  
124 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
125 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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years in advance, European countries provide IOM with very tentative ‘hints’ about the numbers they 
might resettle when at the planning stage for the following year.126
Kenya’s resettlement infrastructure, which European countries are able to use to meet their own 
resettlement quotas, is almost entirely funded by the U.S. Although this is logical, since the U.S. is 
UNHCR’s and IOM’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, there is a sense that European countries 
should be more committed to supporting this infrastructure financially, since it depends upon it for its 
resettlement requirements. As it stands, should the U.S. stop resettling from the region, this 
infrastructure could not be maintained with the relatively insignificant and ad hoc funding that 
European countries provide; there is a sense that European funding could not be depended upon for 
IOM’s operations. For example, total funds from European resettlement allow IOM Nairobi to employ 
only two full-time national staff to manage operations to European countries.
 
127 In addition, because 
European countries tend to provide little notice on their resettlement numbers, IOM can be forced to 
adjust its operations at the last minute, likely incurring further costs.128
IOM can also experience some challenges around a lack of standardised procedures from 
European countries. For example, some countries require thorough medical checks from IOM, while 
others do not. While the UK and Denmark have a no-travel policy if a refugee is infected with TB, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Finland do not. The Netherlands brings their own medical 
doctor who checks refugees at the selection mission stage for reasons of efficiency.
  
129 While all 
refugees undergo fit for travel checks before departure regardless of their destination, this is not 
enough to diagnose more complex health issues. A standard medical examination for all refugees 
which would help prevent outbreaks, better screening to avoid complications in flight and prevent 
problems after arrival.130 Similarly, there is no standard procedure around cultural orientation. This 
is in large part because different countries have different ideas around what cultural orientation 
should involve, reflected in the very different programmes and curriculums taught as described 
above for Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. In situations where a small number of refugees are 
resettled ahead of a larger cohort due to an urgent need to leave Kenya, countries may contract IOM 
to conduct the training. The Netherlands, for example, asks IOM to do four days’ training with 
refugees who are not able to participate in its own extensive cultural orientation programme and 
provide IOM with a curriculum.131 Although the Netherlands would fund this directly, the time 
spent by the manager of cultural orientation at IOM is not accounted for, since such requests have 
an ad hoc nature.132
While European countries are highly valued for their capacity to take dossier and emergency 
submissions and for the speed with which they can resettle refugees, they are also perceived as being 
somewhat choosey about the refugees they accept for resettlement, and not necessarily according to 
individuals’ and families’ vulnerability. For example, the UK’s decision this year to only take Oromo 
refugees from Kenya and the Netherlands’ request for non-Somali refugees were experienced 
 This is again an example of how implementing agencies must respond to 
European countries needs around resettlement on an ad hoc basis, using resources which are largely 
funded by larger resettlement actors. 
                                                     
126 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
127 It was noted the salaries of whom alone are likely higher than the total funding IOM receives from European 
countries on an annual basis. 
128 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
129
 Communication with COA, Netherlands, 10 October 2012. 
130 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
131 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
132 Interview with Canada’s Cultural Orientation Abroad Global Project Manager, Nairobi, 10 August 2012. The position of 
the manager of cultural orientation at IOM is funded by Canada because Canada is IOM’s biggest customer in terms of 
cultural orientation. In the past IOM has conducted cultural orientation for refugees being resettled to the U.S., but the 
contract is currently held by CWS who also have the contract for RSC.  
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problematically by UNHCR, since third countries seen to be favouring or discriminating against 
specific ethnic groups undermines UNHCR’s efforts to make resettlement appear fair and entirely 
according to need and causes refugees to complain about what they perceive as bias and racism (see 
following section).133 Countries assessing the ‘integration potential’ of refugees were also criticised, 
since they tend to select refugees according to their education levels and language skills as opposed to 
on a needs-based assessment.134
Few agency staff interviewed were aware of any changes yet brought about by the Joint European 
Resettlement Programme (JERP) which was passed through the European Parliament in March 2012. 
However, UNHCR’s Senior Resettlement Officer in Nairobi noted that the German Embassy in 
Nairobi had recently requested a meeting with UNHCR to discuss resettlement from Kenya for the 
following year, which she suggested was a response to the JERP’s identification of Kenya as a priority 
country of first asylum from which to conduct resettlement.  
  
6. Refugee Narratives, Perspectives And Experiences Of Resettlement 
Resettlement has become a highly desired commodity for refugees both in camp and urban settings; 
resettlement is often perceived as something that is attainable or can be actively achieved. While those 
refugees and asylum seekers interviewed recognised that resettlement is something that refugees 
should need as opposed to desire, the majority had strong narratives and claims which depicted 
themselves as in need of resettlement. This is not something that should necessarily be disputed or 
questioned; undoubtedly refugees in both camp and urban settings are forced to live in extremely 
challenging circumstances. However, some refugees are of course more vulnerable than others, and 
these are the individuals and families who are sought out by UNHCR and implementing partners. 
The following subsections explore the resettlement contexts in Nairobi and Kakuma and the 
narratives, perspectives and experiences around resettlement of those refugees who were interviewed 
across the two sites.  
Who seeks resettlement? 
A situation of generalised insecurity in Kakuma or Nairobi is not considered sufficient grounds by 
UNHCR for the resettlement of refugees; rather, refugees should have a protection need that is specific 
to them as individuals or families in order to be referred for resettlement. However, the majority of 
refugees want resettlement since, regardless of individual circumstances, life in both the camps and 
Nairobi is extremely challenging and many hold onto the dream of a b etter life abroad. Because 
refugees are aware to an extent of the reasons refugees are referred to be resettled in a third country – 
i.e. extreme vulnerability or insecurity – it is not uncommon for refugees to ‘negotiate 
vulnerability’,135
Who does not seek resettlement? 
 highlighting their cases of insecurity and sometimes embellishing these situations. 
Agencies also spoke of refugees sometimes ‘creating’ situations of vulnerability in order to get 
resettlement.  
Very few informants had no interest in resettlement, or had not explored at least some means through 
which to obtain it. All of the refugees interviewed in the camp were acutely aware of resettlement; 
weekly postings of ration card numbers of refugees called for resettlement interviews with UNHCR, 
                                                     
133 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 September 2012 
134 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012 
135 Cf. Jansen, 2008. 
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RSC and delegations from resettlement countries as well as frequent flights departing out of the camp 
carrying refugees selected for resettlement makes resettlement a highly visible practice on almost a 
daily basis. A minority of the refugees interviewed in Nairobi, however, were less resettlement aware 
or savvy. Four of the South Sudanese refugees interviewed in Nairobi had little to say about 
resettlement, and were much less familiar with the language of resettlement. One Somali young 
woman working for an NGO in the city who had waited two years for feedback from an interview with 
RSC suggested that she had no inclination to waste any more time and energy chasing up her case, and 
that she would rather remain in Nairobi than stress herself with pursuing resettlement.136 An interview 
with one Oromo informant highlighted how very vulnerable refugees may not have the capacity to 
seek out resettlement; his mandate expired in 2004 and he claimed not to have returned to the UNHCR 
office since to renew it due to his anxieties around travelling far from home.137
How is resettlement sought? 
  
A number of informants in both Kakuma and Nairobi seemed to have made attaining resettlement a 
project to actively work on through certain practices or methods, such as regular visits to UNHCR and 
implementing partners, writing letters to submit to the UNHCR offices and collecting papers 
documenting their suffering, mistreatment or the unfairness of UNHCR’s policies and practices. It is 
important to note that for refugees, in camps especially, who may have little control over their lives, 
daily engagement with such a project may be one of the few ways they feel able to gain some agency 
or autonomy, and maintain some hope in an otherwise bleak situation. Saida, a Somali refugee and 
single mother making a l iving in Nairobi’s Eastleigh selling foodstuffs such as ghee and dried meat 
from an open-air stall, said that since she received her mandate she has sought assistance from 
numerous agencies, including Kituo Cha Sheria and RCK,138 telling them of the challenges she faces 
in Nairobi, since that is a way through which one might be referred for resettlement.139 A number of 
Congolese refugees spoke of writing letters to UNHCR describing their hardships in Nairobi. One 
informant described writing letter after letter, week after week, until he lost heart after never receiving 
a single reply.140 In Kakuma, there was more evidence of group action, likely because of the close 
proximity within which refugees live. A group of South Sudanese Dinka informants, for example, 
showed me a letter complaining of the lack of resettlement opportunities for South Sudanese since 
independence, requesting that UNHCR reconsider granting them resettlement.141 An Oromo informant 
informed me that a group of 50 refugees of Ethiopian nationality from one section of the camp who 
had arrived between 1992 and 1999 and yet remained in the camp whilst other such early arrivals had 
since been resettled submitted a letter to UNHCR to remind the agency of their protracted situation.142 
Similarly, a Burundian refugee told me of collective action by himself and ten other Burundians whose 
resettlement cases had long been pending with UNHCR without being informed why; the group went 
directly to talk to the Resettlement Officer in the UNHCR compound.143
 
  
                                                     
136 Asha, interviewed Nairobi, 25 July 2012.  
137 Boru, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012. 
138 Three informants mentioned that RCK had referred their cases and that they expected this to be to HIAS, recommending 
them for resettlement, although they were not advised of this. None of them, however, had received any further feedback, 
and felt that the organisation had given them false hope. Naima [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Fatuma 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 11 August 2012; Saida [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012.  
139 Saida, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
140 Joseph, interviewed Nairobi, 28 August 2012. 
141 Interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012. 
142 Jarso, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
143 Thomas, interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
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Some informants reported seeking resettlement through family reunification, but failing due to 
tenuous biological relationships. This could have ramifications for refugees’ resettlement chances later 
down the line. Abdullahi, for example, a refugee residing in Nairobi but officially registered in 
Kakuma, reported his family attempting reunification with a cousin in the U.S. in 2006 but failing at 
the DNA test. Although they had arrived in Kenya in 1992, and thus should have been referred for 
resettlement some time ago based on their protracted situation, the reunification case stalled their 
resettlement case, which was only reactivated this year, and due to their failure to the U.S. they had 
been referred to Canada.144 Another Somali informant, this time in Kakuma, recounted how her family 
had attempted ‘reunification’ with a family friend who had been resettled in the U.S., and to do so had 
changed their family name, year of arrival and reported only having resided in Nairobi. Having passed 
through interviews with RSC, UNHCR was required to retrieve the family’s file. This required giving 
their fingerprints, at which point it was realised that they had been registered with different details. As 
punishment for fraudulent activity, on return to Kakuma the family were told that they would be put to 
the bottom of the pile for the protracted resettlement programme in spite of being amongst the earliest 
1992 arrivals to Kenya.145 Since, their case has remained ‘pending’. Five out of ten South Sudanese 
refugees in Nairobi (of both Dinka and Nuer ethnicities) spoke of a ‘form’ which they had completed 
in Kakuma in 2004/5 which sought resettlement in Australia through ‘reunification’ with South 
Sudanese people in the diaspora. These individuals were not usually relatives but shared the same 
ethnic group as the refugees. All of the informants had received rejection letters from the Australian 
embassy.146 One informant mentioned paying $50 t o employ somebody to help him complete the 
form.147 Refugees’ desires and even desperation for resettlement can itself render refugees vulnerable 
to scams, as well as manipulative or even violent family relations. Saida described contacting relatives 
who had been resettled in Australia requesting them to call for her as a family reunification case. The 
relatives responded that she would need to marry a r elative, whom she had not met but had heard 
negative things about. When she refused to marry, they cut contact with her.148
Selection stage 
  
Many more refugees seek resettlement than are actually successful in achieving it. Refugees were 
found to have a variety of explanations for why some refugees are successful and others are not, or 
why some refugees go through the selection process and depart within a relatively short space of time 
while others can wait for a number of years. Some Oromo refugees in Nairobi noted that those who 
fled Ethiopia with documentation that proved their persecution had a better chance of being 
resettled,149 although one who had formerly worked for an Oromo rights organisation and claimed to 
have carried documents had waited over ten years for resettlement, and attributed this to being 
received by national staff as opposed to international staff at UNHCR.150 Some of the Oromo refugees 
interviewed in Nairobi were known by Oromo rights activist Dr. Trueman, who had highlighted their 
individual cases to UNHCR and recommended them for resettlement.151
 
  
                                                     
144 Abdullahi, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
145 Zahra, interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012. 
146 Angelina, interviewed Nairobi, 13 A ugust 2012; James, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Daniel, interviewed 
Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Sam, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Esther, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012.  
147 Sam, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012.  
148 Saida, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
149 Abdikadir, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Hussein, interviewed Nairobi, 
17 July 2012; Malik, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012.  
150 Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012.  
151 Said, interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 
July 2012. 
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A number of informants also explained selection and rejection of refugees as occurring unfairly. 
Unfairness was explained in a n umber of ways. Some refugees suggested that resettlement occurs 
arbitrarily and that selection was largely based on chance or luck.152 This was often expressed in 
relation to the officer one was received by; refugees in Kakuma in particular claimed that national staff 
were less sympathetic or willing to help refugees than international staff, sometimes because Kenyan 
staff were jealous of refugees’ resettlement opportunities and would thus sabotage their cases.153 
Unfairness was also articulated as being because UNHCR and resettlement countries favoured 
particular nationalities or tribes. This was particularly strongly articulated by informants in Kakuma; 
because of the proximity in which refugees live and the visibility of resettlement, refugees are acutely 
aware of who is and who is not being resettled – the majority of informants commented that the U.K. 
only wanted Oromo refugees, for example.154 In Nairobi, such comments were less common, though a 
number of Congolese Banyamulenge said that they felt that UNHCR and resettlement countries were 
biased against them since they tended to select other nationalities and even Congolese tribes.155 
Favouring certain ethnic groups was often accounted for by South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer 
refugees as being racist; informants pointed out that ‘brown’ refugees such as Oromo and Somalis 
were being resettled but ‘black’ refugees were not, even if, like the Ethiopian Nuer, they shared the 
same nationality with those who were being resettled, like the Oromo.156 Some informants asserted 
that other refugees bought or stole other people’s resettlement places, especially in the camps, 
including people’s ‘forms’.157 Camp informants also commented that some refugees fake situations of 
insecurity,158 or would change their ethnicity strategically having observed that certain ethnic groups 
were more favoured than others.159 Some refugees also cited mistrust of UNHCR,160 or suspicion of 
corruption within the organisation, as being behind resettlement decisions.161 An Oromo informant in 
Kakuma presented me with a n ewspaper article from 2008 entitled ‘Kenyans fall prey to refugee 
registration scam’, describing how Kenyan Somalis were posing as Ethiopian refugees in order to be 
resettled. Annotated underneath the text was written “UNHCR is the most corrupt organisation in the 
world. By a mistreated refugee”.162
                                                     
152 Joseph [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 28 August 2012; Fatuma [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 11 August 2012. 
 Two Oromo refugees mentioned that they had even come to 
153 Hassan [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Arthur [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Julius [Amhara], interviewed 
Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
154 Hassan [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Joyce [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Lam [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012; John [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Michael [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed 20 S eptember 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed 
Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Stephen [South Sudanese Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Julius 
[Amhara], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012.  
155 Andre, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 August 2012. 
156 Lam [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; John [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Joshua [South Sudanese Dinka], 
interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012. South Sudanese in Kakuma claimed to feel that UNHCR’s racism was a more 
logical explanation for South Sudanese being excluded from group resettlement programmes than the official explanation 
– i.e. South Sudan’s independence. 
157 Leila and Mohamed [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 27 July 2012; Yusuf [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; Sagale 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; James [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012. 
158 Discussion with Dinka refugees, Kakuma, 20 September 2012. 
159 Stephen [South Sudanese Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 
September 2012; Yusuf [Somali Bantu], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012. 
160 Abdikadir [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Malik [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012; 
161 Adan [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
162 Jarso, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
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suspect some staff at UNHCR to be agents of the Ethiopian government.163 South Sudanese Dinka 
refugees expressed suspicion that the Lost Boys resettlement programme was halted before completion 
because 9/11 occurred when U.S. immigration officers were carrying out a mission in the camp; the 
events in New York caused them to leave and they never came back.164
These explanations, although seemingly irrational, do not arise out of nowhere, although I should 
add that this does not mean they are accurate reflections of the way UNHCR operates in Kakuma or 
Nairobi. Especially for the Oromo, a history of persecution may lead refugees to mistrust and be 
paranoid about the activities of all authorities.
 
165 Similarly, for South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer 
who have come from countries where their people have been discriminated against racially, it is 
understandable that these refugees would make sense of their apparent unfair treatment through the 
frame of race. In addition, many refugees have come from contexts where corruption is part of 
everyday business, and so to suspect agencies of engaging in corrupt activities around resettlement is 
quite rational. Accusations that national staff are more likely to behave corruptly than international 
staff may be because corruption is assumed to be more prevalent on the continent than in the global 
North. Corruption accusations may also be a legacy of the resettlement scandal of 2000. In addition, a 
general perception of UNHCR as working against refugees may be fostered by its role around RSD; 
from arrival in Kenya, asylum seekers are interviewed and their claims questioned and judged by 
UNHCR.166
Resettlement interviews stage 
 This goes some way towards explaining why UNHCR may receive such strong criticism 
from refugees as compared to implementing partners, which are able to focus their time and resources 
on supporting refugees as opposed to determining whether they qualify to receive their support or not. 
Accusations of corruption, inhumanity and mistreatment by UNHCR are used by refugees to make 
sense of the often frustratingly slow processes they undergo with the agency, not only for those who 
have resettlement cases but also for those who are seeking the most essential protection tool and 
prerequisite to resettlement, the mandate. 
Most refugees commented that the resettlement interview with UNHCR was much like that of RSD, 
mainly exploring the reason for flight, but with additional questions around challenges faced in Kenya. 
In Kakuma especially, a number of refugees commented that they had been called for the same 
interview on more than one occasion, where they were asked the same questions, likely because there 
were some inconsistencies or contradictions in their accounts that UNHCR needed to verify. For 
refugees in Nairobi, this can be stressful financially, since they may have to pay public transport costs 
in order to attend multiple interviews. A couple of informants noted, with reference to both the RSD 
process and resettlement interviews, that it was natural that their stories would be inconsistent 
considering the trauma they had been through and the time that had passed since they fled their 
countries of origin, and that UNHCR should be more mindful of this.167 One Oromo informant in 
Nairobi commented that within his community it was popularly felt that interviews with UNHCR and 




                                                     
163 Hussein, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012. 
164
 Dinka group discussion, Kakuma, 20 September 2012.  
165 This point is made with regards to the Oromo context in Trueman (2010). 
166 Konzolo, 2010: 11.  
167 Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Jonathan [Congolese], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 
2012.  
168 Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012.  
466 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
Refugee resettlement: the view from Kenya - Findings from field research in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camp 
Congolese Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi expressed concern that during interviews with 
UNHCR (for both RSD and resettlement) and resettlement countries their stories were not being 
accurately translated; interpreters tend to be Rwandan Kinyarwanda or Kirundi speakers, languages 
which are closely related but not identical to the Banyamulenge mother tongue – Kinyamulenge.169 
One informant was rejected resettlement to a country170 following his interview, and felt that this was 
because of inaccurate translation; the interview with UNHCR was conducted in Kiswahili,171 and went 
well, but during the interview with the resettlement country officers the interviewer responded badly, 
even though he gave the same account as in the interview with UNHCR.172
Pending cases 
  
A significant number of refugees had had an initial resettlement interview with UNHCR but then had 
not received any feedback for many months, or even years.173 In such situations, refugees are able to 
enquire about the status of their cases at field post, though some reported receiving contradictory 
information from caseworkers.174 One informant mentioned that one week he would be told that there 
was ‘backlog’, another time that his case was ‘pending’, and not fully understanding the meaning of 
these terms.175 Where informants’ cases were pending, three in Kakuma asserted that UNHCR should 
just come out and tell them what the problem was, expressing the psychological and practical 
difficulties of living in limbo.176 One informant said that she felt that UNHCR’s claim that her 
family’s case was at ‘panel’ was an attempt to fob them off, and that she’d rather they just told them 
directly whether they were successful or not.177 Another described how he had felt unable to make any 
future plans or travel out of the camp because it was possible that he might be called for an interview. 
In his opinion, UNHCR kept refugees in limbo because they were afraid to upset them by telling them 
the truth: that they had been rejected for resettlement.178 Two informants were critical of field post, 
expressing suspicion that it was established simply to keep refugees away from the UNHCR 
compound and deceive any visitors to the camp that everything was in order.179
                                                     
169 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Andre, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 
August 2012. One Burundian Tutsi informant in Nairobi also suggested that she was rejected the mandate when she first 
came to Kenya because of a problem with the interpreter. Sarah, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012. 
 For refugees whose 
cases have moved beyond UNHCR’s assessment and selection process, queries about their cases may 
not be answerable at field post, as the cases are now with the countries of resettlement to which they 
have been referred. 
170 The country will not be mentioned for confidentiality reasons as requested by the informant. 
171 Some Congolese refugees speak Kiswahili, though Congolese Kiswahili is distinctive from Kenyan Kiswahili. 
172 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012.  
173 Joyce [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Zahra [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012; 
Julius [Amhara], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Juliet [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 22 August 2012. 
174 Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 S eptember 2012; Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 
2012; Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Ann [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Abdi [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
175 Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012.  
176 Such comments were also made with regards to decisions about the mandate. 
177 Zahra [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012.  
178 Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012. 
179 Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
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A number of refugees who had gone through interviews with RSC and INS had waited for long 
periods of time without any information about their cases,180 as UNHCR was not always able to 
inform them of the status of their cases. Only one informant mentioned communicating with INS via 
email with the help of an English speaker from his community.181 For refugees referred by UNHCR to 
European countries, acceptance is more likely and if they are unsuccessful, refugees are informed 
within a short space of time. That said, one informant who had been recommended for resettlement to 
the Netherlands was not called for interview, which implies that his case was rejected by the 
Netherlands at the initial screening stage. He expressed anger and frustration to have seen others be 
interviewed without being informed why he was not called himself. He claimed to have enquired with 
UNHCR about this without receiving an answer.182
A number of other informants felt, or had been informed by UNHCR, that their complex family 
situations were causing their cases to be put on hold.
  
183 Many refugees have come from contexts 
whereby orphaned or abandoned children are absorbed into other family units, whether these are part 
of extended family configurations or wider clan networks. These tend not to be recognised by UNHCR 
or countries of resettlement as constituting genuine families, which require further investigations to 
prove their authenticity. One young Oromo woman in Kakuma reported registering with another 
family on arrival having lost her own, since to live alone, especially as a young woman, would not be 
advisable or culturally acceptable.184 Later, when it came to being referred for resettlement based on 
the family’s year of arrival, when it became apparent that she was not related to the family she 
registered with, the case was put on hold. Another informant, a Somali woman, came to Kenya with 
the family of her father’s second wife (whom she called mother as she lost her mother when she was 
very young) after her father was killed in Somalia. The family successfully went through the interview 
process with UNHCR and were referred on to RSC, but then stalled at the DNA test with INS which 
showed that she was not biologically related to her ‘mother’. The family departed for the U.S. without 
her and she remains in the camp.185
Experiences of those being resettled  
 
Those informants who had been accepted for resettlement by European countries generally reported 
positive experiences during interviews which were conducted in a friendly and relaxed manner. They 
also had a clear sense of the timeframe ahead of them in the build-up to resettlement. Abdikadir, for 
example, an Oromo refugee in Nairobi awaiting resettlement to the Netherlands, recounted to me the 
dates of the three cultural orientation sessions (one of which he had already participated in), the 
content that they would cover in these sessions and the month of his departure.186
                                                     
180 Suleiman [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 S eptember 
2012; Muslima [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Kadija [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Asha [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 25 July 2012; Sagale [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012. 
 Those going through 
the resettlement process to the U.S. generally were less clear on the process ahead of them as a result 
of the long security checks on their cases. Two refugees had gone through medical checks and cultural 
orientation without having any real idea of when they might actually depart, and expressed some doubt 
as to whether this would actually ever happen. This situation of limbo was expressed to be 
psychologically very difficult. Of the few refugees who were interviewed who were expecting 
181 Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012. 
182 Abdi [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012. 
183 Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Amina [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Sahara [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Kadija [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; 
Angela [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012.  
184 Amina, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
185 Kadija, interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012. 
186 Abdikadir, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012.  
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imminent departure, none suggested that they were especially more entitled to resettlement than 
others, and my impression was that there was a sense that some refugees are lucky and some are not, 
and that the system largely remains unfair.  
7. Conclusions And Recommendations 
Refugee resettlement from Kenya is a complex operation, involving multiple actors and checks and 
balances in order to minimise corruption and fraud opportunities and ensure that the most vulnerable 
refugees are resettled. Because resettlement is so desired by refugees, in part the result of romantic 
notions of life in the west which have become more tangible through new communications 
technologies and compounded by the visibility of resettlement (in the camps especially), resettlement 
actors are engaged in a constant battle to maintain the credibility of their referrals to third countries 
whilst refugees adapt to changing policies and adjust their resettlement or protection claims 
accordingly. This results in a cu lture of disbelief within agencies and policies around resettlement 
which are experienced by refugees as stringent and draconian, explained and made sense of in multiple 
ways, including unfairness, bias and corruption.  
Refugees might benefit from clearer communication around the statuses of their cases, especially in 
situations where they are pending for long periods. Although it is understandable that UNHCR and 
resettlement countries would not communicate the reasons for refugees being rejected resettlement for 
purposes of keeping selection criteria secret (so that refugees are not able to mould their cases to these 
criteria), not knowing why one was rejected, especially after the stress of going through multiple 
interviews, and the resulting lack of closure can be traumatic for refugees. Similarly, where refugees 
are screened out when UNHCR submits the RRFs to a country, they might benefit from being 
informed of the fact, and advised of why they were not selected for interview. UNHCR and 
resettlement countries ought to have high standards when it comes to selecting interpreters and be 
mindful of Congolese refugees’ (especially Banyamulenge) concerns around translation, ensuring that 
appropriate interpreters are employed.  
For refugees and asylum seekers in Nairobi, support with transport costs to multiple interviews for 
both RSD and resettlement would ease the financial pressures on refugees, especially during the 
period they await the mandate when they are not entitled to other forms of support from UNHCR or 
implementing partners.187
European countries play an important role in Kenya’s resettlement landscape, resettling refugees 
from nationalities which may not be considered by bigger resettlement actors and making provisions 
for emergency and dossier referrals. European countries should increase quotas for emergency and 
dossier referrals in order to meet the resettlement needs of refugees in acute insecurity and medical 
situations. European countries coordinating and spacing their missions throughout the year would 
enable UNHCR to spread its attention more evenly between resettlement countries and avoid having to 
channel all of its resources into meeting the resettlement requirements of European countries at the 
beginning of the year to the detriment of larger resettlement actors. If European countries coordinated 
their missions together, sending a m ixed team from various countries two to three times a y ear, 
UNHCR’s preparation for and hosting of these missions would be more time and cost-effective.
 Urban refugees could also benefit should UNHCR establish field offices in 





European countries would also make IOM’s work easier to plan and manage should they provide more 
notice on the numbers they intend to resettle each year. 
                                                     
187 An exception is Jesuit Relief Services’ (JRS) food aid to newly arrived asylum seekers.  
188 Interview with Refuge Point, 24 July 2012. 
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UNHCR and implementing agencies would also benefit from more standardised policies of 
European countries; as it stands, countries each have their own policies and requirements, and meeting 
them can prove cumbersome, especially due to the small numbers of refugees that these countries 
resettle and the relatively little funding they provide for these numbers, which is often subject to 
change. UNHCR would save significant time and resources should there be an agreement between all 
resettlement actors about what information is required in the RRF; currently, UNHCR completes all 
forms with the maximum information required since it is not always clear which countries these forms 
will be submitted to. Information on t he political situation in refugees’ countries of origin, for 
example, could probably be removed from the form, since all countries have information and 
publications on these countries from their own foreign offices. UNHCR would also benefit from more 
notice from European countries about their resettlement numbers and the dates of their missions in 
order to target the RRFs more effectively, tailoring each to the needs of the country of submission.189 
In order to assist UNHCR with its human resources issue, European countries could share a small 
clerical office in Nairobi with a Kenyan team through which to channel RRFs, coordinate selection 
missions and arrange interviews. This would be more cost-effective than employing UNHCR staff, 
who are often overqualified for this kind of work.190
European countries might benefit from sharing best practices on resettlement, including on how to 
conduct missions and on cultural orientation programming. Countries could learn from each other by 
sending personnel to shadow other countries’ resettlement missions in Kenya and cultural orientation 
classes. This would also apply to countries which currently do not regularly resettle refugees, or at 
least do not currently carry out selection missions in Kenya.  
 Standardised medical procedures would also help 
to reduce the risk of outbreaks, complications in flight and health problems on arrival.  
 
                                                     
189 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
190 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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Annex 1. Refugee population in Kenya according to location, 2007-2012 
 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2012a 
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Annex 2. Refugees submitted for resettlement, 2007-2012 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2012ª 
Annex 3. Refugees departing for resettlement, 2007-2012 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2012a 
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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 EU Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as w ell as t hematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
 
For more information: 
 
KNOW RESET project – Migration Policy Centre 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 892 
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Abstract 
This report surveys Afghan refugee resettlement from Pakistan for the Know Reset Project in order to 
better understand the processes and practices of the refugee populations’ resettlement in EU member 
states. This involved interviews with various agencies working with refugees as w ell as wi th 
individual refugees. The collected source material explains how the Afghan refugee community, living 
in different localities in Pakistan, are informed about resettlement policies, and how refugees are 
identified and selected and what Afghan refugee groups, if any, are given priorities in the resettlement 
processes. The report also examines the role played by local, national and international agencies, such 
as UNHCR, Pakistan-based NGOs, including SACH (Struggle for Change), Sharp (Society for Human 
Rights and Prisoners Aid), the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the International 
Organization of Migration (IOM). More specifically we ex amined these organizations as t hey 
identified, registered and selected refugees for resettlement. The report also considers how information 
about resettlement is disseminated to Afghan refugees in “refugee villages”, camps or places; how the 
refugees are subsequently identified and chosen for resettlement; and how they are assisted in 
submitting applications and obtaining security clearance from the Pakistan Interior and Foreign Affairs 
departments. We then asked how submissions are then forwarded to the individual EU countries for 
resettlement and what selection and scrutiny measures, if any, are adopted by the resettlement 
countries. Finally, the report looks at the responses and reactions of the Pakistani government in the 
resettlement of Afghan refugees in Europe and beyond. The findings not only add to the empirical 
knowledge of resettlement in Pakistan, but offer data to improve the efficiency of resettlement 
schemes in individual EU member states. 
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Introduction 
1. Definition 
Resettlement is one of three durable solutions – the other two being voluntary repatriation and local 
integration – which is offered to refugees who have sought protection in a country where local 
integration is not an option, and to those who cannot return to their home country. 
2. Methodology 
This report relies heavily on oral testimonials. These are drawn from interviews with individual 
Afghan refugees in need of resettlement and the involved actors and partners. Interviews with 
representatives of UNHCR and members of NGOs were conducted in Islamabad. The interviews with 
individual refugees and their spokesmen were conducted at different locations at the refugee camps, 
which are locally called “refugee villages”. More specifically, these were the Khazna Camp, Haji 
Camp, Lucky Marwat Camp and UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation centre at Hayatabad in the city of 
Peshawar in NWFP. All together 25 interviews were conducted that ranged from twenty minutes to 
more than an hour: 15 interviews were conducted with individual Afghan refugees and their headmen; 
3 in the Lucky Marwat “refugee village”; 4 in the Khazana Camp; 3 in the Haji camp; and 5 in the 
Hayatabad camp. 4 extensive interviews were conducted with UNHCR representatives and 3 with the 
members of NGOs in Islamabad. 2 interviews were conducted with local interpreters, who worked in 
the Afghan refugee camps and 2 other interviews were conducted with local journalists who were 
based in the city of Peshawar, and one long interview was conducted with an academic, who is an 
expert on the impact of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In addition, a number of informal discussions 
were held with the directors and staff of IOM and HRCP. A number of “semi-structured” interviews 
were conducted with the authorities of the Pakistan Interior and Foreign Affairs ministries in 
Islamabad, as well as with individual local doctors, journalists and the local UN staff, who have been 
working with refugee communities at the grassroots level. In addition, archival source material was 
also consulted in the “record rooms” of Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs and Interior departments 
concerning the complicated and lengthy security checks and clearance for the refugees selected for 
resettlement. This is referred to officially as the NOC (No Objection Certificate).  
As we shall see, the collected source material has not only provided life and migration histories of 
refugee respondents. It has helped us to understand the socio-economic and the physical and cognitive 
experiences of refugees as they apply for resettlement, more broadly. The interviews looked for 
insights into refugee orientation, awareness and concerns about resettlement in EU member states. The 
focus was on different sets of refugees, their experiences of integration in Pakistan and on the practice 
of repatriation, as well as on their fears about deportation and registration and selection processes for 
resettlement. Source material reveals refugees’ intentions, aspirations and decisions for resettlement 
and consequent preparations. A volunteer Pashtun journalist was engaged in fieldwork research in 
Peshawar, not only to access “refugee villages”, but also for translation purposes. Names of 
respondents have been concealed in this report in order to protect their identities. With respect to 
placenames such as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), I have given the old name, rather than 
the new one, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
It is necessary to point out at the outset, that there was a great difficulty in getting access to the 
Afghan “refugee villages”, because of growing security concerns. It was almost impossible to interview 
female Afghan refugees who, at present, make up many of the refugees, as we shall shortly see. The 
figures mentioned in this report are, perforce, based on t he information available in the conducted 
interviews. They neither cover the entire spectrum of resettlement from Pakistan, nor the fuller 
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experience of the Afghan refugee community. This is especially true in relation to information about 
victimisation and “women at risk” because it proved difficult to record their voices and experiences.  
There are also problems concerning the “biases” in the collected source material. Individuals 
sometimes exaggerate experiences for reasons of resettlement and NGOs toned down criticism towards 
the Pakistani state authorities and the representatives of UNHCR. It also proved difficult to get access to 
the UNHCR representativs in Islamabad and Peshawar for security concerns. In one case, by using every 
means at my disposal, it took me one week to fulfil the bureaucratic requirements to satisfy the 
conditions for entering Islamabad’s security “red zone” to meet up with UNHCR representatives in the 
city’s heavily-guarded “diplomatic enclave”. Likewise it proved difficult to approach the members of the 
IOM and officials from Pakistan’s Interior and Foreign Affairs ministries, in part because of 
deteriorating security. Despite my repeated explanations about this project and its usefulness, many 
respondents were reluctant to contribute. Moreover, despite my constant efforts, I got no information 
from EU consulates, embassies and missions in Islamabad, because of the tight security checks in the 
capital’s “diplomatic enclave”, where the embassies are based.  
The fieldwork, then, was not straight forward. There were many problems ranging from security 
concerns in terms of access to female Afghan refugees to security issues in terms of survey and data 
collection. Moreover, to make matters worse, refugee headmen as well as the Pakistani authorities in 
the interior ministry were uncooperative and sceptical about the scope of the project. Before providing 
any information about the resettlement process, many respondents had to be convinced about the 
usefulness of this project. Some interviews were not easy despite repeated explanations. The UN has 
set up an office in Islamabad and a “f ield unit” in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, but even so 
approaching the members of the refugee community was not easy.  
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that with this kind of a limited time-frame and with such 
scarce resources a fuller understanding of the entire operation of resettlement in Pakistan cannot be 
grasped. There are also the difficulties arising from visiting remote refugee villages and from access to 
Afghan refugee women, the most vulnerable section of refugee populations in Pakistan and perhaps 
the most in need of resettlement. Most Afghan refugees are not educated. And despite the fact that an 
interpreter was present at all times difficulties concerning ethnic issues, gender taboos and languages 
barriers proved formidable. 
3. A Profile of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
Pakistan has hosted the world’s largest refugee populations. The issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is 
protracted: it has now been thirty years since the first arrived. Many of these refugees were actually born 
and raised in Pakistan, though they are still counted as Afghan citizens. They were allowed to work, to 
rent houses, travel and to attend schools in the country until the end of 2012, a deadline set for the 
Afghan refugees to return home. Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in three distinct phases. The first and 
most important phase began with the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the ensuing decade-long occupation of 
Afghanistan (1979–1989). Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the lives 
and conditions of refugees began to change. The refugees longed for a return to their country and they 
began to leave in large numbers. In fact, in six months, more than one million Afghan refugees returned 
to their country of origin. This mass repatriation was halted, however, when the various Mujahideen 
factions began to fight for power. Then, in the last decade there has been a war against terrorists. As of 
October 2012, up to 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan, and another 1 million 
undocumented Afghans. Annex 1 shows the number of the Afghan refugees in different parts of the 
country. Over the years, UNHCR has assisted Afghan refugees to return through its “Voluntary 
Repatriation Programme”. Since 2002, around 5.7 million Afghan refugees have gone back to 
Afghanistan or nearly a quarter of the country’s population. 
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4. Fieldwork Research Sites 
In Pakistan, there are about 160 Afghan refugee camps or “refugee villages”. The focus of this report 
is the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the cities of Peshawar and Islamabad and their 
surrounding areas where different sets of Afghans reside. The Peshawar site was chosen in order to 
understand the experience of Afghans in the city as well as in the refugee camps and villages outside 
the city. According to the 2005 C ensus, NWFP accounted for 61.6 percent (1.88 million) of all 
Afghans in Pakistan, and the Peshawar district was home to the largest single concentration of this 
population (20.1 percent). The most important camps include Khazna Camp, Haji Camp, and Lucky 
Marwat Camp in NWFP. The interviews with individual refugees and their spokesmen were 
conducted at these locations as wel l as UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation centre at Hayatabad in the 
city of Peshawar. They were chosen for fieldwork not only because of the large concentration of 
Afghan refugee, but also because of the refugees’ continued fears of forced deportation to Afghanistan 
and police harassment on a daily basis, as most Afghan Citizenship Cards expired in early 2010. Haji 
Camp in Peshawar houses a s mall population of Hazara Shia refugees who have faced constant 
discrimination and persecution from the Taliban and other anti-Shia groups over the years. These 
refugee groups cited particular concerns due to targeted attacks on them, including forced 
deportations, because of their Shia ethnic identity. 
Some semi-structured interviews were conducted in Nowshera’s Jalozai camp, which was set up in 
1983: over 100,000 refugees live there. Informants claimed that they faced Taliban persecution due to 
their ethnic or religious affiliations (e.g. Shias). More than 25,000 Afghan refugees live in Khazana 
Camp now one of the oldest camps in Peshawar, most are Pashtun Afghans who migrated from 
Afghanistan in the 1980s. Luckily Marwat Camp (refugee village) is one of the oldest and largest 
camps in NWFP: hundreds of thousands of Pashtun refugees live there. They have been living there 
over the last thirty years. Interviews with members of this group suggest that the community was not 
interested in returning to Afghanistan because their children were born and brought up in Pakistan. 
They have a relatively better quality of life as a result of establishing their own local businesses and 
agricultural trades. They also have access to housing, education and healthcare services, provided, for 
the most part, by UN and other international agencies.  
5. Pashtun Refugees in NWFP: A Vulnerable Community 
In 2010-11, a UNHCR survey gathered information about 50 percent of registered Afghans refugees: 
1.8 million live in Pakistan. The registered population living in Pakistan is 52.6 percent males and 47.4 
percent females. About 85 percent of Afghans are identified as Pashtuns, hailing from the Nangarhar, 
Kabul, Kunduz, Logar, Paktia, Kandahar and Baghlan areas, while the rest were Uzbeks and Tajiks. 
The survey provided information about refugees’ family histories, regions, tribes, sects, arrival period, 
as well as their social-economic circumstances and medical conditions. The survey also assessed the 
“genuine reasons” that prevented various sections of refugees from returning to their “homeland” in 
Afghanistan. One important group of Afghan refugees are the Pashtuns. They are not only identified 
as one of the most vulnerable sections of Afghan refugee populations, but they have been living here 
for more than thirty years and are still counted as Afghan citizens. Informants recounted that their 
houses had been destroyed and that their land had been occupied by members of rival tribes. If they 
returned home, their lives would be in danger. The members of this community claimed that they 
could be attacked upon repatriation. Members of this community stated that they wanted to go back, 
but that they had no place to live there; their land had been occupied by the locals and revenue records 
had been destroyed. Some informants stated that their relatives have resettled in some EU countries, 
particularly in Norway, under “family reunification”.  
All of the refugees interviewed in the camp were acutely aware of resettlement, while some 
respondents stated that they were not much interested in resettlement in Western countries. Their elders 
have opposed this option. In fact, they want to live with their tribal traditions and to preserve their culture 
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and values. They feel that they would not integrate in an EU country. Some respondents stated that they 
would prefer to go to a Muslim country, but there is no Muslim resettlement option. Moreover, members 
of Pashtun community cited that they wanted to settle in one place or in one country together. Aftab 
Khan, a spokesman of the Pashtun refugee populations in Lucky Marwar camp, described his 
community’s difficulties as far as resettlement in an EU country is concerned. “We do not want our 
women go in Western countries. I would not send my family to Europe….We can go to resettle in a 
Muslim country, but there is no opt ion for the resettlement. We may go to Muslim countries where 
women observer purda (veil)…..” There were many issues in this community, including “run-away 
couples” and “forced marriages”. There were reports that members of community had brutally killed 
their women who “run-away”. Many members of this community were involved in Taliban activities. 
The community has very strict traditions. For example, women cannot go outside the “refugee village” 
areas. Members of NGOs, human-rights organisations and charities stated that they have little or no 
access to Pashtun womenfolk. An assistant director of Pakistan Human Rights Commission even stated: 
“If they can kill their daughters for ‘running-away’; they could easily kill officials and journalists who 
would try to approach them”. Some young members of this community indicate their intention to resettle 
in the EU in search of a better way of life, as some acquaintances have settled there. Few though have 
submitted their applications for “family reunification”.  
In Pakistan, these Pashtun refugees have established their “refugee villages” on the private land of 
local people. The Pakistani government wants them to return to Afghanistan. There is mounting pressure 
on the government to evict this refugee community. The provincial government faced a great deal of 
pressure from local populations who want their land back. Over the years, there have been many clashes 
over the possession of land between locals and refugees and creating law and order problems in places. 
Children born and raised in Pakistan often consider themselves Pakistani. A young Pashtun refugee 
stated: “I was born in Lucky Marwat in Pakistan in 1982; I never visited Afghanistan. I am a 
Pakistani…but Pakistan wants to send us to Afghanistan…in Afghanistan we have no place to live…our 
elders are not much interested in resettling in the US…They are too concerned about our women”.  
Their first preference is to return back to Afghanistan and their land there. As earlier mentioned, 
their houses and property in Afghanistan have though been occupied or destroyed, and they, on the 
other hand, have set up housing on the land of local people in NWFP. This community want to settle 
en masse. Some of the Pashtun refugees interviewed in the Lucky Marwat camp expressed their 
intentions to resettle. Elder members of the community are against resettlement in the EU or in the US. 
An assessment officer of UNHCR’s resettlement programme noted that “our fieldwork workers have 
unsuccessfully attempted to convince the members of this community for resettlement. Elder members 
of the tribe are against resettlement in the Western countries”. She added that they firmly believe in 
Pashtun traditions. In the past, many members of this community were recruited by the Taliban, 
though now they are not involved. But they still face rigorous security checks both in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. In any case, if the Pakistan government forces them to leave the country– which seems 
likely in the present circumstances – the Pashtun who returned would be in real danger. Pakistan has 
issued Proof of Registration Cards (PoRs) to these Afghan refugees that expired 31 December 2012 
and the government has not yet decided to extend these cards. While the Pakistani government seems 
to be determined to deport these groups, a community headman described how they came to this 
country 30 years ago. He also set out how their houses and properties in Afghanistan had been 
destroyed or occupied by rival tribes and by the Taliban. Instead, they have established their houses 
and businesses in Pakistan, but they have not been given citizenship. Members of this group also 
claimed that some refugee families were selected for resettlement and “family reunification” in 
Europe, Australia, Canada and the US.  
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6. Somali and Iraqi Refugees 
It is worthwhile mentioning here little-studied refugee groups of Somalis and Iraqis who live in 
Pakistan. They altogether number several thousands. They live in very poor conditions and cannot 
move from one area to another. Despite my best efforts, I was not able to conduct an interview with 
members of these groups of refugees. A representative of the UN explained that “they could not be 
integrated locally in Pakistan. They are vulnerable people. The Pakistan government has confined 
these sections of refugees in designated areas”. 
7. Hazara Refugees: Facing Targeted Killings 
One of the most vulnerable Afghan refugee groups in Pakistan are the Hazara refugee families. Their 
number is about 500,000 in Pakistan, mainly in Quetta. The ethnic Hazara constituted about 18 percent 
of the Afghan population and they were massacred and expelled during the time of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan because they are Shia. In Pakistan, over the years they have faced “targeted killings” and 
persecution by Taliban and other anti-Shia groups, such as Lashkar-i-Jangvi. Hundreds of Hazara have 
been victimised in Quetta in recent years. Around 900 Hazars were reported to have been murdered, 
including women and children, either in suicide attacks or targeted shootings. More than 50,000 have 
been displaced internally. This community, as a whole, is in desperate need of protection and 
resettlement, as they cannot be repatriated to Afghanistan because of fear of persecution. In Pakistan 
this community is under attack from anti-Shia militant groups. This community is facing “ethnic 
cleansing”. Pakistan’s encampment policy and draconian measures to restrict the country’s refugees’ 
movements in the designated areas curtails opportunities for local assimilation and integration. Local 
integration appears not to be an envisaged or desirable solution for the government of Pakistan, which 
views Afghan refugees, as a b urden and has made clear that the only option it sees for them is 
repatriation. 31 December 2012 was announced as a deadline for the voluntary repatriation of Afghan 
refugees from Pakistan. Moreover, repatriation of some refugee groups has been unsuccessful, because 
of fears for the security of their families, personal persecution, fear of the cost of building houses and a 
lack of work opportunities upon their arrival in Afghanistan. There were several Afghan families in 
the Hayatabad Camp in Peshawar who were repatriated to Afghanistan but who then returned to the 
camp. A returned refugee recounted his family’s return to Peshawar and how he could find neither 
shelter nor livelihood in Afghanistan.  
Given the circumstances, resettlement is thus an important option for international protection as 
well as a durable solution for some sections of refugee groups in Pakistan, when other two durable 
solutions, repatriation and local integration, is not practical. In 2011, UNHCR named Pakistan 
“refugee top priority”. As mentioned above, the Pakistan government has threatened it will close 
registration for repatriation by 31 December 2012, making it c lear that it would treat all Afghan 
refugees as “illegal immigrants” after the expiry of their PoR. Of the three durable solutions, then, 
resettlement is apparently the only real option for some sections of the refugee population in Pakistan. 
However, owing to the very limited number of resettlements from Pakistan this opportunity is 
realistically just on offer for a fraction of the 1.8 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.  
The Resettlement Process in Pakistan 
Most Afghan refugees in Pakistan are unaware of the resettlement scheme. The interviews with 
individual refugees and the discussions with UNHCR members confirmed this. All the refugees who 
were interviewed in Khazan camps in Peshawar were not aware of the option of resettlement from 
Pakistan. The case was much the same in other camps, though some well-informed and educated 
young men in the Lucky Marwat camp were aware of resettlement as well as those individual refugees 
whose relatives and acquaintances had been selected for this process. In reality, UNHCR little 
advertises the opportunity of resettlement. Instead, the agency widely advertises repatriation to 
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Afghanistan, highlighting the deadline set by the Pakistan government. The UNHCR Resettlement 
officer in Islamabad claimed about 2000 refugees resettled in 2011 f rom the 1.8 million registered 
refugees in Pakistan.  
In Pakistan, the process of identification for individual refugees for the resettlement programme is 
complex. It requires detailed knowledge and documentation of Afghan refugee populations and of 
their specific needs and vulnerabilities. As it is an indirect and a complicated process, it requires the 
help of community headmen, members of NGOs and the local staff of UNHCR. As I  gathered, 
through observations, and interviews, selection for resettlement varies greatly and depends on 
individual case and situations. In some cases, the identification for refugees in need of resettlement 
comes down to community leaders, UN’s local officials and most importantly those doctors/medical 
officers who are involved in the treatment of refugee populations at the grassroots level. In other cases, 
when the local newspapers highlighted the danger to those journalists and interpreters who worked for 
the refugee community, some registrations were made for resettlement. In this way, about 4000 
individuals were registered for the resettlement process in the first half of 2012. While most refugees 
are referred by members of NGOs, local journalists and the local UN staff, the selection process for 
resettlement mainly depends on UNHCR’s Refugee Consideration Assessment (RCA). In this process 
the social and economic condition of refugees are considered, alongside their difficulties in local 
integration and refugees’ repatriation to Afghanistan. The following is a four-tier process and the 
Refugee Consideration Assessment is carried out by UNHCR:  
1. Refugee Identification 
As mentioned-above, refugee candidates for resettlement are generally picked out initially by 
members of NGOs, local journalists and UNHCR’s local staff. 
2. Refugee Registration 
After refugees in need for resettlement have been identified, their registration is made. After taking the 
life histories, arrival time, bio-data, and present circumstances of the refugees, three-way criteria of 
assessment are launched for resettlement consideration. 
3. Personal Refugee Wing Research  
This research wing assesses each individual case thoroughly. Apart from considering the social and 
economic condition of the refugees, this wing carefully notes whether the identification and 
registration processes fall under the actual definition of UNHCR resettlement: namely, that refugees 
cannot integrate locally or that they cannot be safely repatriated. UNHCR caseworkers then gather all 
the necessary information required for the investigation. After completing this process, this wing 
refers the selected cases on to the second stage of resettlement scrutiny, namely “the senior officer 
reassessment” (the UNHCR term).  
4. Senior Officer Reassessment 
The senior officer carefully reassesses the selected cases for resettlement, including refugees’ year of 
arrival and the bio-data of individual refugees. They then select refugees who are invited for interview to 
evaluate their eligibility for resettlement, mainly based on information collected. Refugees are 
interviewed based on t he extent to which they need protection and whether resettlement is the only 
option. Indeed, priority is given to vulnerable refugee groups, including trauma victims, unaccompanied 
children and above all the “women at risk” and medical emergencies. Once cases are considered to be 
qualified for resettlement and UNHCR has identified a potential country of resettlement, the refugees are 
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informed to which countries they have been recommended for the resettlement. At this stage, any case 
could be rejected, though registered refugees have a “right to appeal”.  
5. Right to Appeal 
Upon rejection, refugees can appeal by submitting additional proofs and documents for consideration, 
though this takes months. Resettlement from Pakistan is a p rotracted process. As mentioned 
previously, in 2011, out of 1.8 million registered refugees in Pakistan, 4000 were registered and only 
half of them were finally selected for resettlement. 
What Type of Refugees Register for Resettlement: “Women at Risk” 
The resettlement of refugees in Pakistan varies depending on circumstances and individuals. Some cases 
for registration for resettlement were taken where entire sections of a refugee community faced danger 
and experienced constant sexual harassment. In other cases, refugees were identified and some registered 
for the resettlement on medical grounds. Some members of refugee populations were considered for 
registration because their family members had been killed or because their lives were deemed in serious 
danger. Interviews with refugees and aid agencies working for refugees confirmed this. In addition, a 
number of Afghan refugee families were selected for resettlement as part of “family reunification” in 
Europe, Canada, Australia and the US. Some Pashtun informants reported seeking resettlement through 
family reunification in EU countries, especially Norway, Sweden, Germany and the UK. 
In Pakistan, some refugees are more vulnerable than others: these are naturally given priority in 
resettlement. According to UNHCR, in Pakistan over 38 percent of selected refugees for resettlement 
to the EU states related to “women at risk”. Interviews with UNHCR representatives, NGO members, 
local journalists and community headmen pointed out 15 types of “women at risk” (about 38 percent 
of all selection cases f or the resettlement from Pakistan to EU countries) who were chosen for 
resettlement in 2011.  
1. Husbands Disappeared/Killed 
In this case, women were chosen whose husbands or other adult members of family had either been 
killed during the war or personal feuds/disputes. As a co nsequence, there was, in fact, no other adult 
male in the kinfolk, but children/minors.  
2. Forced Marriages  
In some cases identification and registration of refugees are made when women’s husbands disappeared 
or when they were killed and their widows are afterward forced to marry other members of the tribe. In 
some cases, upon the death of adult males, their young daughters are forced into marriage.  
3. Domestic Violence 
In this case the selections for resettlement are made when women/wives received “repeated husband 
beating”. Sometimes husbands are addicted to heroin or to other drugs.  
4. Loss of Family Members  
In this case, registration for resettlement is generally made for those women/wives/daughters, whose 
close relatives/guardians were lost in Afghanistan during the war; and as a result they are left alone in 
Pakistan and have faced fear, abduction and sexual harassment.  
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5. “Shame Family” 
Some refugee families were found who sold their daughters for money; in other cases adult members 
of family sold their siblings in order to buy drugs. So these cases are registered for the resettlement for 
vulnerable members of these families.  
6. “Run-away Couples” 
In this case, selection/registration is considered for those girls/women who were forced to marry 
against the will of their family/tribe and who somehow managed to escape their family. As a result 
their lives remain in constant danger. In a few cases, some girls were threatened with forced marriages 
with older members of the tribes. 
7. Hazara Women 
Some Hazara refugee families, who are Shiites face threats; this includes a su bstantial segment of 
refugee women whose menfolk had been killed in sectarian violence over the years by Taliban and 
other anti-Shia groups. About 900 Hazaras in Quetta have been murdered in the past few years, mainly 
because of their ethnic identity. In some cases, registration for resettlement is made for vulnerable 
women who are left behind.  
8. Land Disputes/Feuds  
Some refugee families have seen their land, houses and property occupied in Afghanistan by members 
of powerful locals or military types. It is thought that there is no chance of taking back their occupied 
land. These families could not return to Afghanistan, because their property/land either had been 
occupied or destroyed. Members of these refugee families are registered. In cases of “blood feuds”, the 
selection for resettling this group mainly comes from the refugee families who had disputes over land 
and property. In this regard, menfolk had either been killed or are in prison. Women were left alone 
with their families and they faced constant threats to their lives and to those of their children. 
9. Journalists and Interpreters Facing Persecution 
In a few cases, some journalists who broke the stories of “forced marriages”, and “run-away couples” 
and other sensitive issues, are considered for resettlement. They receive regular threats to their lives, 
not only from refugee tribes/headmen but also, on occasion, from the Taliban. In a similar vein, some 
interpreters, who worked with different local and international agencies and NGOs, received threats 
and are identified for resettlement registration  
10. Members of NGOs Killed or Families in Danger 
Members of NGOs working in refugee camps and war fronts were either kidnapped/murdered; their 
families now left alone are in danger. Their cases are considered for resettlement registration.  
11. Unaccompanied Minors 
Selection can also be made for minors whose parents/guardians have been killed, or maimed. In some 
cases, minors face sexual harassment; in others cases, distant relatives used them for bonded labour 
and forced marriages.  
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12. Adult Males in Prisons 
Resettlement is also considered for refugee women where male members of refugee families are in 
prisons. In some cases, they might have committed crimes; in other cases, they were being punished 
for others’ crimes. They would commonly receive money from criminals; and spend time in prison for 
others’ crimes. 
13. Medical Cases 
Selection for resettlement is also considered for refugees on m edical grounds; if medical 
facilities/operations are not available at the local level. This could be “prolonged illnesses”; “treatment 
may change their life”; “significant impact on their life after treatment”.  
14. Violence/Torture 
In this case, registration can be made for women who feel constant danger to their lives. Women could 
be kidnapped, face physical beating, sexual harassment, and the fear of being sold. 
15. War Continued 
War is ongoing in Afghanistan. Some adult males from refugee families have been killed in the war. 
Others have been killed in personal feuds and sectarian violence. As a result only women are now left.  
Resettlement: A Time-consuming Process 
After completing Afghan refugees’ registration and selection for resettlement, it takes months – in 
some cases years – to move on to the next stages. Generally speaking, UNHCR in Pakistan has 
divided resettlement into three categories: 
1. Moral Cases: these should be finalised within 6 months but they typically take a couple of 
years; 
2. Urgent Cases: these should be finalised within 2 months but they typically take months or 
even a year; 
3. Emergency Cases: the cases which are identified as “s erious cases” requiring immediate 
protection needs or medical emergencies usually take one week or less. 
Most emergency cases are submitted for resettlement in Canada, as the country is known as the 
fastest country for resettlement. Emergency cases for resettlement to EU countries are mainly 
forwarded to the transit centre in Manila, the Philippines. If the selected members/families have had 
some involvement in the Taliban in the past, they require a further No Objection Certificate (NOC) 
and this prolongs the process by months. 
EU Countries’ Scrutiny of UNHCR Submissions 
After completing submissions for resettlement, UNHCR in Islamabad forwards the dossiers to its head 
office in Geneva, where the EU resettlement countries offer submissions for resettlement. They assess 
individual submissions in accordance with their policies, laws and regulations and decide whether or 
not to grant resettlement. They also determine the size and composition of refugee resettlement. 
However, the resettlement officer in the Islamabad UNHCR office notes that EU countries take a great 
deal of time. They not only thoroughly assess security concerns, but also integration prospects. In 
some cases, this takes a long time, in other cases they announce their decision punctually. A UNHCR 
representative claimed that “[the EU countries] take a long time for the decisions on certain sections of 
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Afghan refugee populations and that delay is a concern for us.” Some cases do require urgent 
resettlement decisions but response from the countries arrive too late. The individual EU countries, in 
fact, are too concerned about security issues, especially relating to some sections of Afghan refugees. 
Security checks are complicated, complex and lengthy. This not only requires clearance, namely a No 
Objection Certificate from Pakistan’s Foreign and Interior department. An EU country might also 
carry out its own screening. They can reject the cases on any grounds, for example, they might claim 
that relevant refugees are not really risking their lives. Some EU countries do not issue decisions until 
they have completed all security checks and medical examinations. Some cases take a great deal of 
time; while others are processed fast. UNHCR are not informed why some cases take so long. On 
receiving submissions from UNHCR, the EU countries carry out the following steps: 
1. Medical Checks: selected cases can be rejected on medical grounds. 
2. Security Checks: a “no objection certificate” (NOC) is required from the Pakistan 
government.  
3. Consideration: conditions of family/kinships connection in the resettlement countries.  
All resettlement countries have their own security checks; they assess the submitted dossiers in 
accordance with their own criteria. They can reject cases for any reason, but, if they reject a case, they 
do need to provide reasons for rejection to UNHCR. A resettlement officer in Islamabad expressed 
concerns about the criteria adopted by some individual EU states on the submitted dossiers. “We are 
unsure why some refugees’ decisions are processed speedily and they depart within a relatively short 
space of time, while others have to wait for months.” The different countries have various policies for 
resettlement. Canada has set up a local mission office in Islamabad, while Australia’s office for the 
Afghan resettlement is in Dubai. US officials are based out of New Delhi and visit Islamabad every 
three to six months. The US follow the security checks through IOM. While some individual EU 
countries accept UNHCR submissions, others ask for additional information about individual refugees 
or on some refugees. In some cases, they ask for the individual’s life histories, their age, arrival time, 
living place, and their actual name and tribal affiliations. UNHCR staff described how “on the ground, 
it is hard to find their proper addresses, as most move from place to place, locality to locality and from 
camp to camp. In many cases their age is guessed; by stating 20-30 years etc. They claim that 
resettlement countries do not fully understand the realities on the ground and they, on the other hand, 
dictate their own procedural processes”. The Afghan refugee cases for resettlement to EU states are 
generally forwarded through UNHCR head office in Geneva. In the context of resettlement for EU 
countries, most emergency cases are shifted to UNHCR’s transit site in Manila, the Philippines, where 
an “Emergency Transition Centre/Facilities” has been set up. 
Role of International Organization for Migration 
Upon receiving submissions from resettlement counties, IOM liaises between successful candidates 
and their resettlement countries. It also helps refugees in preparing travel documents and obtaining No 
Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interviews with IOM staff 
in Islamabad suggest that the protracted security checks for resettlement refugees consume significant 
time due to the current security situation in the country. Sometimes, the ministry returned filed cases 
back to IOM with some objections, asking for more details and clarification. Pashtun refugees usually 
experience a significantly longer waiting period for the security clearance because of previous Pashtun 
links with the Taliban. In addition to facilitating security checks, IOM arranges refugees’ pre-
departure arrangements and travel schedules. 
Role of the Pakistan Foreign and Interior Ministries 
After the selection process selected refugees must go through security checks, by gaining No Objection 
Certificates (NOC) from the Pakistani government. The NOC/security checks could relate to crimes 
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committed in the localities; courts litigations; and connections with the Taliban. To get an NOC is a very 
hard task. Here the role of local policemen is crucial. They investigate refugees’ characters and 
credentials; they verify their addresses, areas, and streets over the period they have lived in Pakistan as 
well as their arrival time. Tracing their residential histories are a difficult and a time-consuming process. 
Refugees move from one area to another; they live in tents and play-grounds. In this process, massive 
corruption is involved for security clearances; authorities’ decisions for “no” or “yes” can change a 
refugee’s life. A UNHCR representative stated that: “the lengthy process for the security checks is a 
concern for us and this process consumes unbelievable amounts of time. It should take 6 w eeks 
normally, but it takes far longer. Refugees move from one place to another; sometimes they have 
changed their places of residence twenty times over; and they have no proper addresses. In many cases 
they just say they “live near a given shop, or near a school, or near a playground’. Here it is almost 
impossible to trace all addressees where refugees have lived over the years If they are not on the police’s 
“wanted list” they could be issued an NOC in months, but in other cases the process takes a great deal of 
time. Some pay a bribe to the local police to speed up the process of getting an NOC. In obtaining an 
NOC, many refugees face sexually harassment, too. In cases of unaccompanied women, individual 
policemen not only take advantage of their vulnerability. There are also cases reported in which the 
police sexually abuse them. In cases of conversions to Christianity, the police created problems. After 
the long process of getting an NOC, if the resettlement countries find that any selected refugee is 
involved in fraud or crime or has had links with the Taliban in the past, the selections are dropped. 
Role of NGOs and Community Headmen 
UNHCR works closely with the Pakistani-based NGOs, such as Sharp (Society for Human Rights and 
Prisoners Aid) and SACH (Struggle for change), not only for the identifications and referrals of 
refugees in need of resettlement, but also for the legal issues and pre-departure processes. Sharp has 
set up offices in Peshawar and Quetta. This NGO n ot only assists UNHCR in legal issues and 
protection, it has been involved with the identification of refugees for resettlement. It also provides 
advice and legal aid for Afghan PoR Card Holders. SACH is a non-profit organization based in 
Islamabad/Rawalpindi working for the rehabilitation of victims of traumatic human rights abuses 
through a multidisciplinary approach that includes, inter alia, offering shelter, medical treatment, and 
psychological support to survivors of state, domestic and other kinds of abuse: especially to women 
and children. The organization is not only supporting refugee communities. It also focuses on Afghan 
refugee populations in Pakistan. For that matter SACH has been providing shelter services to refugees 
who have been approved for the United States Refugee Resettlement Program, but who are still 
awaiting departure. More importantly, it teaches refugees basic language skills and provides them with 
cultural orientation training that might help in resettlement countries.  
It is important to point out here that these NGOs have no role in the selection of refugees for 
resettlement. In the past, UNHCR was concerned about corruption and nepotism, so it now only gives 
tasks that involve legal issues, or submits applications, or organise workshops for culture awareness. 
While these NGOs are involved, to some extent, the identification of refugees in need of resettlement, 
they mainly provide medical, educational and legal support to both refugees and UNHCR. They 
sometimes identify individual refugees’ suffering and vulnerability to UNHCR, but such cases do not 
often register for resettlement. “I referred some Afghan refugees to UNHCR who were in real need for 
the resettlement as their lives were in danger”, Asif Ali, a member of SACH, informed me during the 
course of an interview in Peshawar, “but almost nine months have passed and they have not been 
contacted for the registration”. When this concern was raised with a UN spokesman in Islamabad, he 
reaffirmed “we do encourage NGOs to provide us assistance about what profile we are looking for. 
They recommend many cases on medical grounds and on vulnerability of some refugees, but medical 
reasons for resettlement are not the only criteria”. However, the spokesman admitted that UNHCR 
always sought support from both SACH and Sharp for the identification of refugees in need for 
resettlement, because they have a better local network. They work mainly on women rights, and 
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children’s wellbeing. Their members could go to areas where UNHCR staff cannot go, so in that sense 
they know better which sets of Afghan refugees are genuinely in need of resettlement. 
A member of SACH who works with Afghan refugees noted “our NGO has recommended 
hundreds of Afghan refugees for resettlement to UNHCR. It provided the names of the refugees whose 
lives are in danger and who deservedly need resettlement”. Sometime NGOs submit a wh ole 
section/tribal of refugees to UNHCR who will not go ba ck to Afghanistan and who the Pakistan 
government will not tolerate either. They have forwarded many unaccompanied minors/children and 
girls to UNHCR for resettlement whose lives have been in danger. A respondent stated “I personally 
recommended resettlement for a P ashtun family whose head worked as an  interpreter for an aid 
agency in the refugee village but who was killed by the Taliban, but as of recently the family has still 
not been contacted”. Rightly or wrongly, some informants believe that UNHCR is unfair in its criteria 
for registration and selection for resettlement.  
Conclusion 
The material here has shown that refugee resettlement from Pakistan is a complex issue that involves a 
series of drawn-out processes and checks. Such practices aim not only to make resettlement 
transparent, but to search out the most vulnerable refugees for resettlement. In actuality, most Afghan 
refugee populations were not aware of resettlement. UNHCR and other agencies do not advertise 
resettlement. Voluntary repatriation remains UNHCR’s preferred solution in Pakistan for most 
refugees, as elsewhere in the globe. The general feelings among the agency members was that the 
number of resettlements were too few to make it worth publicising given the 1.8 million documented 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Few agencies staff interviewed were aware of the modifications 
introduced by the Joint European Resettlement Programme (JERP) which was passed through the 
European Parliament in March 2012. 
Most registration cases for resettlement come through NGOs who work with refugee populations at 
the local level. Other cases for resettlement are referred on by doctors and journalists who are involved 
with refugees at the grassroots level. They only identify the cases though. UNHCR carries outs its own 
assessment for registration and selection for refugees in need of protection for resettlement, what has 
been described “Population Profiling and Verification Exercise”. The refugees who fall into the 
category of resettlement are described by the UNHCR as “Serious Protection Concerns”. The findings 
of this report have identified that some individual refugees or sections of refugee populations in 
Pakistan are more vulnerable than others. Other cases that are registered for the resettlement process 
include “family reunification” in resettlement countries. However, a g reat number of the Afghan 
refugee “women at risk” are registered for resettlement in Pakistan. 
On receiving submissions from UNHCR, some EU resettlement countries initiate their own 
scrutiny for resettlement. They take a si gnificant time in order to scrutinise security and medical 
factors and perhaps most difficult, a clearance (No Objection Certificate) from the Pakistan authorities 
begins. The NOC process starts with the local police station and passes on through different channels 
ends in the Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs and Interior departments. This long process involves issues of 
corruption and sexual harassment of the individual refugees.  
Recommendations 
Local and national publicity and awareness about resettlement option in Pakistan would provide a 
unique opportunity to refugees in need of resettlement, as most vulnerable refugees are sometimes the 
least visible and vocal. It would also provide a better understanding of the motives of resettlement for 
both the refugee populations as well as the public as a whole. There is, of course, the need to ensure 
that the most vulnerable individuals or sections of refugee populations who cannot be reached by 
UNHCR are still given opportunities for resettlement. For example, many ethnic Hazara refugees are 
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in need of resettlement, but they remain largely invisible and inaccessible. As the fieldwork interviews 
have revealed opportunities for resettlement are not usually made explicit, though some Afghan 
refugees were well aware that such options exist. Moreover, in order for a fuller understating of the 
resettlement operation in Pakistan, the voices and experiences of refugee “women at risk” need to be 
recorded. Women informants might be accessed through a f emale fieldwork assistant. One of the 
drawbacks of this research is that the voices of refugee “women at risk” are muted.  
In most cases the refugee populations have no direct access to UNHCR regarding the registration 
for the resettlement process. As we have noted, they are chiefly identified and referred for resettlement 
registration in-directly. In this in-direct process of identification individual refugees sometimes are 
exploited and, on other occasions, fraudulent claims come up. The presence of an EU mission in 
Pakistan, like some other resettlement countries, would not only further the entire operation of 
resettlement. It might speed up the resettlement process, as a whole. 
Moreover, there should be state-level arrangements for resettlement countries with the Pakistan 
government to expedite resettlement and security clearance (No Objection Certificate) from Pakistan’s 
Interior and Foreign Affairs departments. In the resettlement context for EU states, a separate set-up 
office concerning to the “security clearance” in Islamabad could further accelerate the procedural 
requirements for gaining an NOC. More monetary and human resources are required in this regard. 
UNHCR representatives in Islamabad noted limited financial resources and limited time allocated by 
resettlement countries. Indeed, there is a feeling that European countries should be more committed 
not only to supporting the agency financially, but also to assisting in human resource matters at 
grassroots level.  
Moreover, resettlement states should not only increase their number of resettlement places in 
Pakistan, given the presence of millions of refugees who need resettlement. Some Muslim countries 
might offer places, as so me conservative refugees in need of resettlement might be convincingly 
directed there. Finally, the EU resettlement countries ought to be more explicit in their criteria and 
scrutiny in their own selection process. There is bewilderment in Islamabad as to why decisions on 
some submissions are resolved immediately, while others have to wait months, if not years. 
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Annex 1. Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
 
Province 
Number of Refugees  
(in millions) 
NWFP 1.878 61.6 
Baluchistan 769 25.2 
Punjab 207 6.8 
Sindh 135 4.5 
Islamabad 045 1.5 
Azad Jammu & Kashmir 013 .4 
Total 3.047 100 
Source: UNHCR, 2007 
Annex 2. Ethnic breakdown of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
 
Pashtuns Tajiks Uzbeks Hazara Turkmen Balochi Others 
81.5% 7.3% 2.3% 1.3% 2.0% 1.7% 3.9% 
Source: Census of Afghans in Pakistan by the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions  





Security Livelihood Shelter Other 
Pakistan 3.1 17.8 18.2 57.2 3.7  
NWFP 3.1  13.9  13.0 67.0 3.0  
Non-NWFP 3.1 25.1 27.9 39.0 4.9 
Camp 2.3 18.1 12.5 64.3 2.9 
Non-camp  3.9 17.5 23.1 51.2 4.3 
Ethnicity 
Pashtun 3.2 18.2 18.2 56.9 3.5 
Non-Pashtun 2.6 15.7 18.3 58.7 4.7 
Source: UNHCR 2007  
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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 EU Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as w ell as t hematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
 
Results of the above activities are available for public consultation through the website of the project: 
http://www.know-reset.eu/  
 
For more information: 
 
KNOW RESET project – Migration Policy Centre 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 892 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 770 
Email: know-reset@eui.eu  
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Abstract 
As part of the KNOW RESET Project, this report looks at resettlement, from country of first asylum to 
the host countries, especially those in the EU. To do this, we performed an extensive literature search 
and a qualitative survey of the refugees from the Shousha camp, UNHCR and its partners in Tunisia. 
We conducted this study in Tunisia from 15 June to 15 October 2012, with refugees submitted for 
resettlement, as well as stakeholders in the Shousha camp, in Tunis and Zarzis.  
Given the complexity of the resettlement process, we have focused on the risks of non-compliance 
with refugees’ human rights and the possible consequences in terms of the ability of refugees to 
integrate into their host country. Also, we suggest solutions for better resettlement conditions. 
The analysis of the resettlement process reveals the limits of practices, at different levels: 
− The lack of adequate information circulation between the different actors in the process. 
− The highly-centralised role of UNHCR in the process. 
− The imbalance of burden-sharing among countries of resettlement. 
− The lack of harmonization of criteria among EU countries. 
− The disengagement of some countries from the Joint EU Resettlement Programme. 
− The gap between the selection criteria and the local and international contexts. 
− The insufficient management of the refugees’ waiting time. 
− The absence of a legislative framework for asylum and/or resettlement in Tunisia. 
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BID Best Interests Determination 
ETC Emergency Transit Center (in Romania/Slovakia) 
Ex-Libya Refugees or asylum seekers registered with UNHCR Libya 
MAF Medical Assessment Form 
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RSD Refugee Status Determination 
RFF Resettlement Registration Form 
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Introduction 
17 February, 2011, as a result of the civil war that broke out in Libya, thousands of people began 
arriving, asking for refuge at the Tunisian borders. The inhabitants of the South-Eastern region 
hosted the first arrivals with the help of the Tunisian authorities, who quickly implemented the first 
transit camp on t he Ras Jdir border, on 23 February 2011. Subsequently, they had to deal with a 
growing numbers of refugee flows, as an outpouring of international solidarity came in to take care 
of those fleeing from Libya. Thus, several camps were installed between February and May 2011, the 
main camps are: 
− The Shousha camp, installed 24 February, 2011 (UNHCR). 
− The Emirati camp in Ras Jdir, installed 13 March, 2011. 
− The “El Hayet” camp, installed 6 April, 2011 (IFRC). 
− The Remada Camp, 10 April, 2011 (UNHCR). 
− The Emirati camp, installed in Dhiba 13 April, 2011. 
− The Qatari camp, installed in Tataouine 23 April, 2011. 
− The “Save the children” camp, installed in Ras Jdir 9 May, 2011 (UNICEF). 
Receiving, control, health, housing and various social service operations were ensured by 
international organizations, UNHCR’s partners under its own coordination. Aid in different areas was 
carried out by countries: for example, as Morocco (installation of a military hospital) and Switzerland 
(support for repatriation and local integration). A temporary office was operational between April and 
September 2011 for Libyan refugees in urban areas. Then, by July 2011, only the Shoucha camp 
remained operational, grouping all operations, with over 3,700 refugees and asylum seekers. 
Therefore, as a special international recognition of Tunisia, the resettlement of refugees remaining 
in the camp, arose as the main durable solution after repatriation and the voluntary return of most of 
those who had fled. Given the commitment of 26 countries for a joint resettlement program1
We have formulated our study around two major questions:  
, this 
study looks at the practices of resettlement from Shousha camp to the European Union.  
1. According to what criteria are refugees chosen? And how many steps are carried out in 
selecting refugees for resettlement by UNHCR and by EU host countries? 
2. How can we evaluate the overall process of resettlement, particularly in terms of waiting time? 
To do this, we carried out a three-part survey: 
1. Comparative documentary research 
Official data collection from local authorities, media, NGOs, UNHCR and academic expertise. For 
this, we consulted the websites, newspaper articles and UNHCR editions. This research has enabled us 
to place the study in context, to define the various research tissues but also to note that the data 
provided by UNHCR is the main if not the only source of information for institutions and for the 
general public. This is the reason we stuck, in what follows, to statistics and internal documents from 
the national office of UNHCR Tunis and the external office Zarzis (cf. Annexes 1, 2, 4 and 5). 
 
                                                     
1 U.N., A/AC.96/1108, Progress report on resettlement, 4 July 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/503cce2e9.html 
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2. An institutional survey 
For an evaluation of the resettlement process by stakeholders at Shousha camp, namely: 
• UNHCR National Office in Tunis. 
• UNHCR Office in Zarzis. 
• The International Medical Corps (IMC present in Shousha). 
• The Danish Refugee Council (DRC present in Shousha). 
• The Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW present in Shousha). 
• The German Embassy in Tunis. 
• Civil society: the “Boats4people” (NGO), the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social 
Rights (NGO) and the World Social Forum (preparatory meeting of 12-18 July, held at 
Monastir, Tunisia). Civil society supports rejected asylum seekers and refugees for 
resettlement. 
We interviewed some officials and/or attended meetings and activities, as follows: 
• UNHCR Tunis: Interview with an officer (July 2012). 
• IMC: Recorded interviews with two doctors and one psychologist (August 2012). 
• IRW: Recorded interview with the head of the unit (August 2012). 
• DRC: Observation of cultural and educational activities (August 2012). 
• UNHCR Zarzis: Observation of work activities and interviews (August 2012) with:  
− The head of the office, 
− 3 officers. 
− The officer in charge of security, 
− The senior protection assistant, 
− The senior resettlement assistant. 
− German Embassy in Tunis: Interview with the officer in charge of refugees resettled 
in Germany (September 2012). 
In addition, we opted initially for the distribution of a questionnaire to the Tunisian authorities in 
charge of the refugees, but our questionnaire was not returned. Indeed, because of events in Tunisia 
during the investigation, it was difficult to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, the Ministry of Human Rights, and, indeed, the EU embassies. In view of the 
comparative documentary research and interviews conducted with stakeholders in Shousha camp, we 
have come to think that this failure will have no impact on this work, for two reasons: 
• Tunisian authorities and embassies use UNHCR statistics. Thus, information from them 
would essentially have repeated information we already have. 
• Because of national social emergencies, the refugee issue is now very much a seco ndary 
issue for Tunisian officials. At best, we would have received a political speech. 
3. A qualitative investigation 
With refugees in Shousha camp during the week of 27 August, 2012. This investigation focused on 
resettlement procedures, the evaluation of the process and waiting time. Semi-directive Interviews 
with individuals and with groups were recorded in the camp: 
• First group: 4 refugees submitted for resettlement, in waiting for a final decision by the 
receiving countries; 
• Second group: 4 refugees accepted for resettlement by the host countries, awaiting departure; 
508 KNOW RESET RR 2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS
Investigation in first asylum country - Tunisia / Shousha Camp 
• Third group: 2 refugees rejected for resettlement by the host countries. Resubmission in 
progress. 
It should be noted that we had initially planned a larger sample, on the basis of data from the 
exploratory survey, conducted from June to July 2012. However, the number of interviews was, 
naturally, dependent on the readiness of refugees to answer our questions.  
Moreover, due to clashes that took place in June 2012 between the inhabitants of the urban area of 
Ben Guerdane and refugees, the Shousha camp was under strict military authority. Therefore, we 
asked authorization from the Ministry of Defense, and on this occasion, an army officer at the camp 
voluntarily gave us an interview. This allowed us to identify further security and social problems 
related to the waiting time in the camp. 
Finally, it was possible to achieve the third part of the survey thanks to UNHCR. 
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FIRST PART : General Context 
I. Institutional Framework  
Tunisia is a signatory of the UN Geneva Convention of 1951, relative to the status of refugees, its 
1967 Protocol and the 1969 Convention of the OAU for Refugees in Africa. However, Tunisia had 
here its first large-scale humanitarian experience. For this reason, a national legal framework 
governing refugees and asylum seekers was lacking. Therefore, status determination fell to UNHCR, 
which is the only resource of information for refugees and asylum seekers in Tunisia.  
In this regard, discussions were initiated to enact, with urgency, a law that would ensure the 
protection of refugees rejected for resettlement by the host countries, for people outside the mandate of 
UNHCR and for the 21 Palestinians2 in the camp, who for political considerations have not been 
submitted for resettlement. In addition, UNHCR has been working to put in place interim solutions for 
the 2,739 Palestinian refugees registered with UNHCR in Libya: repatriation to Gaza; or integration in 
other Arab countries, by inviting these countries to cooperate more3
In addition, the NGOs involved in the management of Shousha camp operate under the aegis of 
UNHCR, namely: 
.  
− The Tunisian Red Crescent (TRC), whose role is to liaise between UNHCR and refugees and 
asylum seekers in urban areas. The TRC also provides protection and priority treatment for 
the folders of vulnerable persons. 
− The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) provides cultural and educational activities in the camp, 
preparatory actions for resettlement (information, language courses, learning the culture of 
the host country, preparing for interviews, help with refugee rights and help with 
administrative forms ... etc.). 
− The International Medical Corps (IMC) provides the care and psychological support needed 
for camp residents. 
− Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) provides logistics, sanitary and culinary help in the camp. 
− We interviewed representatives of these partners about their role in the resettlement process 
and the impact of the waiting time on the health of refugees. 
Other partners not present in the camp included: 
− International Organization for Migration (IOM), which handles the departure of refugees, 
and which also helps to manage the flows outside the UNHCR mandate. 
− International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
− International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). 
− Arab Institute for Human Rights. 
                                                     
2 UNHCR Registered Shousha, July, October 2012, annexes 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
3 Internal memo in March 2011.  
Note 1 “The Convention does not apply to refugees who fall under United Nations organizations other than UNHCR, such 
as Palestine refugees whose receive protection or assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), or refugees whose status equivalent to that of nationals in their host 
countries. ”,UNHCR, introductory Note, August 2007, In, Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Note 2 : « Palestinian who are not within UNRWA’s areas of operation fall within UNHCR’s mandate, per Article 1D, 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. See, further, UNHCR, Revised Note on the applicability of Article 
1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, Octobre 2009 », UNHCR, 
March 2011, In, Note to Arab League Solidarity Initiative for Palestinian Refugees Formely Residing in Libya. 
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The UNHCR budget in 2011 for refugee programme (Pillar 1) in Tunisia, amounted to 45,742,856 
US dollars4 against less than one million in 2010. The budget was revised to almost 35 million in 2012 
given the expenditure of 2011, and less than 25 million for 20135
II. Refugee Populations in Shousha Camp  
. Note here that voluntary returns to 
countries of origin were mainly financed by Switzerland. 
In the beginning of 2011, Tunisia opened its borders to nearly one million citizens coming from Libya 
escaping the war. The mixed migratory flows, composed of more than 660,000 Libyans6 and 220,000 
persons7
− Libyans living in host families and transit camps (90,000 people
 of thirty different nationalities, arrived in Tunisia led by Eritreans, Somalis and Sudanese. 
Most of them, including the Libyans, have returned to their countries of origin, after the relative calm 
now reigning in Libya. Following the upstream work conducted by the Tunisian authorities, UNHCR 
came to aid the Tunisian people and its government, with which it signed a cooperation agreement in 
June 2011 for three groups: 
8 between April and July 
2011 have found refuge, according to estimates from the Tunisian authorities, there remained 
about 60 families9
− Asylum seekers and refugees of other nationalities hosted in the transit camp waiting for 
durable solutions. 
 in April 2012). 
− Asylum seekers and refugees living in urban areas (220 people10 in July 2011; 276 people11 
in April 2012; 343 people12
The last two groups stood at more than 3,700 people in July 2011. Most fear a return to their 
country of origin, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. 323 people have been rejected for asylum for non-
compliance with Geneva Convention standards
 in September 2012, mainly from Côte d’Ivoire). 
13
Moreover, given the limited capacity of Tunisia and the refusal of refugees to settle in Tunisia, 
UNHCR has submitted almost all refugees who arrived, before 1 December 2011, for resettlement. So, 
3,697 individual folders were submitted between March 2011 and April 2012. 2,037 refugees were 




                                                     
4 UNHCR Global Report 2011, 
. The 1,660 unanswered submissions await a decision from the resettlement countries and 
the first departures began at the end of 2011.  
http://www.unhcr.org/4fc880ad0.html 
5 UNHCR Global Appeal 2012-2013, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec2310016.html 
6 UNHCR Tunisia Fact Sheet, April 2012, Annex 3. 
7 UNHCR Registered Shousha, July, October 2012, annexes 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 UNHCR Tunisia Fact Sheet, April 2012. 
10 UNHCR Registered Shousha, July, October 2012, annexes 1,2, 4 and 5. 
11 UNHCR Tunisia Fact Sheet, April 2012. 
12 UNHCR Tunisia Fact Sheet, September 2012. 
13 “The provisions of this Convention shall not applicable to persons to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
a) they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provisions about such crimes; 
b) they have committed a serious crime law outside the country of refuge prior to his admission as a refugee; 
c)  they have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”, Article1F, of the 
1951 Convention and Protocol relating to status of refugees. (Translated from French). 
14 Private sponsorships emanate from relatives of refugees living abroad (Canada, Switzerland, Italy and Poland). In 
September 2012, over 300 persons of concern departed thanks to private sponsorship or immigration programmes. 
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Taking into account responses received since April from the resettlement countries, this figure 
decreased, in September 2012, to 1,213 refugees waiting for an answer.  
Fearing a pull factor and in order to stop the flow of illegal migrants, UNHCR has not submitted 
the new refugees arriving from Libya after 1 December 2011, for resettlement. These number 131 
(See annexes 4 and 5). Other durable solutions have been proposed for these individuals, namely, 
local integration or voluntary return to countries of origin. The goal of the deterrent approach is to 
ensure the closure of the camp in June 2013. However, some exceptions have been granted to 25 
vulnerable persons (women and unaccompanied children, suffering people whose care can be 
provided for in the host country ... etc.) (See annexes 4 and 5). Thus, in September 2012, the number 
of submissions increased to 4,024 (including appeals), newcomers are now placed outside the camp, 
in the Zarzis youth center. 
However, UNHCR provides humanitarian support to illegal immigrants from third countries, such 
as: the 74 Somalis rescued by the Tunisian army in the Mediterranean 18 March, 2012 (installed in 
Shousha camp); or the 154 passengers of a boat coming from Libya (going to Italy) 10 September, 
2012, who were installed in the Zarzis youth center.  
In addition, the 281 people outside UNHCR mandate among the first arrivals continue to be 
sheltered in Shousha camp (see annexes 4 and 5). Their case i s discussed in the media and civil 
society, because of the precarious living conditions and the uncertain future of these people. For 
example, we now follow the evolution of a “sit-in” protest, organized in Shousha camp since 
September, by rejected asylum seekers and refugees definitively rejected for resettlement, whose 
claims mark the regularization of their status, the right to resettlement and the refusal of local 
integration. In the meantime, a number of these people work in construction and agricultural, because 
of low demand for Tunisians in these two sectors.  
In anticipation of these problems, UNHCR had from the beginning entered into negotiations with 
the Tunisian authorities in order to establish a national legal framework governing the asylum and 
refugee questions, as well as the facilitation of local integration. Palestinians are at the heart of these 
negotiations: on this subject UNHCR has been puzzled by the slowness of the government to respond. 
Among the last resettled groups during November 2012, there are nine new refugees (initially 
rejected for asylum) who received an exceptional submission resettlement to Portugal. 
Below a summary of statistics Shousha camp, provided by UNHCR (See annexes). 
Persons of concern - From Mars 30, 2012 to October 12, 2012 
 Asylum seekers Refugees Total 
30/03/12 164 2,860 3,024 
13/07/12 150 2,381 2,531 
24/08/12 141 2,178 2,319 
30/09/12 138 2,203 2,341 
12/10/12 122 1,868 1,990 
We distinguish in the camp, five categories of refugee candidates for resettlement: 
− The refugees waiting for a resettlement response from the host countries. 
− The refugees accepted for resettlement by the host countries, awaiting a departure date. 
− The refugees accepted for resettlement by the host countries, awaiting departure. 
− The refugees rejected for resettlement by the host countries, awaiting a r esponse after 
resubmission. 
− The refugees definitely rejected for resettlement by host countries, with a choice of two other 
durable solutions, voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, or local integration. 
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SECOND PART: Resettlement Process  
I. Resettlement as a Durable Solution  
UNHCR is engaged in a global process of refugee protection, inviting all signatories of the 1951 
Convention, its 1967 P rotocol and its international and regional instruments to burden share. In 
addition to the right to asylum, the process includes three durable complementary and non-hierarchical 
solutions15
− Voluntary repatriation. 
, namely: 
− Integration (in the country of first asylum). 
− Resettlement. 
In general, any refugee under the mandate of UNHCR has the right to international protection. 
However, resettlement is a l ast resort. Resettlement is only organised where repatriation and/or 
integration in countries of first asylum is impossible. Therefore, UNHCR chooses the appropriate 
durable solution for refugees, individually or in groups, according to the needs and concerns of 
refugees (not according to their wishes). 
It is furthermore stated in the UNHCR Handbook that resettlement, unlike repatriation, is not a right. 
It should never be an answer to a claim, or favor, or accorded out of pity or following an incident. 
It is also noted that acceptance for resettlement by UNHCR must be independent of quotas of 
resettlement countries, and questions of the integration potential of refugees. However, a f ew 
exceptions are tolerated in the absence of prospects for other durable solutions. To this end, admission 
procedures shall be laid down for resettlement by UNHCR, in order to ensure the transparency of the 
process, to limit subjectivity stakeholders and also to combat the possibility of corruption. 
1. Who is eligible for resettlement?  
Besides the basic considerations, the criteria for refugee admission for resettlement by UNHCR are the 
following16
− Refugees in need of legal and physical protection, 
: 
− Victims of violence and torture, 
− Refugees with medical needs, 
− Vulnerable women, 
− Refugees following family reunion, 
− Children and adolescents, 
− Elderly refugees, 
− Refugees without local integration prospects. 
2. Who is not eligible for resettlement?  
Excluded from international protection and, therefore, from resettlement, are refugee with threats 
hanging over them as described in Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, mentioned above. As such, the 
registration for the resettlement form (RRF) must contain the reasons for inclusion in international 
protection. Thus, the review of conformity with the exclusion clauses may, at any time, result in the 
                                                     
15 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 
16 Ibid. 
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revocation or even the cancellation of erroneous initial recognition, whether for refugee status or for 
admission to resettlement. This rigor imposed both by UNHCR and resettlement countries aims to 
avoid the abuse of the institution of asylum. However, as argued above, refugees from Shousha camp 
have, generally, had their applications for resettlement systematically accepted by UNHCR for 
submission to resettlement countries. The few refusals involved cases of crime, polygamy and 
unaccompanied minors, where other durable solutions were offered. Then there were also refugees 
rejected by potential host countries.  
II. Resettlement according to Stakeholders: the Period of Waiting. 
1. The Resettlement Process according to UNHCR:  
“Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a c ountry where they have 
sought protection in a third country which has accepted them as refugees and granted them the 
status of permanent residence. The status is granted protection against refoulement and provide the 
resettled refugee and his family or dependents access to civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals. It should also provide the opportunity to 
eventually become a naturalized citizen of the country of resettlement”17
UNHCR has the obligation to ensure the smooth running of the resettlement process, from the 
initial selection, until there is guarantee of citizenship rights in the country of resettlement. A 
commitment of this kind necessarily involves the establishment of a huge institutional and procedural 
machine around the world, which we c an characterize as “heavy” at times, because of the growing 
number of refugees. Indeed, the main path through which a dossier is submitted for resettlement, 
illustrates this fact:  
.  
 
Shousha                  Lebanon                        Switzerland                        Resettlement countries  
(Regional Resettlement Hub           (UNHCR Geneva 
Middle East and North Africa)         Resettlement Section) 
 
We presume that the centralization process not only slows the mechanism, but also causes a loss of 
information (qualitative) and, therefore, a potential failure to understand the reality on the ground. 
2. The Resettlement Process according to the UNHCR Tunis-Zarzis Team:  
At external offices in Tunis and Zarzis, officers and assistants refer to Chapter 7 of the UNHCR 
Resettlement Handbook of 201118, about the resettlement procedures, and to Chapter 5 in the same 
Handbook for the identification of needs, specific needs and the risks involved in resettlement19
 
. Upon 
arrival, refugees await initial identification (waiting time 1), after which, resettlement operations are 
implemented as follows:  
                                                     
17 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 20011, Chapter 1, page 2 
18 UNHCR, Basic procedures to follow in processing resettlement submissions, http://www.unhcr.org/3d464ee37.pdf, In, 
Resettlement Hand book, chapter 7, 4 July 2011.  
19 UNHCR, Protection considerations, and the identification of resettlement needs, http://www.unhcr.org/3d464e176.html, 
In, Resettlement Handbook, Chapter 5, 4 July 2011. 
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− Assessment of individual resettlement needs: case assessment and verification. 
− Preparation of a resettlement submission: Interviews and preparation of documentation 
(including BID, MAF) and a RRF. 
− UNHCR submission decision: routing of submissions. 
− Resettlement country decision: preparing for state selection missions, decisions and 
practices. 
− Post-decision: resubmissions and family unity.  
− Pre-departure arrangements and monitoring. 
According to the testimonies of officers and assistants to the resettlement and protection 
process, the systematic submission of refugee to resettlement has saved time. The initial 
identification took place simultaneously with the operation of eligibility for refugee status (RSD). 
To do this, a reinforcement team composed of several dozen international UNHCR officers helped 
the home team during 2011. This allowed the realisation of the first three stages of preparation for 
resettlement, approximately, in six months (waiting time 2). This was qualified as “exceptional” 
by our interviewees. 
Let us note here that the conduct of resettlement interviews is a crucial step. Everything said by the 
refugee must be transcribed and evaluated by the interview officer, in the forms in the resettlement 
file. Some complex cases are interviewed twice. 
The Resettlement Registration Form (RFF) traces the life of a refugee. This form is developed for 
all identified refugees. The BID (Best Interests Determination) is an additional form for minors, all of 
them having priority for resettlement. The MAF (Medical Assessment Form) is an additional form for 
serious medical cases, all of them having priority for resettlement. 
These forms contain confidential personal life stories, so we d id not have access rights. 
Nevertheless, a f ew RFF previews were entrusted to us. Here are marked the selection criteria 
mentioned above (vulnerability categories). 
After obtaining data, HUB’s submission for resettlement begins. This implies a r evision of the 
contents, then a cl assification of the files by resettlement countries, according to the criteria and 
preferences defined and communicated by them. These are, then, transmitted to the HUB of Lebanon, 
which, in turn, carries out the same operation again. We regret not being able to get information on 
this, because the regional HUB has had a n ew mission in Kenya since June 2012: the date of last 
submissions at Shousha. 
The refugees we interviewed said that they had no knowledge of the countries’ criteria and the 
reasons for resettlement refusal from some. Deductions, of course, could be made : for example, the 
rejection of opinion leaders by the USA ; the interest of other countries in single women and children ; 
indifference towards the elderly without family ; and the preference for francophones in Canada. 
Chapters about resettlement countries can be found in the 2011 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 
which gives some sense of the resettlement policies of various countries. However, this list is not 
exhaustive, and does not include Belgium, Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK. Out of 
26 resettlement countries, only 19 participated in the resettlement of refugees from Shousha camp20
Once submitted by UNHCR, the treatment of resettlement cases by countries of second asylum 
lasts up to a year. Generally, the time required by each country is divided into three phases: 
, 
among these Romania which hosts an emergency transit center (ETC). 
                                                     
20 Nine resettlement countries have not participated in the resettlement of refugees from Shousha, namely, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Iceland, New Zealand and Paraguay. 
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− The verification phase: Security investigations, content and profile selections are conducted 
for each individual file. Only the US communicate progress of its work to refugees. At the 
end of this phase, an appointment for an interview with an on site delegation will be given to 
each refugee. (waiting time 3). 
− The selection phase in the country of first asylum: Interviews are conducted individually 
with the coordination of UNHCR officers and the Tunisian Red Crescent. Most countries 
make their final decision a long time after the interviews. (waiting time 4). 
− The phase of preparation to departure and resettlement: A final decision will be given, 
well before the departure date is communicated. (waiting time 5). There is often an 
additional wait before departure (waiting time 6). 
Only Spain has reduced the overall waiting time, by giving the final decision immediately after 
interviews in June 2012, and by organizing the departure of refugees the following month. However, 
one of the refugees resettled in Spain reported to his friends in the camp, that the conditions of 
resettlement were not promising. 
In 2011, the first refugees who were rejected from resettlement had the privilege of being accepted 
by other countries, whose criteria are more adequate and/or whose quotas not yet exhausted. In 2012, 
all resubmissions were conducted systematically for the same country, according to the initial 
submission, so few cases have been reviewed and accepted. (waiting time 7).  
Moreover, all our interviewees agree in noting that the US is the country whose resettlement 
process is slowest. However, the US is the country that is the least demanding in the first submission, 
and which resettles the greatest number of refugees.  
Germany resettled 300 refugees in 2012, 202 from the Shousha camp – out of 240 submitted by 
UNHCR – and 100 Iraqi Christians arriving from Turkey, who have family ties in Germany. Germany 
also spends a large budget on the local integration of refugees, ranging from €600,000 to a million, to 
promote the financial independence of refugees. According to the relevant officer at the German 
Embassy priority is given to refugees with potential for integration, namely, for example, those aged 
18-35, high level executives (mostly Iraqi) and technicians (from Iraq, Sudan, Eritrea ...). But, 
Nigerian refugees were rejected because of questions over safety. These statements are confirmed by a 
UNHCR officer, who adds that European standards are certainly more selective: they are established 
by profile and special cases. We were also present at the departure of 195 refugees to Germany 3 
September 2012, who, according to the refugees resettled in Germany at the embassy, will be driven to 
a transit camp in southern Germany before final resettlement. This group will be followed by seven 
other people who need to be given medical treatment in Tunisia before their departure, including a 
pregnant woman, with two children. This group had been awaiting departure since May 2012. The 
German authorities needed five weeks to treat the records, after the submission of UNHCR. 
In addition, the role of the embassy is only to ensure coordination between the German migration 
authorities and UNHCR in Tunisia. Therefore, no accurate information on the selection criteria or the 
Joint European Union Resettlement Programme (JEURP) is available at the Embassy. 
The numbers of refugees are obviously falling, the result of progressive resettlement in host 
countries and repatriation. For example, at the time of writing this report, a UN HCR officer at 
Shousha camp told the media that most of the refugees in the camp will be resettled in the United 
States, Norway and Germany by the end of the year. This suggests that the number of refugees will 
decrease to 1,500 after the repatriation of most, especially Libyans, Egyptians and Bangladeshis.  
However, the pace of operations remains slow. Indeed, during our visit to Shousha Camp at the end 
of August 2012, there were 2,178 refugees against 2,381 in July 2012. We also heard of the departure of 
300 refugees to Germany, the USA and Canada between September and November 2012, which 
suggests an average of 150 departures per month, or approximately 7.5% of the number of refugees in 
2012. These are low numbers given the problems encountered in the camp, and the global waiting time. 
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3. The Resettlement Process According to Other Stakeholders: 
Other stakeholders in the Shousha camp gave us interviews and focused their answers on the 
management of waiting times of refugees in terms of health, safety, and services within the camp. 
− Health: General practitioners suggested that waiting should be shortened to avoid 
complications with health problems, whether prior to arrival at camp, or caused by 
conditions of community life in the asylum. A psychologist talked about reactive depression 
as the main psychological fallout directly related to the difficulty of waiting suffered by 
refugees. The results are mainly insomnia, eating disorders, anxiety, nervousness, social 
withdrawal and loss of interest. In addition, doctors are, of course, bound by professional 
secrecy. They communicate patient records to UNHCR according to predetermined codes, 
and they in no way interfere in the selection criteria of refugees. Their role is limited to 
monitoring, awareness and family planning.  
− Security, Protection and Services: The long stay of refugees in the camp necessarily causes 
security problems following intercommunity conflict : this was a problem according to the 
military officers present on t he ground. In addition, UNHCR protection is required to 
manage daily life, in addition to routine work, and sometimes dramatic humanitarian 
emergencies, which could have been avoided with prompt resettlement. Also, the unit 
manager of Islamic Relief, in charge of camp management, expressed his concerns about the 
future of refugees waiting, after the end of its mission in the Shousha camp. Indeed, a few 
weeks later, we learned through the media that a series of angry protests over refugees broke 
out, following the departure of Islamic Relief and the announcement by UNHCR of the 
closing of the camp, scheduled for 30 June, 2013. Since then, refugees have been left almost 
to their own devices with only weekly food rations. 
4. The Resettlement Process according to Refugees:  
− First group interviewed: four refugees submitted for resettlement, they are waiting for a final 
decision. 
Refugee Arrival country Country of origin Submission 
1 man Libya Somalia U.S.A. 
1 man Libya Eritrea Switzerland 
1 man Libya Ethiopia U.S.A. 
1 man Libya Ivory Coast Canada 
Refugees in this group have been waiting since February/April 2012 f or an answer from the 
respective countries of submission. The final decision may be admission to resettlement, so an 
appointment for interview will be fixed with a delegation of the relevant country and/or establishment 
of the necessary forms. In the case of non admission for resettlement, there is the possibility of appeal. 
Throughout the interview, refugees have continued to express their dissatisfaction with the harsh 
conditions of waiting, which seems sometimes to lack hope. Wardi, from Somalia, is one of the 700 
arrived in March 2011, after being picked up a t sea. Many of his friends, including his wife and 
children, died in attempting to emigrate to Italy. Then, he waited four months to submit for refugee 
status, that he got five months later in December 2011. He is still waiting for a response from the US, 
which he said, resettled much of the Somali group, then comes, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and 
finally Canada for some of them. 
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Camara, from Ivory Coast, arrived at the camp in July 2011. Camara was awarded refugee status 
after eight months, and has been submitted for resettlement in Canada since February 2012, after being 
rejected by the US. 
All the interviewees confirmed that they were not consulted in the choice of resettlement countries. 
However, they were not unhappy about the choice: the important thing for them was to leave the 
camp, not to return to their home country and to start a new life. 




Country of origin Submission Date of departure 
1man Libya Sudan Germany September 3, 2012 
1man Libya Eritrea U.S.A. Unknown 
1 woman Libya Somalia U.S.A. Unknown 
1 woman Libya Somalia U.S.A. Unknown 
Refugees from this group have been awaiting resettlement since January/June 2012. Although they 
have received a positive response, the waiting time seems to them hard, especially because of lack of 
information. Indeed, refugees claim right of access to information related to the progress of their cases 
and prospects of resettlement. They also want more support and assistance for preparation for 
interviews and forms, since according to them, some were rejected because of a language problem, or 
illiteracy. It should be noted here, that there is an information office in the camp for refugees, which 
opens once a week. However, this information point remains insufficient, given the large number of 
refugees in the camp. 
Thus, this lack of information is negative for the morale of refugees, especially as t hey have been 
waiting since February/March 2011. In fact, they had to wait from six months to a year to ask for 
resettlement and six months on average to receive the response of the resettlement countries. The departure 
date is generally eight months afterwards, for a later departure after one to three months. The longest delays 
are those for the U.S.A. Finally, women and children are the most affected by the long stay. 
− The third group interviewed: two refugees rejected for resettlement. Appeal in progress 
Refugee Arrival country Country of origin Submission 
1 man Libya Ethiopia Spain 
1 man Libya Sudan U.S.A. 
Both refugees interviewed are renewing their resettlement applications, for the same countries of 
initial submission. 
Both interviewees came from Libya before December 2011, exactly one year after they were 
rejected for resettlement, and since then they have sunk into state of total despair. 
Abdelmajid, an Ethiopian, has two wives, he had divorced one of them to be eligible for 
resettlement. He was, however, dismissed with his wife and three children, one of them an eighteen-
year-old girl. However, his ex-wife was resettled in Spain with a child. He says he does not know the 
reasons for his rejection, he feels completely lost and hopes to be picked up on resubmission. 
However, we suspect that he was dismissed because of his problematic past in Ethiopia, about which 
he refused to give details. 
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As for Taieb from Sudan, he thinks he failed the interview because of his psychological condition 
and his difficulty in understanding English. He claims not to know the exact reasons for his rejection 
and refuses to return to Sudan, where the war is still being fought. His wish, he says, is to live in a 
country of peace, freedom and security. 
In addition, both refugees talked a lot about difficult conditions of waiting in the camp and they 
regretted not having financial independence. 
General conclusions 
For better conditions of resettlement 
20 June 2011, UNHCR celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of World Refugee Day, under the theme 
“One refugee without hope is too many”, yet in reality we are very far from this ideal. Indeed, 
UNHCR evaluates that 800,000 refugees in the world need to be resettled, while there are not more 
than 80,000 places a year21. On the other hand, burden sharing is spread unevenly between the 27 EU 
Member States, since the EU received 5,000 refugees between 2011/2012 (4,700 in 2010), the vast 
majority are hosted by the USA, Canada and Australia. Despite the resources granted by the European 
Refugee Fund22
Given the various findings, we conclude with the following suggestions: 
, European countries are restrictive with regards to resettlement. 
1. Constitutionalizing the demand for asylum in countries of first asylum, 
2. Revising laws for refugees in both countries of first asylum and resettlement countries, 
3. Reducing the UNHCR resettlement process around the world, through decentralization 
approaches and/or a better division of labour between Geneva and Lebanon. The same for 
resettlement countries, 
4. Avoiding duplication between UNHCR and resettlement countries, 
5. Standardizing E.U. criteria, 
6. Harmonizing and shortening the process of resettlement in the EU, 
7. Working for a better diffusion of information for refugees, Also for a better flow, 
8. Increasing annual quotas, and per resettlement country in the EU, 
9. Minimizing subjective factors, 
10. Taking into account civil society work, 
11. Adapting the selection criteria to its historical context. 
 
                                                     
21 UN, A/AC.96/1108, Progress report on resettlement, 4 July 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/503cce2e9.html 
22 Amnesty International, press release, EU Must Boost Refugee Resettlement, Brussels, 28 March 2012, 
http://www.amnesty.eu/en/press-releases/asylum-and-migration/0556-0556/ 
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Annexes 
1. Persons of Concern of UNHCR in Shousha Camp – Demographics (Internal – External) – 
Source UNHCR Zarzis – 13/07/2012 
2. Population Statistics for Shousha Camp – Internal – Source UNHCR Zarzis – 13/07/2012 
3. UNHCR Tunisia Fact Sheet – September 2012 
4. Persons of Concern of UNHCR in Shousha Camp – Demographics (Internal – External) – 
Source UNHCR Zarzis – 12/10/2012 
5. Population Statistics for Shousha Camp – Internal – Source UNHCR Zarzis – 12/10/2012 
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Persons of Concern of UNHCR in Shousha Camp 
 












*:Registered with other UNHCR operation
**: Spouses of refugees or asylum seekers
F M F M F M F M F M F M
Sub Total 68 91 43 56 39 117 328 1 762 3 25 481 2 051





Chad 1 1 2 2 3 4 14
Côte d'Ivoire 13
DRC 2
Eritrea 8 10 2 2 1 3 25 246 2 4
Ethiopia 13 8 2 1 1 48 111
Gambia 2
India 1
Iraq 9 19 13 14 11 10 82 103 8
Liberia 1




Pakistan 1 1 1 4 5
Palestine 1 1 4 2 3 3 7
Senegal 1
Somalia 20 23 6 2 2 52 80 631 2
Sudan 15 28 18 33 20 40 73 617 1 11
Syrian Arab Republic 1 1
Sex and Age 0-4 5-11 12-17 18-59 60+ Total 
Female 68 43 39 328 3 481 19,0%
Male 91 56 117 1 762 25 2 051 81,0%
Total 159 99 156 2 090 28 2 532
5,3% 3,3% 5,2% 69,0% 0,9%
Avg. case size 1,4        Avg. case size excluding single person cases 3,7
Ethnic Origins
Hawiye 324          12,8% Number of families 1 853        
Zaghawa 313          12,4% Female-Headed 78             4,2%
Arab 240          9,5% Male-Headed 1 775        95,8%
Massalit 160          6,3%
Oromo 156          6,2% Religious Background
Tigrinya 152          6,0% Islam 2 312        91,3%
Shekhal 101          4,0% Christianity 224           8,8%
Tigre 76            3,0% Other 26             1,0%
Fur 72            2,8%
Dir 42            1,7% Specific Needs
Belin 39            1,5% Serious medical condition 271            10,7%
Ashraaf 38            1,5% Specific legal and physical protection needs 181            7,1%
Madiban 36            1,4% Torture 123            4,9%
Rahan-weyn 35            1,4% Unaccompanied or separated child 73              2,9%
Nuba 33            1,3% Disability 59              2,3%
Meidob 31            1,2% Woman at risk 51              2,0%
Dadjo 28            1,1% Family unity 41              1,6%
Sahow 26            1,0% Child at risk 14              0,6%
Berti 25            1,0% Older person at risk 15              0,6%
Tama 23            0,9% Single parent 9               0,4%
Darod 23            0,9% One individual can have more than one specific need
Rer-hamar 20            0,8%
None 18            0,7%
Ogaden 18            0,7%
Other 503          19,9%
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Total Active Registered persons of concern
2 020 2 019149






































































*:Registered with other UNHCR operation    RST Departures (*)
**: Spouses of refugees or asylum seekers UNHCR resettlement departures 1159
ETC Departures 150
Non-UNHCR resettlement departures 147
Total Departures 1456 * As recorder in Progres
New arrivals registered since 1st Dec. 2011 RST process (Refugees) RSD Process (asylum seekers)
294 Accepted by RST country 1 295   137     
131 Submitted to RST country 830      Pending appeal 2         
23 In HCR RST Process 1         11       
6






Dec-11 133 6 79 9 1
Jan-12 56 10 44 -                -             
Feb-12 -              11 75 -                2
Mar-12 -              5 99 -                -             
Apr-12 6(**) 5 274 1 1
May-12* 95 9 165 3 -             
Jun-12 1(***) 2 48 31 -             
Jul-12 4 1 53 1 -             
Week of 7 Jun - 13 Jul 3 -             33 -                -             
*13 persons are waiting clearance for registration (claim to be new arrivals)
** Reopening of 1 case of A/S in detention in Medenine
*** Reopening of 1 case of A/S 
Total 
Cases Persons Cases Cases Persons
Sudan 646 856 33,8% 607 792 39 64
Somalia 704 818 32,3% 637 747 67 71
Eritrea 251 303 12,0% 249 301 2 2
Iraq 77 269 10,6% 77 -             -             
Ethiopia 114 184 7,3% 113 1 1
Chad 18 27 1,1% 15 3 3
Palestine 8 21 0,8% 8 -             -             
Côte d'Ivoire 13 13 0,5% 10 3 3
Pakistan 3 12 0,5% 3 -             -             
Mali 6 6 0,2% 4 2 2
Morocco 1 5 0,2% -         1 1
Nigeria 2 3 0,1% 1 1 1
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 2 0,1% 1 1 1
Algeria 1 2 0,1% -         1 1
Gambia 2 2 0,1% 2 -             -             
Central African Republic 2 2 0,1% 2 -             -             
Syrian Arab Republic -             2 0,1% -         -             -             
Cameroon 1 1 0,0% 1 -             -             
Liberia 1 1 0,0% 1 -             -             
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -             1 0,0% -         -             -             
Senegal 1 1 0,0% 1 -             -             
India -             1 0,0% -         -             -             
Total 1 853 2 532 100,0% 1 732 121 150
Month of Arrival
févr-11 16               0,6% Ex-Libya Origins
mars-11 1 363          53,8% Iraq 177
avr-11 335             13,2% Sudan 124
mai-11 147             5,8% Eritrea 79
juin-11 86               3,4% Somalia 71
juil-11 86               3,4% Ethiopia 19
août-11 59               2,3% Palestine 10
sept-11 42               1,7% Chad 4
oct-11 124             4,9% 1
nov-11 20               0,8% Total 487             
déc-11 130             5,1%
janv-12 25               1,0%
févr-12 10               0,4%
mars-12 61               2,4%
avr-12 7                 0,3%
mai-12 19               0,8%
juin-12 2                 0,1%
juil-12 -                0,0%
Final rejection decisions - Breakdown by Nationality
Country of Origin % of Total 
Cases Persons
Chad 86 111            34,4% Not of Concern:
Sudan 62 69              21,4% Still residing in the camp 281              87,0%
Nigeria 36 41              12,7% Departed 42                13,0%
Côte d'Ivoire 30 30              9,3%
Ethiopia 14 18              5,6%
Mali 8 8                2,5%
Gambia 7 7                2,2%
Ghana 7 7                2,2%
Liberia 6 6                1,9%
Pakistan 3 5                1,5%
Bangladesh 3 3                0,9%
Others 16 18              5,6% Prepared by UNHCR Zarzis
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1 870 149
                   Population movement since 1st Dec. 2011
487
25
2 532 2 381
25
1
Pending 1st inst. decision
 - Including recognized refugees













Persons of concern to UNHCR
Persons of concern Persons Not of concern
2 532
2 020
-                  
Voluntary 
Repatriation
-                    
-                    
6




-                       
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
1
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  





-                 
2
-                    
17
-                       -                  4
19
524

























  1 refugee without hope is too many: visit www.unhcr.org  
Latest Developments 
- On 3 September, 195 refugees in the Shousha transit 
camp were resettled to Germany. The total number of 
refugees accepted to Germany is 201, but six had to 
postpone their departure for medical reasons. 
 
- On 10 September, a boat heading from Libya to Italy 
disembarked 154 passengers in Tunisia. The group was 
not transferred to the Shousha transit camp. Rather, 
100 arrivals opted to return home voluntarily with IOM 
and were transferred to a center in Tunis. 50 arrivals 
requested asylum and were transferred to a center in 
Zarzis. Four migrants who have not sought asylum are 
undecided about return and thus remain in a National 
Guard compound.   
 
- The Department of Homeland Security of the United 
States completed its fifth and final security ride to in-
terview 569 refugees for resettlement on 11 Septem-
ber. 561 refugees were pre-selected for resettlement. 
 
- UNHCR’s Representative met with the Vice President 
of Tunisia's Constituent Assembly to seek support for a 
reference to the right to asylum and respect for the no-
tion of non-refoulement in the new constitution.  
 
- UNHCR, IOM, ICMPD and the EU will participate with 
the Ministry of Interior in a joint assessment of Tuni-
sia’s border management capacity.  
 
Refugees submitted for resettlement 
 In response to the Libya crisis last year and on account of Tuni-
sia’s own revolution, UNHCR launched the Global Resettlement 
Solidarity Initiative.  
 By August 2012, UNHCR made 4,024 submissions (including re-
submissions) to resettlement countries on behalf of refugees reg-
istered in the Shousha transit camp before December 2011. 
Refugees registered after that date will not automatically be re-
ferred for resettlement to prevent a pull factor. 
 Resettlement countries have accepted 2,139 refugees submitted 
through UNHCR. 1,792 refugees have already departed (including 
150 to the ETC in Romania/Slovakia). 
 1,213 refugees await a final decision from a resettlement country. 
Other departures from Shousha Transit Camp 
 In addition to resettlement departures, over 300 persons of con-
cern departed for Canada, Switzerland, Italy and Poland thanks to 
private sponsorship or immigration programmes.  
Departures from Shousha Transit Camp (September 2012) 
Population of the 
Shousha Transit Camp 
September 2012 
Country of origin Refugees Asylum Seekers Total 
Sudan 678 55 733 
Somalia 647 64 711 
Eritrea 214 2 216 
Iraq 183 - 183 
Ethiopia 117 2 119 
Chad 23 3 26 
Palestine 21 - 21 
Côte d’Ivoire 10 3 13 
Others* 30 9 39 
Total refugees and 
asylum seekers 
1,923 136 2,061 
Migrants ex-Libya 280 
Total population in the transit camp   2,341 
 
* 14 different nationalities  
UNHCR Resettlement  
Submissions and Departures (persons) 
 
Country Submitted Departures 
Australia 150 110 
Belgium 27 25 
Canada 38 2 
Denmark 28 21 
Finland 30 21 
France 1 1 
Germany 290 195 
Ireland 27 24 
Netherlands 58 19 
Norway 582 476 
Portugal 28 23 
Spain 107 80 
Sweden 222 201 
Switzerland 2 0 
UK 10 2 
USA 2,424 396 
UNHCR Referral 4,024 1,596 
 Applications that are refused by one resettlement 
country can be resubmitted to another country. Final 
acceptance of refugees, however, is fully dependent 
on the decision of resettlement countries. 
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UNHCR Tunisia 
Tel : +216 71963383 / +216 71963367 
Fax :+21671963384 
Email: TUNTU@unhcr.org  
 
For further information, please contact: 
Shousha Transit Camp 
In response to the 2011 Libya crisis, UNHCR began reg-
istering and assisting non-Libyan asylum seekers and 
refugees of 22 nationalities in a transit camp (Shousha) 
near the border crossing of Ras Ajdir. UNHCR and its 
partners provide basic humanitarian assistance while 
also facilitating durable solutions for the transit camp 
population.  
 
Today, Shousha hosts 1,923 refugees and 136 asylum 
seekers. The majority of refugees in the transit camp 
will be accepted for resettlement. UNHCR nevertheless 
anticipates some 400 refugees will not be resettled and 
will thus be assisted to become self reliant outside the 
transit camp once it is closed. 
 
There are also 280 migrants in Shousha who were not 
recognised as refugees after a careful review of their 
asylum claims by UNHCR. IOM facilitates the voluntary 
return and reintegration of these individuals, who do not 
come under UNHCR’s mandate.  
 
 
UNHCR Tunisia Offices and Staffing 
UNHCR has two offices in Tunisia. The Country Office in 
Tunis also acts as a UNHCR Regional Technical Hub for 
UNHCR offices in North Africa 
 Country Office in Tunis: 
13 national staff, 5 international staff  
 Regional Technical Hub for North Africa in Tunis: 
6 international staff 
 Field Office in Zarzis:  
23 national staff, 10 international staff  
 
Budget 
 2012: USD 27.2 million (requirements) 




Collaboration and Partnerships 
Government Collaboration 
UNHCR is collaborating closely with the Ministries of Inte-
rior, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Women’s Affairs, Justice, 
Human Rights and Employment. 
 
Implementing Partners 
 Tunisian Red Crescent (CRT) 
 Danish Refugee Council (DRC) 
 Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) 
 International Medical Corps (IMC) 
 France Terre d’Asile (FTDA) 
 Arab Institute for Human Rights (IADH) 
 International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
  
UN Coordination 
UNHCR is a member of the UN Country Team and plays an  
active role in the UN’s Transition Strategy for Tunisia, as 
lead agency with IOM for emergency preparedness and re-
sponse.  
Objectives 
UNHCR Tunisia’s overall aim is to ensure a favourable 
protection environment through: 
1. Supporting the government to establish a national 
asylum law and system. 
2. Registering, documenting and counseling persons of 
concern. 
3. Undertaking refugee status determination. 
4. Targetting assistance to vulnerable refugees. 
5. Facilitating durable solutions for refugees. 
6. Promoting a constructive and sustainable engage-
ment from the authorities on international protection. 
7. Strengthening and collaborating with civil society. 
UNHCR Presence in Tunisia 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) started its operations in Tunisia upon request 
of the Tunisian Government in 1957 to assist several 
thousand Algerian refugees and established an Honorary 
Representation in 1963. Following the signing of the Co-
operation Agreement between the Government of Tuni-
sia and UNHCR on 18 June 2011, UNHCR’s first Repre-
sentative was appointed on 15 September 2011. 
Operational Background 
During the Libya crisis in 2011, UNHCR supported the 
generous relief effort of the Tunisian government and 
people for the hundreds of thousands of persons fleeing 
the violence in Libya. This emergency operation and Tu-
nisia’s post-revolutionary climate enabled UNHCR to en-
gage the newly elected Government and non-state ac-
tors to work towards a more favourable protection envi-
ronment for refugees and to explore the potential for a 
legal and institutional framework for asylum.  
 
National Legal Framework 
Tunisia is signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It has also 
ratified the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. A national legal 
framework for asylum has yet to be enacted but is cur-
rently under discussion with the authorities. For the time 
being, UNHCR remains the sole entity undertaking refu-
gee status determination. 
Urban Refugees 
In Tunis, there are 84 refugees and 259 asylum seekers 
(mainly from Côte d'Ivoire). UNHCR processes asylum 
claims and provides assistance to the most vulnerable 
among them. Resettlement is reserved for refugees fac-
ing an immediate physical protection risk in Tunisia. 
 
A few Libyan families who fled the conflict in 2011 still 
reside in urban and semi-urban areas where they have 
been generously accommodated by host communities, 
with some basic assistance from UNHCR.  
 
Groups of Syrians have also entered Tunisia recently, 
but have not yet approached UNHCR. A mapping of the 
Syrian population is thus underway with CRT to deter-
mine their protection needs.  
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*:Registered with other UNHCR operation
**: Spouses of refugees or asylum seekers
F M F M F M F M F M F M
Sub Total 49 75 29 36 25 97 211 1 450 2 18 316 1 676





Chad 1 1 2 2 3 3 13
Côte d'Ivoire 1 13
DRC 1 1 2 1 1
Eritrea 3 4 1 1 3 13 175 1 3




Iraq 7 12 8 9 7 5 49 70 4




Pakistan 2 1 2 3
Palestine 1 1 4 2 3 3 7
Senegal 1
Somalia 17 24 1 1 44 58 539 2
Sudan 9 28 15 22 12 26 52 541 1 9
Syrian Arab Republic 1 1
Sex and Age 0-4 5-11 12-17 18-59 60+ Total 
Female 49 28 26 211 2 316 15,9%
Male 75 36 96 1 451 18 1 676 84,1%
Total 124 64 122 1 662 20 1 992
6,2% 3,2% 6,1% 83,4% 1,0%
Avg. case size 1,3        Avg. case size excluding single person cases 3,8
Ethnic Origins
Hawiye 274          13,8% Number of families 1 534        
Zaghawa 263          13,2% Female-Headed 50              3,3%
Arab 159          8,0% Male-Headed 1 484         96,7%
Massalit 137          6,9%
Tigrinya 107          5,4% Religious Background
Oromo 98            4,9% Islam 1 825         91,6%
Shekhal 85            4,3% Christianity 156            7,8%
Fur 62            3,1% Other 11              0,6%
Tigre 47            2,4%
Dir 35            1,8% Specific Needs
Madiban 32            1,6% Serious medical condition 210            10,5%
Rahan-weyn 32            1,6% Specific legal and physical protection needs 141            7,1%
Ashraaf, Ashraf 28            1,4% Torture 99              5,0%
Meidob 27            1,4% Unaccompanied or separated child 67              3,4%
Nuba 26            1,3% Disability 46              2,3%
Belin 24            1,2% Family unity 33              1,7%
Dadjo 23            1,2% Woman at risk 33              1,7%
Berti 22            1,1% Older person at risk 13              0,7%
Tama 21            1,1% Child at risk 9                0,5%
Sahow 21            1,1% Single parent 5                0,3%
Darod 19            1,0% One individual can have more than one specific need
Ogaden 18            0,9%
None 13            0,7%
Rer-hamar 13            0,7%
Other 406          20,4%






































      Total Active Registered persons of concern
1 660 1 658121





































Population Statistics for Shousha Camp 
 










*:Registered with other UNHCR operation    RST Departures (*)
**: Spouses of refugees or asylum seekers UNHCR resettlement departures 1712
ETC Departures 150
Non-UNHCR resettlement departures 145
Total Departures 2007                   * As recorded in Progres
New arrivals registered since 1st Dec. 2011 RST process (Refugees)                                 RSD Process (asylum seekers)
310 Accepted by RST country 1 475   110     
156 Submitted to RST country 110          Pending appeal -      
25 12       
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Dec-11 133 6 79 9 1
Jan-12 56 10 44 -                -             
Feb-12 -              11 75 -                2
Mar-12 -              5 99 -                -             
Apr-12 6(**) 5 274 1 1
May-12* 95 9 163 3 -             
Jun-12 1(***) 2 48 31 -             
Jul-12 11 4 229 1 1
Aug-12 8 7 42 -                1
Sep-12 -              6 292 -                -             
Oct-12 -              3 38 -                -             
Week of 5 Oct - 12 Oct -              1 30 -                -             
*8 persons are waiting clearance for registration (claim to be new arrivals)
** Reopening of 1 case of A/S in detention in Medenine
*** Reopening of 1 case of A/S 
Cases Persons Cases Cases Persons
Sudan 562 715 35,9% 532 667 30 48
Somalia 601 686 34,4% 546 627 55 59
Eritrea 180 204 10,2% 179 203 1 1
Iraq 50 171 8,6% 50 171 -             -             
Ethiopia 81 117 5,9% 79 115 2 2
Chad 16 25 1,3% 14 23 2 2
Palestine 8 21 1,1% 8 21 -             -             
Côte d'Ivoire 14 14 0,7% 10 10 3 3
Pakistan 2 8 0,4% 2 8 -             -             
Mali 8 8 0,4% 6 6 2 2
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 6 0,3% 1 5 1 1
Central African Republic 2 2 0,1% 2 2 -             -             
Gambia 2 2 0,1% 2 2 -             -             
Algeria 1 2 0,1% -          1 1 1
Guinea 2 2 0,1% -          -      2 2
Syrian Arab Republic -             2 0,1% -          2 -             -             
Morocco -             2 0,1% -          2 -             -             
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -             1 0,1% -          -      -             -             
Nigeria 1 1 0,1% -          -      1 1
Senegal 1 1 0,1% 1 1 -             -             
Cameroon 1 1 0,1% 1 1 -             -             
India -             1 0,1% -          1 -             -             
Total 1 534 1 992 100,0% 1 433 100 122
Month of Arrival
févr-11 9                 0,5% Ex-Libya Origins
mars-11 1 074           53,9% Iraq 115
avr-11 265             13,3% Sudan 72
mai-11 112             5,6% Somalia 47
juin-11 48               2,4% Eritrea 45
juil-11 67               3,4% Ethiopia 14
août-11 41               2,1% Palestine 10
sept-11 24               1,2% D.Republic of the Congo 4
oct-11 81               4,1% 6
nov-11 16               0,8% Total 313
déc-11 123             6,2%
janv-12 22               1,1%
févr-12 9                 0,5%
mars-12 54               2,7%
avr-12 6                 0,3%
mai-12 16               0,8%
juin-12 6                 0,3%
juil-12 7                 0,4%
août-12 4                 0,2%
sept-12 8                 0,4%
Final rejection decisions - Breakdown by Nationality
Country of Origin % of Total 
Cases Persons
Chad 87 112             34,5% Not of Concern:
Sudan 62 69               21,2% Still residing in the camp 281              86,5%
Nigeria 36 41               12,6% Departed 44                13,5%
Côte d'Ivoire 30 30               9,2%
Ethiopia 14 18               5,5%
Mali 8 8                2,5%
Gambia 7 7                2,2%
Ghana 7 7                2,2%
Liberia 6 6                1,8%
Pakistan 3 5                1,5%
Bangladesh 3 3                0,9%
Others 17 19               5,8% Prepared by UNHCR Zarzis




-                    
17
14 -                  5
-                  
1
2




-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
File Closure  
103
20





-                  




Persons of concern to UNHCR













                   Population movement since 1st Dec. 2011
313
19
1 992 1 868
19
2
Pending 1st inst. decision
 - Including recognized refugees
         incl. referred to RST




Total Residents in the Camp
2 273
1 537 121
-                  
-                  
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% of Total 
Increases
122
 - Including finally rejected




Persons Not of concern to UNHCR (rejected asylum seekers)
-                  
-                  
-                  
1
-                  
1 868 2
-                  
-                  
-                  
-                  
Decreases
Country of Origin and Legal Status
-                        
-                  






-                        -                  
-                        -                  
12
-                        
5
-                        -                  4
-                  
-                  
-                  
1
-                  
-                  
-                  
531
